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clarifying that the transfer of EURODAC data to third countries is prohibited also in case of use of EURODAC data for law enforcement purposes (see points 43-44),

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adding the law enforcement purposes to the information communicated to the data subject (see point 45),

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ensuring unequivocally that access by designated authorities to EURODAC data is limited to law enforcement purposes (see point 49),

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submitting the access to EURODAC data for law enforcement purposes to a prior judicial authorisation or as a minimum providing that the verifying authority shall perform its duties and tasks independently and shall not receive instructions as regards the exercise of the verification (see points 50-51),

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adding the criterion of the ‘need to prevent an imminent danger associated with serious criminal or terrorist offences’ as exceptional case justifying the consultation of EURODAC data without prior verification by the verifying authority and introducing a concrete time limit for the ex-post verification (see points 53-54),

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as regards the conditions of access, adding the conditions of (i) a prior consultation of the Visa Information System, (ii) a ‘substantiated suspicion that the perpetrator of a terrorist or other serious criminal offences has applied for asylum’ and (iii) the ‘substantial’ contribution for law enforcement purposes and clarifying what is understood by ‘reasonable grounds’ (see points 56-57),

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describing in a recital the kind of situations justifying a direct access by Europol to the EURODAC Central Unit and providing that the strict conditions of access applying to national designated authorities also apply to Europol (see points 58-59),

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ensuring that comparison of fingerprints for law enforcement purposes shall in any case be subject to at least the same safeguards foreseen for Dublin Regulation purposes (see point 62),

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specifying more clearly the rules on retention or deletion of data (see point 64),

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clarifying which additional information to the ‘hit’ will be communicated to EUROPOL if applicable (see points 65-66),

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specifying the precise purpose(s) of the request by the Agency's Management Board of the comparisons with EURODAC data by Member State's law enforcement authorities as well as the anonymisation by law enforcement authorities of the data prior to their transmission to the Management Board and restoring the rules on professional secrecies (see points 67-68),

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providing an access for the EDPS and Europol's supervisory authority to the records kept by the Agency and Europol respectively as well as the obligation to store records also for conducting regular self-auditing of EURODAC (see points 79 and 85),

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clarifying the supervision of Europol's data processing activities (see point 81).

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replacing the Business Continuity System by the need for a Business Continuity Plan and providing a legal basis for implementing measures containing the modalities of such plan (see point 72),

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ensuring that temporary or permanent impossibility to provide usable fingerprints shall not adversely affect the legal situation of the individual and shall in any case represent sufficient grounds to refuse to examine or to reject an asylum application (see point 73),

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ensure consistency between the obligations of the Agency, the Member States and Europol to keep records and documentation of data processing activities (see point 77),

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improving provisions on data security (see point 82),

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including the EDPS for the submission of the Agency's annual report (see point 83),

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adding in Article 43 an obligation on Member States and Europol to constantly update the information they have provided to the Commission and requiring that the Commission makes this information available to Member States, Europol and to the public ‘via a constantly updated electronic publication’ (see point 86).