1.

Do Articles 63, 64 and 66 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax (1) preclude an administrative practice of a tax authority — such as the one in the present case, which imposed additional payment obligations on the taxable person, a professional limited liability company (SPRL) through which administrators of insolvency proceedings may exercise their profession — consisting in defining the chargeable event and the chargeability as being at the time at which the services were provided in the context of insolvency proceedings, where the insolvency administrator’s fee was determined by the insolvency court or the assembly of creditors, with the result that the taxable person is obliged to issue invoices no later than the fifteenth day of the month following the month in which the chargeable event occurred?

2.

Do Articles 63, 64 and 66 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax preclude an administrative practice of a tax authority, such as the one in the present case, consisting in imposing additional payment obligations on the taxable person — a professional limited liability company (SPRL) through which administrators of insolvency proceedings may exercise their profession — in so far as that taxable person issued invoices and collected VAT only on the date on which payments were received for services provided in the context of insolvency proceedings, even though the general assembly of creditors established that the payment of the insolvency administrator’s fee is subject to the availability of liquid assets in the debtors’ accounts?

3.

In the case of a co-branding agreement between a law firm and the taxable person, is it sufficient, for the purpose of granting the right to deduct, that the taxable person, when proving the existence of a direct and immediate link between the purchases made by the upstream taxable person and the downstream transactions, demonstrate, after the agreement, an increase in the turnover/value of the taxable transactions, without further supporting documentation? If so, what are the criteria to be taken into account in order to determine the actual scope of the right to deduct?

4.

Is the general EU-law principle of respect for the rights of the defence to be interpreted as meaning that, where, in the course of a national administrative procedure for ruling on a complaint against a notice of assessment that has established the payment of additional VAT, new factual and legal arguments are accepted as compared with those contained in the tax audit report on the basis of which the notice of assessment was issued, and the taxable person has been granted interim judicial protection measures, pending the decision of the court dealing with the substance of the case, by suspending the debt, the court hearing the action may take the view that there has been no breach of that principle without examining whether the outcome of that procedure might have been different, had it not been for such an irregularity?