(1)

In view, in particular, of its strategic dimension, regional and global coverage and multiple usage, the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) constitutes sensitive infrastructure the deployment and usage of which are susceptible to affect the security of the Union and its Member States.

(2)

Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union and where the operation of the GNSS could affect the security of the Union or its Member States, or in the event of a threat to the operation of the GNSS, the Council should decide on the necessary measures to be taken.

(3)

For this reason, the Council adopted Decision 2014/496/CFSP (1).

(4)

Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) establishes the Union Space Programme (the ‘Programme’) and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (the ‘Agency’). Article 3 thereof provides that the Programme consists of five components: a global navigation satellite system (Galileo); a regional satellite navigation system (EGNOS); an Earth observation system (Copernicus); a space surveillance and tracking system complemented by observational parameters related to space weather and near-Earth objects (‘space situational awareness’); and a satellite communications service (GOVSATCOM).

(5)

Space technology, data and services have become indispensable to the daily lives of Europeans and play an essential role in preserving many strategic interests of the Union and its Member States. In addition, space-related systems and services themselves are potential targets for security threats.

(6)

A range of potential threats to the security and the essential interests of the Union and of its Member States could arise from the deployment, operation and use of each of the components of the Programme. It is therefore appropriate to extend the scope of Decision 2014/496/CFSP to the systems and services set up under those components that have been determined as security-sensitive by the security configuration of the committee established under Article 107(1)(e) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 and taking into account the differences between the components of the Programme, in particular as regards Member States’ authority and control over sensors, systems or other capacities relevant to the Programme.

(7)

Lessons have been drawn from the experience acquired in implementing Decision 2014/496/CFSP in recent years. The operational procedure foreseen in Decision 2014/496/CFSP should therefore be adapted accordingly.

(8)

Information and expertise concerning whether an event related to a space-related system or service constitutes a threat to the Union, to the Member States or to the space-related systems and services should be provided to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) by the Agency or by the relevant structure designated, where appropriate, to monitor the security of a system set up, or a service provided, under a component of the Programme pursuant to Article 34(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 (‘appointed security monitoring structure’), or by Member States or by the European Commission. In addition, third States may also provide such information.

(9)

The respective roles of the Council, the High Representative, the Agency, any appointed security monitoring structure and the Member States should be clarified within the chain of operational responsibilities to be set up in order to react to a threat to the Union, to the Member States or to any of the systems and services set up under the Programme.

(10)

Article 28 of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 establishes that the Commission has overall responsibility for the implementation of the Programme, including in the field of security. This Decision should define the responsibilities of the Council and of the High Representative to avert threats arising from the deployment, operation and use of space-related systems and services, or in the event of a threat to those systems or services.

(11)

In this regard, the basic references to threats are contained in the System-specific Security Requirement Statements which contain the main generic threats to be addressed by each component of the Programme, and the respective System Security Plans which include the security risk registers set up in the security accreditation processes for each component. Those basic references will serve as references to identify the threats specifically to be dealt with by this Decision and to complete the operational procedures for the implementation of this Decision.

(12)

In urgent cases, decisions may have to be taken within a few hours of receipt of information concerning a threat. If the circumstances do not allow for the Council to take a decision in order to avert a threat or to mitigate serious harm to the essential interests of the Union or of one or more of its Member States, or in the event of a threat to the space-related systems or services, the High Representative should be empowered to issue the necessary provisional instructions. In such circumstances, the Council should be informed immediately and review the provisional instructions as soon as possible.

(13)

In accordance with Article 34(5)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696, the Agency, within its area of responsibility, should ensure the operation of the Galileo Security Monitoring Centre (GSMC) in accordance with the requirements referred to in paragraph 2 of that Article and the instructions developed under the scope of this Decision. In accordance with Article 79(1)(j) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696, the Agency’s Executive Director should ensure that the Agency, as the operator of the GSMC, is able to respond to instructions provided under this Decision.

(14)

The relevant appointed security monitoring structures should operate in accordance with the security requirements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/696 and with the instructions developed under this Decision.

(15)

In addition, Decision No 1104/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) lays down the rules under which the Member States, the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service, Union agencies, third States and international organisations may access the public regulated service provided by the global navigation satellite system established under the Galileo programme. In particular, Article 6 of Decision No 1104/2011/EU states that the GSMC provides the operational interface between the competent public regulated service authorities, the Council and the High Representative and the control centres,