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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council — “A new outlook on the climate and security nexus: Addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence”’ (JOIN(2023) 19 final)

EESC 2023/03725

OJ C, C/2024/2106, 26.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2106/oj (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2106/oj

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Official Journal
of the European Union

Series C

C/2024/2106

26.3.2024

(JOIN(2023) 19 final)

(C/2024/2106)

Rapporteur:

Ozlem YILDIRIM

Referral	European Commission, 18.8.2023
Legal basis	Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Section responsible	Section for External Relations
Adopted in section	21.12.2023
Adopted at plenary	17.1.2024
Plenary session No	584
Outcome of vote (for/against/abstentions)	162/3/0

1. Conclusions and recommendations

1.1.

The EESC believes that the effects of climate change and environmental degradation are exacerbating the risks and threats to peace and European and international security. Runaway climate change is leading to a proliferation of extreme climate events, combined with multiple forms of environmental degradation. These dynamics combine with the agricultural, water and infrastructural vulnerabilities that affect people in many countries, with the risk that they end up driving social, economic, institutional and political destabilisation.

1.2.

While the EESC can only support the European Commission's intention to take account of the climate and security nexus, the document published by the Commission struggles to establish its geographical, political and military parameters. The EESC believes there is an urgent need to invest in setting up resilient responses, including preparing European decision-making processes for these types of future stresses.

1.3.

The European institutions should consider factoring the rapidly changing biophysical realities (on which people's lives and well-being depend) and political cohesion (both of Member States and of the EU's neighbours and partners) into EU policy-making.

1.4.

The EESC highlights the fundamental mission of the European project, namely to promote and preserve peace, and reiterates that this is of paramount importance. In order to promote and preserve peace, Europe needs to step up its peace-building efforts. Promoting peace is inextricably linked to the preservation and promotion of fundamental rights and democracy. The move to take into account the climate and security nexus aims to preserve these rights, as the aim of this approach is to safeguard and promote fundamental rights in the face of the challenges posed to both individuals and societies by the insecurities caused by climate change.

1.5.

The EESC's position is to further integrate the climate and security nexus by creating proactive interfaces between the institutions responsible for external relations, for internal EU cohesion, and for the Member States' security and defence services, and by incorporating permanent dialogue with the scientific community. This dialogue would aim in particular to enable the EU to adapt its policies as the climate and environmental situation deteriorates.

1.6.

These strengthening efforts should incorporate the contributions from research and innovation on resilience, thus improving both the foresight and the effectiveness of EU action.

2. Summary of the Commission proposal

2.1.

In its Communication on the EU response to the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence, the Commission highlights, among other things, the risks and threats that the impacts of climate change pose and will pose to food security, health and demographic change. According to the Commission, it will create risks for social cohesion, especially in urban areas. On the other hand, the ever-faster rise in sea levels and the major upheavals in certain regions, especially in the Arctic, will have serious consequences for all Member States.

2.2.

Moreover, this context, aggravated by the war in Ukraine, increases competition for access to the resources and technologies needed for the green and energy transitions. A concerted effort is therefore urgently needed on adaptation to climate change and implementation of the new Green Deal, while preparing the EU and its Member States for the many risks of disruption caused by the risks and crises generated by the climate and security nexus.

2.3.

In response to these challenges, the document proposes that the EU include the collection of climate and environmental data in the early warning and conflict analysis system and link up the EU networks and platforms dedicated to conflict analysis. Furthermore, the ‘climate and security’ approach should be operationally integrated into the EU's external actions, particularly in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and small island states (1). In addition, Europe should step up its investment in development, international cooperation, peace-keeping and peace-building and humanitarian aid programmes by integrating both climate change and defence issues more explicitly.

2.4.

The document also proposes stepping up the adaptation of defence infrastructures and industries exposed to climate change in the Member States, while proposing that the various initiatives relating to energy and the circular economy as defence issues be linked up within the scope of the European Defence Agency, while at the same time developing permanent exchanges with the Member States on these issues.

2.5.

Finally, synergy should be found between the various initiatives relating to the preservation of natural environments, the energy transition, and critical resources and materials to achieve the EU's climate change objectives.

3. General comments

3.1.

The EESC believes that the effects of climate change and environmental degradation are exacerbating the risks and threats to peace and European and international security. From the global to the local scale, runaway climate change is leading to a proliferation of extreme climate events, combined with multiple forms of environmental degradation, including the biodiversity, soil and water cycle crises, resource scarcity and widespread pollution caused by chemical and plastic inputs. These dynamics combine with the agricultural, water and infrastructural vulnerabilities that affect people in many countries, with the risk that they end up driving social, economic, institutional and political destabilisation. This leads to increased food insecurity, creating a source of major concern in the resulting new health risks (2).

3.2.

It is essential to understand the complex links within the climate and security nexus in terms of the potential for risk and crises for all countries around the world.

Climate change and environmental degradation are global processes. The dynamics and exacerbation of these processes are thus playing out continually on a global scale, which thus calls into question the possibility of dealing with the climate and security nexus exclusively as an external matter.

3.3.

The EESC highlights the fundamental mission of the European project, namely to promote and preserve peace, and reiterates that this is of paramount importance. In order to promote and preserve peace, the EU must step up its peace-building efforts, not only throughout the rest of the world but within Europe itself (3). Taking the climate and security nexus into account implies developing the European policies and allocating the resources required to preserve and promote peace. This is all the more essential as geopolitical tensions increase.

3.4.

Promoting peace is inextricably linked to the preservation and promotion of fundamental rights and democracy. The move to take into account the climate and security nexus aims to preserve these rights (in particular the ‘right to life, security, integrity and freedom’ as well as the other fundamental rights that flow from these) as the aim of this approach is to safeguard and promote fundamental rights in the face of the challenges posed to both individuals and societies by the insecurities caused by climate change.

3.5.

These strengthening efforts should incorporate the contributions from research and innovation on resilience, thus improving both the foresight and the effectiveness of EU action, as well as its legitimacy in the eyes of the Member States, societies and the people. Europe's legitimacy will be further strengthened as the actions carried out will strengthen food security, which is directly threatened by climate change.

3.6.

In view of the new global feedback loops, the European institutions should consider factoring the rapidly changing biophysical realities (on which people's lives and well-being depend) and political cohesion (both of Member States and of the EU's partners) into EU policy-making and into its external relations with both regional partner organisations and international organisations.

3.7.

This approach should result in new priorities being identified, particularly in regard to solidarity in the field of civil security. When it comes to prevention, preparedness, warnings, planning and operational capabilities, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is no longer sufficiently capable nor broad enough in scope to deal with the disasters linked to climate change and the other multiple risks occurring inside and outside the Union's territory (4). The EESC considers that the action taken by the EU following disasters outside its territory needs to be more clearly established and developed. The EESC underlines the utmost importance of strengthening operational cooperation by harmonising training, ensuring compatibility of material and equipment, and ensuring clear and efficient chains of command. Beyond its well-established use in the field of natural disasters, the UCPM will undoubtedly be called upon in the future to tackle other risks, such as pandemics, assistance to people in war zones, major industrial risks, large-scale maritime pollution, and the consequences of cyber-attacks on electricity or drinking water networks and on all essential infrastructure.

3.8.

The EESC believes there is an urgent need to invest in setting up resilient responses, including by preparing European decision-making processes for these types of future stresses. The EESC's position is therefore to further integrate the climate and security nexus by creating proactive interfaces between the institutions responsible for external relations, for internal EU cohesion, and for the Member States' security and defence services, and by incorporating permanent dialogue with the scientific community and with civil society organisations. This dialogue would aim in particular to enable the EU to adapt its policies — particularly following advances in scientific research — as the climate and environmental situation deteriorates.

4. Specific comments

Security and prevention

4.1.

While the EESC can only support the Commission's intention to take account of the climate and security nexus, the document published by the Commission struggles to establish its geographical, political and military parameters.

4.2.

There seems to be an epistemological contradiction throughout the document. While it appears fundamental to take the climate and security nexus into account, the document does not deal with its evolving nature, when in fact the situation is going to rapidly and continuously deteriorate, which may lead to serious tensions between the Member States. We can only anticipate that the ongoing combination of the proliferation of extreme weather events, disruption of the freshwater cycle, biodiversity crisis and the ever-faster rise in sea levels, in conjunction with geopolitical threats, including those caused by the war in Ukraine, will lead to new types of tensions within each Member State, between the Member States (5) and on the international stage.

4.3.

In the face of these challenges, Europe benefits from considerable advantages in the form of research and foresight centres, which can feed into the deliberations of both European bodies and the Member States. For example, by developing the methodology for assessing the nine ‘planetary boundaries’, the Stockholm Resilience Centre makes regular diagnoses of the state of the Earth system, and these can be used to identify challenges in the area of climate security policy. The same applies to many scientists and laboratories that are members of or collaborate in the work of the IPCC.

4.4.

Furthermore, the continual intensification of climate change and environmental degradation processes calls for both the European Environment Agency and European research centres and networks to be rapidly and proactively integrated into the decision-making processes in European bodies in order to provide information and clarification as the decisions are being made.

International cooperation

4.5.

Since climate and security issues are global challenges, they should be addressed through global approaches, particularly in terms of research, and subsequently broken down and addressed at different levels. International cooperation must therefore be strengthened. A robust multilateral framework is an essential lever for effectively addressing this nexus, in particular the partnership between the EU and the UN, which needs to be deepened.

4.6.

However, while the EESC supports its aims, it seems necessary to point out that the climate and security nexus is not limited to the EU's external relations, but involves a seamless continuity between what is external and what is internal to the European territory. The financial, logistical, military, security, humanitarian, health, scientific, technical, industrial and agricultural resources that can be mobilised depend largely on the real capacities of the Member States.

4.7.

It therefore seems necessary for the Commission and the Member States to have a permanent specific dialogue on the climate and security nexus, especially since the threats posed, particularly security and military threats, can only be dealt with by the relevant ministries within each Member State. Ultimately, issues related to coordinating and developing common policies and objectives are primarily strategic challenges. The malicious use of the environment and climate change as a weapon of war should be anticipated by Member States in order to prepare for such strategic developments. Here, proper coordination between the different levels and services in Europe is fundamental and can be an opportunity for better cooperation.

4.8.

Additionally, in some particularly vulnerable regions, such as Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, armed conflicts are already occurring due to problems related to the tensions between climate and security factors, putting their economic development at risk. These conflicts also exacerbate the deterioration of environmental conditions and reduce access to natural resources, like water. It is therefore essential to build stronger strategic partnerships with certain regions in addressing this climate and security nexus.

4.9.

In this context, the EU must equip itself with the means to strengthen its capacity in terms of security, humanitarian aid and international cooperation. These strengthening efforts should incorporate the contributions from research and innovation on resilience, thus improving both the foresight and the effectiveness of EU action, as well as its legitimacy in the eyes of the Member States, societies and the people. Europe's legitimacy will be further strengthened as the actions carried out will strengthen food security, which is directly threatened by climate change.

4.10.

The food dimension of the climate and security nexus is particularly important, as it profoundly undermines the cohesion of societies. However, given the great complexity of the climate and security nexus and the link between data collection, analysis, foresight and policy, it seems necessary to strengthen foresight capabilities by linking them to early warning capabilities.

Strengthening foresight and early warning capabilities in this way will bolster adaptation to climate change at European and local level. At local level, local and regional authorities can include these capacities in their urban and spatial planning, in order to mitigate the impact on the water cycle and avert the risks involved.

4.11.

The EESC also reiterates the urgent need to effectively implement the European Green Deal, the Paris Agreement and the SDGs, which must remain a priority for the EU in order to minimise the negative impacts of this climate and security nexus. Armed forces, as well as the military-industrial sector — which remains one of the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases — must also engage in climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts.

4.12.

The migration issue epitomises this complexity. The European Union is particularly affected by the issue of the migration flows from the Sahel, the Middle East and Central Asia. These flows are caused by a multitude of highly complex factors (social, political, geopolitical, military and environmental), the significance of which varies over time and depending on the area. Climate change is also rapidly exacerbating all of these situations, as well as migration flows. It is therefore essential that a policy taking into account the climate and security nexus fully integrates ethical concerns related to respect for human dignity and the values of the Union, and that it involves broad and effective coordination between the institutions and actors involved (6).

Social cohesion, inclusion and taking account of civil society

4.13.

Addressing this climate and security nexus could be an opportunity to involve civil society even more, given the wealth of experience it has that could be tapped into across a series of exchanges of experience and bottom-up initiatives, which would help deepen European cohesion in all its dimensions. Social dialogue and those involved in it therefore need to be integrated into processes to address the climate and security issue.

4.14.

As the EESC has pointed out on several occasions, climate change exacerbates existing social inequalities. Limiting the impacts of climate change should also make it possible to combat the worsening of social and societal inequalities. Climate justice, which is inextricably linked to the climate and security nexus, aims to reduce inequality and poverty.

4.15.

Women are particularly hard hit by the effects of climate change, not least because their work serves to mitigate its social impacts in the poorest regions. Women with disabilities, in particular, pay a heavy price. The EESC therefore particularly recommends taking account of this gender inequality in the climate and security nexus in order to prevent the exclusion of entire sections of society who no longer have access to dignified, decent and secure living conditions.

4.16.

The intergenerational effect is also important and, in this respect, attention should be paid to two sections of society in particular: young people and the oldest members of society (with a special focus on the vulnerability of children in the event of extreme weather events).

Brussels, 17 January 2024.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE

(1) Valantin, JM., Géopolitique d’une planète déréglée [Geopolitics of an unregulated planet], Le Seuil, Paris, 2017, reissued in 2022.

(2) Sweijs, T., De Haan, M., Van Manen, H., Unpacking the Climate Security Nexus, the seven pathologies linking climate change to violent conflicts, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, March 2022.

(3) OJ C 228, 5.7.2019, p. 31.

(4) OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 30.

(5) Wallace-Wells, D., The Uninhabitable Earth, Garnier Flammarion, Paris, 2021.

(6) Welzer, H., Climate Wars: What people will be killed for in the 21st Century, Gallimard, Paris, 2009.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2106/oj

ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)

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