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Document 62015CN0130

Case C-130/15: Reference for a preliminary ruling from Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) (United Kingdom) made on 13 March 2015 — Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v National Exhibition Centre Limited

OJ C 190, 8.6.2015, p. 2–3 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

8.6.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 190/2

Reference for a preliminary ruling from Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) (United Kingdom) made on 13 March 2015 — Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v National Exhibition Centre Limited

(Case C-130/15)

(2015/C 190/02)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

Defendant: National Exhibition Centre Limited

Questions referred

1.

With regard to the exemption from VAT in Article 13B(d)(3) of the Sixth Directive (Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment) (1) as interpreted by the Court of Justice in Case C-2/95 Sparekassernes Datacenter v Skatteministeriet (ECLI:EU:C: 1997:278; [1997] ECR I-3017), what are the relevant principles to be applied for determining whether or not a service has ‘the effect of transferring funds and entail[s] changes in the legal and financial situation’ within the meaning of paragraph 66 of that judgment? In particular:

1.1.

Is the exemption applicable to a service, such as that performed by the taxpayer in the present case, which does not involve the taxpayer debiting or crediting any accounts over which it has control, but which is, where a transfer of funds results, the cause of a transfer of funds made by an independent financial institution?

1.2.

In a case where payment is made by credit or debit card, does the answer to Question 1.1 depend on whether the service provider itself obtains authorisation codes directly from the cardholder's bank, or alternatively obtains those codes via its merchant acquirer bank?

1.3.

What factors distinguish (a) a service which consists in the provision of financial information without which a payment would not be made but which does not fall within the exemption (such as in Case C-350/10 Nordea Pankki Suomi (ECLI:EU:C:2011:532; [2011] ECR I-7359), from (b) a data handling service which functionally has the effect of transferring funds and which the Court of Justice has identified as therefore being capable of falling within the exemption (such as in SDC at paragraph 66)?

2.

What are the relevant principles to be applied for determining whether or not a service such as that performed by the taxpayer in the present case falls within the scope of the ‘debt collection’ exclusion from the exemption in Article 13B(d)(3) of the Sixth Directive? In particular, if a service of processing payment by a particular method (e.g. debit or credit card) would, pursuant to the principles in Case C-175/09 Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v AXA UK plc (ECLI:EU:C:2010:646; [2010] ECR I-10701), constitute ‘debt collection’ in circumstances where the supply of that service was to the person to whom that payment was due (i.e. the person receiving the payment), will that service also constitute ‘debt collection’' in circumstances where the supply of that service is to the person from whom the payment is due (i.e. the person making the payment)? Further, in the circumstances of this case, does a ‘debt’ even exist to be ‘collected’?

(1)  OJ L 145, p. 1.

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