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Document 32011D0860

Sklep Sveta 2011/860/SZVP z dne 19. decembra 2011 o spremembah Sklepa 2010/800/SZVP o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Demokratični ljudski republiki Koreji

UL L 338, 21.12.2011, p. 56–60 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

Legal status of the document No longer in force, Date of end of validity: 22/04/2013; razveljavil 32013D0183

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2011/860/oj

21.12.2011   

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

L 338/56


SKLEP SVETA 2011/860/SZVP

z dne 19. decembra 2011

o spremembah Sklepa 2010/800/SZVP o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Demokratični ljudski republiki Koreji

SVET EVROPSKE UNIJE JE –

ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o Evropski uniji, zlasti člena 29 Pogodbe,

ob upoštevanju Sklepa Sveta 2010/800/SZVP z dne 22. decembra 2010 o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Demokratični ljudski republiki Koreji (1), zlasti členov 9(2) in 12(3) Sklepa,

ob upoštevanju naslednjega:

(1)

Svet je dne 22. decembra 2010 sprejel Sklep 2010/800/SZVP, s katerim so bili uvedeni omejevalni ukrepi proti Demokratični ljudski republiki Koreji.

(2)

Svet je podrobno pregledal sezname oseb in subjektov iz prilog II in III Sklepa 2010/800/SZVP, za katere se uporabljata člena 4(1)(b) in (c) ter 5(1)(b) in (c) navedenega sklepa.

(3)

Svet je sklenil, da bi bilo treba za osebe in subjekte iz prilog II in III Sklepa 2010/800/SZVP še naprej uporabljati posebne omejevalne ukrepe, določene v navedenem sklepu.

(4)

Svet je tudi sklenil, da bi bilo treba spremeniti podatke o subjektu iz Priloge II Sklepa 2010/800/SZVP.

(5)

Nadalje je Svet sklenil, da bi bilo treba na seznam oseb, za katere veljajo omejevalni ukrepi iz prilog II in IV Sklepa 2010/800/SZVP, uvrstiti dodatne osebe in subjekte.

(6)

Zato bi bilo treba sezname oseb in subjektov iz prilog II in III Sklepa 2010/800/SZVP temu ustrezno posodobiti –

SPREJEL NASLEDNJI SKLEP:

Člen 1

Prilogi II in III Sklepa 2010/800/SZVP se spremenita, kot je določeno v Prilogi k temu sklepu.

Člen 2

Ta sklep začne veljati na dan sprejetja.

V Bruslju, 19. decembra 2011

Za Svet

Predsednik

M. KOROLEC


(1)  UL L 341, 23.12.2010, str. 32.


ANNEX

Decision 2010/800/CFSP shall be amended as follows:

(1)

Annex II shall be amended as follows:

(a)

The following persons shall be added to point (A) and the following entities shall be added to point (B):

A.   List of persons referred to in Articles 4(1)(b) and 5(1)(b)

 

Name

(and possible aliases)

Identifying information

Reasons

1.

Lieutenant General Kim Yong Chol

(alias: Kim Yong-Chol; Kim Young-Chol; Kim Young-Cheol; Kim Young-Chul)

DOB: 1946

Location: Pyongan-Pukto, North Korea

Kim Yong Chol is the commander of Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).

2.

Pak To-Chun

DBO: March 9th 1944

POB: Jagang, Rangrim

Member of the National Security Council.

He is in charge of the arms industry. It is reported that he commands the office for nuclear energy. This institution is decisive for DPRK’s nuclear and rocket launcher program.

B.   List of entities referred to in Article 5(1)(b)

 

Name

(and possible aliases)

Identifying information

Reasons

1.

Hesong Trading Corporation

Pyongyang, DPRK

Controlled by Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) (designated by UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons.

Involved in supplies with potential use in ballistic missile program.

2.

Tosong Technology Trading Corporation

Pyongyang, DPRK

Controlled by Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID) (designated by UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons

3.

Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation

Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country's military-related sales

4.

Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company

(alias Choson International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; Chosun International Chemicals Joint Operation Company; International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation)

Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province, DPRK; Man gyongdae-kuyok, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK

Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country's military-related sales

5.

Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation

Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country's military-related sales

6.

Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation

(a.k.a.: Chosun Yunha Machinery Joint Operation Company; Korea Ryenha Machinery J/V Corporation; Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation)

Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangungdae-gu, Pyongyang, DPRK; Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPRK

Controlled by Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009): defence conglomerate specialising in acquisition for DPRK defence industries and support to that country’s military-related sales

Production sites have been modernized lately and are partly intended for processing materials relevant to nuclear production.

7.

Munitions Industry Department

(a.k.a.: Military Supplies Industry Department)

Pyongyang, DPRK

Responsible for overseeing activities of North Korea’s military industries, including the Second Economic Committee (SEC) and KOMID. This includes overseeing the development of North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programmes.

Until recently, it was headed by Jon Pyong Ho. Information suggests former Minitions Industry Department (MID) first vice director Chu Kyu-ch’ang (Ju Gyu-chang) is now director of the MID, which is publicly referred to as the Machine Building Industry Department. Chu served as the overall supervisor for North Korea’s missile development, including oversight of the April 5, 2009 Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) missile launch and the failed July 2006 TD-2 launch.

8.

Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB)

(a.k.a.: Chongch’al Ch’ongguk; RGB; KPA Unit 586)

Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang, North Korea; Nungrado, Pyongyang, North Korea.

The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) is North Korea’s premiere intelligence organization, created in early 2009 by the merger of existing intelligence organizations from the Korean Workers’ Party, the Operations Department and Office 35, and the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Korean People’s Army. It falls under direct command of the Ministry of Defence and is primarily in charge of gathering military intelligence. RGB trades in conventional arms and controls the EU-designated North Korean conventional arms firm Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine).

(b)

In point (B), the entry for Green Pine Associated Corporation shall be replaced by the following:

 

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

1.

Green Pine Associated Corporation (alias: Chongsong Yonhap; Ch’o’ngsong Yo’nhap; Saengpil Associated Company; General Precious Metal Complex (GPM); Myong Dae Company; Twin Dragon Trading (TDT))

c/o Reconnaissance General Bureau Headquarters, Hyongjesan-Guyok, Pyongyang/Nungrado, Pyongyang

Ch’o’ngsong Yo’nhap has been identified for sanctions for exporting arms or related material from North Korea. Green Pine specializes in the production of maritime military craft and armaments, such as submarines, military boats and missile systems, and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defence-related firms. Green Pine is responsible for approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by North Korea and has taken over many of the activities of KOMID after its designation by the UNSC.

(2)

In Annex III, the following persons shall be added to point (A) and the following entities shall be added to point (B):

A.   List of persons referred to in Articles 4(1)(c) and 5(1)(c)

 

Name

(and possible aliases)

Identifying information

Reasons

1.

Kim Tong-Myo'ng

(a.k.a.: Kim Chin-so'k)

DOB: 1964, Nationality: North Korean.

Kim Tong-Myo'ng acts on behalf of Tanchon Commercial Bank (designated by the 1718 Committee in April 2009).

Kim Dong Myong has held various positions within Tanchon since at least 2002 and is currently Tanchon's president. He has also played a role in managing Amroggang's affairs (owned or controlled by Tanchon Commercial Bank) using the alias Kim Chin-so'k.

B.   List of entities referred to in Article 5(1)(c)

 

Name

(and possible aliases)

Identifying information

Reasons

1.

Korea Kwangson Banking Corp. (KKBC)

(a.k.a.: Korea Kwangson Banking Corp; KKBC)

Jungson-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, DPRK

A subordinate acting on behalf of or at the direction of, owned or controlled by the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (designated by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009).

Provides financial services in support of both Tanchon Commercial Bank (designated by UNSCR1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009) and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation (designated by UNSCR1718 Sanctions Committee in July 2009).

Since 2008, Tanchon has been utilizing KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) (designated by UNSCR1718 Sanctions Committee in April 2009) related funds from Burma to China in 2009.

Additionally, Hyoksin, which the UN described as being involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction, sought to use KKBC in connection with a purchase of dual-use equipment in 2008. KKBC has at least one overseas branch in Dandong, China.

2.

Amroggang Development Banking Corporation

(a.k.a.: Amroggang Development Bank; Amnokkang Development Bank)

Tongan-dong, Pyongyang, DPRK

Owned or controlled by Tanchon Commercial Bank (designated by the 1718 Committee in April 2009). Established in 2006, Amroggang is managed by Tanchon officials. Tanchon plays a role in financing KOMID’s (designated by the 1718 Committee in April 2009) sales of ballistic missiles and has also been involved in ballistic missile transactions from KOMID to Iran’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG).

3.

Bank of East Land

(a.k.a.: Dongbang Bank; Tongbang U’nhaeng; Tongbang Bank)

PO Box 32, BEL Building, Jonseung-Dung, Moranbong District, Pyongyang, North Korea

North Korean financial institution Bank of East Land (aka Dongbang Bank) facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, designated arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation (Green Pine). Bank of East Land has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions.

In 2007 and 2008, Bank of East Land facilitated transactions involving Green Pine and designated Iranian financial institutions, including Bank Melli and Bank Sepah. Bank of East Land has also facilitated financial transactions for the benefit of North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau’s (RGB) weapons program.

4.

Office 39 of The Korean Workers’ Party

(a.k.a.: Office #39; Office No. 39; Bureau 39; Central Committee; Third Floor Division 39.)

Second KWP Government Building (Korean: Ch’o’ngsa), Chungso’ng, Urban Tower (Korean’Dong), Chung Ward, Pyongyang, North Korea; Chung-Guyok (Central District), Sosong Street, Kyongrim-Dong, Pyongyang, North Korea; Changgwang Street, Pyongyang, North Korea.

Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party engages in illicit economic activity to support the North Korean government. It has branches throughout the nation that raise and manage funds and is responsible for earning foreign currency for North Korea’s Korean Workers’ Party senior leadership through illicit activities such as narcotics trafficking. Office 39 controls a number of entities inside North Korea and abroad through which it conducts numerous illicit activities including the production, smuggling, and distribution of narcotics. Office 39 has also been involved in the attempted procurement and transfer to North Korea of luxury goods.

Office 39 figures among the most important organisations assigned with currency and merchandise acquisition. It is said to be directly under the command of KIM Jong-il.

It controls several trading companies some of which are active in illicit activites, among them Daesong General Bureau, part of Daesong group, the largest company group of the country. Office 39 according to some sources entertains representation office in Rome, Beijing, Bangkok, Singapore, Hongkong and Dubai. To the outside office 39 changes name and appearance regularly. Director of office 39, JON il-chun is already listed on the EU sanction list.

Office 39 produced methamphetamine in Sangwon, South Pyongan Province and was also involved in the distribution of methamphetamine to small-scale North Korean smugglers for distribution through China and South Korea. Office 39 also operates poppy farms in North Hamkyo’ng Province and North Pyongan Province and produces opium and heroin in Hamhu’ng and Nachin.

In 2009, Office 39 was involved in the failed attempt to purchase and export to North Korea – through China – two Italian-made luxury yachts worth more than $15 million. Halted by Italian authorities, the attempted export of the yachts destined for Kim Jong-il was in violation of United Nations sanctions against North Korea under UNSCR 1718, which specifically require Member States to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of luxury goods to North Korea.

Office 39 previously used Banco Delta Asia to launder illicit proceeds. Banco Delta Asia was identified by the Treasury Department in September 2005 as a ‘primary money laundering concern’ under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act because it represented an unacceptable risk of money laundering and other financial crimes.


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