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**REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND  
THE COUNCIL**

**on the evaluation of the European Union's External Financing Instruments for the 2014  
- 2020 and 2021 - 2027 Multiannual Financial Frameworks**

{ COM(2024) 208 final }

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## Glossary

<i>Term or acronym</i>	<i>Meaning or definition</i>
AAP	Annual Action Plan
ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
CBSD	Capacity Building of military actors in support of development
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIR	Common Implementing Rules
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DFIs	Development Finance Institutions
DOAG	Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland
EAG	External Action Guarantee
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFIs	External Financing Instruments
EFSD+	European Fund for Sustainable Development +
EFSD	European Fund for Sustainable Development
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIP	Economic and Investment Plans
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
EPF	European Peace Facility
EUAM	EU Advisory Mission

GD	Greenland Decision
HIC	High Income Countries
HR/VP	EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
HUMA	Humanitarian Aid
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
INSC	European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation
IPA III	Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance
IPARD	IPA Rural Development programme
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MFA	Macro Financial Assistance
MTF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MIP	Multiannual Indicative Programme
MSMEs	Micro- Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises
MTR	Mid-term Review
NAO/RAO	National/Regional Authorising Officer
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
OAD	Overseas Association Decision
OCT	Overseas Countries and Territories
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PI	Partnership Instrument

PIPs	Proposed Investment Programmes
RRA	Rapid Response Actions
SBC	State Building Contract
TEI	Team Europe Initiative
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
UMICs	Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs)
WBIF	Western Balkans Investment Framework

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Purpose and scope of the evaluation

This Staff Working Document (SWD) presents the mid-term evaluation of the EU's External Financing Instruments (EFIs) of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the final evaluation of the EFIs of the 2014-2020 MFF through their transition path.

Since 2014, the EU external action has experienced a series of unprecedented challenges, including the migration crisis and exacerbating effects of the climate change. As the geopolitical tensions, economic and social inequalities soared, also worsened by the consequences of COVID-19, the EU's external cooperation has had to adapt to a rapidly changing context.

The EU responded to these challenges by adopting a more policy-driven approach in its external action and by introducing new ways of working with partners and within the EU institutions. These changes have been incorporated into the 2021-2027 MFF and Regulations on EFIs, marking a transition path from the previous EFIs to the current ones.

This evaluation has the overall objective to assess whether the current EFIs are better fit for purpose and enable the EU to better engage in external cooperation than the previous ones. The specific objectives are to assess the EFIs' performance in terms of EU added value, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, flexibility and ability to react to changing political and policy priorities, scope for simplification, coherence, synergies and the continued relevance of the objectives of the EFIs. Furthermore, the use and the functioning of the External Action Guarantee (EAG), including its maximum amount, is also assessed in terms of its additionality and contribution to the overall objectives and results.

#### Temporal scope:

The evaluation of the EFIs under the 2014-2020 MFF covers the period from 1 January 2014 until 31 December 2020. As for the EFIs under the 2021-2027 MFF, the evaluation covers the period from 1 January 2021 until 31 December 2022.

The evaluation covers the following EU's external instruments:

#### *Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027*

- The Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe) established by EU Regulation 2021/947<sup>1</sup>, including its EFSD+/EAG component, as well as the Commission Delegated Regulation

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<sup>1</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj>

2021/1530 of 12 July 2021 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2021/947 (“Delegated Act”)<sup>2</sup>

- The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) established by EU Regulation 2021/1529<sup>3</sup> as well as the Commission Delegated Regulation 2021/2128 of 1 October 2021 supplementing Regulation 2021/1529 (“Delegated Act”)<sup>4</sup> and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2236 of 15 December 2021 on the specific rules for implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 (“Implementing Act”)<sup>5</sup>
- The European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) established by Council Regulation 2021/948 of 27/05/2021<sup>6</sup>
- The Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland (DOAG) established by the Council Decision 2021/1764 of 5 October 2021<sup>7</sup>

#### *Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020*

- The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) established by the Regulation (EU) 233/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>8</sup>
- The European Instrument for Democracy and human rights (EIDHR) established by the Regulation 235/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>9</sup>
- The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) established by the Regulation 232/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>10</sup>
- The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) established by the Regulation 230/2014 of 11 March 2014 amended by Regulation 2017/2306 of 12 December 2017<sup>11</sup>
- The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) established by the Regulation 231/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>12</sup>
- The Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with third countries (PI) established by the Regulation 234/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>13</sup>
- The Overseas Association Decision (OAD) established by the Council Decision 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union (financed under EDF)<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1530>

<sup>3</sup> [Regulation - 2021/1529 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1529)

<sup>4</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R2128>

<sup>5</sup> [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg\\_impl/2021/2236/oj](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2021/2236/oj)

<sup>6</sup> [Regulation - 2021/948 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0948)

<sup>7</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021D1764>

<sup>8</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0233>

<sup>9</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0235>

<sup>10</sup> [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0232&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0232&from=EN)

<sup>11</sup> [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0230&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0230&from=EN)

<sup>12</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0231>

<sup>13</sup> [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0234&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0234&from=EN)

- The Greenland Decision (GD) established by the Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other hand<sup>15</sup>
- The European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) established by the Regulation 2017/1601 of 26 September 2017<sup>16</sup>
- The Common Implementing Regulation laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action (CIR) established by the Regulation 236/2014 of 2 May 2014, which laid down the common provisions for the above-mentioned Instruments<sup>17</sup>
- The 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) which, although not an EU budget instrument, will also be covered by the evaluation<sup>18</sup>

This evaluation is undertaken in compliance with Article 42(2) NDICI – Global Europe as well as with Article 13(6) of IPA III, Article 81 of DOAG and Article 14(1) INSC. It encompasses and builds upon the final evaluation of the EFIs under the 2014 – 2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) as listed below.

#### Geographic scope:

The geographic scope of the evaluation corresponds to that referred to in the Regulations subject to the evaluation.

## **1.2 Approach and limitations**

This evaluation focuses on the EFIs, supporting EU's development, neighbourhood and enlargement policies.

This evaluation focuses on the objectives and principles contained in the relevant Regulations, and the transition from past to current EFIs. It does not focus on programmes and actions supported with the EFIs, because they are covered by strategic evaluations on the EU's cooperation with specific partner countries, sectors or specific implementation modalities.

The selected evaluation approach gives an overall picture on the EFIs supporting EU's external cooperation, while taking into account the different objectives and over 100 partner countries covered by the EFIs. The evaluation assesses whether the instruments are fit for purpose, following a major streamlining effort of the regulatory framework from the past to the current MFF, particularly regarding the NDICI-Global Europe. This is in line with the

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<sup>14</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013D0755>

<sup>15</sup> [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=urisrv%3AOJ.L\\_.2014.076.01.0001.01.ENG](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=urisrv%3AOJ.L_.2014.076.01.0001.01.ENG)

<sup>16</sup> [Regulation - 2017/1601 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>17</sup> <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/43f92a44-af94-11e3-86f9-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>

<sup>18</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015R0322>



legal requirement in Article 42(4) NDICI-Global Europe which provides that the mid-term evaluation shall assess the added value of integrating previously separate instruments into one streamlined instrument.

Given the focus of this evaluation on the transition from past to current EFIs, it was decided to carry out one single evaluation covering the final evaluation of the 2014-20 EFIs and a mid-term evaluation of the 2021-27 EFIs. This approach was decided based on the experience with the 2017 mid-term evaluation of 2014-20 EFIs<sup>19</sup>, which included 10 staff working documents, all underpinned by a separate external study and other related evidence such as open and targeted consultations. Beside creating a high administrative burden for the Commission and stakeholders as well as overlaps among individual evaluations, it had an impact on the overall conclusions.

While mid-term evaluations of EFIs have not generally covered the assessment of results due to the time lapse between financing decisions, starting of implementation, production of outputs and achievement of outcomes, this mid-term evaluation has been especially limited in this respect, given the delayed adoption of the 2021-27 EFI Regulations.

The selected evaluation approach must be seen in the broader context of the efforts of the European Commission to strengthen monitoring and reporting on implementation of EFIs. The Commission is committed to the results-based management in external cooperation, to respond to the growing need for data to capture the results achieved with the EU funds.

Various monitoring arrangements (internal and external) are now in place, focusing on different aspects of results-oriented monitoring such as implementation progress and achievement of objectives (see further in Annex VI).

The NDICI-Global Europe instrument has introduced a set of requirements to monitor and report on progress towards its objectives throughout its implementation. The Global Europe Results Framework (GERF)<sup>20</sup> is the main tool which has been specifically developed to meet these monitoring and reporting requirements. The GERF includes all key performance indicators contained in the Regulation establishing the instrument. They will be used together with data from other existing results reporting, external monitoring reviews and evaluations to assess the extent to which specific objectives have been achieved (see further in annex VI of this evaluation).<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> [REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Mid-term review report of the External Financing Instruments - Publications Office of the EU \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>20</sup> [https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/resources/results-indicators/eu-rfi\\_en](https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/resources/results-indicators/eu-rfi_en)

<sup>21</sup> [2023 Annual report on the implementation of the European Union's external action instruments in 2022 - Publications Office of the EU \(europa.eu\)](#)

Reporting requirements cover all regions and modalities established by the NDICI-Global Europe instrument, including the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD+).

The IPA III results framework<sup>22</sup> provides a unified monitoring system for the instrument. It provides a uniform set of indicators that need to be used in programming, monitoring and reporting and evaluation, to ensure that the results can be aggregated, and the impact and outcomes of IPA III can be more clearly demonstrated for the entire instrument.

In 2022, the European Commission reached significant milestones in the transition towards using the new IT platform OPSYS as a single tool to capture results for corporate reporting and management. OPSYS creates a digital repository of EU-funded operations, and provides a central access to all stakeholders involved, both inside and outside the European Commission. It will assume a pivotal role in ensuring that the European Commission can deliver on the ambitious reporting obligations as set for the implementation of the NDICI-Global Europe and IPA III instruments in the years to come.

### **1.3 Methodology**

This document is largely based on an external study (presented in Annex IX and referred to below as “the external study”) carried out by independent consultants. All five compulsory evaluation criteria (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence, and the EU added value) are assessed in this study. The evaluation criteria of impact and sustainability are also covered. The evaluation methods used include: (i) a review of documentation and analytical data; (ii) more than 340 interviews (iii) a series of targeted surveys; (iv) a series of targeted consultations with Member States experts, Civil Society and Local Authorities organisations, Practitioners Network and Development Financial Institutions (v) an Open Public Consultation that ran from 31 March to 23 June 2023. This mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, using both primary and secondary sources of evidence, provided a comprehensive evidence base for the evaluation.


### **1.4 Reconstructed intervention logic**

This evaluation examines how the three levels: policy framework that guides the objectives to which the EFIs are expected to contribute, institutional changes and regulations, have interacted in practice in the context of the transition from the 2014-2020 EFIs to current EFIs. It also examines the ability of the EFIs to simultaneously promote the EU’s geopolitical interests and policy priorities while responding to the needs and priorities of partner countries and regions, thereby solidifying existing partnerships and forming new ones. It also covers interactions between stakeholders at European level, including the criteria of EU added value. The analysis focuses on what the EU intended to change, through the transition from the

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<sup>22</sup> [SWD 2022 445 1 EN document travail service part1 v2.pdf \(europa.eu\)](#)

former to the present EFIs architecture. A simplified version of the Theory of Change used as an overarching analytical framework is presented below. It addresses the various EFIs together, underpinning the intervention logic of the EU external action from inputs level, via outputs and outcomes to the impact level, the whole result chain, highlighting three main assumptions that underpin this logic.



## 2. WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION?

### 2.1 Description of the intervention and its objectives

The External Financing Instruments subject to this mid-term evaluation form a major part of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework's Heading 6 "Neighbourhood and the world" which provides the EU with the tools necessary to reinforce its geopolitical role on the world stage and to ensure that it realises its ambitions to promote its interests and universal values and principles in line with Article 21 of TEU.

The External Financing Instruments subject to this final evaluation were under the former 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework's Heading 4 "Global Europe":

- The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) established by the Regulation (EU) 233/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0233>

- The European Instrument for Democracy and human rights (EIDHR) established by the Regulation 235/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>24</sup>
- The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) established by the Regulation 232/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>25</sup>
- The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) established by the Regulation 230/2014 of 11 March 2014 amended by Regulation 2017/2306 of 12 December 2017<sup>26</sup>
- The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) established by the Regulation 231/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>27</sup>
- The Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with third countries (PI) established by the Regulation 234/2014 of 11 March 2014<sup>28</sup>
- The Overseas Association Decision (OAD) established by the Council Decision 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Union (financed under EDF)<sup>29</sup>
- The Greenland Decision (GD) established by the Council Decision 2014/137/EU of 14 March 2014 on relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other hand<sup>30</sup>
- The European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) established by the Regulation 2017/1601 of 26 September 2017<sup>31</sup>
- The Common Implementing Regulation laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action (CIR) established by the Regulation 236/2014 of 2 May 2014, which laid down the common provisions for the above-mentioned Instruments<sup>32</sup>
- The 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) which, although not an EU budget instrument, will also be covered by the evaluation<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0235>

<sup>25</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0232&from=EN>

<sup>26</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0230&from=EN>

<sup>27</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0231>

<sup>28</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0234&from=EN>

<sup>29</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013D0755>

<sup>30</sup> [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L\\_.2014.076.01.0001.01.ENG](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2014.076.01.0001.01.ENG)

<sup>31</sup> [Regulation - 2017/1601 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>32</sup> <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/43f92a44-af94-11e3-86f9-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>

<sup>33</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015R0322>

The main instrument in Heading 6 of the 2021 – 2027 MFF is the NDICI-Global Europe. Also subject to this evaluation are the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III), as well as the Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland (DOAG). Other instruments within Heading 6, namely Humanitarian Assistance (HUMA) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF) are not covered by this evaluation.

### **Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe)**

NDICI-Global Europe was adopted on 9 June 2021 and was applicable retroactively from 1 January 2021. With a budget of EUR 79.462 billion (in 2021 prices), its general objectives are:

- to uphold and promote the Union's values, principles and fundamental interests worldwide, in order to pursue the objectives and principles of the Union's external action, thus contributing to the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty, to consolidating, supporting and promoting democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, sustainable development and the fight against climate change and addressing irregular migration and forced displacement, including their root causes;
- to contribute to the promotion of multilateralism, the achievement of the international commitments and objectives that the Union has agreed to, in particular the sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement;
- to promote stronger partnerships with third countries, including with the European Neighbourhood Policy countries based on mutual interests and ownership with a view to fostering stabilisation, good governance and building resilience.

With its global coverage, it was designed to underpin a policy-first approach to EU's external cooperation, based on shared interests and policy priorities, including innovative ways of cooperation with Upper Middle-Income and High-Income Countries. It has a strong focus on investments through the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), successor to a more limited EFSD (set up under the previous MFF).

The NDICI-Global Europe is structured around three pillars: 1) a geographic pillar, to foster dialogue and cooperation with third countries; 2) a thematic pillar, to finance support to human rights and democracy, civil society organisations, stability and peace, and global challenges, and 3) a rapid-response pillar, to allow the EU to intervene rapidly and effectively for conflict prevention, respond to situations of crisis or instability, strengthen the resilience of states, societies, communities and individuals and address EU foreign policy needs and priorities.

Moreover, an emerging challenges and priorities cushion can be used to flexibly address new needs and unforeseen challenges and priorities through a top-up of the pillars when most needed and duly justified.

The below table illustrates these components and their respective envelopes, with a comparison to the previous MFF:

NDICI-Global Europe envelopes 2021-2027 in million EUR (in current prices)			
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation	MFF 2014-2020	MFF 2021-2027	% Difference
Geographic programmes	58.099	<b>60.388</b>	3,9
Neighbourhood	17.859	19.323	8,2
Sub-Saharan Africa	26.336	29.181	10,8
Asia and the Pacific	9.909	8.489	-14,3
Americas and the Caribbean	3.995	3.395	-15,0
Thematic programmes	9.220	<b>6.358</b>	-31,0
Human Rights and Democracy	1.314	1.362	3,7
Civil Society Organisations	1.427	1.362	-4,5
Peace, stability and conflict prevention	712	908	27,5
Global Challenges	5.767	2.726	-52,7
Rapid response	3.439	<b>3.182</b>	-7,5
Emerging challenges and priorities cushion	<i>p.m.</i> 6.869	<b>9.534</b>	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>70.758</b>	<b>79.462</b>	<b>12,3</b>

NDICI-Global Europe includes the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), a tool aimed at multiplying European funds, leveraging investments and supporting access to financing in partner countries. EFSD+ contributes to achieving the SDGs by fostering sustainable and inclusive economic and social development in all of EU's partner countries. Special attention is given to fragile or conflict-affected countries as well as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and heavily indebted poor countries by making them priority areas that partner financial institutions must consider in planning their investments. Its

material scope covers both sovereign, sub-sovereign and private investment, encompassing traditional tools such as grants and technical assistance ('blended' with repayable financing), as well as novel financial instruments, budgetary guarantees backed by the EAG. EFSD+ strives to maximise additionality of funding, address market failures and sub-optimal investment situations, deliver innovative products and 'crowd-in' private sector funds. Involvement of the private sector in the EU's cooperation with partner countries through the EFSD+ should yield measurable and additional development impact without distorting the market.

In addition to covering the guarantee operations under EFSD+, the EAG covers also macro-financial assistance and Euratom loans<sup>34</sup>.

Under the NDICI-Global Europe, a specific emphasis is put on certain priorities through targets:

- At least 93% shall fulfil the criteria for **Official Development Assistance (ODA)**
- At least 30% shall contribute to step-up efforts on **climate** objectives. In addition, in her State of the Union address in September 2021, President von der Leyen announced an additional EUR 4 billion for climate finance until 2027.
- Indicatively 10% should support management and governance of **migration** and **forced displacement**, as well as address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement.
- At least 20% of the ODA spending should be dedicated to **social inclusion and human development**.
- At least 85% of new actions should have **gender equality** as principal or significant objective. At least 5% of these actions should have gender equality and women's and girls' rights and empowerment as a principal objective.
- NDICI-Global Europe should contribute to the ambition of providing 7,5% of annual spending under the multiannual financial framework to **biodiversity** objectives in the year 2024 and 10 % of annual spending under the multiannual financial framework to biodiversity objectives in 2026 and 2027, while considering the existing overlaps between climate and biodiversity goals.

### **The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)**

The IPA III Regulation was adopted on 15 September 2021 and it is applicable retroactively from 1 January 2021. With its EUR 14.162 billion financial envelope for 2021-27, IPA III has been designed to provide coherence between EU's political priorities and financial

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<sup>34</sup> To note that loans to third countries referred to in Article 10(2) of Regulation (Euratom) 2021/948 are financed from that Regulation.



assistance in supporting beneficiaries listed in Annex I of the IPA III Regulation in view of their future Union membership.

IPA III aims at supporting the beneficiaries in adopting and implementing the political, institutional, legal, administrative, social, economic and environmental reforms required by those beneficiaries to comply with Union values and to progressively align to Union rules, standards, policies and practices (*'acquis'*) with a view to future Union membership, thereby contributing to mutual stability, security, peace and prosperity. IPA III entails a policy-driven approach, with the fundamental requirements for EU membership at the core of the instrument. By focusing EU financial assistance on key priorities in line with the new enlargement policy and methodology, IPA III aims at leveraging support to reforms fostering sustainable socio-economic development and bringing the partners closer to the Union's values and standards. IPA III is designed to be a flexible instrument that can adapt to the evolving EU policy and the needs of IPA III beneficiaries.

Compared to its predecessor instruments, IPA III is a policy-driven and thematic instrument. There are no country-specific strategies but one strategic document, the IPA III Programming Framework, for the 7-year period. There are no pre-defined financial envelopes for each beneficiary but indicative allocations to five thematic Windows, which reflect the new enlargement strategy / methodology and key EU priorities:

IPA III Windows	%	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total
<b>Window 1:</b> Rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy	15,13%	281	287	292	298	304	310	317	2.089
<b>Window 2:</b> Good governance, EU <i>acquis</i> alignment, good neighbourly relations and strategic communication	16,59%	308	314	321	327	333	340	347	2.291
<b>Window 3:</b> Green agenda and sustainable connectivity	42,45%	788	804	820	837	853	870	888	5.860
<b>Window 4:</b> Competitiveness and inclusive growth	22,31%	414	422	431	440	448	457	467	3.080
<b>Window 5:</b> Territorial and cross-border cooperation <sup>48</sup>	3,51%	65	66	68	69	71	72	73	485
<b>Total Operational Budget</b>	<b>100,0%</b>	<b>1.855</b>	<b>1.894</b>	<b>1.932</b>	<b>1.971</b>	<b>2.010</b>	<b>2.051</b>	<b>2.093</b>	<b>13.804</b>
Administrative Appropriations	n/a	49	49	50	51	52	53	54	357
<b>Total</b>	<b>100,00%</b>	<b>1.904</b>	<b>1.943</b>	<b>1.982</b>	<b>2.022</b>	<b>2.062</b>	<b>2.104</b>	<b>2.147</b>	<b>14.162</b>

Assistance under IPA III is expected to be based both on a performance-based approach and a fair share principle. Assistance should be differentiated in scope and intensity according to the performance of the beneficiaries, in particular as regards their commitment to and progress in implementing reforms, as well as according to their needs. Particular attention should be paid to the efforts made in the fields of the rule of law and fundamental rights, democratic institutions, and public administration reform, as well as economic development and competitiveness. The fair share principle means that no IPA III beneficiary committed to the objectives of the instrument should receive a disproportionally low level of assistance compared to other beneficiaries. Assessment of performance and fair share are embedded in the annual bilateral programming process.



The IPA III Regulation also foresees a possibility for the Commission to modulate the scope and intensity of IPA III assistance in case of a significant regression or persistent lack of progress in the fields of the rule of law and fundamental rights, democratic institutions and public administration reform, as well as economic development and competitiveness. A modulation decision should be substantiated by the relevant indicators of the IPA III Programming Framework.

The following targets apply to IPA III:

- IPA III should contribute to mainstreaming climate action in the Union's policies and to the achievement of an overall target of 30 % of Union budget expenditure supporting climate objectives and the ambition of 7,5 % of the budget reflecting biodiversity expenditures in 2024 and 10 % in 2026 and 2027, while taking into account the existing overlaps between climate and biodiversity goals.
- Actions under IPA III are expected to contribute 18 % of the overall financial envelope of IPA III to climate objectives, with the objective of increasing this percentage to 20 % by 2027.
- Implementation of IPA III is guided by the principles of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls and should seek to protect and promote women's and girls' rights in line with the EU Gender Action Plans and relevant Council conclusions and international conventions, including the Council conclusions on Women, Peace and Security of 10 December 2018. Therefore, at least 85% of new actions should have gender equality as a principal or a significant objective. At least 5% of these actions should have gender equality and women's and girls' rights and empowerment as a principal objective.

### **The Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland (DOAG)**

The DOAG Decision was adopted on 5 October 2021 and was applicable retroactively from 1 January 2021. With a total envelope of EUR 500 million the DOAG aims at promoting the economic and social development of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) and at establishing close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole.

The OCT instrument is an Association Decision which builds on 3 pillars: the political and institutional, the trade (OCTs benefit from a duty and quota free access regime) and financial cooperation (global envelope of EUR 500 million) between the Union and the OCTs. The DOAG includes specific provisions guiding the partnership with Greenland, where required.

OCTs remain eligible for Union programmes as a matter of principle. DOAG further strengthens intra-regional cooperation, to allow the continued cooperation of OCTs with their non-OCT neighbours, such as EU Outermost regions, through a dedicated envelope. Investment support is from now on funded through the InvestEU instrument, as the former European Investment Bank (EIB) Investment OCTs facility ceased to exist. OCTs are also eligible for the thematic programmes and rapid response actions of the NDICI-Global Europe

instrument. Unless otherwise specified, the DOAG makes a general referral clause to NDICI-Global Europe concerning implementation. The Decision still provides for a specific and simplified programming exercise for the OCTs. Contrary to NDICI-Global Europe, the DOAG does not have an end date.

### **The European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)**

The INSC was adopted on 27 May 2021 and was applicable retroactively from 1 January 2021. With a budget of EUR 300 million INSC complements the activities under the NDICI-Global Europe with the objective to promote a high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste management, and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear materials in third countries, building on the activities within the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and includes the provisioning for guarantees of Euratom loans for enhancing nuclear safety. EU Directives and the high standard of nuclear safety and radioactive waste and spent fuel management implemented in the EU are examples to be used in order to encourage third countries to adopt similar high standards. The INSC is implemented using the same tools and processes as NDICI-Global Europe wherever possible.

## **2.2 Points of comparison**

In terms of comparison, the broad aim of the evaluation is to examine the key features of the current instruments and to assess what has changed, what works better with the new architecture and what could be further improved. The evaluation findings, (see section 4) are structured around the key guiding principles that accompanied the transition to the new MFF, based on the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation of the 2014-2020 instruments.

### **2.2.1 2017 Mid-term review of the EFIs under MFF 2014-2020**

#### The 2017 Mid-term review report from the Commission - General conclusions

The external financing instruments under the MFF 2014-2020 were subject to mid-term reviews (MTR) which assessed whether these EFIs were fit for purpose to ensure the effective implementation of the EU's external cooperation. The Commission's 2017 MTR report<sup>35</sup> was based on the findings from a set of evaluation staff working documents (one per external financing instrument)<sup>36</sup> which were themselves based on external evaluations of the

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<sup>35</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0720>

<sup>36</sup> Commission Staff Working Documents on 1) Development Cooperation Instrument: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0600&rid=5>; 2) 11th European Development Fund: [https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-09/swd-mid-term-review-edf\\_en.pdf](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-09/swd-mid-term-review-edf_en.pdf); 3) Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance <https://eur->

instruments. The 2017 MTR report concluded that the priorities and sectors of intervention defined in the EFIs were broadly relevant and functioning well in terms of their substance and content. It also concluded that there was no need to amend the instruments through legislative amendments or delegated acts.

As a lesson-learnt, the 2017 MTR report stated that the next generation of instruments would need to consider the level of financial and other forms of flexibility required to allow the EU to respond, through its external action to world challenges. This flexibility needed to be built in at different levels – starting from the budget, which should include more substantial reserves, to multi-annual programming and greater simplification at implementation level to increase efficiency and effectiveness.

The 2017 MTR report further noted that the main issues to be addressed by the next generation of EFIs related to their complex and fragmented architecture and operational aspects. In particular, the number of instruments under the 2014-2020 MFF, each of them having different and at times overlapping, scopes and rules, had created obstacles to an efficient use of funds across regions and themes.

Finally, the 2017 MTR report noted that the overall effectiveness of the instruments in meeting their objectives was difficult to measure, because of the difficulty in defining appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems at instrument level.

## **2.2.2 Final evaluation of the EFIs under MFF 2014-2020**

In this evaluation, the EFIs under MFF 2014-2020 are notably examined through the lens of the transition, to gain insight into the concrete improvements and possible shortcomings in moving from one set of instruments to another. However, it is important to recall that actions financed under the previous MFF are still being implemented, in parallel with those financed under the current MFF.

The annual reports on each of the EFIs present the main achievements of EU cooperation, elaborating on selected results and case studies from EU-funded interventions as well as country-based results when applicable, based on the EU Results Framework indicators<sup>37</sup>.

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[lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2017:0463:FIN:EN:PDF](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2017:0463:FIN:EN:PDF); 4) Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2017:0605:FIN:EN:PDF>; 5) European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0604&from=SV>; 6) European Neighbourhood Instrument <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017SC0602>; 7) Greenland Decision: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0609&rid=10>; 8) Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace: [https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD\(2017\)607&lang=en](https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2017)607&lang=en); 9) Partnership Instrument: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=SWD:2017:608:FIN> 10) Common Implementing Regulation <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2017:0463:FIN:EN:PDF>

<sup>37</sup> [Annual reports - European Commission \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/annual-reports/)

Also, the strategic evaluations at geographic, thematic, implementation modality or implementing partners' levels assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, impact, sustainability and added value of the actions supported by the past EFIs.

On a general level, the conclusions of the 2017 MTR of the EFIs under MFF 2014-2020, as referred to above, remained valid for the whole period of the past MFF and were scrutinised in the impact assessment for the instruments of the current MFF. In particular, the conclusion related to the fragmentation of the EFIs architecture, and the identified lack of flexibility remained also valid in the last years of the 2014-2020 MFF. The validity of key 2017 MTR conclusions for the full cycle of the past MFF is discussed below, with examples per instrument.

### **European Development Fund (EDF)**

The 2017 MTR noted that the 11th EDF was a relevant instrument with appreciated flexibility features at instrument level. The related Staff Working Document shared the opinion of the external evaluation as to the challenges on how to improve the implementation of the 11th EDF for the remaining period until 2020 and on the future external financing instrument(s) for the post-2020 period. The strategic importance of the EDF performance reserve persisted from 2018 to 2020, with the entire budget of the reserve having been committed by end 2020. This lesson-learned was the basis for the design of the NDICI-Global Europe cushion for the 2021-2027 MFF. The 2017 MTR found evidence of overlaps between the 11th EDF and the thematic component of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) as both programmes had overlapping scopes and were able to support similar types of actions. This lack of coherence continued from 2018 to 2020, as exemplified by the fact that consultations conducted as part of the current evaluation, and notably EUD surveys and interviews, had noted a sharp increase in coherence in the past three years. The 2017 MTR further noted that the National or Regional Authorising Officer (NAO/RAO) structures initially created to ensure the principles of ownership had not fully fulfilled that role and were even hampering effectiveness and efficiency. This remained a challenge also for the years 2018-2020, on the basis of the evidence gathered in the current evaluation pointing to the fact that the termination of the NAO/RAO structures is perceived as a benefit of NDICI-Global Europe which brought simplification also in terms of administrative burden.

### **European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)**

The MTR concluded that ENI remained relevant and fit for purpose. It allowed the EU to implement the reviewed Neighbourhood Policy. The implementation of the principle of differentiation, which was still paramount in 2018-2020, has allowed the EU to adapt its support to partner countries' needs and ambitions.

ENI proved to be a flexible instrument by allowing EU to react to multiple crises and new challenges in the Neighbourhood. However, its flexibility was stretched to its limits in

financial terms and the indicative allocations had to be modified beyond the 10% range set in the multiannual programmes. This constraint remained valid from 2018 to 2020 and was addressed via the introduction of flexibilities in NDICI-Global Europe.

The MTR highlighted a mixed picture regarding the effectiveness of ENI in achieving results due to the difficult political contexts. However, it showed that policy dialogue and cooperation leveraged the implementation of agreed reforms in a number of countries (e.g., public administration reform in Ukraine). This leverage was stronger when budget support was used as implementing modality, because of the greater depth of policy dialogue with the beneficiary throughout the life of the operation.

### **Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)**

The 2017 MTR concluded that DCI was largely on track to deliver on its objectives, as countries receiving the bulk of DCI assistance were showing signs of poverty reduction.

To measure the performance of the DCI in achieving its overall aim i.e. poverty reduction and its specific objectives of (1) fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development and (2) supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and the relevant principles of international law, the Regulation makes reference to the indicators of the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals. However, the Millennium Development Goal/Sustainable Development Goal indicators only show global progress towards development results (based on the actions of partner countries and all donors). Therefore, these results cannot be directly attributable to the DCI.

The 2017 MTR also concluded that the principles of differentiation and graduation left a gap in the EU's ability to cooperate with Upper Middle-Income Countries through bilateral cooperation under DCI. This gap persisted as there was no cooperation with these countries under the DCI in the past MFF.

### **Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)**

The mid-term evaluation carried out in 2017 covered the three components of the Instrument, namely: (1) response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts, (2) conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness and (3) addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats. The evaluation found that the IcSP was effective, delivering on its objectives and commitments in a politically responsive manner. Findings also show that it successfully mainstreamed conflict prevention and conflict-sensitivity across EU interventions. The IcSP was highly appreciated by both EU actors and partners for its 'niche' areas (namely its focus on crisis response, conflict prevention and peacebuilding), as a forerunner, 'gap filler' or financing bridge to interventions by other EFIs. Its faster and flexible management procedures, its ability to provide support in conflict and crisis situations at short notice when no other financing was available, to take risks, to engage with specific

stakeholders beyond third-country governments, enabled the EU to remain responsive to evolving contexts, while advancing EU's values and priorities and respond to local needs.

The IcSP was seen as relevant and able to contribute to fill gaps, enhance coherence and creating synergies in priority EU actions. As such, the Instrument contributed to enhance the EU's political leverage and enabled the EU to seize windows of opportunity for engagement and advance peace and stability goals. These characteristics were confirmed over the 2018-2020 implementation period.

In 2017, an amendment to the IcSP Regulation was introduced to allow the Union to include military actors, under exceptional circumstances in the framework of assistance provided to security sector actors, in the context of a wider security sector reform process or capacity building in support of development and security for development in third countries (Capacity Building of military actors in support of development, CBSD).

A mid-term evaluation of CBSD <sup>38</sup> concluded that it had a strong role to play as an enabler of dialogue between the EU and national military actors, both at strategic and at programming level. In terms of efficiency, while CBSD interventions tended to be over-ambitious in terms of timeline, given the 18-month lifespan of actions under IcSP Article 3, concrete results were obtained and were useful for the EU to build strategic relations with partner countries and military. In this context, CBSD provided a clear EU added value, strengthening EU's capacity and legitimacy to engage in the security sector and start dialogue with military actors in fragile or crisis contexts.

### **Partnership Instrument (PI)**

The creation of the Partnership Instrument, one of the major novelties in the 2014-2020 MFF, responded to an evolving international context, with the emergence of new actors and development of EU partnerships with strategic partners and third countries. The external evaluation of the PI (June 2017) confirmed its relevance as a mechanism responding to EU and mutual interest cooperation, beyond the context of third country development needs. Its key features of being policy-driven and supporting peer-to-peer cooperation, alongside its promotion of the external dimension of EU policies and its linkages with EU trade policy were identified as its core strengths to be carried over into the next MFF, together with its flexible approach. The MTR also noted that the PI provided the means to flexibly pursue EU strategic interests globally, demonstrating clear EU added value through innovative responses to new and changing policy priorities, such as accompanying decarbonisation efforts in Latin American economies or supporting a bottom-up approach to energy and climate action through the Global Covenant of Mayors.

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<sup>38</sup> Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) Initiative Evaluation Multi-Country EuropeAid/138778/DH/SER/Multi – SIEA 2018 - LOT 3: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND PEACE Specific Contract 2019/412021

High external and internal coherence was achieved because of its innovative upstream consensus approach, where interventions were designed and implemented together with other EU services: this method allowed for a timely response to EU interests and strategic policy opportunities in a wide range of areas. With a global reach, the PI supported bilateral cooperation in areas and subjects beyond development cooperation and created a positive environment for a deepened relationship <sup>39</sup>, particularly in the case of industrialised partner countries, most strategic partners and graduated<sup>40</sup> (middle and high income) countries, including providing support to the Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA) implementation and facilitating EU Chambers' coordination ahead of the agreement's entry into force, to mention but one example. The PI was used where an EU strategic interest existed and where the actions considered could not be funded by other instruments.

### **European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)**

The 2017 MTR confirmed the EIDHR was “fit for purpose”. The instrument's worldwide mandate and broad thematic scope reflected the universality and indivisibility of human rights. The EIDHR created space for political and democratic dialogue. Beyond contributing to the ability of civil society to advocate for reforms and change from within their societies, it also provided Commission services, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU Delegations with considerable input into their political and other dialogues with partner countries. Its flexible procedures allowed it to address human rights and democracy challenges in the most difficult environments. Throughout the 2014-20 MFF, its specific features and added value made it a “niche” instrument, able to operate where others could not and confirming its relevance for the political priorities of the EU. The specific features of the EIDHR were incorporated to the Human Rights and Democracy thematic programme.

The 2017 MTR also found that EU election observation missions were a pillar of EU support to the integrity of electoral processes and the engagement of civil society. The deployment of electoral missions (87 electoral missions were deployed between 2014 and 2017) was a key tool not only in supporting democratic governance and resilience, but also contributing to increased quality of electoral processes, hence promoting human rights and rule of law globally. Election observation proved effective in improving the reliability of electoral processes with the presence of observers on the ground contributing to reducing the possibility of election-related violence and tampering with results. Clear evidence of effectiveness and impact were identified supported by relevant data for periods before and after the MTR. Space for policy dialogue on electoral reform was created (Lebanon and

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<sup>39</sup> Recitals, Regulation (EU) 234/2014

<sup>40</sup> Countries that meet at least two of the three following [criteria](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldc-graduation.html) in two consecutive triennial reviews: (i) GNI per capita: \$1,306 or above/Income-only: \$3,918 or above, (ii) Human Assets Index (HAI) 66 or above, (iii) Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) 32 or below. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldc-graduation.html>

Pakistan) while significant legislative and administrative changes were directly attributed to EOM recommendations (Cambodia and Honduras).

### **Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II (IPA II)**

The evaluation of the IPA II instrument as part of 2017 MTR reaffirmed that the strategic relevance of the EU pre-accession support was considerably improved under IPA II compared to the first IPA instrument, as the instrument put strong emphasis on structural reforms fuelling the accession process. It was nevertheless also noted that while the introduction of the sector approach improved the strategic focus of IPA II, there was uneven uptake and implementation among beneficiaries. The 2017 MTR also acknowledged that the instrument demonstrated a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness in cases of pressing emerging needs, such as the 2014 floods in the Western Balkans and the 2015 refugee crisis. The capacity to react in a flexible manner to emerging crisis situations held valid during the period 2018-2020, with extensive support provided to especially Western Balkans beneficiaries to address the health and socio-economic needs caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2017 MTR noted weaknesses in reporting on results but considered the monitoring and evaluation system embedded in the IPA II Regulation and the setting up of a performance framework promising. However, the numerous indicators used for the monitoring and evaluation systems at national level, especially at the outcome level, were still considered weak.

### **Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)**

The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 2014-2020 has been successful in its implementation. Specific achievements included the completion of the Chernobyl New Safe Confinement, improved arrangements for emergency preparedness and response in several countries and regions; and improved management of radioactive waste, particularly in pre-accession and neighbourhood countries.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>[https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2327e980-2b14-45cc-a8f8-c65d94012e3c\\_en?filename=evaluation-report-insc-2014-2020\\_en.pdf](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2327e980-2b14-45cc-a8f8-c65d94012e3c_en?filename=evaluation-report-insc-2014-2020_en.pdf)



## **Greenland Decision (GD)**

The 2017 MTR confirmed the continued relevance of the Greenland Decision as the basis for the relations between Greenland, Denmark and the EU and confirmed that it provides a sufficiently wide platform for pursuing dialogue on emerging global issues of mutual interest. It furthermore confirmed that the partnership had been effective in contributing to sustainable development in Greenland.

The 2017 MTR also concluded that the choice to focus cooperation on education had been appropriate considering that this sector was seen in Greenland as the most relevant growth parameter for prosperity and societal development, with the qualification that the economic impact of this choice was necessarily long-term and thus not immediately visible. It was noted that the partnership had continued to deepen throughout the period and that further initiatives had been taken to continue this work – e.g., further developing the policy dialogue on areas of mutual interest.

## **European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD)**

The European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) was launched in 2017 as one of the three pillars of the “External Investment Plan” (EIP). Built on the model of the “Juncker Plan” for Europe, the EIP was a tool aimed at encouraging investment in the EU partner countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the EU Neighbourhood regions.

The EFSD enabled the signature of 18 guarantee agreements with thirteen partner DFIs for a total of EUR 1.54 billion – i.e., the ceiling allowed under the EFSD Regulation. With regard to the blending component of EFSD, during the period 2017-2020 the EU approved EUR 3.8 billion of blending support, EUR 2.1 billion covering sub-Saharan Africa and EUR 1.7 billion the Neighbourhood region.

On the basis of the independent assessment of the initial functioning of the EFSD (as carried out between July 2019 and January 2020), the Commission concluded in its 2020 report<sup>42</sup> that the EFSD was very relevant to the investment needs of the targeted regions, as well as to the EU priorities and commitments. The approach fit well within the ‘new Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)-led global development finance model’ given the EFSD’s catalytic role, risk sharing capabilities and ability to enhance partnerships. While the implementation was in its initial phase, early-stage dialogue in country would ensure that the EFSD pipeline would be aligned with SDG priorities, which boded well for effectiveness and additionality of this new instrument. With regard to efficiency, the EFSD governance structure was seen by the external independent assessment (mentioned above) as conducive to facilitating transparency and coordination with all involved actors. There were also indications that EFSD had positive impact on overall coherence, as it encouraged greater coordination and alignment between the EU and financial institutions, especially through the

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<sup>42</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0224&rid=5>

new tool, the EFSD Guarantee, where efforts have been made to engage with more development finance organisations. An “open access model” and portfolio approach have been considered important innovations for increasing flexibility. High demand for the new EU budgetary guarantee was regarded in the external independent assessment as a sign of a long-term sustainability of the EFSD as an approach. This has been reinforced during the roll-out phase by the potential of the EFSD (guarantees, in particular) to test and develop new financial products.

### **2.2.3 Impact assessment for the EFIs under the MFF 2021-2027 and Explanatory memorandum for the proposal establishing NDICI-Global Europe**

#### **NDICI – Global Europe**

Building on the experiences gained with the past instruments and the lessons learned with their mid-term evaluation, the impact assessment<sup>43</sup> for the EFIs under the MFF 2021-2027 concluded that the broad areas covered by previous instruments should be maintained. The objective was to enable the EU to pursue its foreign policy objectives with more flexibility and increased impact.

The impact assessment stated that the EFIs needed to address the weaknesses in the previous instruments by ensuring complementarity of thematic programmes with geographic programmes and of rapid response actions with geographic and thematic programmes. Also, a strong coordination and consistency with other areas of external action and with other relevant EU internal policies would need to be ensured. It concluded that one broad instrument would provide a more geographically and thematically comprehensive approach, facilitating the implementation of different policies in a trans-regional, multi-sectoral and global way.

The impact assessment also stressed the need to focus more on the performance of the EFIs, to respond to the lessons learned from the 2017 MTR regarding deficiencies in measuring effectiveness, monitoring of results and reporting and evaluation. Key performance indicators were therefore included in the legal basis proposal, allowing to measure results and success towards the specific objectives.

The explanatory memorandum of the Commission proposal for the Regulation establishing the NDICI-Global Europe<sup>44</sup> factored in the findings of the 2017 MTR report and the impact assessment, stressing that the lessons learned had to be considered together with the growing challenges to be tackled by EU external action. The explanatory memorandum further described the enabling nature of the NDICI-Global Europe in terms of consistency with

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<sup>43</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SWD:2018:0337:FIN:EN:PDF>

<sup>44</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A460%3AFIN>

international obligations and within the EU policy framework for external action and other relevant EU policies. It explained the complementarity with IPA III, DOAG as well as the INSC, the CFSP as well as the future EPF.

### **IPA III**

The common impact assessment of EFIs concluded that IPA should remain a self-standing instrument. The explanatory memorandum of the Commission proposal for the IPA III Regulation highlighted that the IPA objectives remain substantially distinct from the general objectives of the Union's external action, as IPA aims to prepare partners to and support their accession process. It was therefore essential to maintain a dedicated instrument in support of enlargement policy, while ensuring that it complements the general objectives of Union's external action and in particular those of the NDICI-Global Europe.

The explanatory memorandum outlined that under IPA III assistance would continue to be targeted and adjusted to the specific situations of the beneficiaries. It further noted that the instrument would introduce more flexibility by not establishing pre-allocated financial envelopes. Access to bilateral funds would be based on the performance-based approach and the fair share principle, and the selection of actions would be based on their relevance and maturity. In contrast to IPA II, no specific performance-reward mechanism was introduced under IPA III, but the performance assessment was embedded in the annual programming process.

### **DOAG**

The 2013 Overseas Association Decision and the 2014 Greenland Decision could not be included in the NDICI-Global Europe or in any other legal act subject to the ordinary legislative procedure because of their specific adoption procedure (a Council Decision by unanimity, following consultation of the European Parliament). However, to streamline the number of programmes both Decisions were merged into a single Decision regrouping all OCTs, including Greenland. This new legislative act for all OCTs, that covers the political and legal framework and cooperation implementation, delivers unity of management - having all the OCTs under the same source of financing (the EU budget) and creates synergies in programming and implementation. It gives a higher profile to the OCTs as a group. As both decisions have been deemed 'fit for purpose', the guiding principle was to preserve what worked well, while improving what hindered the partners' ability to deliver effectively on their policies and priorities.

The Decision offers a single instrument which covers both the political aspects and the specific relations between the Union and the OCTs. It includes specific provisions where required, guiding the relationship with Greenland, the financial resources consolidated under one heading of the EU budget and implementing rules, which largely follow the NDICI-Global Europe, ensuring coherence and simplification. Where necessary, the Decision

provides for specific, simplified rules for OCTs, as for programming. Thus, the Decision aims to simplify the management and oversight architecture of the former set of instruments.

The OCTs have a special status, belonging to the territory of their Member States (France, the Netherlands or Denmark) but not to the EU, and only one of them is eligible to ODA (Wallis and Futuna). They are not bound by the '*acquis communautaire*' but their legislation is in line with the principles of the EU.

## **INSC**

NDICI-Global Europe Impact Assessment also covered INSC, noting that some nuclear activities fall under the competence of the Euratom Treaty, which provided the legal basis for the INSC (Article 203 of the Euratom Treaty). As the INSC could not be integrated into the NDICI-Global Europe, a separate instrument was maintained based on the Euratom legal basis, to pursue the objectives of Euratom. However, efforts are made to ensure that actions carried out under the new INSC are more consistent with those of the NDICI-Global Europe.

### **3. HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD?**

This section looks at the progress made in implementing the EFIs under the 2021 – 2027 MFF since 2021 and the introduction of monitoring systems used to measure progress.

#### **3.1 Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe**

- **Geographic and thematic programmes**

The financial resources linked to the NDICI-Global Europe geographic and thematic pillars have been programmed through a comprehensive process resulting in a set of country, multi-country, regional and thematic multiannual programming documents that define the priority areas for financing, specific objectives, expected results, indicators and indicative allocations. The programming exercise started in November 2020 and most of the multi-annual indicative programmes (MIPs) were adopted in 2021, with some further adoptions in 2022 and 2023, considering the political context in partner countries.

Through this process, the EU defined its priority areas and specific objectives for the period 2021-2027 with each partner country and region. This process was inclusive, with dialogues with partner countries, EU Member States, civil society organisations including women and youth organisations, local authorities, private sector, the UN and other donors and key stakeholders, in line with the NDICI-Global Europe's principles.

As of November 2023, a total of 104 geographic MIPs were adopted as a result of the programming exercise with 10 country, 1 multi-country and 2 regional MIPs adopted in the Neighbourhood, 46 country and 1 regional MIPs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 23 country, 1 multi-country and 1 regional MIPs in Asia and the Pacific, 17 country and 1 regional MIPs in Americas and the Caribbean and the MIP for Erasmus+<sup>45</sup>.

Amongst the geographic MIPs, joint programming documents replacing MIPs were adopted for 7 countries: Djibouti, Ghana, Laos, Mali, Senegal, Togo and Palestine.

NDICI-Global Europe introduced the obligation to undertake conflict assessments as part of the geographic programming for fragile and conflict affected countries (one of the recommendations of the 2017 Mid-Term Evaluation). To date, 48 country conflict assessments and 2 regional conflict assessments have been conducted. Findings indicate that this measure can help to mainstream support to peace and security more coherently and to better focus on the needs of the partner country and the responses needed.

Furthermore 4 thematic MIPs were adopted covering Human Rights and Democracy, Civil Society Organisations, Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention and Global Challenges.

The European Court of Auditors in its special report 14/2023 published in June 2023 on the programming of NDICI-Global Europe<sup>46</sup> concluded that overall, the Commission and the EEAS had designed comprehensive geographical multi-annual indicative programmes addressing a broad range of partner country needs and EU priorities.

Furthermore, in line with the policy first principle, both EIB lending operations and Open Architecture operations must be aligned with the priority areas identified in the relevant geographic programmes.

In this context, the Guarantee Agreement for EFSD+ Investment Window 1 refers to the Economic and Investment Plans (EIPs) for the Western Balkans, the Neighbourhood East and South and to geographic strategic documents for Africa, Latin America, Caribbean and Asia and Pacific as well as relevant Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs). The EIPs and TEIs provide guidance for investments. For public sector investments, the Commission has established a rigorous method of operational coordination with the EIB to ensure that all EIB loans backed by the EFSD+ Window 1 guarantee correspond to EU policy priorities.

The alignment of the EFSD+ operations under the Open Architecture with the policy first principle has also been ensured at the first call for proposals with the establishment of six investment windows<sup>47</sup> corresponding to EU priorities. In addition, the Commission plans to further intensify the “pipeline coordination” processes under EFSD+, so that DFI loans and

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<sup>45</sup> Financed by NDICI-Global Europe and IPA III.

<sup>46</sup> See [Report | European Court of Auditors \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/auditors-report-ndici-global-europe).

<sup>47</sup> Connectivity – Sustainable Energy, Transport, Digital; Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) Financing for Inclusive and Green Growth and Job Creation; Sustainable Agriculture, Biodiversity, Forests and Water – Natural Capital; Sustainable Cities; Human Development; Sustainable Finance.

private co-investment enabled by the EFSD+ become linked as much as possible with priority reforms agreed between the EU and the respective partner countries.

The “guarantee component” of EFSD+ has seen a major increase in terms of available resources compared to its predecessor (the EFSD). The NDICI-Global Europe Regulation establishes the maximum amount of operations that can be guaranteed under the EAG to EUR 53.449 billion. The ceiling in terms of provisioning for the EAG is set at EUR 10 billion. Owing to the leverage effect of guarantees and of blending contributions, the EFSD+ is estimated to have the potential to mobilise more than half a trillion euros in investments for 2021-2027, largely from the private sector.

The state of play by end 2023 of the implementation of the EFSD+ component of the EAG is as follows:

- A) The Commission signed in April 2022 a EUR 26.7 billion guarantee agreement with the European Investment Bank (EIB) to cover operations with sovereign and non-commercial sub-sovereign counterparts<sup>48</sup>. Negotiations are ongoing with the EIB for a dedicated window to cover also operations with commercial sub-sovereign counterparts<sup>49</sup>. So far discussions on another window which would cover operations for the *“promotion of foreign direct investment, trade and the internationalisation of partner countries’ economies, providing a political risk cover for private sector operations”*<sup>50</sup> have not started, partly because relevant opportunities exist for the EIB to obtain guarantee cover under EFSD+ Open Architecture. For all three EIB dedicated investment windows, the EIB can sign operations up to an aggregate amount of EUR 26.7 billion.
- B) To step up investment in the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions, the Commission and the EIB have signed in February 2023 a dedicated guarantee agreement in support of private sector lending<sup>51</sup> – worth EUR 1 billion in terms of operations as well as set up a high impact trust fund for the amount of EUR 1 billion to support riskier operations.
- C) The first call for proposals – to allocate the portion of EAG’s amount open to all Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)<sup>52</sup> – was launched in April 2022 and attracted strong interest, with bids surpassing the available cover capacity by close to fourfold. Following the Commission’s favourable assessment and a positive opinion by EU Member States represented in the EFSD+ Operational Board, 51 Proposed Investment Programmes (PIPs) put forward by 20 DFIs (some as joint operations) were considered to be in line with the requirements to receive EFSD+ support. In 2023, the

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<sup>48</sup> This is the so called EIB’s “(exclusive) investment window 1”.

<sup>49</sup> This is the so called “investment window 2”.

<sup>50</sup> This is the so called “investment window 3”.

<sup>51</sup> This is the so called “investment window 4”.

<sup>52</sup> So called “open access” / “open architecture”, which functions on the basis of calls for proposals.

Commission started negotiating the terms of guarantee agreements on a priority set of PIPs.

With regard to macro-financial assistance (MFA), by end 2023 approximately 65% of the total MFA lending capacity under the EAG has been allocated for loans in Ukraine, Moldova, North Macedonia<sup>53</sup>.

As concerns the loans foreseen under the Euratom Regulation (2021/948), by end 2023 no loan has been issued yet under the EAG.

- **Rapid Response**

### **Crisis Response**

Crisis response actions are meant to contribute to peace, stability and conflict prevention in situations of crisis and urgency world-wide. Since 2021, more than 130 crisis response actions have been adopted addressing unforeseen crisis including the Taliban take-over in Afghanistan in 2021 (e.g. support for human security including mine action), the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022 (e.g., advancing accountability in Ukraine and support to recovery of liberated areas), the provision of much-needed support for security and resilience needs in Syria following the devastating earthquake of February 2023 (e.g. delivering basic services and safer spaces for trauma-affected children and caregivers), and in Gaza following the terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023 and the related military escalation (e.g. support to health infrastructure). Apart from swift action in response to on-going crises/conflicts funds are also used to reduce the risk of conflict (such as the risk of spill-over from the Sahel to West African coastal countries, to mention but one example) until programmable funds become available.

All these actions have translated EU policy on conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue, confidence building and post-conflict peace building and contributed to the promotion of effective global governance and multilateralism.

The budget for crisis response actions is an average EUR 242 million/year, which means actions need to be strictly prioritised and coordinated closely with other services to obtain the best possible impact.

### **Resilience**

The resilience component of the rapid response actions pillar of NDICI-Global Europe aims at strengthening resilience of States, societies, communities and individuals and to linking

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<sup>53</sup> EUR 676.8 million of provisioning (out of the available EUR 1.05 billion), covering loans for EUR 7.5 billion.

humanitarian aid and development actions when they cannot be swiftly addressed through geographic and thematic programmes. For the years 2021 to 2023 the entire budget for resilience was allocated to finance actions in support of Syrian refugees and host communities in Türkiye. The actions focused on needs in the fields of health, education and socio-economic development of refugees and host communities, notably in terms of access to public services and livelihood opportunities, and municipal infrastructure. They focused on vulnerable groups and included a gender dimension in the interventions, e.g., protection of women and girls against sexual and gender-based violence and improving access to sexual and reproductive health care.

### **Foreign Policy Needs and Priorities**

The Foreign Policy Needs is designed to support EU foreign policy needs and priorities globally across political, economic and security issues, by acting where there is an urgent or imperative foreign policy interest requiring a rapid reaction.

As of 2021, the FPN has supported EU foreign policy interest in the following thematic areas (list is not exhaustive): public and cultural diplomacy (i.e. Taiwan, Japan, UK, Australia, New Zealand), connectivity (EU/Japan connectivity partnership), support to policy dialogues (i.e. UK, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, Arctic), mine action (Ukraine), climate change (Egypt-COP27), climate and security (Bangladesh), strategic communication (i.e. engaging with Russian-speaking audiences), deforestation in the framework of the new EU Regulation on deforestation and forest degradation (Colombia, Argentina and South East Asia), Digital Transition (future of Internet at global level, digital partnerships with South Korea, Japan and Singapore), disinformation (at global level, in Asia and in Latin America), economic diversification (Gulf Cooperation Council), human rights (in the Neighbourhood and in Asia), maritime security (Gulf of Guinea), media support (Asia, Latin America and the Neighbourhood), energy (Japan-Fukushima), transport (Moldova), sanctions (global), trade (US).

By accompanying trade negotiations, mustering support for climate change action, and influencing decision making on standard setting world-wide, FPN actions have helped to create a level playing field and contributed to the rules-based multilateral order.

- **Emerging challenges and priorities cushion**

Since the beginning of its implementation, NDICI-Global Europe and its emerging challenges and priorities cushion had to respond to an unprecedented series of crisis. 79% of the seven-years cushion budget has been earmarked in the first three years of implementation, notably to:

- Support Ukraine since February 2022;
- Support the EU response to challenges related to migration and forced displacement, notably in support of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries and to support migration-related actions in North Africa;



- Provide an answer to COVID-19 pandemic and strengthening the health systems in partner countries;
- Reinforce the Global challenges, Human rights and democracy, and civil society organisations thematic programmes, as part of the top-ups embedded in recital 70 of the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation, as well as supporting human development worldwide;
- Promote EU priorities, notably to support the Global Gateway strategy by providing additional guarantee coverage for EIB's (sovereign) operations in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean.

### **3.2 The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)**

The Commission adopted the legal basis, the delegated and implementing acts, in 2021, and the Financial Framework Partnership Agreement model in March 2022. It provided the basis for conclusion of multi-annual framework agreements with all seven IPA III beneficiaries by the end of 2022.

The IPA III assistance benefiting Western Balkans and Türkiye is programmed on the basis of a seven-year strategic document, the IPA III programming framework and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, which articulates in more detail the thematic priorities laid out under Windows 3 and 4 of the IPA III programming framework.

By the end of 2023, the Commission has adopted multi-annual and annual programmes worth over EUR 8.6 billion, including bilateral annual action plans for the Western Balkans partners and Türkiye, annual and multi-annual multi-country action plans, including support to the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) and civil society and media. The Commission also adopted 2021-27 IPA Rural Development (IPARD) programmes for Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Türkiye, as well as nine cross-border cooperation programmes between Western Balkans and IPA III beneficiaries, ten cross-border cooperation programmes between IPA III beneficiaries and Member States, one transnational cooperation programme and one interregional cooperation programme, which is also available for Western Balkan partners. Several individual measures on migration and border management, refugee support or post-earthquake support in Türkiye as well as support measures on communication, monitoring, evaluation and audit were also adopted together with allocation of funding to the Erasmus+ programme. The preparation of annual bilateral and multi-country programmes for seven IPA III beneficiaries has followed a two-stage programming process, focusing on policy relevance of the strategic responses submitted by IPA III beneficiaries in the first stage and on the technical maturity of proposed actions in the second stage. The respect of performance-based approach and the fair share principle of the IPA III Regulation have been equally taken into account during the programming process.

### **3.3 The European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)**

The financial resources linked to the INSC have been implemented through a comprehensive programming process. The result of the process has been an INSC Multiannual Indicative Programme for the period 2021-2027 containing the priority areas, specific objectives, expected results, performance indicators, indicative financial allocations and cooperation principles. Commitments through the INSC Annual Action Plans for 2021 and 2022 were broadly in line with the indicative allocations for 2021 and 2022 in the INSC MIP 2021-2027.

### **3.4 The Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland (DOAG)**

The financial resources linked to the DOAG have been implemented through an ad-hoc comprehensive programming process. The result of the process has been a set of programming documents that define per territorial/regional/intra-regional programme: the priority area for financing, the specific objectives, expected results, indicators and indicative allocations.

As of October 2023, the programming has been finalised, with 16 Multi-annual Indicative Programmes (MIP) adopted, including: 1 MIP per OCT, 3 Regional MIP (French Southern and Antarctic Lands, Caribbean, Pacific) and 1 intra-regional MIP. Each MIP defines only 1 sector priority (except for Greenland that has 2). There is also only one Annual or multi-annual action plans per OCT (except Greenland), and 19 AAP have been adopted until end 2023 (territorial, regional, support measures).

Given the specificity of the cooperation with the OCTs (only 1 AAP for the 2021-2027 period), no Mid-term review of programming is foreseen under the DOAG.

## **4. EVALUATION FINDINGS**

### **4.1 To what extent was the intervention successful and why?**

#### **Effectiveness**

#### **2014-2020 EFIs**

The 2017 MTR report noted that the overall effectiveness of the external financing instruments under the 2014-2020 MFF in meeting their objectives was challenging to measure, partly because of the difficulty in defining appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems at the instrument-level. The limitations as to measuring the effectiveness of the EU support is further explained in section 1. The approach to look at the past instruments from the transition angle is also highlighted in section 2.

The past instruments continue to deliver against their respective objectives, with a number of actions still ongoing and delivering results. Recent Annual Reports on the implementation of the EU external financing instruments confirm this trend.

The below table shows the latest aggregated results<sup>54</sup> for EU Results Framework Level 2 indicators (on the indicators, see further in annex VI on the results, evaluation and monitoring). The data was compiled from completed and ongoing EU-funded interventions financed under MFF 2014-2020 by the DCI, the EDF, the ENI, the EIDHR, the IcSP and the PI. A substantial number of these interventions are still ongoing and continue to produce results.

<b>EU Results Framework indicator</b>	<b>2018-2022</b>
Number of food-insecure people receiving EU assistance	29 057 000
Number of women of reproductive age, adolescent girls and children under five reached by nutrition-related interventions supported by the EU	22 337 000
Number of smallholders reached with EU-supported interventions aimed to increase their sustainable production, access to markets and/or security of land	21 402 000
Agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced with EU support (ha)	3 124 000
Number of one-year-olds fully immunised with EU support	64 439 000
Number of women of reproductive age using modern contraception methods with EU support	31 009 000
Number of students enrolled in education with EU support: a) primary education	45 052 000
Number of students enrolled in education with EU support: b) secondary education	8 887 000
Number of individuals with access to improved drinking water source and/or sanitation facility with EU support	22 339 000
Number of individuals accessing electricity with EU support through: a) new access, b) improved access	38 065 000
Renewable energy generation capacity installed with EU support (MW)	34 000
Number of jobs supported/sustained by the EU	798 000
Number of countries supported by the EU to strengthen investment climate	124
Number of beneficiaries with access to financial services with EU support: a)	828 000

<sup>54</sup> [2023 Annual report on the implementation of the European Union's external action instruments in 2022 - Publications Office of the EU \(europa.eu\)](#)

firms	
Number of beneficiaries with access to financial services with EU support: b) individuals	2 723 000
Number of quality schemes adopted by economic operators with EU support	34 000
Number of people who have benefited from institution- or workplace-based VET/skills development interventions supported by the EU	2 115 000
Total length of road supported by the EU through: a) construction, b) rehabilitation, c) maintenance (km)	80 000
Number of migrants, forcibly displaced people or individuals from host communities protected or assisted with EU support	29 007 000
Number of migration management or forced displacement strategies or policies: a) developed/revised with EU support	235
Number of migration management or forced displacement strategies or policies: b) under implementation with EU support	202
Number of countries and cities with climate change and/or disaster risk reduction strategies: a) developed	294
Number of countries and cities with climate change and/or disaster risk reduction strategies: b) under implementation with EU support	126
Number of micro, small and medium enterprises applying sustainable consumption and production practices with EU support	29 000
Greenhouse gas emissions avoided with EU support (tonnes CO <sub>2</sub> e)	115 557 000
Marine areas under: a) protection with EU support (km <sup>2</sup> )	966 000
Areas of terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems under: a) protection with EU support (ha)	77 599 000
Areas of terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems under: b) sustainable management with EU support (ha)	70 637 000
Number of countries supported by the EU to conduct elections and/or improve their electoral process	56
Number of government policies developed or revised with civil society organisation participation through EU support	2 000
Number of victims of human rights violations directly benefiting from assistance funded by the EU	166 000
Number of people directly benefiting from legal aid interventions supported by the EU	6 649 000
Number of individuals directly benefiting from EU-supported interventions that specifically aim to support civilian post-conflict peacebuilding and/or conflict prevention	1 041 000
Number of state institutions and non-state actors supported on security, border management, countering violent extremism, conflict prevention, protection of civilian population and human rights	14 000
Number of countries supported by the EU to strengthen revenue mobilisation, public financial management and/or budget transparency	160
Number of people benefitting from EU-funded interventions to counter sexual and gender-based violence	17 341 000

## 2021-2027 EFIs are on track to deliver against their general objectives

### NDICI-Global Europe

At this point in time, NDICI-Global Europe is on track to effectively deliver against the objectives it was expected to fulfil at the time of its adoption. While the first operational results related to its financial execution are only starting to materialise and will be reported as of 2024, the evidence from the external study confirms that the programming documents are policy-driven and in line with the objectives and priorities set in the relevant regulations and EU goals in the relevant geographical regions. It also confirms that non-programmable actions under NDICI-Global Europe rapid response pillar are being implemented in a manner that will yield results in line with EU policy objectives regarding promoting stability in conflict-affected regions via appropriate crisis response actions. The external study also confirms that non-programmable actions under rapid response are on track to deliver results in line with EU policy objectives with regard to supporting stability and peace in conflict-affected regions and countries. It also confirms the coherence of Crisis Response and Resilience with the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus.

The programming documents indeed substantiate the finding that the general objectives as provided for in Article 3 of the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation (see under section 2.1) have been adequately translated into the programming. In particular:

1. NDICI-Global Europe has strengthened the means for the EU to promote the **Union's values, principles and fundamental interests worldwide**, emphasising the promotion of shared priorities with partner countries. The Global Gateway strategy was adopted to enable the EU to deliver on these key objectives with more impact. In an evolving and challenging international context, the strategy aims to increase Union's geopolitical and geoeconomic influence, providing a framework for the EU external action, with NDICI-Global Europe effectively serving as its main tool and catalyst. In this setting, while NDICI-Global Europe places a stronger emphasis on policy reforms than did the former EFIs, much remains to be achieved in that regard.
  - The EU's actions funded under NDICI-Global Europe pursue the objective of **poverty eradication**. They promote inclusive public policies in partner countries, which leave no one behind. Data for 2022 show that a total of 170 NDICI-Global Europe funded actions targeted SDG 1 "No poverty" as the main SDG with EUR 4.99 billion committed in 2022, whereas SDG 1 was also reported as a significant SDG in 593 projects where other SDGs were marked as main SDG with EUR 2.916 billion in terms of commitments. In 2021-2022, 99% of NDICI-Global Europe committed funds have been allocated to development actions fulfilling the criteria for official development

aid (ODA), contributing to the at least 93% target for the entire 2021 – 2027 period, which reaffirms the development aid nature of the instrument.<sup>55</sup>

- The support to **human rights, democracy and good governance** is further specified in a dedicated spending target of 15% of the geographic programmes, embedded in the Delegated Act. The cumulative 2021-22 contribution to the target corresponds to 21% of NDICI-Global Europe funding under the geographic programmes.<sup>56</sup>
- The objective to **fight against climate change** set under Article 3 is further specified in a dedicated spending target of 30% of NDICI-Global Europe spending for climate objectives. In addition, in her State of the Union address in September 2021, President von der Leyen announced an additional EUR 4 billion for climate finance until 2027.
- At programming level, climate priority features in all MIPs. The cumulative figure for 2021-2022 show a 22% contribution of NDICI-Global Europe total commitments to climate objectives. For the first two years of implementation, the level of contribution varies greatly between the different NDICI-Global Europe components and among regions, but overall, the progressive increase of 2022 contribution compared to 2021 shows a positive trend towards reaching the target by 2027, even though further efforts will be required in the next years<sup>57</sup>.
- The objective to **address irregular migration and forced displacement** is also further embedded in a dedicated spending target of indicatively 10% of NDICI-Global Europe financial envelope. Migration is covered by more than half of the MIPs. NDICI-Global Europe 2021-2022 cumulative figure shows a contribution to the migration and forced displacement spending target of 14% of total commitments.<sup>58</sup>

2. Engagement with international organisations is an EU priority and is reflected in its sustained commitment to **multilateralism** and a rules-based multilateral order. The NDICI-Global Europe covers the global and multilateral dimensions of the EU's action to implement its political priorities and since the adoption of NDICI-Global Europe, the EU has taken action at political level to address the global trends in new policy frameworks that are directly linked to these global challenges. The EU sent a strong political message with the Joint Communication on strengthening the EU's contribution to rules-based multilateralism<sup>59</sup>. The objective to support the **2030**

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<sup>55</sup> [2023 Annual report on the implementation of the European Union's external action instruments in 2022 - Publications Office of the EU \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>56</sup> Idem

<sup>57</sup> Idem.

<sup>58</sup> Idem.

<sup>59</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52021JC0003>

**Agenda and the implementation of the SDGs** was translated into the implementation of the instrument. All MIPs include for each priority area the relevant SDGs and each action document also specifies the SDGs it aims to support, in accordance with the NDICI-Global Europe provisions on addressing the interlinkages between the SDGs to promote integrated actions. In terms of monitoring and reporting, the annual reports on the implementation of the European Union's external action instruments are structured around both Commission priorities and SDGs. The contribution of the NDICI-Global Europe to the SDGs was thoroughly described in the first ever EU Voluntary Review on the implementation of the SDGs<sup>60</sup>, which was presented by the Commission at the UN High Level Political Forum on sustainable development in July 2023. The NDICI-Global Europe's support to climate objectives embedded in the **Paris Agreement** is illustrated in the previous point above.

- The implementation of NDICI-Global Europe has also been underpinned by the objective of **promoting stronger partnerships with third countries**, which is exemplified by the fact that NDICI-Global Europe programming documents are built on shared priorities among the EU and its partner countries, largely based on national and regional development plans. Another example of this trend is the addition of a specific envelope for HICs within the geographic pillar, which is a recognition of the importance of and leverage to be achieved from cooperation with like-minded partners. This allocation allows the EU to pursue the development of its soft power and promote its interests and values by engaging on key issues with identified target groups as part of regional cooperation with the Americas and East and Southeast Asia in particular. A good example is the launch of business cooperation actions with Japan and South Korea to accompany the implementation of the recently concluded EU-Japan Green Alliance and the EU-Korea Green Partnership, with the aim to enhance business to business partnerships and promote EU green and clean technologies, as a means to support the green transition.
- In addition to the internal coordination among Commission services and the EEAS, an extensive consultation has been carried out with all relevant local, European and international stakeholders. Local civil society organisations welcomed the efforts made and reported a positive evolution of the EU's dialogue with them. Cooperation with partner countries is thus guided by EU strategic policy objectives while anchored in strong partnerships established through a multi-stakeholder dialogue and reflecting shared interests and priorities.

In addition, other priorities that are not part of the general objectives have been incorporated into the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation and Delegated Act through the definition of targets:

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<sup>60</sup> <https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/SDG-Report-WEB.pdf>

- *Social inclusion and Human development*: At least 20 % of the ODA funded under the Instrument shall contribute to social inclusion and human development, including basic social services, such as health, education, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, and social protection, particularly to the most marginalised. Cumulative figure 2021-2022 shows a high contribution to the social inclusion and human development spending target of 32% of NDICI-Global Europe total commitments, partly due to the COVID-19 related spending in the first years of the MFF.
- *Gender equality*: At least 85 % of new actions implemented under the Instrument should have gender equality as a principal or a significant objective. At least 5 % of those actions should have gender equality and women's and girls' rights and empowerment as a principal objective. Cumulative figure 2021-2022 shows a contribution to the gender equality target of 71% of NDICI-Global Europe total actions, of which 6% have gender equality and women's and girls' rights and empowerment as a principal objective.
- *Biodiversity*: In addition to the climate target, the Instrument should contribute to the ambition of providing 7,5 % of annual spending under the MFF to biodiversity objectives in the year 2024 and 10 % in 2026 and 2027. NDICI-Global Europe's spending for biodiversity in 2021-2022 was 5.6%.
- *Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development*: the Delegated Act contains a spending target of 45% of the geographic programmes to an inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. The 2021-22 cumulative contribution to the target is of 62% of NDICI-Global Europe commitments under the geographic programmes.

A number of NDICI-Global Europe objectives have been translated into spending targets, while other targets, on gender equality for instance, were included to emphasise their importance. The number of targets in NDICI-Global Europe has increased compared to the previous MFF. The introduction of a considerable number of targets in the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation is positively perceived in particular by the Member States as it reflects EU priorities contained in key EU policy documents and frames the prioritisation in implementing the instrument, providing structure and steer. Nevertheless, while targets are not competing among themselves as actions can contribute to several targets, an increased number of targets do constrain the flexibility of the instrument, limiting its adaptability and therefore its effectiveness, as highlighted by respondents in Commission Headquarters. Also, too great a focus on compliance may deviate attention from the pursuit of main objectives. All implementing modalities, grants, budget support as well as blending or budgetary guarantees under EFSD+, contribute to the achievement of the NDICI-Global Europe objectives and targets. By applying the 'policy first approach', EFSD+ aims to align the operations of the Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) with EU priorities and objectives.



## IPA III

Overall, the progress made with **Key Performance Indicators** of the IPA III Regulation, and indicators of the IPA III programming framework, as evidenced by the annual assessment of the implementation of the IPA III programming framework<sup>61</sup>, indicate that the instrument is on track to deliver against the main objectives of the Regulation, although there are some limitations as well. For example, the Key Performance Indicator on the acquis alignment, which was substantially supported by IPA III, is close to reaching the target of 2027 both in the Western Balkans and Türkiye. Also, the Key Performance Indicator on political criteria in the Western Balkans shows slight improvements on the functioning of the judiciary, fight against corruption, fight against organised crime and freedom of expression indicators.

IPA III represents a shift towards a more policy-driven and responsive approach compared to its predecessors, as it has evolved from a sector-based instrument to a more holistic **policy first instrument**. The thematic windows largely mirror the clusters of the accession negotiating chapters/clusters as per the revised enlargement methodology. The assistance can be therefore better tailored to the specific needs and the state of play of the accession process of each beneficiary.

Also, IPA III **mirrors the EU priorities and policy developments** in preparing beneficiaries for the future membership of the Union. In line with the new enlargement methodology, the democratic, rule of law, governance and economic reforms are at the core of the instrument. In the stakeholder consultations (e-surveys and the Open Public Consultation) 57% of respondents considered that IPA III assistance is strengthening beneficiaries' capacity on rule of law and fundamental rights, economic governance, democratic institutions, public administration reform, and the ability of beneficiaries to meet membership criteria, while 32% remained neutral and 11% did not consider IPA III to have such effect. From public authorities, 63% considered that IPA III assistance had positive impact on these areas, while 35% of citizens considered it not to be the case.

Substantial part of IPA III funding has been allocated to the implementation of the **Economic and Investment Plans in the Western Balkans**, to spur the long-term economic recovery of the region, support a green and digital transition, and foster regional integration and convergence with the EU. As stated in the 2023 Enlargement Package, insufficient socio-economic convergence between the Western Balkans and the EU has been a long-standing issue, exacerbated by the economic impact of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and before that by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Western Balkans' GDP growth accelerated only marginally from 1.6% to 1.7% in a year and the region's economic convergence in terms of GDP per capita in purchasing power standards is at between 30% and 50% of the EU average and is not progressing fast enough. While IPA III has been **effective in leveraging the necessary investments**, there is a need to further accelerate convergence **with the EU**.

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<sup>61</sup> Article 7(6) of the IPA III Regulation

The external study highlights the **challenges linked to phasing in of an entirely new bilateral programming process** and the increased ownership and strategic planning capacity expected from IPA III beneficiaries. Given that the IPA III programming framework includes broad thematic priorities without any prioritisation or sequencing, the strategic responses of IPA III beneficiaries are expected to perform a function of multi-annual strategic planning documents with prioritised and sequenced reforms. So far, however, most strategic responses have not succeeded in this respect, as found by the external study.

IPA III is designed to be a performance-based instrument with differentiation of assistance in scope and intensity according to **the performance of the beneficiaries**, in particular on their commitment to fundamental reforms. The external study points out that so far there is no evidence on systematic application of the performance-based approach. One challenge is that the performance assessment embedded in the bilateral programming process needs to be balanced with the principle of fair share, which is not conclusively defined. Compared to IPA II, there are no significant variations of yearly allocations for bilateral annual action plans among IPA III beneficiaries.

With regard to **spending targets**, in view of the funds committed so far, IPA III is well on track with the 18% climate target (20% by 2027) in the first two years of IPA III implementation, while the IPA III contribution to the EU biodiversity target is still at early stages of implementation. As concerns the gender equality target, IPA III has increased the number of actions with gender equality as a principal or a significant objective in the first two years of implementation, although more efforts are needed to meet the target. Close monitoring of the spending targets will be required in the second part of the MFF.

## **DOAG**

The general objective of the DOAG is to promote the economic and social development of the OCTs and to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole. The first specific objective of the DOAG is to foster and support cooperation with OCTs, including in addressing their major challenges and reaching the SDGs. Its second specific objective is to support and to cooperate with Greenland in addressing its major challenges such as the raising of education level and to contribute to the capacity of the administration of Greenland to formulate and implement national policies.

DOAG is on track to effectively deliver against these objectives. The OCTs programming documents correctly reflect these objectives, through the priority sectors of the DOAG and in particular those identified *after* its adoption by the Commission (Green deal, climate change, digitalisation, etc.). With Greenland, the EU has maintained its important support to the Education sector (90%). The projects under the DOAG also fall under the Global Gateway agenda.

## INSC

INSC is on track to deliver against its objectives at the time of its adoption. While not foreseen at that time, it responded effectively and in a flexible manner to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through an increased country allocation, close situation monitoring and accelerated contracting. New INSC interventions delivered initial outputs contributing to its main goal of further enhancing nuclear safety and aligning partner countries with best European/international standards and practice. It also contributed to EU cross-cutting issues, particularly to a better environment and sector governance, and SDGs (particularly SDG 16 through stronger institutions and SDG 11 through disaster risk reduction).

## Efficiency

### **Simplification and streamlining: a less complex landscape for stakeholders**

By integrating previous external financing instruments, NDICI-Global Europe provides a unified legal basis for a large share of the EU's external interventions and makes EU external action more coherent and streamlined. NDICI-Global Europe addressed the fragmented nature of the previous architecture, merging several EFIs of the previous MFF, namely DCI, EIDHR, ENI, IcSP, PI and the CIR, as well as the Guarantee Fund for External Action. It also integrated the financially most important EFI, the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF that covered Sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries and previously funded outside the EU budget. NDICI-Global Europe also covers Neighbourhood alongside other regions, while preserving its specificities. NDICI-Global Europe thus addressed the need to improve coherence and complementarity between instruments, in line with the conclusions and recommendations of the 2017 MTR. The implementation of the EFIs under the 2014-2020 MFF was in some respects more focused on their separate objectives and processes than on delivering coherently on common policy objectives and results. The design of NDICI-Global Europe aimed to remedy this aspect.

The integration of previously separate instruments into NDICI-Global Europe is overall very well perceived by all the consulted stakeholders and seen as an improvement allowing for a holistic view of the EU actions, which proves an efficiency gain for the EU and its partners.

In particular, the respondents from the Delegations note that by integrating previous financial instruments NDICI-Global Europe provides a unified legal basis for all interventions and makes EU external action more coherent and practical, with implementation benefitting from streamlined processes. The respondents from Member States development agencies (Practitioners' Network), while welcoming the simplification that a single instrument brings, stressed that the interplay between geographic, global and thematic elements on the ground is not yet clear. They also held that different processes and contracts still coexisted on similar

issues and differences in programming in Sub Saharan Africa and North Africa notably on issues like migration were still noticeable as well as the lack of coordination between national and regional actions (e.g. on Team Europe Initiatives or migration corridors). The feedback from civil society organisations was positive as regards the streamlining to a single instrument but noting that the new regulation brings extra complexity for the local actors, including CSOs. When it comes to CSO funding, respondents noted the key need to consider local contexts as mechanisms to operationalize actions depend much on the context, especially shrinking space for CSOs. The local authorities' organisations also appreciate the simplification brought by NDICI-Global Europe as it allows the Delegations to be more responsive to partner countries priorities.

The external study confirms that the simplification of the EFIs' structure and regulatory framework, especially through the establishment of NDICI-Global Europe, is a significant step forward in terms of efficiency and clarity. The external study further notes that under the previous MFF, the EU produced geographic and thematic programming documents that were not fully harmonised in terms of format, timing and content. Due to the existence of diverse instruments, these documents did not capture all initiatives in all countries. Under the current MFF, all countries, territories, and thematic programmes covered by NDICI-Global Europe go through their programming process concomitantly, using a unified process and an identical MIP template.

The external study further affirms that Delegations and Headquarters have welcomed this change, because it makes the MIPs clearer for the partners. It points to several Delegations in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Neighbourhood region which highlighted the increased transparency stemming from this unified process regarding the policy objectives covered and prioritised by the EU in partnership with stakeholders in a given country. The MIPs are also institutionally more useful under the current EFIs, as comparable documents that facilitate coherent planning, monitoring and instrument-level reporting, including on the coverage of policy objectives.

### **Efficiency in leveraging private investment**

Looking at the efficiency of EU resources, the EFSD+ allows to use limited EU public financial resources as a leverage for other public and private investment. In light of the vastly insufficient public financial resources to cover all development needs, the private sector should assume a greater role in the process, serving as a powerful engine for sustainable and inclusive growth.

Building on the experience from EFSD, EFSD+ is key to reap the full potential of the budgetary guarantees being a complex and still relatively new modality in the EU toolbox. It should also enable to reduce the time needed for projects to hit the ground running.

As underlined by the external study, looking at efficiency from the point of view of the internal organisation and working methods, the introduction of EFSD+ has been

accompanied by efforts to ensure internal capacity of the staff to deal with such new implementing modality. The external study recognises the positive steps taken in terms of recruitment of specialised staff and delivery of training, while underlying that capacity development is still very much needed in this area.

### **Flexibility: NDICI-Global Europe proved flexible enough to adapt to an ever more complex geopolitical environment**

One of the main conclusions of the 2017 MTR was that the flexibility of external instruments should increase, taking as an example the flexibility allowed under the off-budget European Development Fund, allowing the EU to better respond to sudden and unforeseen changes in the geopolitical context. This conclusion determined the inclusion in the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation of some flexibility features, which proved even more relevant when two major crises arose in the very first years of implementation of the instrument: the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine.

The EDF had a multiannual budget. The coverage of ACP countries under NDICI-Global Europe in the 2021-2027 MFF implied a transition to an instrument financed through the EU budget, subject to annual budgetary availability. The subsequent loss in flexibility for ACP countries was partly mitigated by the provisions of Article 30 on budgetary flexibilities of the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation, which applies to all partner countries eligible under the instrument. This has been widely recognised as an increase in flexibility for non-ACP countries compared to the previous MFF, since the 2014-2020 instruments under the EU budget did not have that flexibility. Budgetary flexibilities and the possibility to carry-over funds to the following year, is a major flexibility gain, which has already demonstrated added value in the first years of implementation of the instrument, especially considering the challenging international context, in particular in the Neighbourhood region.

Another flexibility feature inspired by the EDF is the NDICI-Global Europe's Emerging challenges and priorities cushion. It is composed of unallocated funds available to increase the budgets of any of the three NDICI-Global Europe pillars, namely the geographic programmes, thematic programmes and rapid response actions, in the circumstances referred to in Article 17 of the Regulation.

In the first three years of implementation, the cushion proved to be a strategic tool, providing a prompt geopolitical and geoeconomic response to crises, unforeseen events and Union priorities, as also confirmed by the external study, by several Member States through dedicated consultations and by several stakeholders through the OPC.

For example (see Annex VII - table 8 for the list of the mobilisations), the NDICI-Global Europe cushion allowed the EU to quickly and flexibly step up its support to partner countries facing the COVID-19 pandemic and health systems fragility, also supporting capacity-building in the production of vaccines in partner countries. It also allowed the swift provision of additional support to Ukraine following Russia's war of aggression. It was instrumental in

covering needs linked to crisis and post-crisis situations or migratory pressure and forced displacement. Furthermore, in line with the top-ups embedded in recital 70 of the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation, the cushion has also been used to reinforce the Global challenges, Human rights and democracy, and Civil Society Organisations thematic programmes.

The unprecedented series of crises faced since 2021 has revealed the strategic and political added value of the cushion, allowing the Union to provide an appropriate response to unforeseen events and priorities, which was widely recognised in consultations with stakeholders and in the external study. The main limitation related to the cushion related to its over-consumption in the first years of the MFF as, at the end of 2023, 79% of the 2021-2027 budget had been earmarked. Moreover, as underlined in the external study, future reflection is needed concerning the use of the cushion for certain actions that could have been programmed.

The crisis response component of the Rapid Response Actions under NDICI-Global Europe contributed to the overall efficiency and flexibility of the instrument. As also confirmed by the external study, it enabled the EU to react swiftly and flexibly to emerging and existing crises, and increased fragility around the world. For the financial years 2021 and 2022, resources were allocated where they were most needed: Ukraine and Moldova (approx. EUR 133.9 million), as well as Sub-Saharan Africa, (approx. EUR 179 million) and the Syrian crisis (EUR 46.25 million), amongst others. Identification of new measures started from the beginning of 2021, even before the adoption of the regulation, thanks to the retroactivity from 1 January 2021 mentioned above (see 2.1.2). This allowed the EU to provide immediate and swift responses to international crises creating the platform for a more coherent EU political action.

Another example of flexibilities available under NDICI-Global Europe is related to its Foreign Policy Needs (FPN) component under Rapid Response Pillar that can be mobilised if there is an ‘urgent or imperative foreign policy interest, or a window of opportunity to achieve its objectives, requiring a rapid reaction and which are difficult to address by other means’. In practice, FPN interventions pursue innovative responses to short-to-medium term needs, opportunities and priorities, including to bridge potential future actions under geographic or thematic programmes (bridging). In 2023, for instance, a flagship action was launched to support the EU to manage the external impacts of its new Regulation on deforestation and forest degradation. Concretely, these interventions in Latin America and South-East Asia will mitigate political and trade irritants and wrongful perceptions linked to the Regulation by countering the negative narratives produced by the affected sectors and by enhancing the understanding of the Regulation. Ultimately, these actions will facilitate an inclusive transition towards deforestation-free and legal supply chains to the EU, and thereby contributing to minimise the EU’s contribution to global deforestation and forest degradation - a key aim of the Regulation.

NDICI-Global Europe’s flexibility is also exemplified by the broad and enabling nature of its scope. For example, NDICI-Global Europe is used as the main EU tool serving Global

Gateway, the EU offer to partner countries with a strong focus on environment, social and sustainability aspects. Provisions of NDICI-Global Europe related to its objectives, geographic and thematic scope, approach to programming, implementation modalities and close cooperation with the Member States have been constructed to serve evolving EU policy objectives, strategies and priorities, which makes the Instrument fit for the implementation of the Global Gateway strategy, in line with all the objectives set in the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation, even though the strategy was adopted after the instrument. Global Gateway, by supporting smart investments in quality infrastructure, while respecting the highest social and environmental standards, is contributing to the objectives of the EU development policy and development objectives of the EU partner countries, also in line with the objectives its main EU vehicle, NDICI-Global Europe.

According to the majority of respondents from Delegations, overall levels of flexibility have increased compared to the previous MFF. Regarding responsiveness of current EFIs to EU policy and political priorities, overall responses were very positive on the flexibility of the instrument and slightly positive about its suitability for mainstreaming EU policy priorities. More than half of respondents agree that the current EFIs are flexible enough to respond to developments in the EU external action policy framework (e.g. Global Gateway).

Overall, the Delegations think that the new framework's simplification made it clearer and easier to understand for partners. There has been a positive contribution to streamlining and reducing the administrative processes required to programme and then implement. The mid-term review, determining the allocation of funds for the second half of the MIP period can help foster policy dialogue.

Evidence gathered during the consultation process shows that there is room for improvement in terms of flexibility when it comes to the programming process. While the programming exercise successfully allowed to identify shared priorities for the following seven years, based on inclusive consultations, it turned out to be an administratively cumbersome and lengthy process which to a certain extent hampered the flexibility and the efficiency of the instrument. Indeed, the Delegations note that the programming process is heavier to manage than before with an increase in transaction costs especially for a small Delegations with small country envelopes.

With regard to the investment component of NDICI-Global Europe, most stakeholders and notably DFIs highlighted that EFSD and EFSD+ proved to be flexible tools. This was also recognised (to a certain extent) by the external study, with the caveat that procedures for prioritisation should be further developed. Indeed, both EFSD and EFSD+ investments could be reoriented to quickly respond to the adverse socio-economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic as well as to the fallout of the war of aggression against Ukraine. To address the all-encompassing consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, several EFSD guarantee agreements and blending operations were revised or repurposed to steer resources towards urgent needs. This spanned not only the health sector, such as in the case of an existing EFSD guarantee agreement with the EIB (which was amended so as to guarantee the EIB's loan to

the COVAX initiative promoting equitable access to Covid-19 vaccines); it also covered the real economy, where the changes targeted a more deliberate support for the most vulnerable economic actors, such as the small producers, entrepreneurs and firms hit by the crisis. Similarly, at the outset of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, an existing European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) programme guaranteed under the EFSD was adapted to allow immediate support to Ukrenergo, the Ukrainian energy transmission company. DFIs have called for this flexibility to be used and further enhanced in the future, especially to allow them to respond faster in view of the evolving market needs. This will be assessed also taking into account the instrument's risk limits.

### **IPA III allows more flexibility and efficiency gains compared to its predecessors**

Building on the lessons learnt and the experience from previous instruments, IPA III has been efficient in deploying a mix of modalities and tools, including budget support, grants and investments generated under the WBIF, a joint initiative of the EU, international financial institutions, bilateral donors and beneficiaries, pooling their financial resources together. This combination of modalities has ensured that various dimensions of the enlargement process, including legislative alignment, institution-building, green and digital and sustainable socio-economic development, have been addressed more holistically.

The external study confirmed that IPA III is flexible in responding to exceptional external events, even though the instrument does not have a similar cushion as the NDICI-Global Europe instrument. The absence of pre-set country financial envelopes has provided the required flexibility to programme assistance according to urgent and evolving needs. Following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU addressed efficiently the impact of the war on the energy security and the post-COVID 19 recovery in the Western Balkans. Within just a few months, the Commission was able to redirect the ongoing programming exercise and prepare an Energy Support Package to the Western Balkans, including approximately 500 million EUR in budget support, followed by another EUR 500 million in investments through the WBIF, bringing about concrete achievements:

- A total of 427 011 vulnerable households received financial support to overcome the price increase of energy bills in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo\* and Montenegro.
- In North Macedonia, 374 (out of 474) schools, 57 (out of eligible 67) public utilities, and 32 (out of eligible 109) health care facilities benefitted from subsidised electricity prices. 244 (out of eligible 820) SMEs involved in the production of basic foods were supplied energy at lower than the market price. The Government adopted the Just Transition Action Plan in June 2023. Consequently, the Government mobilized EUR

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\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



85 million through the Climate Investment Fund for implementation of the key decarbonisation projects identified in the Action Plan and announced during the COP28 meeting in UAE.

- In Kosovo, 1937 households, of which 1152 living in single family houses, and 785 in 28 multi-apartment social buildings benefited from gender sensitive energy efficiency measures (thermal insulation of external walls and roof, replacement of external windows and doors, replacement of heating systems, connection to district heating) in Kosovo. In addition, 15.030 households benefited from energy-efficient household appliances, heating equipment and solar energy systems.
- The Albanian Power Exchange (ALPEX) went live on 12 April 2023. The operation of ALPEX fulfilled one of the requirements of the Third Energy Package and integrated the Albania and Kosovo electricity markets. After launching ALPEX, the Albanian energy market is connected with Kosovo.
- In Montenegro, Solari 5000+ project is fully functional and effectively facilitating energy efficiency and solar panel installation for individual consumers and SMEs.

The adoption of the unified monitoring and reporting system, the IPA III results framework, is expected to improve programming, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of IPA III. With a uniform set of indicators the IPA III result framework ensures the consistency and harmonisation of approaches followed by the different users and promotes reporting on results at a higher level (outcomes). Therefore, its main advantage compared to the previous monitoring and reporting system under IPA II lays on the comprehensiveness and strengthened policy relevance of the indicators used, in line with the “policy first” principle. Furthermore, the IPA III results framework promotes the disaggregation of data by sex, age, disability, beneficiary and sector whenever possible and relevant, in line with Article 41(7) of the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation.

There have been some efficiency gains with having fewer and larger actions with bigger financial envelopes and longer duration, where feasible, under IPA III. However, while there are increasingly more strategic multi-annual multi-country programmes, bilateral programming continues to be done annually, as has been the case since the first IPA instrument. According to external study, the move to a new type of thematic bilateral programming approach that is repeated annually has resulted in increased transaction costs under IPA III both for the Commission and for the national authorities. This new approach resulted in a heavier process, with Strategic Responses including more project proposals from NIPACs that needed to be assessed in terms of relevance and maturity, which required more consultation and guidance.

### **INSC proves agile enough to adapt to external challenges**

The INSC proved to be sufficiently broad, flexible and resilient to allow for an adaptation of its support to new external challenges, like in Ukraine and Armenia. In the targeted consultations the Member States experts found that the EU still has a strong comparative

advantage in working with partner countries in the area of nuclear safety. They acknowledged its useful mission in the current global context. Member States agreed that there is sufficient level of complementarity between INSC and NDICI-Global Europe as well as IPA III.

## **DOAG**

In the targeted consultations the Member States experts agreed that the coherence of EU cooperation with the OCTs under the DOAG has been strengthened after merging the former Greenland and OAD decisions. Member States considered that DOAG has proven to be sufficiently flexible in its objectives and sectors of cooperation to be able to respond to the challenges of all OCTs.

### **Governance: improved and more conducive inter-institutional dynamics**

The transition from the EDF to NDICI-Global Europe, an instrument financed through the EU budget (the so-called “budgetisation” of the EDF), was a long-standing request of the European Parliament. The transition to the NDICI-Global Europe increased the democratic scrutiny of the European Parliament, and improved its legislative and budgetary powers, by extending them to cooperation with ACP countries. Mindful of the European Parliament’s role in the political steer of the Instrument, the Commission committed to conducting a high-level geopolitical dialogue between the two institutions on the implementation of NDICI-Global Europe. The high-level geopolitical dialogue, which has been organised twice a year since the adoption of the Instrument, successfully enhanced the involvement of the Parliament in the political steering of the Instrument and the dialogue between institutions.

The involvement of the Council in the steering of the NDICI-Global Europe also increased. The Council issued a statement on the governance of NDICI-Global Europe on the adoption of the Regulation. The statement foresees inter alia regular follow up on the overall strategic choices for the programming, the use of the rapid response pillar and of the cushion, as well as on the monitoring of the targets and the flexible funding mechanism on migration. Increased dialogue and consultation became structural through the newly created NDICI-Global Europe sub-group of CODEV-PI, where the Council is kept closely informed on the implementation of the Instrument by the Commission.

With regards to IPA III, the Commission and the European Parliament, mindful of the latter’s functions of political control, have committed to conducting a high-level geopolitical dialogue between both institutions. It takes place twice a year, focusing on general orientations on the implementation of IPA III. The high-level geopolitical dialogues are preceded and prepared in Senior Officials Meetings. After each high-level geopolitical dialogue, the European Parliament issues recommendations for the Commission’s follow-up. Five high-level geopolitical dialogues have been successfully organised. The Commission has also provided updates to the Council on the implementation of IPA III

In line with the IPA III Regulation, the Commission also provides to Member States in the IPA III Committee an annual assessment of the implementation of the IPA III programming framework in light of the evolution of the policy framework and based on the IPA III programming framework indicators. The assessment shall also include the state of play of the allocations committed and planned for the beneficiaries and how the performance-based approach and the fair share principle referred to have been implemented.

When it comes to DOAG, the Council adapted its structures to the Decision and, while Greenland file under the budget was covered previously by the COEST Committee, the entire OCT file is now under the responsibility of the sole ACP Council Working Party. OCTs have a dedicated budget chapter, in line with the European Parliament's request.

## **Coherence**

### **Geographisation and internal complementarity of NDICI-Global Europe**

Looking back at the EFIs under 2014-2020, the specific scope of geographic instruments made it difficult to engage coherently with some partner countries: for example, three geographic instruments were used to engage with Africa (EDF, DCI and ENI) and the cooperation at continental level was funded both from the DCI and the 11th EDF. Furthermore, other instruments with a thematic scope were also used, such as the EIDHR or the IcSP. This scattered EFI framework made it difficult for partners and local stakeholders to get a clear understanding of the EU cooperation tools.

The principles of geographisation and internal complementarity that underpin NDICI-Global Europe clarified the articulation between geographic, thematic and rapid response actions, thus increasing coherence and addressing the issues stemming from the overlaps between the large number of instruments during 2014-2020.

Indeed, the coherence between the instruments under the 2014-2020 MFF was lacking because of the multiplicity of programmes; the interplay between the geographic and thematic approaches resulted in sometimes overlapping responses at country level and taking advantage of complementarities and creating synergies between instruments proved challenging. The majority of respondents in Delegations agreed that coherence and complementarity has increased with NDICI-Global Europe, enhancing EU's leverage by combining different modalities and tools to promote EU external priorities. On the other hand, in the targeted consultations Member States experts pointed to the differences within the instrument regarding the Neighbourhood region compared to other regions that also translates into different approaches and working methods.

In line with the principles of geographisation and internal complementarity, enshrined in Article 6 of the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation, NDICI-Global Europe actions are implemented primarily through country and regional geographic programmes in the

Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the Americas and the Caribbean. The budget has been distributed accordingly, with 76% of NDICI-Global Europe budget allocated to geographic programmes.

The geographisation principle has contributed to better focus EU's engagement with multiple actors at country level under NDICI-Global Europe. The value of geographically structured instruments lies in the capacity to address the specific needs of partner countries in a tailored manner with country programmes focusing on fewer and more impactful joint priorities. This is crucial given the diversity of the challenges and needs across these countries and country programmes allow to maximise the impact of the EU cooperation. This is confirmed by the external study which noted the improved coherence between the levels of EU engagement (local, national, regional and global) and opportunities for stronger partnerships and a greater political weight of the EU.

The respondents of Member States development agencies welcomed also the policy first principle, highlighting the need to better link policy and implementation and to recognise the role of partner countries in that process to ensure ownership.

The respondents to the consultation with UN organisations acknowledged that NDICI-Global Europe is more agile, flexible and predictable with reduced administrative complexities and increased synergies. In terms of geographisation, they stressed that change happens at the country-level and its impact is felt differently depending on the country. In this context, complementarity with the regional and thematic programmes is important.

Regional programmes complement the country programming and address regional issues, support alliances and coalitions or pilot new approaches and initiatives. They include priorities that are more efficiently addressed at sub-regional, regional, continental or trans-regional level. Regional programmes also cater for country cooperation with high income countries, which do not benefit from country financial allocations. In line with the principle of policy first, implementing geographisation and extending cooperation to countries non-eligible for ODA involves a more flexible and innovative understanding of regional configurations. The latter are not exclusively centred on regional organisations, as was the case in the past and was highlighted in the different consultations. Regional cooperation is driven by sub-regional needs, geopolitical dynamics, common interests and priorities and channelled through the most appropriate groupings. Despite efforts to increase cross-regional coherence, breaking silos has not been easy and different operational practices exist hindering the possibilities for pan-African and cross-regional approaches, or multi-country initiatives on both sides of the Sahara or across the Neighbourhood – although enabling these was an intention of the Regulation. In the targeted consultations while Member States experts acknowledged that NDICI-Global Europe targets and 'geographisation' bring value in this regard, they considered that sufficient resources should be provided for regional programmes as well. Member States development agencies also welcomed the geographisation principle, highlighting the need to strengthen interlinkages between global, regional and country-level actions.

Thematic programmes are complementary to geographic ones. In particular, thematic actions should focus on global and trans-regional initiatives that cannot be adequately accommodated by geographic programmes, which addresses the shortcomings related to the overlapping scopes of the instruments under the past MFF. This is true for the Global Challenges thematic programme that supports multilateral initiatives and priorities around four of the SDGs’ “Ps”: People, Planet, Prosperity and Partnerships. The Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention thematic programme covers the fifth SDG “P”: Peace, with actions supporting multilateral efforts, alongside structural responses to prevent conflict and build peace. The thematic programme for Human rights and Democracy, along with that for Civil society organisations, have taken over the scope of the former EIDHR and the former thematic component of the DCI for CSOs and are building on the lessons learned of these instruments to deliver highly specific actions in these two priority fields of EU intervention.

Rapid response actions (RRA) are complementary to both geographic and thematic programmes and are financed under the non-programmable pillar of NDICI-Global Europe. RRA are structured in three components, namely crisis response and conflict prevention, resilience and foreign policy needs with the actions based on the areas of intervention, detailed respectively in Article 4(4) and Annex IV of the Regulation. Crisis response and conflict prevention is the biggest component and when used in complementarity with the other NDICI-Global Europe pillars, has proven its added value, providing a prompt answer to needs and political priorities in the current context of increased crisis and instability. In 2023 alone, 42 new crisis response actions were adopted: in addition to maintaining significant support for the many needs in and around Ukraine as a consequence of the Russian war of aggression, new actions were also swiftly mobilised to address new crises and conflicts, including the January earthquake in northwest Syria; the outbreak of full war in Sudan in April; as well as the war on Gaza following the 7 October attack into Israel by Hamas.

The resilience line has been entirely earmarked for 2021, 2022 and 2023 to contribute to the Syrian refugees’ package, for Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Over that period, the resilience component could not support other partner countries and societies recover from political, economic and societal pressures and shocks, as well as natural or man-made disasters.

The third component of the RRA is the Foreign Policy Needs, which has proved useful to support EU foreign policy objectives at large and globally, by acting where there was an “urgent or imperative foreign policy interest” requiring a “rapid reaction”. Actions under Foreign Policy Needs provide opportunities to cooperate with like-minded partners and high-income countries to promote EU interests and values through open dialogue and best practice learning at regional and multilateral levels, as it is the case with the new action adopted in 2023 to operationalize the commitments of the 70 signatories of the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, forming an integral part of the EU’s strategic digital diplomacy agenda, initiated and promoted by the EU and the US, setting out a shared and comprehensive vision for the future of the open Internet.

Thorough review of programming documents and action documents as well as extensive consultations confirm a great degree of complementarity and coherence among the three NDICI-Global Europe pillars. The integration of the EFSD+ in the NDICI-Global Europe helped streamline the instruments and increase the coherence of EU external action through a better policy alignment. However, the length and complexity of EFSD+ provisions and the fact that those are presented separately from other implementing modalities leave room for further simplifying the relevant provisions.

The external study finds that the geographisation has all in all contributed to better coherence with EU policies at country level in the Neighbourhood region, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific by also requiring stronger dialogue and consultation as well as stronger emphasis on EU policy priorities. It also notes that the full programmatic impact of geographisation is difficult to assess yet.

### **IPA III internal coherence and complementarity**

IPA III objectives are consistent with its predecessor instruments, given the specific purpose of the instrument to support beneficiaries in their progressive alignment with EU standards and policies with a view to EU membership. The instrument has nevertheless evolved over time, reflecting also the changes in the EU enlargement policy, such as increased focus on the fundamental reforms and the internal EU policy priorities, such as the green and digital agenda.

IPA III continues to ensure strong complementarity between different types of programmes supported under the instrument. This is especially evident for bilateral programmes and multi-country programmes. The responsibility for programming of bilateral actions is with IPA III beneficiaries in close coordination with the Commission, while the responsibility for multi-country programming is with the Commission in close coordination with IPA III beneficiaries. The multi-country programmes are assessed for their relevance at the same time with the bilateral programmes, to ensure continued strategic focus and complementarity with bilateral actions.

The external study found that strong efforts are made to foster IPA III internal coherence, and the strengthening of regional coherence is a priority. On the other hand, targeted consultations and the review of strategic responses suggested that internal coherence is highly dependent on the quality of the strategic responses submitted by the beneficiaries.

### **Coherence of NDICI-Global Europe, IPA III, DOAG and INSC**

NDICI-Global Europe, IPA III, DOAG and INSC are coherent and complementary:

- IPA III, DOAG and INSC contain referral clauses to NDICI-Global Europe concerning implementation, ensuring that a common set of implementing rules are applicable to these four external financing instruments, with specific exceptions for

each instrument. For DOAG, avenues to adapt these exceptions to the smaller financial amounts and thresholds of actions under the Decision should be explored in the future.

- IPA III and DOAG beneficiaries are eligible to the NDICI-Global Europe's thematic programmes as well as its Rapid response pillar, even though no OCT benefitted from thematic or rapid response actions so far.
- IPA III further refers to NDICI-Global Europe when it comes to the EFSD+, which is a shared investment component. IPA III contributes to the provisioning needs of the External Action Guarantee for what concerns operations in the IPA III beneficiaries. The contribution of the external financing instruments in support of the external dimension of Erasmus is also streamlined, with IPA III referring to NDICI-Global Europe.
- INSC contributes to the provisioning needs of the External Action Guarantee for what concerns EURATOM loans.

Three new Neighbourhood countries, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, have become enlargement countries in 2022. Given that IPA III beneficiaries are defined in the annex of the IPA III Regulation, Moldova and Georgia will continue to receive support to their EU accession process under the NDICI-Global Europe instrument, and Ukraine under a new dedicated financing instrument. As the enlargement policy will be the primary policy framework for these three countries, the coherence of IPA III and the assistance provided under the instruments from which they receive pre-accession assistance will need to be continuously ensured.

### **Strengthening synergies with other external instruments not covered by this evaluation**

The humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach is a coordinated and coherent way of working in order to build resilience, sustainable development and peace and thus ending the cycle of needs, essential in fragile and crisis-affected contexts. The nexus approach allows to maintain an engagement in case of escalation of tensions and conflict, maintain basic needs and development support to the extent possible. During the recent conflict in the north of Ethiopia for example, three sets of individual measures supported the triple nexus with the aim of protecting vulnerable populations and recovery strategies. They provided systematic responses to the food crisis, complementing the already existing and planned humanitarian, crisis response and peacebuilding activities. While regular and constructive exchanges in support of the nexus are ensured among the relevant services, efforts are needed to strengthen synergies among instruments which have different legal bases, adopted in different times and contexts. The external study further elaborates on an evaluation on the Implementation of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach, based on country examples from Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Iraq and Myanmar. The evaluation shows that the approach is valuable and of added value to the EU's external action in protracted crises contexts.

The EU has played, and is still playing, an important role in support of peace, stability and conflict prevention. The coverage of actions previously falling under the IcSP by the Thematic and Rapid Response Pillars of the NDICI-Global Europe is broadly seen as a positive step, that can lead to more coherence and a better linking of actions in the domain of peace and security, also with other external cooperation instruments (e.g., CFSP, humanitarian action, EPF). For civilian CFSP missions, including those established before 1 January 2021, there is an obligation to ensure ‘Consistency of the Union's response and coordination’<sup>62</sup>. In some cases (EUAM Iraq) the need to ensure coordination is explicitly cited in their mandate. The external study cites this as evidence of emerging synergies between civilian CSDP missions and NDICI-Global Europe actions, informed by the influence of the CFSP Compact.

The EPF is part of the Union’s integrated approach and makes the best use of synergies with other actions and support measures of the Union and its Member States. Its purpose is to finance CFSP actions having military and defence implications whose operating expenditure cannot be charged to the Union budget. Actions in support of third states, regional and international organisation or supporting the military aspects of peace support are decided by the Council upon a Member State or the EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) initiative. The relevant Commission services are consulted in the course of their preparation, so that consistency is ensured with actions funded by other EU instruments, notably NDICI-Global Europe and in particular its component for capacity building of military actors in support of development and security for development.

### **Enhanced coherence of EU internal and external policies**

In line with Article 5, NDICI-Global Europe ensures consistency, coherence, synergies and complementarity in the external action, as well as with EU relevant policies and programmes which have an impact on sustainable development. To achieve it, good practices pertaining to upstream information and consultation flow have been established with NDICI-Global Europe. Commission implementing services (DG INTPA, DG NEAR and FPI), together with the EEAS, closely involved Commission services in charge of internal policies in the programming exercise, allowing an enhanced coherence and quality of EU internal and external policies, notably in the area of migration and climate in line with the objectives of the Instrument. Continuous exchanges among Commission services also allowed for a better definition and identification of straddling actions, avoiding overlaps and increasing synergies and complementarity.

The external study further substantiates the above points, explaining that consultation between external action services and line DGs has intensified since the start of the current

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<sup>62</sup> Council Decision on the EUAM in Iraq of October 2017, in line with Article 21 (3) TEU



MFF. According to line DGs, when this cooperation takes place at appropriate level and early on, it contributes to higher quality of MIPs and, ultimately, of interventions. Such collaboration is labour-intensive and creates additional transaction costs which are likely to decrease slightly in the long run, but they are positive, as they ensure mutual understanding and priorities and common approaches, in line with the Policy first approach.

IPA III ensures consistency, synergies and complementarities with other areas of external action, as well as with relevant policies and programmes, and policy coherence for development. Notably, IPA III supports EU territorial cooperation between adjacent land border regions of at least one Member State and one or more IPA III beneficiaries (Interreg VIA strand), as well as the participation of IPA III beneficiaries in transnational (Interreg VI-B strand) and interregional cooperation programmes (Interreg VI-C). Interreg VI-A, VI-B and VI-C programmes are the responsibility of DG REGIO, with funding pooled together by IPA III and the European Regional Development Fund. Furthermore, through IPARD the EU provides to the eligible IPA III beneficiaries (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Türkiye) financial and technical support to their farming, food production and rural development structures in a sustainable way, aligning their agricultural and rural development policies with the EU's common agricultural policy, and adapting their agriculture and food sector with the EU food, hygiene and environmental standards as well as in line with the goals of the European Green Deal.

Participation of third countries in Union programmes can be beneficial to the programmes and the policy objectives pursued and at the same time it is an important tool of the Union's foreign policy and should be approached strategically. The association of IPA III and several Neighbourhood beneficiaries to Union programmes fosters the implementation of concrete reforms and offers the citizens clear benefits, as well as a bottom-up boost to the EU integration process. The participation of third countries from Africa, the Caribbean and South America in the EU Outermost Regions Interreg programmes and the possibility of joint actions funded with ERDF and NDICI-Global Europe under these programmes, contributes to the regional integration between Outermost regions and their neighbours benefiting the whole area. Encompassing most Community policies, these Union programmes are a major pre-accession instrument that help candidate and potential candidates and their citizens familiarising themselves with the European Union policies and working methods. Participation in the Union programmes encourages the active involvement of public and private institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society institutions and universities to benefit from the EU accession process. Participation in Union programmes contributes to the implementation of strategies adopted in the IPA III beneficiaries for the respective sectors targeted by individual programmes, to capacity building of institutions and sectorial progress in the European integration process, and in meeting the accession criteria.

The DOAG seeks coherence and complementarity between the Union's external financing instruments and allow for the combination of funding with other Union Programmes such as Interreg with outermost regions, as long as the contributions do not cover the same costs. In this context, an important modality of flexibility introduced by the DOAG is the possibility in

case of joint projects (intraregional, EU programs and other) to choose the modality of implementation, which was not possible under the EDF. OCTs are also eligible under conditions to other EU instruments, such as LIFE, Horizon, Erasmus etc.

In light of a renewed interest in nuclear energy as part of a more sustainable energy mix in several partner countries, INSC support for nuclear safety related improvements promoted stronger coherence and alignment with Euratom Acquis.

### **The EU's comprehensive response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine as an illustration of internal and external coherence of instruments**

Since the start of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the total pledged support in a Team Europe approach amounts to EUR 88.322 billion, covering all types of support such as humanitarian, economic, macro-financial assistance, military, and support to refugees. Support from the EU budget amounts to EUR 31.096 billion and includes:

- Humanitarian assistance: EUR 785 million
- Budget support and grants (NDICI-Global Europe): EUR 2.347 billion
- Loans: EUR 25.2 billion
- Other support (Connecting Europe Facility): EUR 202 million
- Support through EU guarantees: EUR 2.578 billion
- Nuclear safety: EUR 16 million

## **4.2 How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom?**

### **EU added value**

#### **EU added value of NDICI-Global Europe towards partner countries**

Recent evaluations illustrate the added value and leverage potential of the use of EU public funds. For example, the Fast Track Assessment of the EU Initial Response to COVID-19 Crisis in Partner Countries and Regions<sup>63</sup> conducted in 2020 concluded that massively mobilising budget support and macro-financial assistance was a relevant approach to support governments' fiscal capacity for initial crisis response linked to COVID-19. In several cases, this helped countries to stabilise their macro-fiscal framework and to execute supplementary budgets placing COVID-19 measures at their core. It also offered a policy dialogue platform to monitor the implementation of the response to COVID-19.

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<sup>63</sup> [Fast-Track Assessment of the EU Initial Response to the COVID-19 Crisis in Partner Countries and Regions \(2020\)](#)

In the same vein, the evaluation of EU State Building Contracts (SBCs) (2012-2018)<sup>64</sup> concluded to the added value of EU cooperation. These budget support contracts have, among others, improved primary school enrolment, including girls. The improvement of primary school enrolment was achieved through a conjunction of factors. Through financial transfers and dialogue on the budget, SBCs contributed to this outcome by securing current public expenditure, essentially used to cover the wages of teaching staff. This is particularly the case in fragile countries with major financial constraints. In cases of reconstruction after a natural disaster, SBCs contributed more directly to the investment programme (Nepal) and to the redeployment of infrastructure to maintain services. The increase in primary school enrolment rates was coupled with improved geographic accessibility in several countries (Nepal, Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Sierra Leone) by ensuring a better distribution of resources over the territory, SBCs were able to contribute to this important outcome (Ivory Coast and Madagascar).

The new architecture of EFIs equips the EU better to exert leverage as a development actor, a global player and a geopolitical actor, though the articulation between these different roles come with challenges. External study shows that the new EFIs have laid the foundations for the EU to strengthen the EU's added value on external action. In particular, NDICI-Global Europe brought significant added value by providing a more integrated, sizeable and coherent offer to the world compared to the previous MFF, improving partner countries' capacity to address joint priorities with the EU and tackle global challenges. The programming process was conducted through multi-stakeholder and inclusive consultations, both at country and Headquarters level, with partner countries' authorities, other donors and actors, including local authorities, representatives of civil society, including women and youth organisations, foundations and the private sector, where relevant, in order to facilitate their respective contributions, as appropriate, and to ensure they play a meaningful role in the programming process. The fact that the NDICI-Global Europe now allows the Union to engage in geographic cooperation with all partners under one common instrument enables a more coherent approach. With Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs) in particular, this enables a more strategic and tailor-made approach, as illustrated towards China. Leverage is also created to support longer-term cooperation with multilateral partners on key areas of EU policy interest including climate, trade and energy untied to any particular region or country. Engaging with UMICs also addresses the need to further align cooperation and partnerships with them to expand EU geopolitical ambitions.

The external study shows a mixed picture of the EU's ability to exert leverage through NDICI-Global Europe. In the case of the Neighbourhood, the implementation of the incentive-based approach has proven insufficient to promote political and economic reforms due to the limited funding available (indicatively 10% of the overall Neighbourhood envelope) and the complexity of assessing the progress along the several criteria set out by

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<sup>64</sup> [Evaluation of EU State Building Contracts \(2012-2018\) - European Commission \(europa.eu\)](#)

the NDICI-Global Europe regulation. The application of the incentive-based approach was further complicated by the negative economic impact of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and a democratic backsliding in several partner countries, in particular in the South Neighbourhood. A mixed assessment also emerged from the consultation with stakeholders whereby only one third of respondents replied positively on the effectiveness of the incentive-based approach to promoting policy objective and priorities in the EU's neighbouring countries.

### **EFIs as triggers and catalysts for Team Europe: joining forces for a greater impact**

The current EFIs increased the collective engagement of European actors in EU external cooperation in a Team Europe approach, sharing and building upon knowledge and expertise of EU Member States. As confirmed during the consultations with Member States and also with the EU Delegations, NDICI-Global Europe makes EU external cooperation more coherent, and partner countries are increasingly recognising the EU as a single global actor, especially thanks to the Team Europe approach. At general level, one of key takeaways from the targeted consultations with stakeholders is that the Team Europe approach is seen as improving joint implementation and allowing Member States agencies to align with the EU action. On the other hand, the respondents from Member States development agencies (Practitioners' Network) stressed the need to strengthen coordination and communication flow in particular at country level.

Team Europe approach, initially put in place to ensure a co-ordinated and comprehensive response between the EU and its Member States to the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences, means joining forces so that the EU and its Member States external action, with the support of European financing institutions, becomes more than the sum of its parts. By working together and pooling resources and expertise, the EU delivers more effectively, giving effect to Article 210 of the TFEU in a more coordinated and committed way. The scale of the initiatives, with more than 150 TEIs being developed and rolled out across the world, is also unprecedented. The NDICI-Global Europe is the main EU tool used in a Team Europe approach and Team Europe Initiatives have become a key component of the NDICI-Global Europe programming. The Team Europe approach started to be undertaken at the same time as the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation was adopted and although not mentioned as such in the Regulation, it builds on the principles enshrined therein, in particular 'working better together' as well as inclusiveness, collaboration and, whenever appropriate, joint implementation with Member States in the implementation of the Instrument. In light of the above, the Regulation encourages joint programming, which is promoted while being kept voluntary, flexible, inclusive and tailored to the country context and allows for the replacement of EU and Member States' programming documents with Union joint programming documents. The external study indicates that the new EFIs have successfully promoted closer collaborations between the Commission services, EEAS, and the EU Member States.

### **EU added value of IPA III**

The added value of IPA III stems from its distinct objective to prepare beneficiaries for the future membership of the Union based on the European values. The external study found that the ability to create EU added value is reinforced with the alignment with the *acquis* – a keystone for the accession. However, the beneficiaries' commitment to EU values should not be taken for granted. The Commission Annual Enlargement reports and European Court of Auditors' report<sup>65</sup> have observed the standstill and blockage of certain fundamental reforms, such as constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina and justice reform in various beneficiaries.

With nearly EUR 14.2 billion of IPA III funding for the period 2021-27, the EU is the largest donor in the enlargement region. As the external study showed, the EU has a distinct added value in terms of not only the volume of funding but also of the thematic coverage, as demonstrated by the IPA III Programming Framework.

The IPA III instrument continues to promote the established close and long-lasting partnerships between IPA beneficiaries, the Commission and the EU Member States, international financial institutions (IFIs), international and regional organisations as well as civil society organisations and regional and local government authorities and private sector actors. These partnerships are among the key added value of the instrument, as they ensure continuity of EU financial assistance.

As reaffirmed by the external study, the Team Europe approach is particularly visible with IFIs in the EU-coordinated WBIF. During the evaluation period the WBIF contributed to the enhancement of the harmonisation and cooperation in investments for the socio-economic development of the region and for its integration in the EU. In December 2022 – January 2023, 17 new EFSD+ guarantees (EUR 877 million) were endorsed, to support the implementation of the EIP flagship investment priorities, notably on competitiveness of the private sector, clean energy, environment and climate, and digital future. Similarly in Türkiye, the Türkiye Investment Platform established in 2022 under the EFSD+ is another example of a Team Europe approach. The Operational Board of the Türkiye Investment Platform has endorsed 14 guarantees (EUR 317 million). This funding is for investments to support Micro- Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) on energy efficiency, renewable energy, green bonds, sustainable urban development and agriculture, transport decarbonisation and new climate technologies.

### **EFSD+ as a catalyser for investment**

With regard to the guarantee component of EFSD+ and taking into account the caveat on the timing of this evaluation compared to the longer implementation period of budgetary guarantees, the very high interest to benefit from EU guarantee coverage both from the EIB

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<sup>65</sup> [https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR22\\_01](https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR22_01)

under the dedicated windows and from the EIB and other DFIs for the open architecture indicates that the maximum amount set out in NDICI-Global Europe is relevant.

Compared to the past experience under the External Lending Mandate (where the EU was working on the basis of guarantees exclusively with the EIB), with the EFSD and the EFSD+ the EU has expanded its financial cooperation through the provision of budgetary guarantees to all DFIs. This allows the EU to draw on the strengths and capacities of each DFI. At the same time, the synergies of acting together at scale increase the collective firepower of EU's development assistance.

In addition to guarantees, the EFSD+ supports blending operations, where grants are used to mobilise investments with a clear development added value, but which might not be financially viable. The EU grant allows to get projects off the ground when budgetary guarantees alone would not be sufficient in de-risking the project. In other cases, EU support under blending provides technical assistance or investment grants to align a project with EU standards, to increase its reach or to green the project.

Overall, blending under EFSD+ is crucial to enhance sustainability, climate-proofing and development impact in EU partner countries, in particular in countries with under-developed financial markets or which are politically less stable.

On the basis of the available analysis, it can be concluded that the use of the EAG, and of the EFSD+ in general is on track to contribute to the overall objectives of NDICI-Global Europe. This is in line with the overall positive feedback by Member States and DFIs, which perceive favourably the tool's relevance, usefulness, and their initial experience with EFSD+.

While it is too early to assess the capacity of EFSD+ to attract private sector investment on a large scale due to the longer implementation process of financial instruments (as also recognised by the external study), its added value in terms of mobilising additional finance and expertise of a number of multilateral financial institutions and development finance institutions, including national development banks and regional institutions, is substantiated by the large oversubscription of the first call for proposals under the EFSD+ open architecture. This will have to be confirmed in the subsequent implementation phase by the number and policy-relevance of inclusion notices related to concrete investments under each guarantee agreement. Overall, however, it is a sign that DFIs are keen to collaborate through new and innovative tools, and notably make use of EU budgetary guarantees to share the risk of investing in less developed markets.

The EU triggered a positive emulation among public and private financial organisations by opening up its cooperation to a variety of development finance counterparts. In this respect, the EFSD+ governance structures – where stakeholders can discuss EFSD+ proposals (both guarantees and blending) – facilitates regular peer to peer review and offers a good platform for enhanced coordination. In particular, this fosters collaboration among DFIs, allows new ideas to flow and innovative transactions to take place, thereby pushing the boundaries of what a “bankable” project is.

The strengthened framework has also given rise to new partnerships among DFIs. For instance, the Global Green Bond Initiative (GGBI), launched by the European Commission, received the backing of a consortium of European Development Finance Institutions<sup>66</sup> as well as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), all together forming the Global Green Bond Initiative Coalition.

Another example is a joint initiative of the EU, EBRD and the emerging-market asset manager ILX Management, which was launched in May 2023 to boost private-sector finance in eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Western Balkans, Türkiye, the southern and eastern Mediterranean and Central Asia.

The Team Europe approach and the Team Europe Initiatives have further espoused closer cooperation among the European development actors, including via the EFSD+ tools. The TEI “Investing in Young Businesses in Africa” is one such example, where the European Commission has joined forces with EIB, EBRD and ten EU Member States, bringing together public and private funding to develop and support the new and early-stage business actors by facilitating their access to technical and financial means.

Similarly, EFSD+ has allowed the EU to extend its cooperation with new implementing partners, such as the work with Gavi for the production of safe and affordable Covid-19 vaccines or the cooperation established under the Global Green Bond Initiative with the Inter-American Development Bank and the IDB Invest.

With regard to the deployment of EFSD+ tools in all EU partner countries, the NDICI-Global Europe highlights that LDCs and heavily indebted poor countries, as well as fragile or conflict-affected countries should be given special attention under EFSD+. The external study and the stakeholders of the targeted consultations reported concerns regarding how EFSD+ funding, especially with the use of guarantees, can be directed towards difficult contexts and non-traditional lending policy areas. While it is too early to assess the effectiveness of EFSD+ in those countries, it is worth noting that the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation introduces a possibility of partially subsidising the remuneration of the guarantee (the so called “guarantee fee”) in order to give more concessional terms in these duly justified cases; this is possible through so called “policy discounts”. In such difficult contexts blending may also be a possible modality of support – to be combined with guarantees where feasible.

At the operational level, the strong focus on investments, reinforced by the Global Gateway narrative, resulted in a sharp increase in the number of actions implemented by partners (indirect management by partner countries or pillar-assessed entities), which are in charge of the related procurement award procedures. This has led to discussions around eligibility rules

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<sup>66</sup> Participating institutions are: European Investment Bank (EIB), Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (“CDP”), Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (“AECID”), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”), Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (“KfW”), Société de Promotion et de participation pour la coopération économique (“PROPARCO”) for the whole Agence Française de Développement (“AFD”) Group.

(defined in the regulations) and the use of quality standards in public procurements procedures to ensure high economic, social and environmental standards, which are a key dimension of the Global Gateway approach.

While the benefits of a comprehensive investment platform, initiated with the EFSD and further built on through the EFSD+, are widely recognised, the new structures and tools require accepting and adapting to a new project management logic. The external study highlighted that the long-term view of EFSD+ creates de facto uncertainty for geographic programme staff. Working with DFIs and the private sector on investment operations typically assumes faster decision-making procedures, but longer execution timeframes compared to more traditional implementation modalities.

## **DOAG**

OCTs are not part of the EU but are part of the European family. Their citizens are European. The DOAG is an Association instrument which provides beyond the classical EU cooperation support a special political framework and a commercial regime (duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market). The EU-OCT partnership is politically sensitive and complex because of the specific sovereign interests of the three Member States concerned. Therefore, the OCTs are also very important for the EU to promote its values and standards and are often considered as “outposts” of the EU. Particularly specific is the partnership with Greenland notably because of the fisheries agreements and because of the growing geostrategic interest in the Arctic - connectivity, climate change impact and natural resources (critical raw materials necessary for the green transition). The DOAG has enlarged the political dialogue to all the Member States not only to the 3 to which OCTs are linked constitutionally. The inclusion of Greenland into the DOAG has allowed a more inclusive interest of Member States to the OCT matters. Moreover, the presence of the EU outermost regions in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean is an asset for this partnership. Cooperation between EU outermost regions and OCTs is encouraged through synergies between the DOAG and the EU outermost regions Interreg programmes.

## **INSC**

As a result of its experience in the field of nuclear safety, the EU is well positioned to engage in international cooperation to ensure that nuclear activities are conducted safely, based on the transfer of EU standards and best practices. INSC fosters unique EU added value to engagement in nuclear safety cooperation with third countries, well beyond the capacities of individual Member States and other donors. The institutional framework allows the EU to act at a global level on nuclear safety cooperation with consultations with the G7/8, and features: specialised know-how and expertise, high nuclear safety standards and exclusive EU powers to address nuclear safeguards; and a relatively substantial financial provision and continuity for nuclear safety cooperation with a track record of over a quarter of a century. While INSC



remains primarily a technical instrument, it is highly valued by partner countries, thereby facilitating and supporting political and policy dialogue. INSC continues to have a strong EU added value through EU knowledge transfer in a Team Europe format to partner countries.

#### **4.3 Is the intervention still relevant?**

<b>Relevance</b>
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##### **The 2021-2027 instruments' objectives are still fit for purpose**

The objectives and the sectors of intervention of the various EFIs under the MFF 2014-2020 enabled the EU to address the priorities and needs identified in their respective legal basis at that time and proved to be highly relevant given the overall geopolitical context. Building on their relevance, these objectives have been broadly taken over by the 2021-2027 EFIs' objectives. This is particularly true for INSC that is largely built on a continuation of the previous programme. This is also the case for IPA III, that has substantially changed in its implementation approach as detailed below but has largely kept the same objectives as IPA II. Regarding NDICI-Global Europe, its general and specific objectives have been designed based on the large set of objectives of the instruments that have been subsumed by NDICI-Global Europe in the current MFF.

The external study also concludes that the new instruments adequately responded to the lessons learned during the previous MFF, with a combination of old and new flexibility features. It further notes that during the first half of the MFF, these features allowed strong and quick reaction to high priority issues and crises, while testing the limits of the EFIs: COVID-19, the Russian war of aggression, and the migration crisis.

##### **NDICI-Global Europe**

Looking at the NDICI-Global Europe general objectives at the time of adoption and placing them in the current complex and challenging geopolitical context, these objectives appear as even more important and relevant today:

- COVID-19 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine are just the latest manifestations of a broader trend of geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges. These are a mixture of short-term and long-term shocks and include rising powers (e.g., China) asserting themselves in a multipolar world, a crisis of multilateralism, with challenges to the UN system and Bretton Woods institutions that have long formed the bedrock of international relations. Long-term challenges include climate change, digital transitions and demographic change. The links and interplay between these various challenges create complex and potentially volatile conditions for humanity. In this

context, the EU must find a balance between preserving cooperation and partnerships while promoting its values, principles and fundamental interests.

- For almost 25 years, poverty has steadily declined, and the poverty rate halved in the Union's partner countries on average<sup>67</sup>. EU cooperation has helped achieve this result, but progress towards eradicating poverty has suffered a setback with the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic crisis has had particularly devastating consequences for the most vulnerable people, resulting in an unprecedented increase in global poverty. The World Bank estimates that over 100 million people have been pushed into extreme poverty and around 118 million more people have faced chronic hunger, making the economic and social consequences of the COVID-19 crisis more serious than the virus itself. The spillover effects of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have further exacerbated an already dire situation worldwide.
- Consolidating, supporting and promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in line with EU values, is a necessary precondition for boosting economic and social development in the EU partner countries. Moreover, in a global context of continued shrinking civic and democratic space and multiple attacks on the universality of human rights, the EU has reaffirmed its unconditional support to the protection and promotion of human rights, including gender equality and democracy worldwide.
- Climate action is more relevant than ever, as the COP28 Climate Action Summit confirmed. The EU remains committed to achieving SDG 13 on climate action within the EU and is supporting partner countries with their implementation goals<sup>68</sup> through external cooperation. NDICI-Global Europe objective related to climate change is a key priority of the EU's external action and a central theme of the European Green Deal now reinforced by the Global Gateway promoting inter alia the green and digital transitions. The implementation of the Paris Agreement remains high on the EU geopolitical agenda and the EU and its Member States continue to lead global efforts to tackle climate change and environmental challenges, remaining the world's largest contributor of public international climate finance with EUR 23.04 billion in 2021 and EUR 28.47 billion in 2022 respectively<sup>69</sup>. Expectations of developing countries with

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<sup>67</sup> [2023 Annual report on the implementation of the European Union's external action instruments in 2022 - Publications Office of the EU \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>68</sup> As an example, the EU, through the Foreign Policy Needs component of the Rapid Response pillar, is supporting the "Green Partnership" with South Korea, whereas both parties commit to keep global temperature rise below 1.5°C and reach climate neutrality by 2050.

<sup>69</sup> These figures include climate finance sources from public budgets and other development financial institutions of the member states, the EU budget, the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank.

regards to climate finance remain very high, not least because of the increasing impact of climate change and the estimated cost of the transition<sup>70</sup>.

- The first years of implementation of the NDICI-Global Europe were marked by increased migration on most routes towards the EU, notably the Central and Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkan routes. At the same time, forcibly displaced people globally reached the staggering number of 100 million for the first time<sup>71</sup>. Russia's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine and the exacerbated global food crisis resulted in further displacements.
- Commitment to the promotion of multilateralism has proven to be crucial in the current complex geopolitical landscape. Therefore, this objective of NDICI-Global Europe is even more relevant as engagement with partners in international organisations remains an EU priority and is reflected in its sustained commitment to the rules-based multilateral order.
- The EU is committed to supporting the accelerated implementation of the SDGs at global level, including in relation with partner countries and at multilateral level and NDICI-Global Europe includes priorities that encompass the whole 2030 Agenda and its principles, in particular leaving no one behind.
- Stronger partnerships with third countries are still crucial for EU's open strategic autonomy, as well as to design a new growth and investment model, to support reforms, to accompany a green and digital transition and to ensure access to critical raw materials and value chains.

Therefore, the NDICI-Global Europe's objectives were fit for purpose at the time of the adoption and continue to be relevant in the current context.

At the same time, as illustrated by the Commission's proposal on the revision of the 2021-2027 MFF<sup>72</sup>, there is a mismatch between EU ambitions and the funds available to meet the challenges in the different regions and globally, or respond to the multiplicity of crises, notably in the Neighbourhood and Enlargement regions. In both regions increased migratory pressures had to be addressed in the absence of adequate funding also due to the ending of the relevant EU regional Trust Funds.

### IPA III

The overall objective of IPA III continues to be relevant, as the instrument aims to support beneficiaries in adopting and implementing the political, institutional, legal, administrative,

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<sup>70</sup> In its COP28 report, the Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance highlight a demand for around US\$2.4 trillion annually by 2030 in emerging markets and developing countries to address key areas like energy transition, adaptation, resilience, loss and damage, and conservation.

<sup>71</sup> [2023 Annual report on the implementation of the European Union's external action instruments in 2022 - Publications Office of the EU \(europa.eu\)](#)

<sup>72</sup> [IMMC.COM%282023%29336%20final.ENG.xhtml.1\\_EN\\_ACT\\_part1\\_v6.docx \(europa.eu\)](#)

social and economic reforms required to comply with Union values and to progressively align to Union rules, standards, policies and practices with a view to Union membership, thereby contributing to their stability, security and prosperity. The overall relevance of IPA III was also confirmed during targeted consultations.

IPA III has also been effective in promoting socio-economic development and leveraging necessary investments under the Economic and Investment Plan, while there is a need to further accelerate convergence towards the EU, as also pointed out by the external evaluation and the 2023 Enlargement Package. The Commission has therefore proposed a complementary financing instrument, the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in November 2023. This new instrument aims to further accelerate fundamental socio-economic reforms with new type of funding and *ex ante* payment conditionalities.

IPA III continues to be relevant in supporting democracy, human rights, and the engagement of civil society organisations and local authorities as an integral part of the fundamentals first approach. For civil society alone, EUR 218.5 million support has been programmed under the 2021-2023 EU Civil Society Facility and Media Programme for the Western Balkans and Türkiye.

The external study states that IPA III is closely aligned with internal EU priorities. IPA III contributes to the EU horizontal policies, such as mainstreaming climate action and achieving an overall target of 30% of EU budget expenditure supporting climate objectives. IPA III also pledges to contribute to addressing sustainable development, in addition to its core mandate.

The IPA III instrument is not the only instrument supporting enlargement policy objectives. The two new enlargement countries, Moldova and Georgia, will receive support from the NDICI-Global Europe instrument, as they are not eligible for IPA III support, and Ukraine has a separate financing instrument, the Ukraine Facility, to support both the reconstruction and the enlargement process. While multiplication of financing instruments risks increasing transaction costs in short-term, it also provides a unique opportunity to assess what type of financing instrument would be best suited to support enlargement objectives under the next MFF.

## **DOAG**

The EU-OCT relations date back to the Treaty of Rome (1957) and are enshrined in the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU. While OCTs are not part of the EU they are considered as part of the EU family. Furthermore, OCTs are EU outposts in strategic regions of the world (Caribbean, Pacific and Arctic regions). The Association decision, the DOAG, remains relevant as it provides a clear political, commercial and financial response to OCTs challenges.

## **INSC**

The objectives of INSC are well aligned with EU policies and priorities and were relevant to partners' needs and priorities. The promotion of the highest standards of radiation and nuclear safety (i.e., compliance with the EU's Directives on radiation protection, nuclear safety and management of radioactive waste and spent fuel), supporting the establishment of strong, independent and sustainable regulatory authorities, environmental remediation (e.g., restoration of radioactive waste legacy sites), and seeking continuing improvement are at the core of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The programme is demand led and is responsive to the needs of partner countries. Requests for cooperation, from either a new or existing partner, are carefully scrutinised and the nature and form of cooperation tailored to best achieve their objectives. Examples of the responsive nature of the programme to emerging needs is best illustrated by: the significant increase in support given to Emergency Preparedness and Response reflecting the major improvements made both nationally and globally following the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant; the support provided for conducting, and responding to the outcomes of the 'stress tests'; and the significant cooperation with Iran following the agreement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Further consideration could, perhaps, be given to whether there should be a role for cooperation with those responsible for design, construction and operation of nuclear installations in achieving the Instrument's objective of promoting an effective nuclear safety culture. In addition, the relevance of implemented cooperation projects could be further improved either through greater alignment of the timescales of the needs and priorities of partner countries with the timescales over which the implementation is likely to take place, given the typical 'time to contract', or through significant reductions in the 'time to contract'.

## **5. WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED?**

The conclusions of the 2017 MTR report covering EFIs under the MFF 2014 - 2020 remained valid for the whole period of that past MFF and they have been largely factored in the design of the current set of instruments.

### **NDICI-Global Europe**

- NDICI-Global Europe has overall shown to be fit for purpose. Its current state of implementation indicates that it is on track to deliver against the objectives it was expected to fulfil at the time of its adoption and these objectives continue to be relevant.

- In the evolving geopolitical context, NDICI-Global Europe also effectively serves as a key tool to roll out the Global Gateway strategy, including the Economic and Investment Plans for the Eastern Partnership and Southern Neighbourhood.
- NDICI-Global Europe has also enabled the EU to promote its internal policies and priorities in a more coherent manner towards the external world. To enhance the coherence between internal and external action objectives, it needs to better contribute to an integrated approach balancing EU interests, partnerships and values.
- In terms of simplification gains, NDICI-Global Europe provides a unified legal basis for a large share of the EU's external interventions and their implementing modalities.
- By superseding a large number of the EFIs of the past MFF, NDICI-Global Europe has brought about a major increase in coherence and complementarity as regards the geographic, thematic and rapid response actions and other EFIs.
- Even though the implementation of the EFSD+ is at an early stage, it has already demonstrated its catalytic effect to leverage additional finance and expertise contributing to sustainable development and growth and implementation of the Global Gateway, including through the Economic and Investment Plans in the Neighbourhood.
- The contribution of private sector via EFSD+ is key for an efficient use of EU budget to support sustainable growth in partner countries. Placing EFSD+ in the NDICI-Global Europe has contributed to the streamlining of all implementing modalities.
- Various flexibility features in the NDICI-Global Europe have proved their relevance to pursue EU priorities as well as to provide support to partner countries notably in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the migratory pressures, notably in the Neighbourhood. However, three years into implementation the NDICI-Global Europe cushion has almost been depleted showing a mismatch between available funds and actual needs. Moreover, NDICI-Global Europe was not designed to support countries at war at the scale needed by Ukraine. Therefore, a new financing instrument, the Ukraine Facility was adopted for period 2024-27, to support Ukraine both in the face of Russia's ongoing war of aggression and on Ukraine's path towards EU membership.
- On the one hand, NDICI-Global Europe is generally on track to meet the spending targets, even though further efforts will be required in the next years for some of

them, such as climate. On the other hand, their high number has also constrained the flexibility of the instrument.

- The programming exercise has successfully allowed to identify shared priorities with partner countries. As programming documents cover a broad range of objectives, further prioritisation is needed downstream. Programming remains a heavy process, which in turn contributes to delays at the start of the implementation phase.
- The inclusion of a non-programmable Rapid Response Pillar, axed around three components, of which two are new (Resilience and Foreign Policy Needs), has endowed the EU with a wider toolbox to quickly address urgent unforeseen and emerging political priorities that cannot be tackled through the programming exercise, as well as to implement the humanitarian-peace-development nexus. Greater efforts are required to make the overall approach more effective and to improve coordination between relevant funding instruments, particularly in engaging with conflict-affected countries and other fragile contexts.
- NDICI-Global Europe brings significant added value to partner countries in providing a more sizeable and coherent offer. More efforts are required when it comes to bridging short-term rapid response actions with long-term actions.
- To facilitate learning, improvements to monitoring and evaluation need to focus on maximising the use of qualitative analysis of results.
- To realise greater EU added value and a ‘whole of the EU approach’, more time and collaboration across services and with Member States will be required. To better exploit windows of opportunity and maximise scope for EU leverage, differentiated response strategies may be required.

### **IPA III**

- IPA III has demonstrated its general effectiveness as a pre-accession instrument and is on track to deliver its main objectives. The instrument is aligned with the new enlargement methodology with the fundamentals of the EU accession process at the forefront. It also mirrors the EU policy priorities and developments, such as the focus on green, digital and economic priorities, as demonstrated by the emphasis on implementation the Economic and Investment Plans in the Western Balkans.

- IPA III has been effective in promoting socio-economic development and leveraging necessary investments under the Economic and Investment Plan, while there is a need to further accelerate convergence with the EU.
- IPA III is a more challenging instrument for the beneficiaries than its predecessors as it requires strong ownership and strategic planning capacity by them on bilateral programming. More efforts will be needed in the second part of the MFF to transform beneficiaries' strategic responses into multi-annual strategic planning documents with prioritised and sequenced reforms and actions.
- While IPA III is designed as a performance-based instrument both in terms of scope and intensity of assistance, balancing the performance assessment with the fair share principle has limited the financial reward to well-performing beneficiaries.
- IPA III has been particularly efficient in deploying a mix of modalities and tools, including budget support, grants and investments. Efficiency gains have also been achieved with fewer and larger actions, but there is further room to streamline and consider multi-annual programming for bilateral programming.
- The new unified monitoring and reporting system, the IPA III results framework, presents a considerable improvement compared to the results framework used under IPA II. It is expected to improve programming, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of IPA III.
- IPA III has been flexible in responding to exceptional external events despite the lack of a similar cushion as in the NDICI-Global Europe instrument. The absence of pre-set country financial envelopes has provided the required flexibility to programme assistance according to urgent and evolving needs.
- IPA III ensures consistency with its predecessor instruments and complementarity between different types of programmes it supports. It is also coherent with other areas of external action and EU internal policies. Given that Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have now become enlargement countries, but remain funded outside of IPA III, coherence between IPA III and the instruments from which they receive EU assistance will need to be consistently ensured.
- With IPA III, the EU is the largest donor in the enlargement region. The EU's added value is multiplied by long-standing partnerships especially with international organisations, international financial institutions and Member States.



- The overall objectives of IPA III to prepare beneficiaries for future membership of the Union by increasing alignment of national legislation and public administration to the EU acquis and EU standards remain relevant. IPA III will be complemented by a new financing instrument, the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which aims to further accelerate fundamental socio-economic reforms with new type of funding and ex-ante payment conditionalities.

## **DOAG**

- The DOAG has proved its worth. By merging the Greenland Decision and the former OAD, this association instrument has provided a single legal basis for all 13 Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), including Greenland, with a dedicated budget chapter, as was requested by the European Parliament.
- By including a referral clause to the NDICI-Global Europe for the implementation of cooperation (cf. Article 81 DOAG), it has significantly increased coherence with other EFIs. However, the thresholds applicable to comitology contained in NDICI-Global Europe and referred to in DOAG could be adapted to the latter's needs.
- The OCTs no longer benefit from a dedicated envelope under the European Investment Bank Investment OCTs facility funded under 11<sup>th</sup> EDF. They have now access to InvestEU programme on a competitive basis, however it is too early to assess its impact on the private sector in the OCTs.

## **INSC**

- INSC is a unique instrument which complements NDICI -Global Europe in the area of nuclear cooperation, under the Euratom legal base. It is well suited to address challenges in the areas of nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and nuclear safeguards.
- INSC planning was sufficiently flexible to respond to the challenges created by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine.

## ANNEX I: PROCEDURAL INFORMATION

Lead service: DG for International Partnerships (INTPA)

Co-lead services: DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, the European External Action Service


DECIDE reference: PLAN/2022/1365

### Organisation and Timing

This evaluation was initiated in 2022 with the evaluation Call for Evidence<sup>73</sup> published in August 2022. An Interservice Steering Group (ISG), composed of representatives from the European Commission and the European External Action Service, was constituted to steer the evaluation.

The evaluation is largely informed by an external study conducted by independent consultants. The external study started on 3 January 2023. The Final report was received on 18 January 2024, on schedule. The evaluation process, led by the ISG, was conducted in four phases: (i) an inception phase; (ii) an interim phase; (iii) a synthesis phase; and (vi) a dissemination phase. Figure below provides additional information on each of the four phases.

Figure:



### Process overview and quality assessment

The external study was commissioned to provide the main evidence and information for this Staff Working Document. The evaluation was carried out fully in line with the indications provided in the above-mentioned Call for Evidence. The evidence base consisted of both primary sources and secondary sources. Primary sources of data included extensive interviews with key internal and external stakeholders, two online surveys, targeted consultations and an Open Public Consultation, whilst secondary sources included in-depth document and data review.

During the external study, seven meetings of the ISG were held. The objectives of these meetings were to: provide an initial briefing on the evaluation, review and provide feedback on the various deliverables (including inception, interim, preliminary conclusions and draft reports) and provide guidance and input to the work of the consultants. There were also regular meetings between the consultants and the Commission's Evaluation Managers and co-lead Units to promote an

<sup>73</sup> [Financing for European action outside EU borders – evaluation of the instruments \(2014-2020 & 2021-2027\)](https://european-council.europa.eu/media/en/press-articles/2022/08/10/financing-for-european-action-outside-eu-borders-evaluation-of-the-instruments-2014-2020-2021-2027.pdf) ([european.eu](https://european-council.europa.eu/media/en/press-articles/2022/08/10/financing-for-european-action-outside-eu-borders-evaluation-of-the-instruments-2014-2020-2021-2027.pdf))

understanding of the evaluation's themes and to exchange on complementarities and synergies within and between the instruments.

The ISG also quality assessed the external study as satisfactory at their meeting of 15 December 2023. The robustness and reliability of the data used by the external evaluators was found to be high. The quality of the data can easily be verified through the sources that are systematically referenced. In case of information emanating exclusively from EU sources, the evaluators attempted as much as possible to triangulate with external sources of information to alleviate any possible bias. In addition, information was collected through interviews with both key internal and external interlocutors. A number of previous evaluations were reviewed and used as sources of evidence; as these were commissioned by Commission services, they are quality assured. The quantity of information analyses also appears satisfactory.

### **Regulatory Scrutiny Board**

This evaluation has been selected for scrutiny by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB). The evaluation took place on 14 February 2024. The RSB provided a negative opinion with a number of recommendations. For reasons of time constraint, it has been decided not to resubmit the evaluation but to address directly the RSB's recommendations. The table below enlists the recommendations of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board in its opinion, indicating how they have been integrated into the evaluation.

<b>Recommendations in the RSB opinion</b>	<b>Integration of the RSB's recommendations into the evaluation report</b>
1.The report should be explicit upfront on the scope and limitations of the evaluation. Given that the instruments covered are of widely differing scales, scopes and purposes, meaningful collective evaluation is challenging. The report should therefore explain upfront how such single approach ensures that the fundamental requirements for an evaluation as set out in the better regulation guidelines are fulfilled, including the assessment of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added value of both the instruments in the preceding period (final evaluation) and of the current one (mid-term evaluation).	<p>The revised evaluation SWD explains more in detail reasons for the choice of covering the past and current instruments in one single evaluation. It points to the advantages following this choice but also clearly elaborates on its limitations, concluding that the synergies inherent in the chosen approach prevail, also in the light of the experience with the 2017 mid-term evaluation of the instruments under the past MFF.</p> <p>The limitations and the challenges of the chosen approach are discussed upfront, as it is noted that concrete implementation of the spending programmes in partner countries or any intervention-level data and related outcomes are not evaluated as such in this evaluation.</p>
2.The report should present the full intervention logic of the various instruments and use it to structure the analysis. While the report appears to focus on the change in architecture and structure in the new programmes compared to	The revised SWD contains the intervention logic reconstructed as part of the independent study, which covers all the instruments.

the previous ones, the report should ensure that this is not to the detriment of addressing all required elements of the evaluation.	
3. The report should fully comply with the Better Regulation standards for evaluations and ensure it is self-standing, presenting the evidence, the methodology and the analysis clearly in order to support the findings and conclusions. It is not sufficient to make references to supporting studies, annual reports and strategic evaluations, without explicitly pointing to the evidence therein and showing how it feeds into the analysis.	The evaluation SWD was revised to present upfront the detailed methodology underpinning the evaluation. It ties the analysis presented to the evidence gathered, explaining the latter more in detail, based on the annual reports, strategic evaluations and in particular, the evidence collected from the consultations with various stakeholders and the external study.
4. The report should present the extent to which the specific objectives were achieved in the previous programming period, and to the extent possible, whether the specific objectives of the current programming period are on track to being achieved. In doing so it should provide clear points of comparison.	<p>As regards the achievement of specific objectives under the past MFF, the revised SWD explains upfront the limitations inherent in evaluating the concrete development impact of the EU support in partner countries, also given the broadness of both general and specific objectives in the external financing instruments.</p> <p>Moreover, as regards the recommendation to present whether the objectives of the current instrument are on track to being achieved, the revised SWD explains the links between the general and the specific objectives and thoroughly assesses how they are reflected in the programming and financial execution.</p>
5. In the final evaluation of the former instruments, some examples are provided as well as a table with indicators covering the period 2018-2022, but not all instruments are covered, and these outcomes are neither presented comprehensively nor sufficiently analysed. The report should evaluate the performance of programmes in terms of outputs, results and impacts.	In the section related to limitations of this evaluation it is explained why the evaluation does not focus on elements related to the specific outcomes areas but instead is focused on assessing the extent to which the instruments deliver against their objectives.
6. As regards the mid-term evaluation of the current instruments, any limitations due e.g., to recent onset of instruments or lack of data should be acknowledged upfront, including their implication for the assessment of outputs, results and impacts.	<p>These limitations are now clearly recognised upfront. They have been added in the introduction of the revised SWD and reflected in the analytical part of the SWD.</p> <p>Reference is also made to the continuous efforts to enhance the monitoring and reporting, as provided notably in the NDICI-Global Europe, and to the progress made so far.</p>
7. In providing an assessment of effectiveness with the supporting evidence, the report should	The revised SWD goes into more details into the different stakeholders' perception of the

also discuss more thoroughly the experience with setting spending targets and the budgetary flexibility to respond to new challenges and emergencies. The report should also assess how much setting spending targets helps in achieving the related objectives.	spending targets and their functioning and tracking.
8. The report should identify clearly the specific objectives of current instruments and discuss whether these remain relevant in light of the changing global geopolitical landscape during the period under assessment. The report should provide insights on how the stated specific objectives contribute to address the current challenges.	This evaluation precisely focuses on assessing progress towards the general objectives as well as reflect on their continuous relevance to respond to the changing geopolitical landscape. This is clearly presented and detailed in the SWD (see also above under recommendation 4).
9. The efficiency assessment should be comprehensive and include evidence and analysis on costs and benefits to the extent possible. It is not sufficiently clear what lessons were learned from actions under the instruments during the pandemic and in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The report should present evidence to support the finding that the programme has been flexible enough and performed in this sense. It should explain and substantiate what lessons could be learned on potential areas for improvement.	<p>The part on limitations also touches upon the challenges related to the efficiency assessment of cost and benefits of the EU support to partner countries. Annex IV elaborates this point on the basis of the programme performance statements in the annual budgets.</p> <p>On the lessons learned from actions under the instruments during the pandemic and in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, one of the key issues in the evaluation is to look at whether the instruments were enabling enough to address these challenges. Details on the internal and external coherence of instruments in the EU response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine have been added.</p> <p>The flexibility to respond to new challenges and emergencies – and the limits to this flexibility – is reflected upon, notably as regards the cushion for emerging challenges.</p>
10. The conclusions of the report should be more specific and build on the analysis of a more complete and robust evidence basis. The limitations of the evidence basis should be clearly reflected in the conclusions that are drawn. The report should then present in a very concise manner the lessons learned to inform on future actions.	<p>On the evidence basis, see below under replies to recommendations 1 and 3.</p> <p>Conclusions and lessons learned are identified in the revised SWD.</p>
11. The report should present an overview of the various groups of stakeholders' contributions and show how this input has been used in the analysis. It should clarify when	The revised SWD presents an overview of the various groups of stakeholders' contributions and details how these are taken into consideration in the analysis.



- **Synthesis Phase** during which the evaluators triangulated all sources of evidence and ensured the validity of the findings. The evaluators then produced the Final Report which included answers to all the Evaluation Questions as well as conclusions and lesson learned from the evaluation.

Overall, the quality of the collected evidence (data, documentation, interviews and survey results) for this evaluation has been assessed as good, within the limitations mentioned below. The Commission services also conducted ongoing quality assurance by providing comments and revisions to the various deliverables produced by the external evaluators in order to address some shortcomings, notably related to the understanding of the policy framework and articulation of the different external financing instruments. Quality was also ensured through the ISG meetings and their review of all the key deliverables.

This Staff Working Document relies on and concurs with the findings and conclusions of the external study unless mentioned otherwise.

### **Limitations:**

The process of this evaluation is robust and the strength of the evidence has been assessed as good. However, the external study faced several limitations, including:

- The evaluation was set at instrument level meaning that project level data was not the focus. The instrument level focus also means that the policies, including development, neighbourhood and enlargement policies, which are set outside the Instruments, but upon which the Instruments are based, were not analysed.
- The implementation of EFIs 2021-2027 was in its early stages when the collection of evidence was made. This was particularly the case for some of the tools such as EFSD+ and notably its guarantee component. To mitigate this, evidence for the evaluation of 2021-2027 EFIs has also been based on the 2014-2020 EFIs and for EFSD+ the analysis has built on the lessons from the predecessor's investment framework (EFSD).
- When addressing the question of the added value of the EFSD+, it is important to flag the constraints with regard to the timing of this evaluation. Compared to the majority of other implementing modalities under NDICI-Global Europe and other instruments under review in this evaluation, financial instruments in support of investment activities, such as the EFSD and the EFSD+, and in particular their guarantee components, have longer execution timelines both in terms of the contractual negotiations and of the actual implementation of the programmes/projects. Negotiation of the terms of guarantee agreements, which are all bespoke, are comparatively lengthy. Once the guarantee agreement is signed, pipeline generation also takes time (the period of investment, so called "inclusion notice phase" stretches between 3-5 years), can be volatile and subject to attrition. In terms of assessment of the impact, the delay is even longer – as the socio-economic results might only fully manifest themselves in 10-15 years, especially in the case of infrastructure investments. Earlier results might be available for SME access to finance projects.

- Consequently, while an effort has been made to analyse the main features and the early signs regarding the performance of this new and innovative tool, it would be premature to draw any firm conclusion on the impacts and results of the EFSD+.
- The very broad nature of the EFIs, objectives and the partner countries where interventions take place (over 100 countries) made generalisations, aggregation and comparisons between data difficult.
- When evaluating the instruments, it must be taken into consideration that the support can only be seen as a contributing factor towards any results achieved, for example:
  - The fight to reduce and in the long-term eradicate poverty in partner countries is a highly ambitious agenda. Many factors, both internal and external, affect the development of those countries. An important number of official aid providers play an active role, together with an increasing number of private donors.
  - In addition, it is for the partner countries' governments to adopt and implement the necessary reforms and policies that are the driving force behind these achievements.

### **ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX AND, WHERE RELEVANT, DETAILS ON ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

#### **EQ 1 - To what extent have the EFIs been, and are at present, reflecting and responding to the evolution of EU political and policy priorities and the priorities and needs of partner countries?**

Evaluation criteria: relevance

Information sought in this question includes among others:

- The extent to which the objectives of the EFIs responded to the EU political and policy priorities and partners' needs and priorities identified at the time when the EFIs were adopted.
- The extent to which the overall support provided under the relevant EFIs has been in line with the priorities of the EFIs.
- The extent to which the EFIs have been (and are still being) flexible enough to respond to changing needs (e.g., changed EU political and policy priorities, changed contexts), given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international and EU contexts.
- The extent to which EFIs have enabled policy dialogue and/or capacity building that led, or paved the way, to greater alignment between partners' and EU policy priorities.

#### **EQ 2 - To what extent has the overall support provided under the EFIs been delivering lasting results and impact against the instruments' objectives?**

Evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, sustainability

Information sought in this question includes, among others:



- The extent to which the overall support provided under EFIs has been contributing to the achievement of different objectives of the EFIs.
- What were the provisions of EFIs regulations and other factors that facilitated or hampered the contribution of the EFIs to the results achieved?
- What is the impact globally and on the ground in the partner countries (taking into account the stage of implementation of the overall support funded under the EFIs) and are there signs of sustainability?
- The extent to which appropriate monitoring processes and performance measurement indicators are in place and functioning to demonstrate impact. Performance reward elements, where relevant, are also to be covered.
- The extent to which the EU has ensured an appropriate and complementary mix of financing sources (geographic, thematic, rapid response) to achieve its objectives in different contexts and levels (global, regional, multi-country, country, local).
- The extent to which the financing sources used, and their combination with EU engagement in policy and political dialogue, have facilitated the attainment of the intended objectives.

**EQ 3 - To what extent has/is the overall support provided under the various EFIs and their combinations been / being efficient, flexible, and appropriate to provide effective EU support to partners?**

Evaluation criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, impact

Information sought in this question includes among others:

- To what extent the provisions of the EFIs have allowed / are allowing for efficient and effective EU support to stakeholders, in particular partner countries?
- The extent to which the different EFIs have been allowing for appropriate EU response in case of crises (country crisis or impact of international crisis on partner countries).
- The extent to which EFIs programming approach and implementation procedures contributed to the achievement of their objectives.
- The extent to which the administrative/management procedures used have facilitated the attainment of the intended objectives while promoting ownership of stakeholders, in particular partner countries.
- Has integration of previously separate instruments into one streamlined instrument (INDICI-Global Europe) brought added value? Has it led to any unexpected challenges?
- Is there scope for further simplification and efficiency for the EFIs?

**EQ 4 - To what extent has the overall support implemented under the individual EFIs been adding value to interventions by Member States (incl. EU IFIs) or other key donors?**

Evaluation criteria: EU added value

Information sought in this question includes among others:

- Does EU support offer added value in terms of size of engagement, critical mass, particular expertise, and/or particular weight in advocacy?

- The extent to which the EFIs facilitated/incentivised the emerging of synergies between supports from different donors.
- The extent to which the support provided under the EU EFIs complements support from EU Member States.
- The extent to which EFIs have facilitated/incentivised synergies for European (i.e., EU + Member States (incl. EU IFIs)) actors to establish and/or effectively implement joint initiatives such as Team Europe Initiatives
- The extent to which the support provided under the EU EFIs complements support from other key donors or facilitated synergies.

**EQ 5 - To what extent have the individual EFIs been facilitating coherence, consistency, complementarity, and synergies both internally between their own set of objectives and actions and vis-à-vis other EFIs and ‘internal’ EU policies and programmes?**

Evaluation criteria: coherence

Information sought in this question includes among others:

- The extent to which the EFIs under current MFF are coherent, consistent, complementary, and foster synergies among and within themselves and also in comparison to the past MFF.
- The extent to which EFIs under current MFF facilitate coherence, consistency, complementarity, and synergies with other areas of EU external action, (including Common Foreign and Security Policy, humanitarian action and humanitarian development-peace nexus), and also in comparison to the past MFF.
- The extent to which the overall support funded under the relevant EFIs has been creating synergies and complementarity with the external dimension of the internal EU policies and programmes.

**EQ 6 – To what extent the overall EU support under EFIs has been mainstreaming the cross cutting and other issues identified in their respective legal bases?**

Evaluation criteria: impact

Information sought in this question includes among others:

- The extent to which the overall support implemented under individual EFIs mainstreamed issues defined in their respective legal bases.
- The extent to which the spending targets set under individual EFIs have informed the design of the overall support implemented under those EFIs.

## Evaluation criteria – mapping

	EQ 1	EQ 2	EQ 3	EQ 4	EQ 5	EQ 6
Relevance	□□□	□□				□
Coherence		□			□□□	
Effectiveness		□□□	□□□			
Efficiency		□	□□□□			
EU value added				□□□		
Impact			□□□			□□□
Sustainability		□□□				

**Main support costs in implementing NDICI-Global Europe, IPA, DOAG and INSC**

The main support costs in implementing the external financing instruments are described below, on the basis of the Union's annual budget with the corresponding tables on the commitment and payment appropriations for 2021 and 2022.

**Chapter 14 01 - SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE OF THE 'EXTERNAL ACTION' CLUSTER**

In accordance with Article 2, point (64) and Article 47(4), point (d), of the Financial Regulation, the appropriations under this chapter are intended to cover expenditure on external personnel and technical assistance directly linked to the implementation of programmes. Technical assistance includes support and capacity building activities necessary for the implementation of a programme or an action, in particular preparatory, management, monitoring, evaluation, audit and control activities.

The main support costs in implementing NDICI-Global Europe, IPA, DOAG and INSC are presented below for each instrument.

**14 01 01 Support expenditure for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe**

Besides the expenditure described in this chapter this appropriation is also and more specifically intended to cover support expenditure for the implementation of the Instrument and for the achievement of its objectives, including administrative support associated with the preparation, follow-up, monitoring, control, audit and evaluation activities necessary for such implementation, as well as expenditure at headquarters and Union delegations for the administrative and coordination support needed for the programme, and to manage operations financed under this Regulation, including information and communication actions, and corporate information technology systems.

**14 01 01 01 Support expenditure for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe**

<i>Non-Differentiated Appropriations</i>			
	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	
<b>Budget line</b>	<b>Committed <i>m</i> EUR</b>	<b>Committed <i>m</i> EUR</b>	<b>Total Committed <i>m</i> EUR</b>
<b>14 01 01 01 - Support expenditure for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe</b>	<b>301.348.856,02</b>	<b>320.528.968,18</b>	<b>621.877.824,20</b>
C1	301.348.856,02	299.551.605,78	600.900.461,80
C2		20.977.362,40	20.977.362,40

Besides the expenditure described in this chapter, this appropriation is more specifically intended to cover: — expenditure on external personnel at headquarters (contract staff, seconded national experts or agency staff) intended to take over the tasks previously conferred on phased-out technical assistance offices or carried out under the European Development Fund; this covers remuneration of the staff concerned and the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology, telecommunications and other costs relating to the external personnel financed under this item, — expenditure on external personnel in Union delegations (contract staff, local staff or seconded national experts) for the purposes of devolved programme management in Union delegations in third countries, including tasks previously conferred on phased-out technical assistance offices and/or carried out under the European Development Fund; this covers remuneration of the staff concerned and the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology, telecommunications and other costs directly relating to the presence in delegations of external personnel financed under this item, including logistical and infrastructure costs e.g. the renting of accommodation.

**14 01 01 75 European Education and Culture Executive Agency — Contribution from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe**

<i>Non-Differentiated Appropriations</i>			
	2021	2022	
Budget line	Committed m EUR	Committed m EUR	Total Committed m EUR
<b>14 01 01 75 - European Education and Culture Executive Agency - Contribution from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe</b>	<b>229.000,00</b>	<b>6.144.641,00</b>	<b>6.373.641,00</b>
C1	229.000,00	6.144.641,00	6.373.641,00

This appropriation is intended to cover the operating costs of the European Education and Culture Executive Agency incurred as a result of the implementation of the international dimension of the Erasmus+ programme financed through the NDICI — Global Europe (Heading 6) entrusted to the Agency and the completion of its predecessor programmes.

**14 01 04 00 Support expenditure for overseas countries and territories**

<i>Non-Differentiated Appropriations</i>			
	2021	2022	
Budget line	Committed m EUR	Committed m EUR	Total Committed m EUR
<b>14 01 04 00 - Support expenditure for overseas countries and territories</b>	<b>756.420,78</b>	<b>1.184.301,03</b>	<b>1.940.721,81</b>
C1	756.420,78	611.373,03	1.367.793,81
C2		572.928,00	572.928,00

Besides the expenditure described in this chapter, this appropriation is also and more specifically intended to cover: — expenditure on external personnel at headquarters (contract staff, seconded national experts or agency staff) intended to take over the tasks previously carried out under the European Development Fund; this covers remuneration of the staff concerned and the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology, telecommunications and other costs

relating to the external personnel financed under this article, — expenditure on external personnel in Union delegations and Commission offices established in overseas countries and territories (contract staff, local staff or seconded national experts) for the purposes of devolved programme management in Union delegations or Commission offices in third countries previously carried out under the European Development Fund; this covers remuneration of the staff concerned and the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology, telecommunications and other costs directly relating to the presence in Union delegations or Commission offices of external personnel financed under this article, including logistical and infrastructure costs, e.g. the renting of accommodation, — the preparation, follow-up, monitoring, control, audit and evaluation activities necessary for such implementation, as well as expenditure at headquarters and Union delegations for the administrative support needed for the programme, including information and communication actions and corporate information and technology systems.

#### **14 01 05 00 - Support expenditure for the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)**

<i>Non-Differentiated Appropriations</i>			
	2021	2022	
<b>Budget line</b>	<b>Committed m EUR</b>	<b>Committed m EUR</b>	<b>Total Committed m EUR</b>
<b>14 01 05 00 - Support expenditure for the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)</b>	<b>1.502.026,50</b>	<b>1.460.359,35</b>	<b>2.962.385,85</b>
C1	1.502.026,50	1.457.585,85	2.959.612,35
C2		2.773,50	2.773,50

Besides the expenditure described in this chapter, this appropriation is more specifically intended to cover: — expenditure on external personnel at headquarters (contract staff, seconded national experts or agency staff) intended to take over the tasks previously conferred on dismantled technical assistance offices; this covers remuneration of the staff concerned and the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology, telecommunications and other costs relating to the external personnel financed under this article, — studies, meetings, information systems, awareness-raising, training, preparation and exchange of lessons learnt and best practices, publication activities and any other administrative or technical assistance expenditure necessary for the programming and management of actions, including remunerated external experts, — expenditure related to the provision of information and communication actions, — IT-related expenditure including corporate information technology.

## **CHAPTER 15 01 — SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE OF THE ‘PRE-ACCESSION ASSISTANCE’ CLUSTER**

In accordance with Article 2, point (64), and Article 47(4), point (d), of the Financial Regulation, appropriations under this chapter are intended to cover expenditure on external personnel and technical assistance directly linked to the implementation of programmes under this title. Technical assistance includes support and capacity building activities necessary for the implementation of a programme or an action, in particular preparatory, management, monitoring, evaluation, audit and control activities.

### **15 01 01 Support expenditure for the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)**

Besides the expenditure described at the level of this chapter, support measures may cover technical and administrative assistance for the implementation of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), such as preparatory, monitoring, control, audit and evaluation activities, including corporate information technology systems and any activities related to the preparation of the successor programme for pre-accession assistance, in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 (IPA III), i.e.: — studies, meetings, information, awareness-raising, training, preparation and exchange of lessons learnt and best practices, publication activities and any other administrative or technical assistance expenditure necessary for the programming and management of actions, including remunerated external experts, — research activities and studies on relevant issues and the dissemination thereof, — expenditure related to the provision of information and communication actions.

#### **15 01 01 01 - Support expenditure for IPA**

<i>Non-Differentiated Appropriations</i>			
	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	
<b>Budget line</b>	<b>Committed m EUR</b>	<b>Committed m EUR</b>	<b>Total Committed m EUR</b>
<b>15 01 01 01 - Support expenditure for IPA</b>	<b>41.559.183,13</b>	<b>46.962.200,92</b>	<b>88.521.384,05</b>
C1	41.559.183,13	43.132.174,19	84.691.357,32
C2		3.830.026,73	3.830.026,73

Besides the expenditure described in this chapter, this appropriation is also and more specifically intended to cover:

- expenditure on external personnel at headquarters (contract staff, seconded national experts or agency staff). This covers remuneration of the staff concerned and the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology and telecommunications and other costs relating to the external personnel financed from this item,
- expenditure on external personnel in Union delegations (contract staff, local staff or seconded national experts) for the purposes of devolved programme management in Union delegations in third countries including tasks previously



conferred on phased-out technical assistance offices, as well as in Commission Post-Accession Transitions Teams remaining in new Member States during the phasing-out period (contract staff, agency staff) working on tasks directly related to completion of accession programmes. This covers remuneration of the staff concerned and the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology, telecommunications and other costs directly relating to the presence in delegations of external personnel financed under this item, including logistical and infrastructure costs, e.g., the renting of accommodation.

### **15 01 01 75 - European Education and Culture Executive Agency — Contribution from IPA**

#### *Non-Differentiated Appropriations*

	<b>2021</b>	<b>Committed 2022</b>	<b>Total Committed m EUR</b>
<b>15 01 01 75 - European Education and Culture Executive Agency - contribution from IPA</b>		<b>1.399.424,00</b>	<b>1.399.424,00</b>
C1		1.399.424,00	1.399.424,00

This appropriation is intended to cover the operating costs of the European Education and Culture Executive Agency incurred as a result of the implementation of the international dimension of the Erasmus+ programme financed through the IPA (Heading 6) entrusted to the Agency under this chapter and the completion of its predecessor programmes.

### **Main support costs in implementing EFIs under MFF 2014-2020**

The main support costs in implementing the external financing instruments<sup>76</sup> are described below:

In m EUR	DCI	EIDHR	Greenland	IcSP	INSC	PI	IPA	ENI
Support Expenditure (BA Lines) 2014-2020	624,56	71,67	1,400	66,65	9,88	34,90	319	243

**Support expenditure for the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)** is intended to cover: — expenditure on technical and administrative assistance not involving public authority tasks outsourced by the Commission under ad hoc service contracts for the mutual benefit of the Commission and beneficiaries, — expenditure on external personnel at headquarters (contract staff, seconded national experts or agency staff) intended to take over the tasks previously conferred on

<sup>76</sup> [SEC03.pdf \(europa.eu\)](#)

dismantled technical assistance offices; expenditure on external personnel at headquarters is limited to EUR 7 549 714. This estimate is based on a provisional annual unit cost per man-year of which 93 % is accounted for by remuneration for the staff concerned and 7 % by the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology (IT) and telecommunications relating to the external personnel financed under this item, — expenditure on external personnel in Union delegations (contract staff, local staff or seconded national experts) for the purposes of devolved programme management in Union delegations in third countries or for internalisation of tasks of phased-out technical assistance offices, as well as the additional logistical and infrastructure costs, such as the cost of training, meetings, missions and renting of accommodation directly resulting from the presence in delegations of external personnel remunerated from the appropriations entered against this item, — expenditure on studies, meetings of experts, information systems, awareness-raising, training, preparation and exchange of lessons learnt and best practices, as well as publications activities and any other administrative or technical assistance directly linked to the achievement of the objective of the programme, — research activities on relevant issues and the dissemination thereof, — expenditure related to the provision of information and communication actions, including the development of communication strategies and corporate communication of the political priorities of the Union.

**Support expenditure for the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)** is intended to cover: — expenditure on technical and administrative assistance not involving public authority tasks outsourced by the Commission under ad hoc service contracts for the mutual benefit of the Commission and beneficiaries, — expenditure on external personnel at headquarters (contract staff, seconded national experts or agency staff) intended to take over the tasks previously conferred on dismantled technical assistance offices. Expenditure on external personnel at headquarters is limited to EUR 1 613 273. This estimate is based on a provisional annual unit cost per man-year, of which 95 % is accounted for by remuneration for the staff concerned and 5 % by the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology (IT) and telecommunications relating to the external personnel financed under this item, — expenditure on external personnel in Union delegations (contract staff, local staff or seconded national experts) for the purposes of devolved programme management in Union delegations in third countries or for internalisation of tasks of phased-out technical assistance offices, as well as the additional logistical and infrastructure costs, such as the cost of training, meetings, missions and renting of accommodation directly resulting from the presence in delegations of external personnel remunerated from the appropriations entered against this item, — expenditure on studies, meetings of experts, information systems, awareness-raising, training, preparation and exchange of lessons learnt and best practices, as well as publications activities and any other administrative or technical assistance directly linked to the achievement of the objective of the programme, — research activities on relevant issues and the dissemination thereof, — expenditure related to the provision of information and communication actions, including the development of communication strategies and corporate communication of the political priorities of the Union.

**Support expenditure for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)** is intended to cover: — expenditure on technical and administrative assistance not involving public authority tasks outsourced by the Commission under ad hoc service contracts for the mutual benefit of the Commission and beneficiaries, — expenditure on external personnel in Union delegations (contract staff, local staff or seconded national experts) for the purposes of devolved programme management in the Union delegations in third countries or for internalisation of tasks of phased out technical assistance offices, as well as the additional logistical and infrastructure cost, such as the cost of

training, meetings, missions, information technology and telecommunications, and renting of accommodation directly resulting from the presence in delegations of the external personnel remunerated from the appropriations against this item — expenditure on studies, evaluations and audits, meetings of experts, information systems, awareness-raising, training, preparation and exchange of lessons learnt and best practices, as well as publications activities and any other administrative or technical assistance directly linked to the achievement of the objective of the programme, — research activities on relevant issues and the dissemination thereof, — expenditure related to the provision of information and communication actions, including the development of communication strategies and corporate communication of the political priorities of the Union.

**Support expenditure for the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)** is intended to cover: — expenditure on technical and administrative assistance not involving public authority tasks outsourced by the Commission under ad hoc service contracts for the mutual benefit of the Commission and beneficiaries, — expenditure on external personnel at headquarters (contract staff, seconded national experts or agency staff) intended to take over the tasks previously conferred on dismantled technical assistance offices. Expenditure on external personnel at headquarters is limited to EUR 968 300. This estimate is based on a provisional annual unit cost per man-year, of which 93 % is accounted for by remuneration for the staff concerned and 7 % by the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology and telecommunications relating to the external personnel financed under this item, — expenditure on studies, meetings of experts, information systems and publications directly linked to the achievement of the objective of the programme.

**Support expenditure for the European Union-Greenland partnership** is intended to cover: — expenditure on technical and administrative assistance not involving public authority tasks outsourced by the Commission under ad hoc service contracts for the mutual benefit of the Commission and beneficiaries, — expenditure on studies, meetings of experts, information systems and publications directly linked to the achievement of the objective of the programme.

**Support expenditure for the Partnership Instrument:** This appropriation is intended cover expenditure for the implementation of the Instruments and for the achievement of their objectives, including administrative support associated with the preparation, follow-up, monitoring, audit and evaluation activities directly necessary for such implementation, as well as expenditure at Union Delegations on the administrative support needed to manage operations financed under the Instruments. Provided that the activities are related to the general objectives of the applicable Instrument implemented through the action, Union financing may cover (a) studies, meetings, information, awareness-raising, training, publication activities and any other administrative or technical assistance expenditure necessary for the management of the actions, (b) research activities and studies on relevant issues and the dissemination thereof, (c) expenditures related to the provision of information and communication actions, including corporate communication of the political priorities of the Union.

**Support expenditure for the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance:** This appropriation is intended to cover administrative costs directly linked to the implementation of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), the phasing out of pre-accession assistance and TAIEX, in particular: — expenditure on technical and administrative assistance not involving public authority tasks outsourced by the Commission under ad hoc service contracts for the mutual benefit of the Commission and beneficiaries, — expenditure on external personnel at headquarters (contract staff, seconded national experts or agency staff), limited to EUR 5 146 149. This estimate is based on a provisional annual unit cost per man-year, of which an estimated 95 % is accounted for by the

remuneration of the personnel concerned and 5 % by the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology (IT) and telecommunications relating to the external personnel financed from this appropriation, — expenditure on external personnel in Union delegations (contract staff, local staff or seconded national experts) for the purposes of devolved programme management in Union delegations in third countries or for internalisation of tasks of phased-out technical assistance offices, as well as in Commission Post-Accession Transitions Teams remaining in new Member States during the phasing-out period (contract staff, agency staff) working on tasks directly related to completion of accession programmes. In both cases, it also covers additional logistical and infrastructure costs, such as the cost of training, meetings, missions and renting of accommodation directly resulting from the presence in Union delegation of external personnel remunerated from the appropriations entered against this item, — expenditure on studies, meetings of experts, information systems, awareness-raising, training, preparation and exchange of lessons learnt and best practices, as well as publications activities and any other administrative or technical assistance directly linked to the achievement of the objective of the programme, — research activities on relevant issues and the dissemination thereof, — expenditure related to the provision of information and communication actions, including the development of communication strategies and corporate communication of the political priorities of the Union.

Any income additional financial contributions from Member States and contributions from third countries or from bodies other than those set up under the TFEU or the Euratom Treaty, to certain external aid actions or programmes financed by the Union and managed by the Commission may give rise to the provision of additional appropriations. Such contributions under Article 6 3 3 of the statement of revenue constitute assigned revenue under points (a)(ii) and (e) of Article 21(2) of the Financial Regulation. The amounts entered on the line for administrative support expenditure will be determined, without prejudice to Article 235(5) of the Financial Regulation, by the contribution agreement for each operational programme with an average not exceeding 4 % of the contributions for the corresponding programme for each chapter. Other assigned revenue received under Articles 5 7 0, 5 7 3, 5 9 0 and Item 6 6 0 0 of the statement of revenue may give rise to additional appropriations under this Item, in accordance with Article 22(1) of the Financial Regulation. This appropriation covers expenditure on administrative management under Chapter 22 02.

**Support expenditure for European Neighbourhood Instrument:** This appropriation is intended to cover: — expenditure on technical and administrative assistance not involving public authority tasks outsourced by the Commission under ad hoc service contracts for the mutual benefit of the Commission and beneficiaries, — expenditure on external personnel at headquarters (contract staff, seconded national experts or agency staff) intended to take over the tasks previously conferred on dismantled technical assistance offices. Expenditure on external personnel at headquarters is limited to EUR 4 846 907. This estimate is based on a provisional annual unit cost per man-year, of which 93 % is accounted for by remuneration for the staff concerned and 7 % by the additional cost of training, meetings, missions, information technology (IT) and telecommunications relating to those staff members, — expenditure on external personnel in Union delegations (contract staff, local staff or seconded national experts) for the purposes of devolved programme management in Union delegations in third countries or for internalisation of tasks of phased-out technical assistance offices, as well as the additional logistical and infrastructure costs, such as the cost of training, meetings, missions and renting of accommodation directly resulting from the presence in delegations of external personnel remunerated from the appropriations entered against this item, — expenditure on studies, meetings of experts, information systems, awareness-raising, training, preparation and exchange of lessons learnt and best practices, as well as publications activities and

any other administrative or technical assistance directly linked to the achievement of the objective of the programme, — research activities on relevant issues and the dissemination thereof, — expenditure related to the provision of information and communication actions, including the development of communication strategies and corporate communication of the political priorities of the Union. Any income from additional financial contributions from Member States and contributions from third countries or from bodies other than those set up under the TFEU or the Euratom Treaty, to certain external aid actions or programmes financed by the Union and managed by the Commission may give rise to the provision of additional appropriations. Such contributions under Article 633 of the statement of revenue constitute assigned revenue under points (a)(ii) and (e) of Article 235(5) of the Financial Regulation. The amounts entered on the line for administrative support expenditure will be determined, without prejudice to Article 187(7) of the Financial Regulation, by the contribution agreement for each operational programme with an average not exceeding 4 % of the contributions for the corresponding programme for each chapter. Other assigned revenue received under Articles 570, 573, 590 and Item 6600 of the statement of revenue may give rise to additional appropriations under this Item, in accordance with Article 22(1) of the Financial Regulation.

## **Overview on the benefits of the EFIs**

### **At development impact level:**

- As explained in Annex II (on methodology and analytical models used), when evaluating the EFIs it must be taken into consideration that the support provided can only be seen as a contributing factor towards any results and benefits to be achieved, given the very broad nature of the EFIs, the objectives and the political priorities of over 100 partner countries where interventions take place.
- Level 1 of the Global Europe Results Framework (GERF, see further in annex VI) monitors development progress and impact in partner countries, the medium/long term international cooperation and development impact achieved in collaboration with partner governments, donors and other international cooperation and development actors including the private sector and civil society. Such progress is, by nature, slow and impact reported at this level is not intended to directly assess the performance of EU international cooperation, but rather give the context in which EU external assistance is provided, including the implementation of the SDGs. While level 1 indicators present the results at such a high level that they are too far removed from the intervention to be able to claim any sort of direct contribution, they are important as they serve to describe the context in which an intervention is being implemented and to communicate the ultimate objective of that intervention. These indicators are prominent international indicators for which data collection is ensured by a third party (for example, SDG indicators)<sup>77</sup>.
- Therefore, to discuss benefits of the support provided under the EFIs, for example by comparing it with a ‘no EU intervention scenario’ would not be realistic in external

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<sup>77</sup>Commission Staff Working Document - Launching of the Global Europe Performance Monitoring System containing a revised Global Europe Results Framework <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5697-2022-INIT/en/pdf>

cooperation. As mentioned above, given the broad scope of the instruments, ranging from conflict affected countries, least developed countries to high-income countries, the very diverse conditions for interventions, the number of external factors affecting the benefits of an EU intervention is such that a counterfactual presentation of what the situation would be without this intervention is not feasible.

## Contribution of NDICI-Global Europe to horizontal priorities

The Programme Performance Statements as annexed to the draft budget proposals<sup>78</sup> illustrate the contribution from NDICI-Global Europe in the financing of horizontal policy priorities in the EU budget and provide information at EU budget level on the financing of initiatives relating to climate, biodiversity, gender equality, and sustainable development goals (SDGs) objectives.

### *Contribution to green budgeting priorities (million EUR):*

	Implementation		Estimates					Total contribution	% of the 2021–2027 budget
	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027		
<b>Climate mainstreaming</b>	1426.1	2902.4	3 626.5	3 626.5	3 626.5	3 626.5	3 626.5	22461.0	28%
<b>Biodiversity mainstreaming</b>	529.7	924.3	837.4	952.8	1 173.9	1 150.2	1 057.5	6 625.8	8%
<b>Clean air</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%

A higher climate spending target (30%) has been set by the co-legislators for NDICI – Global Europe for 2021-2027 compared to the previous programming period (20% for 2014-2020). Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, pledged an additional EUR 4 billion in her 2021 State of the Union address.

As indicated in the table, 2021 data showed a performance level in the order of 18%. However, it must be considered that the target is intended to be achieved over the course of the entire 2021-2027 period. With 2021 being the first year of the multiannual financial framework, contributions to targets tend to be in line with the historical performance, as in many cases, initiatives identified at the very end of the previous multiannual financial framework are then adopted in the new one to ensure the continuation of ongoing initiatives. In order to ensure the delivery of the climate target, a number of initiatives are currently being put in place, including the following:

- Significant outreach to EU delegations to strengthen climate and biodiversity mainstreaming in the formulation of new EU-funded actions.
- Operationalisation of the Green Knowledge Hub comprising several technical assistance facilities in support of climate and biodiversity actions. In the course of 2021 and 2022, as part of the implementation of the global gateway, a number of important initiatives were set up. These included the Team Europe initiative on adaptation and resilience in sub-Saharan Africa,

<sup>78</sup> [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/performance-and-reporting/programme-performance-statements/neighbourhood-development-and-international-cooperation-instrument-global-europe-performance\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/performance-and-reporting/programme-performance-statements/neighbourhood-development-and-international-cooperation-instrument-global-europe-performance_en)

the EU's contribution to the Adaptation Fund, the Green and Blue Alliance for the Pacific, the science technology and innovation regional programme in sub-Saharan Africa focusing on early warning systems and the Euroclima programme in the Americas and the Caribbean. The adoption of the NaturAfrica flagship programme, covering key biodiversity landscapes, is a major initiative for the biodiversity objectives.

Regarding biodiversity more specifically, the figures for 2021 and preliminary estimates for 2022 are consistent with the pathway provided for in the 2023 NDICI – Global Europe programme statement. In 2021, NDICI – Global Europe contributed 4.9% to biodiversity. Preliminary estimates for 2022 are around 6.7%, showing a positive trajectory (2021 was in many ways a transition year). Spending under NDICI – Global Europe is already very close to the 7.5% target for 2024 defined for the whole multiannual financial framework (which does not define any annual targets). Of course, these efforts have to be sustained in the coming years with a view to meeting the Commission's political ambitions for biodiversity. A comprehensive approach that combines the development of a substantial portfolio of biodiversity-related actions and the mainstreaming of biodiversity into relevant sectors and actions has been put in place. More than EUR 1 billion will be allocated to biodiversity projects in Africa between 2021 and 2024 under the NaturAfrica initiative alone.

***Contribution to gender equality (million EUR) (\*):***

<b>Gender score</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Score 0:</b>	2 028.0	2 027.5	<b>4 055.5</b>
<b>Score 0*</b>	4.5	6.1	<b>10.6</b>
<b>Score 1:</b>	8 185.8	10 175.7	<b>18 361.4</b>
<b>Score 2:</b>	462.4	181.1	<b>643.5</b>

(\*) Based on the applied gender contribution methodology, the following scores are attributed at the most granular level of intervention possible:

1. 2: interventions the principal objective of which is to improve gender equality;
2. 1: interventions that have gender equality as an important and deliberate objective but not as the main reason for the intervention;
3. 0: non-targeted interventions (interventions that are expected to have no significant bearing on gender equality);
4. 0\*: score to be assigned to interventions with a likely but not yet clear positive impact on gender equality.

1. NB: Numbers provided for 2022 are provisional and subject to quality review.
2. According to the NDICI – Global Europe regulation, at least 85% of new initiatives implemented should have gender equality as a principal or a significant objective, as defined by the gender equality policy marker of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. At least 5% of these actions should have gender equality and women's and girls' rights and empowerment as a principal objective. On 25 November 2020, the gender action plan III (2021-2025), a joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was adopted with the same objective of 85% towards the total number of adopted initiatives, following the Development Assistance Committee's methodology.

3. The Commission's gender expenditure tracking methodology for the EU budget is in line with the Development Assistance Committee's gender equality policy marker methodology. Score 2 equals G2 and implies that gender equality is principal objective; score 1 equals G1 and implies that gender equality is a significant objective; score 0 equals G0 and means that gender equality is not targeted.

4. For 2021, under NDICI – Global Europe, 23 actions were marked as score 2, 236 actions were marked as score 1 and 67 were marked score 0, which gives a percentage of 79.5% of actions marked as score 1 or 2, of which 8.8% were marked as score 2. Data for 2022 had not yet been stabilised when this report was drafted.

### ***Contribution to the digital transition (million EUR)***

	2021	2022	Total	% of the total 2021-2022 implementation
<b>Digital contribution</b>	1 951.0	2 981.2	4 932.0	19%

1. NB: Numbers provided for 2022 are provisional and subject to quality review.

2. In 2021, the Commission continued to boost digitalisation and digital transformation in partner countries. The African Union–EU data flagship project was launched as a cooperation framework. Work continued on improving digital skills, in particular by publishing a toolkit on digital and data technologies and by proposing e-learning tools and courses on space technologies, cybersecurity and digitalisation. Support for EU delegations and partner countries was strengthened in 2022 by means of various technical assistance facilities and the maturing of multi-stakeholder operations, memberships and outreach within the Digital for Development Hub. Digital for Development Hub regional branches for the Americas and the Caribbean region and the Asia and Pacific region were launched in 2021 and 2022 respectively (in addition to the sub-Saharan Africa branch, which was launched in 2020). Relations with key multilateral organisations (such as the International Telecommunication Union) were strengthened, and exchanges with other important stakeholders (such as Smart Africa) multiplied. Specific exchange formats have been created with the United Nations, but also with civil society and the private sector. The first African Union–EU Multistakeholder Forum was organised in March 2022 with support from the Digital for Development Hub.

3. 2022 saw a move towards the concrete implementation of actions. Examples of global gateway flagship actions include the Team Europe initiative on data governance, the EurAfrica gateway, regional fibre optic backbones in Africa, the extension of the Bella project, including the launch of Copernicus data centres in Panama and Chile, the Team Europe initiative on digital connectivity in central Asia and the Earth observation flagship project with Africa. The Commission is also ready to start operationalising the Africa–Europe digital innovation bridge. Moreover, the Commission further supported cyber capacity building, especially in African states, to enable a more efficient response to cyber threats, in addition to cybersecurity being mainstreamed across digital flagship projects.

4. EU policies were further strengthened in 2022 by developing internal digital policies and strategies in certain areas (such as work on the connectivity masterplan, the guidelines on education and skills and internal work with regard to data centres) and by



strategically supporting such policies while working with partners. This was done, for example, by working with multilateral organisations on strategic topics covered by EU policy (such as digital rights and principles and artificial intelligence). The Commission is also stepping up its efforts to mainstream the digital domain across various thematic sectors, for instance by supporting the Africa Union in developing strategies on digital health, digital education (finalised in 2022) and digital agriculture (to be finalised in spring 2023). Moreover, interlinkages between the digital and green transitions have been strengthened through the work of the Digital for Development Hub thematic working group on digital and green.

5. Last but not least, a positive trend is expected with the establishment of digital economy packages for a specific list of countries, taking into account the regional influence of a partner country and the intensity and variety of EU digital interventions. In 2023, high-level political announcements will be made both in the selected countries and at the regional level, such as on the EU–Latin America and the Caribbean Digital Alliance. This will further boost the political visibility of the EU’s digital initiatives and the capacity to link investments, including through European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus guarantees and blending, and through governance considerations.

### ***Contribution of NDICI-Global Europe to the sustainable development goals***

- The objective to support the implementation of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) is explicit across the NDICI-Global Europe and is included in programming of NDICI-Global Europe. The outcome of the effort to integrate SDGs is shown in the various reports produced by the Commission and notably:
  - in the Annual Reports on the implementation of the European Union's external action instruments, which are structured combining the Commission priorities and SDGs. They show in an innovative manner how the EU policies and support contribute to several SDGs at once, given interlinkages among SDGs.
  - in the 2023 EU Voluntary Review on the implementation of the SDG where the roll-out of the NDICI-Global Europe in support to the SDGs is thoroughly described. Taking further the approach already laid down in the 2017 New Consensus for Development and NDICI-Global Europe, one central element of the Review in relation to international partnerships is the emphasis put on how the deployment of Global Gateway contributes to the achievement of the SDGs.

1. The Programme Performance Statements as annexed to the 2024 budget further elaborate on the contribution of NDICI-Global Europe to each of the SDGs with illustrative examples:<sup>79</sup>

SDGs the programme contributes to		Example
SDG1	Yes	<p>The enhancing rural resilience in Yemen programme aims to reduce vulnerability and strengthen resilience of crisis-affected communities in Yemen through the creation of sustainable livelihoods, improved food security, economic recovery, access to basic services, climate risk reduction and community conflict mitigation.</p> <p>The programme is implemented by a consortium of United Nations agencies under the lead of UNDP and comprising WFP, ILO and FAO. The main local partner for the implementation in Yemen is the Social Fund for Development, a local non-governmental organisation with public-sector competences in basic service delivery and small business support. Example activities include the creation of sustainable livelihoods opportunities through improved farming practices, support to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises to stimulate employment opportunities, community assets restoration (communal marketplaces, water infrastructure), agricultural value chains, supporting women's economic empowerment (targeted training and business skills support) as well as access to renewable energy (provision of solar power to public buildings and businesses). The programme's third phase is expected to reach close to 850 000 beneficiaries across Yemen.</p> <p>The EU contribution to the third phase of this programme, which lasts from 2022 to 2025, is EUR 35 million, with an additional contribution of EUR 1 million from Sweden. The overall investment of the EU in all three phases of the enhancing rural resilience in Yemen programme amounts to EUR 105 million since 2016.</p>
SDG2	Yes	<p>In the framework of the Budget Support for the Development of Uzbekistan's Agri-food Sector and Resilient Rural Livelihoods, the EU contributes with EUR 27 million to the development of a sustainable market oriented and inclusive agri-food systems that will increase farm income, expand rural livelihood opportunities and enhance food security. In particular, the action aims at promoting a healthy, environmentally sustainable and fair food system that takes into consideration climate change and biodiversity, and supports the livelihoods, market inclusion and competitiveness of smallholder farmers, and in particular, women, youth, and the most vulnerable. According to the expected results, the average annual income of smallholder farmers will be increased by 20% by the end of the budget support contract. It contributes to the implementation of Uzbekistan's agri-food development strategy, whose outputs will notably reinforce government's actions aimed at improving food security and nutrition and at creating a demand responsive agricultural innovation that promotes climate smart, and digital solutions. The action further includes a capacity-building component and promotes private-public dialogue as well as the involvement in the sector governance of the civil society and farmer associations. Notably, by the end of the budget support, at least 50 persons should have been trained to conduct food and nutrition surveys including diet diversity for women. The implementation period of the action is of 72 months.</p>

<sup>79</sup> [Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe - Performance \(europa.eu\)](https://european-council.europa.eu/media/1000000/attachment/data/1000000/1000000.pdf)

SDG3	Yes	<p>The project ‘Enhanced access to rights, essential services, and livelihoods for vulnerable Afghans and host communities in Iran in the context of COVID-19 recovery’ aims at enhancing resilience and self-reliance of vulnerable Afghans and their host communities in Iran. This is done in a way that they may live together peacefully, have access to social services and develop economic ties to build sustainable livelihoods, and thus foster social cohesion and stability. One of the specific objectives of the project is to facilitate improved access to health services through improved health facilities, capacity building of medical staff, cash assistance to facilitate access to health care services and activities to increase health awareness among target populations.</p> <p>In this action has an EU contribution of EUR 14 million and will have a duration of 36 months. It is implemented by NRC, which partners with INTERSOS and CESVI in order to leverage their specialist technical expertise. ICRI contributes to the project as an affiliated entity. In addition, the local non-governmental organisations SRS and PDA are included as co-applicants to reflect the growing involvement of local civil society in responding to the needs of Afghans and vulnerable Iranians.</p>
SDG4	Yes	<p>The Education Access and Quality Improvement Program in Somalia aims at supporting the strong commitment of the Government of Somalia to Education. The EU contributes with EUR 25 million to improve the educational attainment and employability of relevant target groups. The specific objective of this action is that the governance, quality, relevance and inclusiveness of education and training sector are improved. The expected results are to increase access to equitable quality education at primary and secondary levels, to increase participation of youth and adults in quality technical and vocational education; training linked to employment and economic opportunities as well as to enhance capacity of public institutions to lead, monitor, and manage the education system.</p> <p>The quantifiable results expected at the end of the action include the following: 50 new schools and 200 new classrooms will have been built; at least 50% of existing universities will have been assessed and accredited based on established standards and guidelines; a 10% increase in the number of children completing primary and secondary education and a 10% decrease in the youth unemployment rate in each of the established categories (age, sex, sector).</p>
SDG5	Yes	<p>All projects and programs marked as G1 (gender equality is a significant objective) or G2 (gender equality is the main objective) as per the gender equality policy marker of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee contribute to SDG5. According to the NDICI – Global Europe regulation, at least 85% of new actions implemented should have gender equality as a principal or a significant objective, as defined by the aforementioned gender equality policy marker. At least 5% of these actions should have gender equality and women’s and girls’ rights and empowerment as a principal objective. On 25 November 2020, the gender action plan III (2021-2025), a joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was adopted with the same objective of 85% towards the total number of adopted actions, following the Development Assistance Committee’s methodology. In 2021, over 303 committed projects and programmes, 236 were marked G1 or G2. Examples are provided above, when presenting the regulation contribution to gender equality.</p> <p>In Morocco, since 2018, the EU supports a EUR 35 million programme (Egalite/Moussawat) in the framework of the implementation of the action plan on gender equality. This program contributes, through the human rights-based approach, to gender equality in Morocco with the specific objectives of strengthening the empowerment of women and the enjoyment of their rights.</p>

SDG6	Yes	<p>The European Union is currently supporting Moldova bilaterally with EUR 53 million in the area of water supply and sanitation. The EU has also used its contribution to leverage an additional EUR 69 million in loans and grants from the EBRD, EIB and Member States, bringing the total investments in ongoing water supply and sanitation initiatives to EUR 122 million. In addition, other EU-funded initiatives of EUR 45 million, out of which EU contributed EUR 22.5 million and leveraged EUR 22.5 million from other donors, have recently been completed. Together with key partners such as the Austrian Development Agency, German Agency for International Cooperation, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, the EU has provided more than 170 000 inhabitants with improved water supply and sanitation services. An additional 1 million inhabitants are projected to benefit from the ongoing programmes in the next few years.</p> <p>The project ‘AguaNorte: access to water, sanitation and hygiene in Northern Mozambique’ will contribute to improve the living conditions of the population through increased access to basic services, reduction of inequalities, economic recovery and peacebuilding. It aims to increase access to sustainable safe water and sanitation services for approximately 60 000 people from selected towns in three northern provinces of Mozambique. It encompasses the construction, rehabilitation, and/or expansion of water supply systems, the creation of demand and local market development for sanitation and hygiene services and products. The action will include the construction of gender sensitive WASH infrastructures in schools and healthcare facilities, as well as support the establishment of management modalities for sustainable WASH services.</p> <p>The Action has an EU contribution of EUR 20 million and will have a duration of 48 months, ending in 2026. The implementing partner, UNICEF, will also contribute to the action with EUR 2 million.</p>
SDG7	Yes	<p>The Green for Growth Fund founded in 2009 is an ongoing initiative designed to advance energy and resource efficiency, as well as renewable energy in 19 markets across Southeast Europe, Turkey, the European Eastern Neighbourhood Region, and the Middle East and North Africa. It provides refinancing to financial institutions to enhance their participation in these sectors, and also invests directly into energy efficiency and renewable energy projects. Over the course of 2021, the fund recorded its strongest ever net growth in its outstanding portfolio, facilitating EUR 1.3 billion in impactful green loans to over 42 000 end borrowers. These were complemented by the fund’s Technical Assistance Facility initiatives, totalling EUR 19 million across a record number of projects. Also the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership, to which the EU is the largest donor, supports many projects designed to improve energy efficiency.</p>
SDG8	Yes	<p>In Armenia, the EU has supported socioeconomic recovery and built resilience with a budget support programme ‘COVID-19 Resilience Contract for Armenia’ (2020-2022) of EUR 30 million. The programme provided much needed financial assistance through available Government schemes to over 2 million vulnerable individuals, as well as support in grants or loans to almost 20 000 small and medium-sized enterprises.</p>
SDG9	Yes	<p>The Medusa submarine optical fibre cable will install 7100 km state-of-the-art submarine optical fibre cable in the Mediterranean and connect Northern African countries with Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain with the aim of increasing by 200 times the speed of internet in Northern Africa universities. This investment will integrate 500 universities and research centres from Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, into ‘EU essential terabit network of research and development’. They will receive a 200 Giga bits per second connectivity for the next 20 years. Small and medium-sized enterprises will also benefit from this enhanced connectivity.</p> <p>The Team Europe Initiative on human-centred digitalisation in Kenya seeks to lift</p>

		<p>synergies to boost digitalisation that is inclusive, human-centric, gender-responsive, and rights-based, and that includes youth, women, marginalised groups and remote areas.</p> <p>The project pursues three areas of intervention, namely digital connectivity, jobs and skills and digital governance. Working modalities include a combination of grants, blended financial instruments and services, and support to the policy and regulatory environment through dialogue, technical assistance, and other facilities as required.</p> <p>The project lasts from 2021 to 2024. The EU will contribute EUR 28 million in EU grants to leverage another EUR 165 million of investment. The project supports Kenya's digital agenda and the EU's 'Partnership with Africa on the transition to a digital age'.</p>
SDG 10	Yes	<p>The action 'Support to formalisation of the economy including social protection and support to public finance management' in Angola aims at addressing inequalities, by reducing the informality of the Angolan economy, providing social protection and promoting decent jobs, focusing on the most vulnerable.</p> <p>With an estimated budget of EUR 62.6 million for a 5-year period, the Action seeks to expand access to social protection, digital financial services and business-related trainings for informal vulnerable workers and businesses, in particular women. The EU will provide financial transfers and technical assistance as well as conduct inclusive and gender-responsive policy dialogue towards defining a government plan to ensure continuous progress in accelerating the formalisation process, along with social benefits (access to social protection) and digital financial inclusion, and effective social dialogue. Through this Action, the EU will also support Public Finance Management reforms, an effective tool to address inequalities.</p>
SDG 11	Yes	<p>The action 'green and smart cities' in Tanzania aims at contributing to sustainable and inclusive urban development for the benefit of local urban communities and businesses. This includes promoting green cities for the benefit of their communities and businesses, enhancing employability and entrepreneurship through skills development, contributing to poverty reduction and economic empowerment through financial inclusion and social protection, fostering the creation of green jobs through the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and providing them with access to finance, supporting government systems' ability to deliver effective policy development and implementation and rendering the business environment more conducive to private-sector growth and increase investment and trade.</p> <p>Expected results of the programme include 10 green infrastructures developed through EU resources in selected cities , a reduction down to 20% of leakage on the water pipe networks until 2025 (from 30% in 2021) and 10 online trainings provided, data analysis done, and digital applications developed with EU resources to strengthen the planning in urban resilience in selected cities using digital skills and technology. The EU contribution to this action, which is a Team Europe Initiative and will last 48 months, amounts to EUR 75 million.</p>
SDG 12	Yes	<p>In the Eastern Neighbourhood, the EU4Environment programme is contributing to sustainable consumption and production. It has helped both public and private actors to adopt circular economy principles and practices. Due to the programme, legislation was aligned with the EU acquis in areas such as, for example, green procurement (in Georgia and Moldova) and waste management (in Armenia, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine). Industrial waste mapping pilots were implemented in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine. Enterprises across the region received expert advice to improve resource and energy efficiency and adopt eco-innovation. An awareness campaign on sustainable lifestyles was conducted in Moldova and will be implemented in several other partner</p>

countries.

SDG 13	Yes	The Covenant of Mayors East is an EU-funded project aimed at introducing the EU climate and energy initiative to the Eastern Partnership countries. It supports local authorities in implementing sustainable energy policies, improving the security of energy supply, and facilitates their contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation. The overall objective is to enable local authorities in Eastern Partnership countries to develop and implement sustainable energy and climate actions, therefore significantly contributing to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption, increasing generation of renewable energy, and adaptation to climate change. The signatories to the Covenant of Mayors East, which joined the Covenant of Mayors before October 2016, undertook to reduce their CO <sub>2</sub> emissions by at least 20% by 2020. New signatories commit to reducing CO <sub>2</sub> emissions by 30% by 2030.
SDG 14	Yes	The EU works closely with its neighbours in the Black Sea in the context of the Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea. An environmental monitoring project (EU4EMBLAS) continued its activities. In 2022, the project worked to identify needs for improving laboratory capacity to monitor marine environment in Georgia. Several awareness raising campaigns were carried out in Ukraine and support has been provided to children affected by the Russian war of aggression to recover through art and science, as part of an initiative called 'Black Sea diaries'.
SDG 15	Yes	<p>Capitalising on previous EU support to mangrove protection and management in Guyana, the action financed with EUR 4.68 million from NDICI – Global Europe will further continue the progress made in this area by supporting institutional inter-agency coordination and the development of regulations to conserve and protect mangroves. These measures will lead to an integrated coastal protection plan focussed on mangroves, while shoreline communities will be assisted with development of value chains for such mangrove products (e.g., honey, shellfish, charcoal and eco-tourism). Under the expected results, a regulation to enforce the protection of mangroves will be drafted and adopted by 2025. Since mangroves have a very high carbon sequestration potential, forest carbon also has potential as a revenue stream. Furthermore, the strengthening of the natural coastal defence will contribute to the establishment of a biodiversity habitat, restoring the natural protection towards climate change related disasters and natural hazards. By 2025, the percentage of mangroves in green-grey sea defences is expected to stand at 30% compared to 25% in 2018 and at least 100 persons are expected to be trained by 2025 in in mangrove livelihood opportunities.</p> <p>The programme is scheduled to run from 2023-2025 through budget support in close coordination with the Government, permitting policy dialogue on cross-cutting issues, as well as broader topics of mutual interest.</p>
SDG 16	Yes	Within the framework of the EuroMed justice programme (2020-2023), Southern Neighbourhood countries contributed to the preparation of action plans on judicial cooperation for countering trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, and on confiscation of crime proceeds and asset recovery. The overall objective is to contribute to protecting the EU neighbouring countries' citizens against criminal activities, respecting the rule of law and fundamental human rights. The programme builds sustainable cross-regional mechanisms of cooperation, strengthens regional judicial training platforms, develops practical tools. Partner countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia.
SDG	Yes	The Technical Assistance Information Exchange instrument and twinning international partnerships have been supporting the public administrations in partner countries in strengthening their national development policies and achieving the SDGs since 2019.

17	<p>Both instruments have supported the needs of countries in Africa, Americas, Asia and the Caribbean in wide ranging policy areas, such as e-governance, anti-corruption, sustainable finance and food safety. The Technical Assistance Information Exchange instrument and twinning international partnerships strengthen the capacities of beneficiary institutions, underpinning their ownership over their national legal and institutional processes and reforms. The focus on peer-to-peer exchanges in the public sector has the potential to create trust and build long-term institutional partnerships with the EU. The budget under the NDICI in 2022 amounted to EUR 3 million.</p>
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## Contribution to horizontal priorities IPA III

### Green budgeting

Contribution to green budgeting priorities (million EUR):

	Implementation				Estimates			Total contribution	% of the 2021–2027 budget
	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027		
<b>Climate mainstreaming</b>	697.0	555.0	549.0	560.0	566.0	568.0	569.0	4 064.0	28%
<b>Biodiversity mainstreaming</b>	33.1	67.9	94.0	96.0	96.0	97.0	102.0	586.0	4%
<b>Clean air</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%

#### Climate mainstreaming

- It is estimated that IPA III measures will contribute EUR 4 billion to climate mainstreaming in 2021-2027, and that IPA III contributed EUR 555 million in 2022 (subject to quality review).
- IPA III contributes to mainstreaming climate action in the EU's policies and to achieving an overall target of 30% of EU budget expenditure supporting climate objectives. Measures under IPA III are expected to contribute 18% of the overall financial envelope of the programme to climate objectives, with the objective of increasing this percentage to 20% by 2027.
- Estimates reflect the reporting methodology of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee for the Rio markers on climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation. The budget of interventions contributing to climate change is weighted at 100% if mitigation or adaptation is the 'principal objective' of the measure and 40% if it is a 'significant objective'.
- The partial results for 2021-2022 suggests that IPA III is in the early stages of implementation, while the evolution of this marker is on track. The quality review of 2022 data will be performed during 2023. The Commission is committed to stepping up its efforts to achieve the climate target by the end of the multiannual financial framework.
- In 2022, three measures with climate adaptation or mitigation as a principal objective were adopted, namely the annual action plan in favour of Türkiye (environment and climate change, along with sustainable urban and reliable transport) and the annual action plan in favour of Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU for environment and climate change).
- IPA III supports the beneficiaries in their efforts to align themselves with the climate change and energy package and in the implementation of the external dimension of the European Green Deal. In particular, the measures support the implementation of several priorities of the economic and investment plan for the western Balkans (clean energy, environment, transport) and the green agenda for the Western Balkans, especially under thematic window 3 (green agenda and sustainable connectivity) of the IPA III programming framework. A great deal of the support in the area of clean energy and smart transport is channelled to the beneficiaries via the WBIF, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus and the Green for Growth Fund. In Türkiye, the establishment of the Turkey Investment Platform in 2022 will ensure that



the country can take advantage of the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus and that investment is channelled to support the implementation of the Turkish Green Deal.

### Biodiversity mainstreaming

- It is estimated that IPA III measures will contribute EUR 586 million to biodiversity mainstreaming in the 2021-2027 period, and that they contributed EUR 67.9 million in 2022 (subject to quality review).
- Estimates reflect the reporting methodology of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee for the Rio marker on biodiversity. The budget of interventions contributing to climate change is weighted at 100% if biodiversity is the 'principal objective' of the measure and 40% if it is a 'significant objective'.
- The partial results for 2021-2022 suggest that IPA III is in the early stages of implementation, while the evolution of this marker is on track. The quality review of 2022 data will be performed during 2023. The Commission is committed to stepping up its efforts to achieve the biodiversity target by the end of the multiannual financial framework.
- Moreover, under the IPARD III programmes, the beneficiaries are supported with agri-environment-climate operations aimed at improving the status of biodiversity, extensively managed ecosystems and genetic resources that are at risk of being lost.
- In 2022, one initiative with biodiversity as a principal objective was adopted, namely the annual action plan in favour of Türkiye (environment and climate change).
- Biodiversity, ecosystem protection and ecosystem restoration are key pillars of the green agenda for the western Balkans. The thematic window 'Green agenda and sustainable connectivity' will be the primary entry point for supporting action in the area of ecosystems and biodiversity. However, measures under other thematic windows of the IPA III programming framework, such as the 'Competitiveness and inclusive growth' window, including the agriculture and rural development priority, will also contribute to biodiversity protection and the management of natural resources, in line with the goals of the European Green Deal. The EU biodiversity strategy for 2030 requires that all EU neighbourhood countries be on board, particularly those aspiring to EU membership. Biodiversity and ecosystem conservation and restoration enjoy high-level political support in the western Balkans and Türkiye. In those countries, which are biodiversity hotspots, specific support is provided to further align legislation with the EU's *acquis*, notably the EU birds and habitats directive, and to prepare for the designation of Natura 2000 sites. Technical assistance is targeted at, among other things, supporting the management of protected areas and forestry management. Considerable progress has been made in terms of *acquis* alignment, but challenges remain in ensuring its effective implementation, for instance with respect to illegal logging and the use of environmental impact assessments.

## Gender

Contribution to gender equality (million EUR) (\*):

Gender score	2021	2022	Total
0	1 024.9		<b>2 129.6</b>
1	498.4	865.6	<b>1 364.0</b>
2	42.8	11.0	<b>53.8</b>

(\*) Based on the applied gender contribution methodology, the following scores are attributed at the most granular level of intervention possible:

- 2: interventions the principal objective of which is to improve gender equality;
- 1: interventions that have gender equality as an important and deliberate objective but not as the main reason for the intervention;
- 0: non-targeted interventions (interventions that are expected to have no significant bearing on gender equality);
- 0\*: score to be assigned to interventions with a likely but not yet clear positive impact on gender equality.

In 2021, the IPA III contribution to gender mainstreaming was EUR 42.8 million through measures with gender equality as a principal objective (2) and EUR 498.4 million as a significant objective (1).

In 2022, the initially estimated IPA III contribution to gender mainstreaming was EUR 11 million through measures with gender equality as a principal objective (2) and EUR 865.6 million as a significant objective (1). Moreover, on top of the figures presented in the table above, IPA III contributed EUR 350.5 million through measures, financed from carried-over appropriations and recoveries, with gender equality as a significant objective.

The attribution of the above scores is also in line with the gender equality policy marker and methodology of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee. This is also aligned with the 2021-2025 EU gender action plan III for external relations, adopted in November 2020.

The Commission is committed to implementing the new gender action plan and promoting gender equality and women's empowerment in international forums and agendas. 2021 was the first year of implementation of this action plan. The assessment of the plan's performance against its indicators will be a feature of the midterm review, which is currently underway and is expected to be finalised by the end of 2023.

In 2022, one initiative with gender equality as a principal objective was adopted, namely the annual action plan in favour of North Macedonia (EU for improved health, social protection and gender equality).

This measure is focused on promoting gender equality and mainstreaming by:

- developing services to prevent and protect against gender-based violence;
- improving the state response to the country's most significant health threats, in particular in the field of maternal and neonatal healthcare (improving the prevention and control of oncological diseases by developing a national cancer control strategy and an implementation and quality control plan for national population-based screening programmes for breast, cervical and colorectal cancer);
- improving social services.

## Digital

Contribution to digital transition (million EUR):

	2021	2022	Total	% of the total 2021-2027 implementation
<b>Digital contribution</b>	306.4	385.0	691.5	18%

- The Commission committed EUR 306.4 million in 2021 and EUR 385 million in 2022 as the IPA III contribution to the digital transition.
- Digitalisation is an indicator of the global Europe results framework level 3 (indicator 3.2), and reported as such in the annual report on EU external action. The marker has been operational since late 2020, therefore the commitments and payments for 2021 correspond to a complete year. The marker exists for the whole of heading 6 of the budget, including IPA III.
- The budget of interventions contributing to digital transformation is weighted at 100% if measures are marked as a ‘principal objective’ or 40% if they are marked as ‘significant objective’. No quality review has yet been performed. In order for an action to be considered to relate to digitalisation, the following general considerations must be taken into account.
  - An analysis of the digitalisation context must be conducted to inform future steps and facilitate the identification of the measure’s digital component.
  - After the analysis, the existence of a digitalisation-situation specific objective or result should be identified. It is important to make sure that this objective is backed by at least one indicator from the sector indicator guidance on digitalisation.
  - It should be kept in mind that the data and indicators found in the action document should be disaggregated by sex, age, socioeconomic status and region, where appropriate and applicable.
- In 2021 and 2022, the Commission concentrated its main efforts on reducing data roaming prices within the western Balkans and the EU. In this context, the following two main milestones were achieved: (1) the voluntary gradual reduction of roaming charges between the EU and the western Balkans as of 1 October 2023, as agreed at the last EU–Western Balkans Summit in December; and (2) the removal of data roaming within the western Balkans since July 2021. In 2022, the Commission approved two digital infrastructure projects with a value of EUR 45 million in IPA funding within the WBIF. This concerns the roll-out of rural broadband in Serbia and the establishment of smart labs in the Albanian education system.
- In addition, concerning the western Balkans, the Commission is preparing an IPA regional digital programme for adoption in 2024 (EU4Digital). This programme will accelerate the digital transition for the whole region, focusing on four main strands: (1) secure and sustainable digital and telecom infrastructure across the region; (2) enhancing the interoperability of public services; (3) digitalising businesses; and (4) developing digital skills.
- In 2022, five measures with digital transformation as principal objective were adopted:
  - the annual action plan in favour of Türkiye (employment, education, social policies and health action);

- the annual action plan in favour of North Macedonia (EU for improved border and migration management, EU for modern public administration, EU for improved health, social protection and gender equality);
  - the annual action plan in favour of Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU4 public administration reform increased administrative capacity, EU4 public finance management).
- Digitalisation and the digital transition are an important part of the common regional market action plan, which aims to create a regional digital area focusing on roaming, digital skills, the digital economy, the recognition of electronic signatures and other forms of electronic identification, and the protection of data. This was the most important part of IPA III's digital contribution in 2021 and 2022. Digital has also been recognised as an enabler and has been integrated as a component in measures across different sectors.

## DOAG - Contribution to horizontal priorities

Contribution to green budgeting priorities (million EUR):

	Implementation		Estimates						
	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total contribution	% of the 2021–2027 budget
<b>Climate mainstreaming</b>	0.0	50.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.3	10%
<b>Biodiversity mainstreaming</b>	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.4%
<b>Clean air</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%

- The Green Deal is pivotal to the new EU–OCT cooperation. The DOAG, with its EUR 500 million envelope for 2021–2027, sets specific targets on priority areas of mutual interest, such as climate change and biodiversity. Spending targets for climate action (25%) and biodiversity (7.5% in 2024, 10% in 2026–2027) are therefore included.
- Given the vulnerabilities of the OCTs as islands, the major sectors of intervention under the 11th European Development Fund for the 2014–2020 period included the environment, climate change and sustainable energy. For 2021–2027, the Green Deal has even emerged as a key priority of EU–OCT cooperation. Most (9 out of 12) bilateral multiannual indicative programmes have a strong Green Deal focus (Bonaire, Curaçao, French Polynesia, Greenland, New Caledonia, Saba, Saint Barthélemy, Sint Eustatius, Sint Maarten), along with the three regional multiannual indicative programmes (Indian Ocean, Pacific and Caribbean). Around 40% of the overall resources will be mobilised for Green Deal cooperation, such as renewable energy, water, disaster risk reduction, sustainable agriculture and green growth.
- In 2021, the Greenland annual action programme and support initiatives were committed. They did not include markers on biodiversity or climate change. In 2022, seven initiatives were committed with positive climate coefficients.

- The 2022 implementing initiatives for French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Saba, Saint Barthélemy, Sint Eustatius and Saint Pierre and Miquelon will contribute to the climate and biodiversity targets.
- In French Polynesia, the programme (EUR 31.1 million) aims, among other things, to preserve and restore ecosystems and biodiversity and to better monitor, report on and prevent water pollution. The initiative will contribute to protecting the environment and biodiversity and to adapting to climate change through the more efficient use of water.
- In Greenland, the multiannual indicative programme's second priority area – green growth (EUR 22.5 million) – will support in particular the extension of a renewable energy supply, to ensure that the economic development of the island is sustainable and as carbon neutral as possible. Also in line with the Green Deal and climate adaptation goals is its second goal, the protection of biodiversity, as Greenland's flora and fauna is particularly affected by climate change in the Arctic region, and is heating up more quickly than the rest of the planet. Lastly, as Greenland is an important territory in which to study climate dynamics, the support for research coordination also provided for in this priority area will contribute to a better understanding of the related challenges.
- In New Caledonia, the programme (EUR 30.9 million) aims to green the mining sector, develop decarbonised mobility and develop the sustainability and resilience of the territory. Therefore, the direct and indirect results of the programme will contribute to the fight against climate change and will foster environmental protection.
- A clean-energy transition with climate mitigation as the principal objective will be the focus of the 2021-2027 territorial cooperation with Saba (EUR 4.1 million, budget support, implementation will start in 2023), and the multiannual programme for Sint Maarten (EUR 7.7 million) also focuses on the renewable energy transition.
- Saint Barthélemy's budget support programme for disaster risk management (EUR 2.5 million), is interlinked with climate adaptation. The EU's support in this sector will contribute to developing integrated risk reduction management in Saint Barthélemy, but also, more broadly, to the island asserting its role as a leader and main trusted partner in the fight against climate change in the Caribbean region, one of the region's most vulnerable to its impacts.
- In Saint Pierre and Miquelon, the programme (EUR 27 million) aims to support the development of sustainable tourism. Several planned initiatives with a contribution to green priorities, to be carried out by the territorial collectivity, are in hand. The forest management plan provides for the protection of natural areas and remarkable sites. Furthermore, the territorial collectivity has developed a planning document for the sustainable development of the territory. This document is intended to both address the risks to the territory and protect the biodiversity of the coastal zone.
- For the first time, sustainable agriculture was selected in an OCT, in Sint Eustatius (EUR 2.9 million, budget support, implementation will start in 2023), instigated by the current disruptions in food supplies and the need to boost food security and increase the resilience of the island's own food production (the Caribbean OCTs are highly dependent on food imports). The initiative will enhance food security in the face of climate change and biodiversity loss, reduce the island's environmental and climate footprint and provide opportunities for local operators in the different segments of the food value chain. The action is fully aligned with the Green Deal (under the farm-to-fork strategy).

Contribution to gender equality (million EUR) (\*):

Gender score	2021	2022	Total
<b>Score 2:</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Score 1:</b>	60.0	67.6	127.6
<b>Score 0:</b>	3.3	0.6	3.9
<b>Score 0*</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0

(\*) Based on the applied gender contribution methodology, the following scores are attributed at the most granular level of intervention possible:

- 2: interventions the principal objective of which is to improve gender equality;
- 1: interventions that have gender equality as an important and deliberate objective but not as the main reason for the intervention;
- 0: non-targeted interventions (interventions that are expected to have no significant bearing on gender equality);
- 0\*: score to be assigned to interventions with a likely but not yet clear positive impact on gender equality. While there was no specific target set for the 2014-2020 EU–OCT cooperation concerning gender equality, care will continue to be taken to ensure that all cooperation programmes include a focus on gender equality. Indeed, the DOAG programme explicitly states that gender equality should be mainstreamed into all initiatives as a key contribution to the successful achievement of the SDGs. Consequently, all new initiatives aim to ensure that gender aspects are considered to the best extent possible, notably through sex-disaggregated data.
- OCTs being Member State territory, they are subject to the respective national legislation, which includes the progressive application of EU legislation in this matter even though OCTs are not bound by the EU *acquis*. Therefore, no initiatives target gender equality specifically, but gender equality is mainstreamed in all new cooperation initiatives as a significant objective (G1 marker), while there are no initiatives with gender equality as a main target (G2).
- French Polynesia (G1). Action regarding equitable access to water and to appropriate hygiene conditions responds to a crucial issue for the health of women and children. However, gender-disaggregated data on access to water in French Polynesia does not yet exist. The gender issue in connection with the sustainable management of water will mainly be raised within the framework of the policy dialogue. The action will also support the production of sex-disaggregated data.
- Greenland (G1). Cooperation on education has several indicators disaggregated by gender, and one of its specific objectives is increased equality in the education system, including on gender. Female students perform particularly well in upper secondary and higher education. Young people in Greenland face the specific challenges of underperformance by male students and socio-psychological issues, along with gender-based violence.
- New Caledonia (G1). The energy sector is influenced by a set of persistent gender inequalities, which can be summarised as gender gaps in energy access, in the energy labour market, in energy-related education and in decision-making in the energy sector. The EU initiative and the policy dialogue will help the policies arising from the programme to address these inequalities. Moreover, the initiative will also support the production of sex-disaggregated data.
- Saba (G1). Action on energy transition will support a more affordable, sustainable and reliable energy supply, and will foster gender equality (better access to energy by women). It also has a

gender-sensitive indicator, with a specific strategy for the sector to be drafted by 2025 (supported by technical assistance).

- Saint Barthélemy (G1). Cooperation on risk management has a gender-related goal (public policy documents taking gender into consideration).
- Saint Eustatius (G1). Cooperation in the field of sustainable agriculture, promoting a gender-sensitive agricultural-sector policy framework and minimum gender targets for the funding scheme. Infrastructure outputs require a gender-sensitive analysis.
- Saint-Pierre and Miquelon (G1). The territorial government is committed to implementing several initiatives for the careers of young women and men in the territory, in particular e-training courses. This training contributes to the better integration of women into the labour market. Moreover, the EU initiative will support the production of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis relating to the sector. It will also seek to build the capacity of stakeholders in relation to the gender and human-rights approach.
- Support initiatives are driven by demand, therefore they do not specifically target gender issues and are scored at 0 in the above table.

Contribution to the digital transition (million EUR):

	2021	2022	Total	% of the total 2021-2022 implementation
<b>Digital contribution</b>	0.0	11.8	11.8	9%

- During the 2014-2020 period, important work was carried out on digital connectivity with Wallis and Futuna (EUR 19.6 million) and Saint Helena (EUR 21.5 million).
- Under the DOAG programme, cooperation with Aruba in 2021-2027 will prioritise the digital transformation (e-government, EUR 14.2 million). Though programming is finished, the formulation of the implementing measure will take place in 2023, and implementation will only begin in 2024. The ongoing cooperation on education with Greenland includes the provision to extend and improve the use of digital technologies in education, for instance to battle the chronic lack of qualified teaching staff in remote locations. The government launched the evaluation of the information technology strategy in education in 2022, and is currently drafting a new action plan for digital and distance learning, to be finalised in 2023.

## Contribution of DOAG to the sustainable development goals

SDG	Does the programme contribute to the goal?	Example
<b>SDG1</b>	yes	With the COVID-19 pandemic and, more recently, high inflation and the global impact of the war in Ukraine on food supplies and food security, global poverty has increased, and this is also the case in the OCTs. As part of the EU's global response to COVID-19, OCTs benefited from reorientations of ongoing programmes and the front-loading of budget support operations, as well as mobilising all remaining funds from the B-envelope (emergency assistance), to the total amount of EUR 111 million. This highlights the importance for the EU–OCT partnership to continue the fight against inequalities and poverty (see also below on SDG 10).
<b>SDG2</b>	yes	OCTs share particular vulnerabilities, resulting in a complex set of food security and nutrition challenges. For 2021-2027, the EU will support sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition in the Pacific region (regional multiannual indicative programme, EUR 36 million), Caribbean OCTs (regional multiannual indicative programme, EUR 21 million) and in Sint Eustatius (EUR 2.9 million).
<b>SDG3</b>	yes	<p>The populations in the OCTs are highly dependent on the quality of resources and natural environments. Indeed, the latter provide a large part of the population with essential services such as means of subsistence and a vector of well-being. The regional Pacific multiannual indicative programme (EUR 36 million) is expected to promote sustainable and healthy food consumption, and to ensure that citizens are better informed to make healthy and sustainable choices. It is planned that the regional Caribbean multiannual indicative programme (EUR 21 million) will strengthen food and nutrition security through the development of sustainable and resilient local food value chains.</p> <p>Over 60% of the population of Wallis and Futuna suffer from obesity and other related health conditions (diabetes, gout, etc.). However, the local offer of treatments is limited. People with serious conditions often need to go to New Caledonia, Australia, or even France for consultations and treatments. The EU budget support under the 11th European Development Fund of EUR 19.6 million (with a EUR 0.56 million top-up for COVID-19 support) helped to finance the territory's connection to the TUISAMOA digital cable and to introduce broadband. This 'digital revolution' enabled the Health Agency to develop its telemedicine capabilities aiming at improving prevention, early detection and treatment of many diseases.</p>



<b>SDG4</b>	yes	<p>Access to quality education fosters equality and is an essential pre-condition for achieving sustainable growth and jobs. This is the rationale of one of the two priority areas of EU cooperation with Greenland 2021-2027. EUR 202.5 million is earmarked for education cooperation in Greenland. This will contribute to increase the quality, the access and the efficiency of the territory's education system, which is facing a number of complex challenges (lack of skilled staff, geography, social issues). For instance, the rate of students staying in education, and the completion rates have recently shown a positive trend, and a number of institutional and policy changes are making progress.</p> <p>Through the Erasmus+ programme, the EU also supports OCTs in facilitating mobility of individuals, and reinforcing intercultural dialogue and understanding. OCT participation has more than doubled since 2018, in the number of both projects and beneficiaries. From 87 projects with 41 beneficiaries (total EUR 3.2 million) in 2018, participation grew to 177 projects and 95 beneficiaries (EUR 5.5 million) in 2020.</p>
<b>SDG5</b>	yes	<p>Gender equality is a cross cutting issue of EU OCT cooperation. All new initiatives include gender-sensitive indicators and sex-disaggregated data whenever possible. Climate resilience, renewable energy development, water and sanitation are all crucial for gender equality.</p> <p>The education programme in Greenland is a good example on how EU action fostered equality, including on gender. Greenland's education policy, which the EU supports since 2007, aims to create a more equal and inclusive society, advancing gender equality. In 2022, the Commission disbursed EUR 30 million, translating to EUR 12 million for gender equality in a G1 action (gender equality as an important, but not principal objective). In fact, female students and pupils tend to outperform their male counterparts (e.g. having an eleven percentage points higher transition rate to upper secondary education). Educational attainment and participation of girls and women has been consistently high, with 65% and 64% of enrolments and completions in upper secondary education. Women outperform men even more in higher education (72% of completions for all diplomas, all numbers for 2020). Enrolment and completion of vocational education are more equally distributed between genders (49% and 50% respectively in 2020).</p>

<b>SDG6</b>	yes	<p>As part of the broader EU support for access to water and sanitation, interventions relating to the construction of water collection systems and of treatment facilities contribute to delivery on SDG 6. This will be the focus of the new cooperation with French Polynesia (EUR 31.1 million), Bonaire (EUR 4.6 million) and Curaçao (EUR 18.6 million).</p> <p>In French Polynesia, the programme will contribute to the achievement of sustainable development objectives aiming at guaranteeing access to drinking water and sanitation while ensuring an integrated management of water resources in the face of climate change constraints.</p> <p>In Bonaire and Curaçao, the population and economic growth (notably linked to the tourism sector) led to increased production of wastewater and solid waste and more pressure on ecosystems. The programmes will therefore aim to improve water management and increase access to sustainable sanitation.</p>
<b>SDG7</b>	yes	<p>Sustainable energy transition in New Caledonia (EUR 30.9 million), Saba (EUR 4.1 million) and Sint Maarten (EUR 7.7 million).</p> <p>In New Caledonia, the programme will contribute to the decarbonisation of the mining industry, which is the lungs of the economy and responsible for 77% of the territory's total energy consumption. Furthermore, New Caledonia aims at energy autonomy for the territory, based on reliable, decarbonised, resilient and affordable energy.</p> <p>The programme in Saba will accelerate the transition to a low carbon economy building on in the 11th European Development Fund action which substantially improved the energy mix of Saba with 40% of renewable energy produced. More action is needed to increase the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix (objective of 60% production by 2025) and energy efficiency (with the launch of a programme to promote the use of LED technologies and solar water heaters).</p> <p>In Greenland the cooperation aims at increasing the percentage of renewable energy in the public electricity provision to 90%, and there are initiatives to reduce the carbon footprint of current and future economic developments.</p>

<b>SDG8</b>	yes	<p>The EU envisaged support 2021-2027 to sustainable tourism (Saint Pierre and Miquelon, EUR 27 million), green growth (Greenland, EUR 22.5 million), sustainable agriculture (Sint Eustatius, EUR 2.9 million) and e-government (Aruba, EUR 14.2 million) will drive progress towards sustained economic growth, full employment and decent work.</p> <p>In Saint Pierre and Miquelon, the programme will contribute to the sustainable economic diversification of the territory, relying on the potential and multiplier effect for sustainable growth of the tourism sector. It will reinforce the attractiveness of the territory bringing decent jobs and new opportunities, including for local youth and women.</p> <p>For 2021-2027 the EU will team up with Aruba to implement its e-government-strategy. This entails the building of an e-government organisation, an e-ID development and implementation, national cyber security development and the creation and implementation the national digital payments infrastructure. Aruba's digital transformation will contribute to secure the digital access to government services and unlock new economic opportunities for all, including women and youth.</p> <p>In Greenland, the EU is supporting initiatives to make the territory's natural riches more accessible to foreign tourists in a manner that is sustainable and respectful of the unique environment, while supporting local populations.</p>
<b>SDG9</b>	yes	<p>Since 2019 the EU is boosting through a EUR 13.05 million programme (11th European Development Fund) the capacity of the University of Aruba. To this end, the EU also collaborated with the University of Leuven. The focus of the programme was put on science, technology, engineering and mathematics to enhance teaching (at bachelor's and master's levels) and research (at PhD level). A new faculty has been set up, including research facilities and laboratories that comply with the European Qualifications Framework. This action will contribute to boost innovation skills and partnerships between research and industries in Aruba.</p> <p>In Greenland, the ongoing programme for education includes a goal of including more innovative skills in the curriculum, formulation of which is under way.</p>

<b>SDG10</b>	yes	<p>The focus of our past territorial cooperation (9th and 10th European Development Fund) was on urban infrastructures (mainly street lighting, paved streets as well as sewage infrastructures) in the most deprived neighbourhoods of Curaçao. These programmes were very well received with a strong ownership of the inhabitants and local neighbourhood organisations. Our joint cooperation has resulted in important and sustainable impacts by strongly improving the quality lives of poor inhabitants, which represent 1/3 of the population of the island. The ongoing 11th European Development Fund programme on resilient infrastructures of EUR 16.95 million and the new programme for 2021-2027 on water and sanitation of EUR 18.6 million will continue to eliminate the inequalities in access basic infrastructure notably for clean water and sanitation.</p> <p>In Greenland, inequality is tackled with the improved access of all children to pre-school education, which lays the ground for future economic security independent of starting conditions.</p>
<b>SDG11</b>	yes	<p>An important part of Bonaire's young population faces social hardship due to growing up in vulnerable single-parent households. For this reason, the EU joined hands to build better social and developmental prospects for children in this Dutch Overseas Country and Territory in the Caribbean. Youth empowerment is at the heart of the EU- Bonaire partnership agenda. The 11th European Development Fund budget support programme of EUR 3.95 million advanced well with the setting-up of a childcare regulation and comprehensive child development centres.</p>
<b>SDG12</b>	yes	<p>The EU envisaged support 2021-2027 to Bonaire and Curaçao on water management and sanitation will aim to expand the application of the circular economy in water resources management, as a mechanism to achieve greater environmental and health protection (via increased sanitation coverage and greater wastewater treatment capacities as well as reuse of wastewater resources).</p>

<b>SDG13</b>	yes	<p>The OCTs are especially vulnerable to climate change and environmental degradation due to their geographical locations and characteristics. The ongoing all-OCT thematic programme green overseas and the Caribbean, Indian Ocean and Pacific regional programmes (for a total of EUR 97.8 million) from the 11th European Development Fund are all dedicated to ensuring the sustainable use of natural resources, protecting biodiversity and supporting climate initiatives and resilience, showing the vital importance of these areas to all OCTs. The regional initiatives under the DOAG (EUR 36 million for the Pacific OCTs, EUR 21 million for the Caribbean OCTs and EUR 4 million for the French Southern and Antarctic Lands) will build on these achievements.</p> <p>EU support to protect biodiversity will continue to be the priority area for cooperation with the French Southern and Antarctic Lands in 2021-2027 (EUR 4 million). This will build on the ongoing Indian Ocean regional programme (EUR 4 million) which aims at improving the surveillance and observation of terrestrial and marine ecosystems in the French Southern and Antarctic Lands, restoring ecosystems and reinforcing impact prevention mechanisms. The programme 2021-2027 for Saint-Barthélemy (EUR 2.5 million) will also support disaster risk management and climate adaptation.</p> <p>In addition, the on-going BEST Initiative has helped OCTs to promote the EU's environmental standards and provided an incentive for local actors to engage in environmental initiatives. The new LIFE programme 2021-2027 will continue to scale up the initiatives in OCTs on biodiversity and nature conservation. All these programmes focus therefore on translating SDG 13, 14 and 15 into effective results on the ground and will prepare the work for the future.</p>
<b>SDG14</b>	yes	Same as SDG13
<b>SDG15</b>	yes	Same as SDG13

<b>SDG16</b>	yes	<p>All EU-funded initiatives in the OCTs intend to reinforce the capacity, the accountability and inclusiveness of their institutions.</p> <p>Budget support is generally a preferred implementation modality for OCTs' territorial allocations. It is an efficient way of addressing long-term and structural challenges, of improving the performance and accountability of administrations while focusing on the effective achievement of results of territorial policies and of maintaining a constructive policy dialogue. Practice confirms that this modality provides satisfactory results in OCTs through a high level of appropriation from local authorities. This is also supported via a specific instrument, the Technical Cooperation Facility, that OCTs have access to.</p> <p>As an example, the territory of Saint Pierre and Miquelon benefited from a public finance management assessment, funded by the facility, which, was finalised in 2022. As a result of the assessment, a plan for the improvement and modernisation of public finances for the 2023-2026 period has been prepared by the local authorities. This document serves as a basis for assessing the Territorial Authority's progress.</p>
<b>SDG17</b>	yes	<p>The special relationship between the EU and the OCTs is based on the association of the OCTs with the EU, which constitutes a partnership. This principle of partnership is embedded in the DOAG programme, which is the framework for political and policy dialogue and cooperation on issues of common interest.</p> <p>Recently, the partnership has been further reinforced by including dedicated cooperation on youth engagement. A new initiative of over EUR 560 000 funded by the OCT Technical Facility, the OCT Youth Network, was launched in July 2022 by the EU with the aim of increasing the ties between young people living in OCTs and the EU, and of enhancing the knowledge and involvement of young people in the EU–OCT partnership.</p>

## Contribution of INSC to horizontal priorities

Contribution to green budgeting priorities (million EUR):

Implementation			Estimates						
2021	2022		2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total contribution	% of the 2021–2027 budget
<b>Climate mainstreaming</b>	0.0	3.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.7	1%
<b>Biodiversity mainstreaming</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%
<b>Clean air</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0%

– The amount committed under climate mainstreaming relates to the environmental remediation programme in central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), aiming at cleaning up and restoring former uranium legacy sites.

Contribution to gender equality (million EUR) (\*):

Gender score	2021	2022	Total
<b>Score 1</b>	34.3	35.9	<b>70.2</b>
<b>Score 0:</b>	3.3	2.6	<b>5.9</b>

(\*) Based on the applied gender contribution methodology, the following scores are attributed at the most granular level of intervention possible:

- 2: interventions the principal objective of which is to improve gender equality;
  - 1: interventions that have gender equality as an important and deliberate objective but not as the main reason for the intervention;
  - 0: non-targeted interventions (interventions that are expected to have no significant bearing on gender equality);
  - 0\*: score to be assigned to interventions with a likely but not yet clear positive impact on gender equality.
- The INSC continues to promote gender equality through its training, tutoring and education programme, where the participation of partner countries is conditional upon the gender-balanced registration of students.
- In 2022, 22 students followed the master’s course in European leadership for safety education financed by the INSC, 11 of whom were women, and 26 followed the master’s course in nuclear safeguards, 12 of whom were women.

Contribution to the digital transition (million EUR): N/A

## Contribution of INSC to sustainable development goals

SDG	Does the programme contribute to the goal?	Example
SDG1	No	
SDG2	No	
SDG3	No	
SDG4	No	
SDG5	Yes	Almost half of the students benefitting from training and education are women (EUR 1.6 million).
SDG6	No	
SDG7	No	
SDG8	No	
SDG9	No	
SDG10	No	
SDG11	Yes	Environmental remediation in central Asia provides a safer environment to the local population (EUR 4.8 million).
SDG12	No	
SDG13	No	
SDG14	No	
SDG15	No	
SDG16	Yes	Regulatory authorities are strengthened in beneficiary countries (EUR 11 million).
SDG17	No	



The stakeholder consultation for the evaluation of the EFIs began in August 2022 and came to an end in September 2023. The majority of the consultation activities took place during the Open Public Consultation in the 1<sup>st</sup> half of 2023. As highlighted in the Call for Evidence and in line with the consultation strategy endorsed by the Interservice Steering Group, the consultation approach involved collecting input from a wide range of stakeholders on the EFIs.

### **1. Call for Evidence**

The consultation process began with the publication of the evaluation Call for Evidence, which was published on the European Commission “Have Your Say” website in August 2022 under the title “Financing for European action outside EU borders”. As per the Better Regulation guidelines, the aim of the Call for Evidence was to give stakeholders and the general public an early opportunity to provide feedback on the evaluation and its approach. However, no feedback was received on the Call for Evidence.

### **2. Open Public Consultations**

The objective of the public consultation, which took place from 31 March to 23 June 2023 (open for 12 weeks), was to gather stakeholders’ views and experience on the EU’s External Financing Instruments for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 multiannual financial frameworks in the context of their ongoing evaluation. The open public consultation targeted all types of stakeholders, including citizens. The questionnaire was divided into two parts: the first and more general part was intended for the general public and the second and more technical ‘expert’ part was aimed at stakeholders with specific knowledge of EU external cooperation (e.g., development agencies, non-governmental organisations and public authorities). The public consultation questionnaire consisted of 8 general questions and 14 expert questions. The questions were available in five languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish) and replies could have been provided in any of the 24 official EU languages. Respondents could also upload a document if they wished to develop their replies in detail. The summary report on the results of the consultation has been published on the “Have Your Say” website and it provides an overview of the received contributions.

### **3. Targeted Consultations**

Targeted consultations took place April and May 2023 through various dedicated meetings aimed at gathering the views of specific types of stakeholders on the EFIs. In the context of targeted consultations, EU Member States experts, development agencies of the EU Member States, civil society (CSO) and local authorities (LA) networks and platforms, Development Financial Institutions, and the United Nations were consulted through dedicated meetings.

The views of relevant stakeholders are summarised below.

#### **Consultation with Member States experts**

- **NDICI-Global Europe**

Member States agreed that having one instrument is an improvement in providing more predictable and holistic view of the EU external cooperation.

Member States agreed also that the coherence of the EU external financing instruments has improved under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) thanks to the streamlining of separate instruments into NDICI-Global Europe. However, they also pointed to the differences within the instrument regarding the Neighbourhood region in comparison to the other regions covered by NDICI-Global Europe that also translates into different approaches and working methods. They called for a closer involvement of Council and in particular the NDICI sub-group of CODEV-PI, in order to provide thorough strategic steer.

Member States also shared their views on whether NDICI-Global Europe has proven to be flexible enough to respond to crisis and changing geopolitical context. They acknowledged increased flexibility, notably thanks to the emerging challenges and priorities cushion, however shared concerns regarding its relatively quick depletion.

Finally, Member States acknowledged that NDICI-Global Europe is a policy-driven instrument and that targets and ‘geographisation’ bring value in this regard, however sufficient resources should be provided for regional programmes as well. They consider that targets are a good way to balance the geographisation and ensure thematic steering. Targets also put into perspective the commitments achieved, however they must be monitored in real time.

Member States considered that the instrument has proven to be adequate and useful despite such challenges as COVID-19 and the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

- **Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland (DOAG)**

Member States agreed that the coherence of EU cooperation with the OCTs under the DOAG has been strengthened after merging the former Greenland and OAD decisions. Member States considered that DOAG has proven to be sufficiently flexible in its objectives and sectors of cooperation to be able to respond to the challenges of all OCTs.

- **European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)**

Member States found that the EU still has a strong comparative advantage in working with partner countries in the area of nuclear safety. They confirmed their commitment to this instrument and acknowledged its useful mission in the current global context. Member States agreed that there is sufficient level of complementarity between INSC, NDICI-Global Europe and IPA III.

- **European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+)**

Member States agreed that, despite its early stage, EFSD+ can be used to catalyse cooperation with development financial institutions and boost financial flows towards investment in EU’s partner countries. Member States considered EFSD+ as a policy driven modality and agreed that it must follow the objectives, priorities and targets of NDICI – GE and contribute to other geopolitical initiatives such as Global Gateway or Team Europe Initiatives. Member States agreed that EFSD+ could improve the capacity of the EU to attract and support investment in partner countries, however shared concerns about functioning of EFSD+ in difficult contexts, especially in LDCs.

- **Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)**

Member States welcomed the instrument’s thematic approach while noting that it was early in its implementation. Member States also pointed out to the bottlenecks caused by the weak

administrative and absorption capacities of the beneficiaries. They called for a deeper discussion on the operationalisation of the conditionality mechanism foreseen in the instrument and stressed the importance of involving CSOs. Member States agreed that IPA III should not include new candidate and potential candidate countries at this stage.

## **Consultation with Member States development agencies (Practitioners' Network)**

### **NDICI-Global Europe**

- **Streamlining of instruments into NDICI-Global Europe:**

Member States agencies welcomed simplification that single instrument has brought, however stressed that the interplay between geographic, global and thematic elements on the ground is not always clear. Also, different processes still coexist on similar issues. There are also differences on programming in Africa (Sub Saharan Africa vs. North Africa) notably on issues like migration and there is lack of coordination between national and regional actions (e.g. on TEIs or migration corridors).

- **Geographisation and policy first:**

Member States agencies welcomed geographisation principle, however they highlighted the need to strengthen interlinkages between global, regional and country-level actions. Member State agencies welcomed also policy first principle, highlighting the need to better link policy and implementation and to recognise role of partner countries in that process to ensure ownership. When it comes to policy first in the EFSD+ context, Member States agencies concluded that it is still too early to provide comments.

- **Team Europe and Global Gateway:**

Team Europe approach is largely seen as a step towards improving joint implementation approach as it allows Member States agencies to align with the EU action. However, there is a need to strengthen coordination and communication flow in particular at country level. Member States agencies also called for operationalisation of joint intervention logics by joint teams to avoid having multiple contracts as this would help cutting transaction costs.

- **Flexibility**

Emerging challenges and priorities cushion was also brought up in the discussion and Member States agencies called for closer dialogues between the Commission and the Council. They also recalled the flexibility of trust funds under the previous MFF where agencies could propose actions which were quickly approved and stressed that currently the level of flexibility is not the same.

### **IPA II and IPA III**

Member States agencies welcomed the new approach in IPA III. The new IPA III instrument contributes to more flexibility and efficiency, noting, however, programming under the new approach is less predictable and more dependent on political factors. At the same time, the new approach puts a healthy pressure on the beneficiaries' governments to show political and policy commitment.

## **Consultation with civil society and local authorities' organisations (Policy Forum for Development)**

### **Feedback from civil society organisations**

#### **NDICI-Global Europe**

##### **Streamlining and geographisation**

CSOs welcome the broad instrument but the new regulation brings extra complexity for the local actors, including CSOs. Geographisation is appreciated since it allows to tailor responses to local contexts and may lead to more meaningful dialogue between the EU Delegations and CSOs. However, in practice access to geographic funds at country level is limited as call for proposals at country level are cumbersome and it seems there is a preference for indirect management, by which the EU delegates management of funds to international organisations or bilateral development agencies from EU Member States.

##### **Funding for CSOs**

When it comes to CSOs funding, it is key to consider local contexts to operationalise actions, especially taking into account shrinking space for CSOs. It has been recalled that CSOs are important for oversight and representation of citizens, therefore EU funding mechanisms for CSOs should capitalize on, and defend these roles of the CSOs. CSOs called also for closer and more open dialogue with the Delegations.

#### **IPA III**

The IPA III programming framework and its articulation with NIPACs that submit strategic responses was not fully clear initially, with not much involvement of CSOs early on. While programming documents should be co-drafted with the beneficiaries, local authorities should be more involved. The DG NEAR Guidelines for EU Support to Civil Society in the Enlargement Region were considered an important document, but awareness raising is needed, especially on monitoring of implementation.

### **Feedback from local authorities' organisations**

#### **NDICI-Global Europe**

- **Geographisation and simplification**

Geographisation principle is bringing challenges to local authorities since the budgetary decisions have been decentralised and the decision makers at country level are not easily accessible to them. Simplification that NDICI-Global Europe has brought is appreciated since it allows the Delegations to be more responsive to partner countries' priorities. This simplification should be taken further downstream to the modalities used to work with partners at country level.

- **Funding for local authorities**

There are concerns among local authorities organisations regarding the disappearance of dedicated budget line which should have been compensated by mainstreaming in the geographic programmes. However, there is a perceived lack of strategic priority setting by the Delegations, so this approach seems not to be properly implemented in practice and should be followed up by proper monitoring and tracking of geographic programmes.

- **Team Europe and Global Gateway**

Local authorities recalled that they have a role to play in the consultation processes to support the Commission and wish to engage constructively in the rollout of Team Europe Initiatives and Global Gateway. Global Gateway is a great opportunity to channel infrastructural investment to the local level, in particular city level, however consultations have not yet reached local authorities' level.

### **Consultation with the UN organisations**

#### **NDICI-Global Europe**

- **Geographisation**

UN acknowledged that NDICI-Global Europe is now more agile, flexible and predictable with reduced administrative complexities and increased synergies. In terms of geographisation, the change happens at the country-level and its impact is felt differently depending on the country. In this context, complementarity with the regional and thematic programmes is important, even if these two elements have decreased in size. UN highlighted that, as a highly decentralised organisation, they understand the need to respond to local priorities, but good balance should be maintained when it comes also to responses at global level. With too much country-level implementation, global issues, e.g. migration, pandemics and climate change should not be left behind.

- **Migration**

On migration issues, UN stressed that the EU should strengthen a holistic approach to root-causes of migration and to labour mobility schemes. In particular, there is a need for balancing the comprehensive migration policy with development policy. Evidence-based approach with solid migration data is needed in order to make development cooperation more coherent and effective.

- **Team Europe**

Team Europe approach may present challenges for the UN as being seen as even more external partner. Coordination between EU and Member States absorbs way more attention than coordination with other partners. Even if UN can be a better implementing partner in a given context, the temptation and political pressure to engage with Member States will be high.

#### **IPA III**

UN acknowledged that the new approach under IPA III is the most significant change since IPA instrument was first created. However, since the rollout of the IPA III was still at a very early stage,

more time was needed to evaluate the impact and provide meaningful comments. UN appreciated the consultative process at national level during programming and is keen to continue such exchanges and the overall very good collaboration.

## **Consultation with Development Financial Institutions (DFIs)**

- **Design of operations**

While DFIs acknowledged that the financial instruments in support of investment, i.e. blending of grants and loans and budgetary guarantees under EFSD+, have manifested the added potential in opening policy dialogue in more difficult environments, they also noted a lack of flexibility in the design of operations. Impactful tailor-made projects would require more targeted funding. It has been argued that a full coverage of guarantees was necessary, especially in view of the limited risk appetite in fragile / less-developed countries (LDCs). DFIs also called for more clarity on the priority countries and sectors. Some DFIs emphasised the importance of local currency solutions to address policy priorities. On the type of instruments, the importance of blending (and hence grants) has been recalled as more suitable to certain contexts, compared to guarantees.

- **Sovereign lending**

On sovereign lending, DFIs pleaded for a broader access to Investment Window 1, currently available exclusively to EIB, considering that involvement at state level is essential to deliver on the Global Gateway.

- **Technical assistance**

Regarding the implementation aspects, DFIs stressed the importance of technical assistance and called for greater volume to cover costs beyond the implementation period as shrinking TA contributions are not at a par with increasing fees and policy complexity. They also asked for an increase in management fees.

- **Contracting, monitoring and reporting**

DFIs raised the issue of complexities in negotiating contracts, implementing setbacks and the burden of reporting. Some suggested greater reliance on pillar assessments and proposed to approve operations at a programme level instead of on a transaction-by-transaction basis. DFIs also called for greater contribution in favour of joint facilities due to increased coordination needs. They also welcomed a common results monitoring framework, but emphasised that it was difficult to gauge the impact of deploying the new instruments given the short timescale, and argued that some reporting requirements are extremely heavy, particularly on small businesses.

- **Team Europe**

On policy steering, DFIs mentioned that Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) are time consuming and requested a further streamlining of the approach. It has also been proposed to make a better use of the EFSD+ tools to implement concrete and compact projects with a view to contributing to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Some DFIs stressed that pushing for operations with multiple lenders may be inadequate in certain contexts and even counterproductive vis-à-vis the achievement of policy objectives (notably higher risk markets or LDCs) as it adds too much complexity.

- **Pricing**

On pricing and risk, DFIs call for greater transparency, including through getting access to a pricing simulation model.

- **Coordination and role of Delegations**

DFIs noted that there is a learning curve to take into account with the new financial instruments and that greater awareness and stronger capacity was needed, crucially also in the EU Delegations (EUDELs). DFIs suggested to involve EUDELs early in the process to provide input in the origination of operations. And proposed holding quarterly partnership dialogues. Some DFIs also raised concerns about the time-consuming and at times incoherent processing by the Commission and suggested to revert to a central INTPA-NEAR blending and guarantee secretariat. DFIs noted that Western Balkan Investment Framework (WBIF) should be considered as a good practice, however acknowledged that it might not be a suitable model to apply on a global level.

#### **4. Interviews**

Whilst the evaluation approach used by the external study maximised the use of available secondary information, great importance was given to collecting primary data through interviews. The external study report mentions that "the interviews were a critical source of evidence for the evaluation".

The external evaluators proceeded to a stakeholders' analysis under the guidance of the Inter-Service Steering Group that steered their work. Sampling techniques were applied to ensure a selective approach amongst each stakeholder group, given the many thousands of stakeholders directly involved.

The objectives of the interviews were to (i) address gaps in the documentation reviewed, (ii) better understand realities on the ground, especially through consultations with EUDs, and (iii) triangulate findings especially when the evidence collected was based on internal EU documentation and sources.

The external study team conducted over 340 semi-structured interviews with more than 350 informants. These interviews were undertaken progressively, throughout the evaluation phases leading to the draft evaluation report.

All interview notes were included in an interview compendium. These notes and compendium have been treated as confidential by the external evaluators. The European Commission services have not had access to them. However, it is possible to assert that the external study has included numerous elements from those interviews in the report as sources quote Meeting Notes with the abbreviation MN.

#### **5. Surveys**

One call for contributions and two surveys were conducted by the external study.

##### **EU Delegations/Offices – Call for contributions**

Call for contributions took place from 20 June to 11 July 2023 (open for 3 weeks) and targeted all EU Delegations and Offices in EU partner countries. The aim was to gather EU Delegations and

Offices views and experience on the EU's External Financing Instruments for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 multiannual financial frameworks. The questionnaire consisted of six questions and was available in English. Replies from 64 EU Delegations and Offices were received.

#### **a) Feedback from the EU Delegations**

##### **Streamlining into one instrument**

- Overall having one instrument is appreciated. Introduction of a single instrument simplifies the working environment in terms of systems, processes and reporting requirements. Further, the harmonisation of rules and procedures and reduces scope for error and delays. These benefits will be more pronounced once EDF and EUTF programmes are phased out.
- Budgetisation of EDF brings more coherence in all external financing instruments, and simplification of budgetary procedures.
- With one Instrument it is easier to have better overview at field level of all activities funded by EU.
- From an external communication point of view a single financing instrument is much easier to explain. It is also easier to communicate about strategic priorities in a coherent manner.
- Having all under a single instrument ensures greater coherence of interventions across sectors and areas of cooperation.

##### **Disappearance of NAO**

- A perceived benefit of NDICI-Global Europe is the end of the NAO system which was a time-consuming fiction, since all the effective contractual and financial checks anyway were done at the Delegations level.
- Abandonment of the NAO function has brought simplification since engagement with national authorities goes beyond and above the NAO to direct exchanges with line ministries, and now is free of EDF administrative burden.
- Delinking from co-management with partner countries in a post-Cotonou environment is seen as positive change. Management of the cooperation concentrated at the Delegation level is seen as an advantage since in many cases administrative capacities of partner countries are weak and co-management was complicated and was often leading to delays.
- In many countries authorities are used to having NAO which have lost the “gatekeeper position” within government. In some countries new cells are created to ensure higher political steer and enhanced inter-ministerial coordination.

##### **Ownership and EU interests**

- New Instrument has brought freedom to engage in promotion of EU interests. However, under NDICI-GE, cooperation offer tends to be more unilateral. While this meets the trend to give more importance to EU interest, reduced ownership can be a trap if it negatively affects implementation and policy dialogue.



- NDICI-Global Europe allows cooperation to better respond to the EU priorities in the external action, among other via leading role of the EU in the programming and implementation of the cooperation.

### **Geographisation**

- Having less thematic envelopes has facilitated a country-based approach. Complementarity of the three main pillars of the NDICI-Global Europe has been more evident and effective with the new instrument whereas in the past several instruments were used sometimes in a silos modus operandi (when not in competition).
- Integration of thematic instruments with geographic ones under a broad instrument allowed for better overview at Delegations level, ensuring more complementarity, easier coordination and follow-up of implementation.
- The opportunities to access demand-driven thematic budget lines for actions in sectors of high political relevance such as environment, food security, local authorities are however reduced.
- Geographic focus of thematic actions: the fact that work is done under a broad instrument promotes the channelling of cooperation in through the Delegations, increasing their ability to leverage from actions that are being financed.

### **Annuality**

- Several Delegations flagged annuality as an issue making large size projects impossible to commit in one go. There is a need to commit funds in annual tranches, which poses problems of continuity. The latter can be smoothened by multiannual action plans. The amounts finally committed depend on the budget voted every year.

### **EFSD+**

- EFSD+ remains largely driven by DFIs and HQ. EU Delegations are consulted on the alignment of submitted PIPs with their interest and priorities but insufficiently involved in the design, implementation and monitoring.
- Guarantees remain largely sub-utilized. Blending grants are still the favoured modality (by IFIs).
- EFSD+ is very work intensive and has big risks for EU visibility and for monitoring of use of EU funds. Role of Delegations is unclear and changes quickly.
- The practice of taking “haircuts” from bilateral MIPs to replenish the EFSD+ is controversial for two reasons: it is misleading vis-à-vis partner countries and their expectations about available funds; it does not provide any guarantee that the EFSD+ will support EU strategic priorities and interests in the country, despite the best efforts of Delegations.

### **Targets**

- There is a clear vision for cross-cutting priorities such as migration, climate change, digitalisation, inequality, etc. and it is oriented for a more integrated and comprehensive programming process and strategic intervention within the priorities of the partner countries.
- However, after a first attempt at « rationalisation » to enhance focus, the pressure from various spendings targets could lead to fragmentation.

## **Programming**

- Overall, the new framework has positively changed the programming process, especially due to the simplification of the instruments that make it clearer and easier to understand for partners. There has been a positive contribution to streamlining and reducing the administrative processes required to programme and then implement.
- A more performance-based approach, with the mid-term review determining the allocation of funds for the second half of the MIP period is welcome and can help foster policy dialogue.
- The programming process and principles of “co-creation” are clear, but it is heavier than before to manage and transaction costs have increased especially for a small Delegations with a small bilateral envelopes.

## **NDICI-DOAG vs. EDF**

- The separation between NDICI (covering the 13 Pacific Island Countries) and DOAG (covering the French OCTs) has made it more difficult to develop regional programmes covering the entire region. This is particularly true in the areas of ocean governance and fisheries, both of which are of primordial interest in the Pacific. This problem did not occur in the past, when both groups of countries/territories were covered by the EDF.

## **Foreign policy needs and priorities**

- The addition of the Foreign Policy Needs as part of the Rapid Response Action is a positive development as in the previous MFF we missed a tool fully devoted to supporting EU foreign policy priorities in the short to medium term outside the context of CSDP, election observation and crisis response.

## **Team Europe**

- Cooperation in a Team Europe approach occurs at project level, contributing to the TEI, but also in some sectors outside of the TEI's (gender, education and research as example). The guidelines for the MIP were conducive in this regard. As a next step, MS need to give a strategic importance to joint strategizing – this is key to take advantage of the EU's geostrategic potential, however implemented only to nascent degree.
- If EFSD+ could help in mobilizing EU private sector and technical knowledge, this would strengthen the TEI and GGs, but so far the approach seems rather about funding of general (guarantee) schemes, where it remains very unclear how this will be rolled out on the ground without strong in-country presence and know how.
- Messaging related to Global Gateway (GG) and the Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) vis-à-vis the governments and other development partners remains challenging.

## **EU Delegations/Offices – Validation survey**

The objective of the EU Delegations, EU Offices and HQ survey, which took place from 11 August to 10 September 2023 (open for 4 weeks), was to validate and generalise some of the emerging findings on the EU's External Financing Instruments for the MFF 2014-2020 and MFF 2021-2027.

The survey targeted all EU Delegations and EU Offices and the HQ staff who had been interviewed during the evaluation. In total, around 240 persons were contacted to reply to the e-survey – 91

from EU HQ and around 130 from EU Delegations and EU Offices. EU Delegations and Offices and HQ Units contacted were asked to provide at least one response per Delegation/Office/Unit.

The questionnaire was structured around 5 subjects: i) EU cooperation priorities; ii) Efficiency; iii) Flexibility; iv) Team Europe and EU added value; and v) EU's leverage. Respondents were asked to express to what extent they agreed with some statements around the subjects, formulated on the basis of the information previously collected by the team. The questionnaire was available in English.

Results of the survey were used to validate findings of the external study on which this evaluation is largely based.

- **In-country stakeholder – Data Collection survey**

The objective of the partner country stakeholder survey, which took place from 19 July to 6 September 2023 (open for 7 weeks), was to gather stakeholders' views and experience on the EU's External Financing Instruments for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 multiannual financial frameworks. The questionnaire consisted of 3 thematic sections with a total of 10 questions. The questionnaire was available in English. In total, 336 persons in the 17 sample countries were contacted to reply to the e-survey. 92 stakeholders responded to the questionnaire from 16 countries.

## **ANNEX VI. MONITORING, EVALUATION AND RESULTS**

### **1. EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework**

The EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework (EURF) was introduced in 2015. It aims to promote accountability by collecting, measuring and aggregating key results achieved at corporate level by interventions funded using the external financing instruments of EU international cooperation<sup>80</sup>. It aimed and still aims to: (i) be a communication tool for reporting on results; (ii) improve practice in implementing the EU development policy; and (iii) increase accountability and transparency. The list of indicators was structured around three levels of results.

- Level 1 corresponded to development progress of partner countries (impact level).
- Level 2 corresponded to outcomes and outputs of EU-funded interventions illustrating the EU contribution to development progress in partner countries.
- Level 3 related to the organisational performance of the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA).

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<sup>80</sup> *A Revised EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework in line with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the New European Consensus on Development*, SWD(2018) 444 final, page 3.

The EURF was revised in 2018 to align the framework with the developing context of international cooperation at EU and international level. The aim was to ensure the framework's continued relevance in supporting effectiveness and efficiency of EU international development assistance. Therefore, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was integrated, using Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicators to measure development results at country level. By doing so, progress was made towards a common approach to measuring and communicating the results of the EU development policy and that of its Member States. The revised framework incorporated the objectives of communication, management, and learning<sup>81</sup>. The EURF should also facilitate the pursuit of common approaches to measuring and communicating results in joint programming. Moreover, the SDGs provide a better context to align EU action with that of other stakeholders, including not only Member States but also other international donors. This would help increase development effectiveness. The approach aimed to strengthen the role of the results framework as an essential aspect of the architecture that supports the effective implementation and consistent communication of the EU's role towards achieving the SDGs in partner countries.

The 2018 revised EURF maintained the broad three-level results structure of the 2015 framework: levels 1 and 2 were not changed and from 2018 onwards, level 3 focuses on policy priority mainstreaming as measured by budgetary commitments directed towards specific priorities (e.g., human development, gender, nutrition).

## **2. Results frameworks for external financing instruments**

### **NDICI-Global Europe**

#### **Global Europe Results Framework**

Further changes to the EURF were needed to align it with:

- the 2020-2024 strategic plans of Directorate General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), drawn up under the political priority of 'A stronger Europe in the world' of the von der Leyen Commission; and
- the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), which includes the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe)<sup>82</sup>.

The NDICI-Global Europe Regulation<sup>83</sup> calls for 'reinforced monitoring and reporting with a focus on results, covering outputs, outcomes and impacts in partner countries benefiting from the Union's

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<sup>81</sup> *Launching the Global Europe Performance Monitoring System containing a Revised Global Europe Results Framework*, SWD(2022) 22 final, page 5.

<sup>82</sup> *Launching the Global Europe Performance Monitoring System containing a Revised Global Europe Results Framework*, SWD(2022) 22 final, page 2.

<sup>83</sup> OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, pages 1–78.

external financial assistance' (recital 17). It is applicable to all NDICI-Global Europe pillars (geographic programmes, thematic programmes and rapid response actions) and implementation arrangements, including the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), as well as to all services involved (DG INTPA, DG NEAR and FPI).

The revised EURF, now Global Europe Results Framework (GERF), is a key tool to ensure annual monitoring and reporting of progress towards results. It continues to comprise three levels of corporate indicators. These include all results indicators in Annex VI to the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation, as well as key financial indicators to monitor the Regulation's spending targets as well as that on gender equality and education. Data will be collected from completed and ongoing EU-funded interventions, as reported by EU implementing partners. The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system builds on existing practice from previous external aid financial instruments under the previous MFF and is a continuous process organised around the reporting requirements.

Out of the 39 GERF level 2 indicators, 11 are also incorporated into the Results Measurement Framework (ReMF) for the EFSD+. The EFSD+ ReMF is composed of a 'menu' of results and related indicators, structured around sectors/areas reflecting the EFSD+ overarching priorities. The indicators of the EFSD+ ReMF include built-in alignment with the GERF, the performance framework of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, as well as the SDGs. The EFSD+ ReMF is to be used for all interventions funded with the EFSD+ tools, including budgetary guarantees, blending and other financial assistance (including the dedicated windows of the EIB). Hence, the EFSD+ ReMF will make it possible to aggregate data provided by partner financial institutions that have used the EFSD+ ReMF indicators to report on the progress of their EFSD+ interventions.

## **Learning from experience**

The division of the EURF indicators into three levels of results was welcomed by the Council<sup>84</sup>. The revised EURF aimed both to serve as a communication tool for reporting on results and to improve practice in implementing the EU development policy. As regards level 3, the indicators on overall organisational performance included in the first version of the EURF were not easily understandable by the public and were already reported on regularly and published as part of a more comprehensive set of key performance indicators in DG INTPA's annual activity report<sup>85</sup>. To avoid duplication and partial reporting, level 3 was revised to focus on the mainstreaming of policy priorities only. Following the introduction of the EURF, the availability of data from partner systems has improved.

Experience with the 2018 EURF has shown that most indicators cannot be used for all four purposes of accountability, communication, management and learning due to structural

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<sup>84</sup> *A Revised EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework in line with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the New European Consensus on Development*, SWD(2018) 444 final, page 3.

<sup>85</sup> *A Revised EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework in line with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the New European Consensus on Development*, SWD(2018) 444 final, pages 6 and 7.

incompatibilities (or competing priorities)<sup>86</sup>. Examples of these incompatibilities would be the indicator selection for the 2021-2027 MFF and the 2020-2024 strategic plans, which had to respond to technical measurement requirements as well as political considerations. The resulting compromise included indicators that are of limited use to management. Additionally, indicators that are selected to serve the accountability (and communication) needs of certain stakeholders might not serve management or learning needs. Therefore, the performance measurement framework should include a clear separation between the indicators to be used for accountability purposes (primarily) and those to be used for other purposes. Meeting the communication, management and learning needs of all relevant stakeholders required further tools necessarily involving more indicators. More indicators were also needed to improve the coverage of results generated by EU interventions. Adding the thematic indicators considerably extended the list of indicators to be monitored. Additionally, the relationship between the GERF and SDG indicators has been mapped in greater detail than before, in a manner that highlights the inevitable interlinkages between the international cooperation and development results that underpin the SDG framework.

A further challenge during the implementation of the EURF concerned the integration of the indicators into the logical framework matrices (logframes). The relevant EURF indicators were not always included in the logframes at intervention level, which means that certain results go unreported. Consequently, even if results are generated, they might not be measured if the indicator has not been included in the logframe. This was changed with the adoption of the GERF, and GERF indicators are included in the logframes if they are relevant.

Experience with the EURF has confirmed its utility in ensuring accountability but has exposed certain limitations in fulfilling the remaining ambitions of communication, management and learning. Thus, the GERF is supplemented by:

- a comprehensive set of sector-specific results chains containing quality-assured thematic indicators that have been developed in collaboration with DG INTPA's thematic units to serve the other needs of communication, management and learning and to provide improved coverage of the results generated in the field;
- an intervention performance measurement system that uses monitoring data to calculate performance scores at intervention level and key performance indicators at corporate level; and
- a new set of indicators that measure the quality of results data collected, e.g., how the data collection for the indicators is organised, if the logframe is designed in a way that enables results to be measured easily, or if all logframe indicators are reported on.

This broader performance monitoring system is called the Global Europe Performance Monitoring System (GEPMS)<sup>87</sup>.

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<sup>86</sup> *Launching the Global Europe Performance Monitoring System containing a Revised Global Europe Results Framework*, SWD(2022) 22 final, pages 3-6.

<sup>87</sup> *Launching the Global Europe Performance Monitoring System containing a Revised Global Europe Results Framework*, SWD(2022) 22 final, pages 3-6.

Additionally, an IT platform (OPSYS) has been set up to facilitate logframe management as well as results data collection and assessment at corporate level, including a results dashboard to aggregate and display results.

## **Monitoring and evaluation**

Evaluations supplement the ongoing internal monitoring processes described above. The Commission performs two main types of evaluations in relation to the external financing instruments: (i) intervention-level evaluations, which assess the results of interventions; and (ii) strategic evaluations, which assess the degree to which the objectives of EU external cooperation strategies and plans are achieved, their overall contribution to EU priorities and the SDGs, and their impact in partner countries and globally.

Strategic evaluations include: (i) geographic evaluations related to EU cooperation with partner countries and regions; and (ii) thematic evaluations related to specific sectors, themes, implementing arrangements, instruments, and partners. These evaluations rely heavily on data from monitoring and evaluation carried out at intervention (project) level, as well as increasingly on the existing results frameworks. The present evaluation of external financing instruments supplements and builds on a significant body of evidence collected and presented in the strategic-level evaluations<sup>88</sup> of the EU's external cooperation that have been conducted since 2014.

Important features of the GERF are the ability of the indicators to be aggregated and to be used for assessing implied causal linkages in EU key policies. The system helps to improve the quality of evaluations and to gradually introduce impact evaluations. By using tools early on and appropriately, the GERF will lead to improved EU external cooperation monitoring and reporting practice.

Already during strategic programming (multiannual indicative programmes, MIPs), the focus is put on results and performance. This approach continues throughout all phases of the intervention cycle: programming, design, implementation and closure. In addition, performance scores at intervention level and key performance indicators at corporate level are reported in the internal External Action Management Report.

Global Europe Monitoring and Evaluation arrangements are based on predefined, transparent, country-specific and measurable indicators, adapted to the specificities and objectives of the instrument and the intervention. The arrangements promote using corporate indicators and a system of sector-specific results chains containing predefined thematic indicators. This should provide inspiration and coordination on a broader set of indicators to monitor performance at intervention level.

The GERF leads to increased cooperation with Member States and the implementing partners in various areas of results-based management. For Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs), the monitoring, reporting and evaluation (MORE) framework has been launched to aggregate results at TEI level. This framework enables partners to use the GERF. Noting that more than 50% of the funding under

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<sup>88</sup> [Strategic Evaluation Reports \(europa.eu\)](https://european-council.europa.eu/media/en/press-communications/infographic/Pages/infographic-2022-05-11-01.aspx)

the MIPs is allocated to TEIs, a specific marker will make it possible to track results in relation to the EU component of the TEIs.

The tools in place will not only serve the purpose of complying with the accountability and learning functions, but also of communicating clearly and transparently on the performance and achievements of EU interventions to strengthen the role of the EU as a global player. Focus will be put on providing results data on EU achievements and the EU's role in delivering on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs that support a stronger narrative at both global and partner country- levels. The results dashboard will be continuously improved. This will lead to better information on and understanding, reporting and communication of EU financing and investment operations covered by various implementation arrangements (including details and assessment of the results achieved by each arrangement, aggregation by geographical area, by Official Development Assistance (ODA) purpose code, and by implementing service or partner, by policy priority, by spending target). By communicating both externally and internally, results can be highlighted, and colleagues can learn from experience and practice.

### **IPA III**

Building on key messages from external evaluations that called for improvements in the monitoring and evaluation systems, DG NEAR during the current MFF embarked on strengthening its monitoring and evaluation potential. The novelty derives from promoting a corporate result framework that is less activity-driven and more outcome-oriented.

At the beginning of 2023, the Commission adopted the IPA III Results Framework<sup>89</sup> in order to support Commission staff, IPA III beneficiaries and external experts who are involved in programming, monitoring and reporting and evaluation of IPA III actions. The IPA III Results Framework provided a comprehensive and uniform set of indicators that need to be used in all relevant interventions, to ensure that the results can be aggregated, and the impact and outcomes of IPA III can be more clearly identified and demonstrated.

The basis for the IPA III Results Framework is the key performance indicators included in Annex IV of the IPA III Regulation, indicators included in the overarching European Commission's strategic document for the use of IPA III funds over the period 2021-27 – the IPA III Programming Framework - and in the IPA Performance Framework.

It is structured according to the five Windows of the IPA III Programming Framework: Window 1 (Rule of Law, Fundamental Rights and Democracy), Window 2 (Good Governance, EU *Acquis* Alignment, Good Neighbourly Relations and Strategic Communication), Window 3 (Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity), Window 4 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth) and Window 5 (Territorial and cross-border cooperation).

Three levels of indicators for each Window/Thematic Priority are included in the IPA III Results Framework in order to capture the whole result chain.

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<sup>89</sup> [pdf \(europa.eu\)](#)



- Level 1 indicators are impact level indicators, monitoring the long-term changes in a given Window and a Thematic Priority as an indirect result of the outcomes of the European Commission interventions (measured by Level 2 indicators).
- Level 2 indicators are indicators measuring the outputs and outcomes to which EU funded interventions have contributed in collaboration with partners and beneficiaries.
- Level 3 indicators are indicators tracking the resources directed towards specific priorities, measured either in terms of budgetary commitments or numbers of interventions. Level 1 and Level 2 indicators are presented jointly in Annex 1 while Level 3 indicators are presented in Annex 2

Therefore, reporting on results on IPA III encapsulates the following key elements:

- Alignment with the IPA III Regulations objectives, in line with “policy first” principle, and in particular with the IPA III Programming framework and its five windows.
- Encompassing the three levels of “Results” including outputs, outcomes, and impact as measured by indicators; but a predominance is given to the outcome level, since this is the level that best expresses changes directly influenced by IPA III interventions
- including indicators that allow for aggregation of values for estimated and actual results in a given area and over different beneficiaries.
- Allowing disaggregation of data by gender, age, disability, country and sector whenever possible and relevant.

The use of the IPA III Results Framework transcends different streams of exercises and notably the programming, monitoring and reporting and evaluation. The increased focus on results-based monitoring of interventions and programmes is also accompanied by the corporate investment on the information system OPSYS. The deployment of OPSYS results module allows to encode and consolidate results data as reported by each intervention. Ongoing interventions record their latest results data at least once a year until the end of implementation. The data collected is also used to report against the indicators at corporate level (the IPA III Results Framework being the main corporate tool for IPA III beneficiaries, in addition to the EFSD+ Results Measurement Framework and the WBIF), and in turn feeds into institutional reporting and communications products.

### **Programming, Monitoring and Evaluation and Reporting**

The use of indicators of the IPA III Results Framework is promoted for the Commission staff, IPA III beneficiaries and the implementing partners preparing the IPA III programming documents, including annual and multi-annual and individual measure action documents and operational programmes. It is also promoted for the IPA III beneficiaries to embed the relevant IPA III Results Framework indicators into their own strategic documents, including strategic responses, to reinforce and streamline programming, monitoring and reporting and evaluation practices. In this way the measurement of results across countries and the entire IPA instrument is ensured. The legal basis for monitoring, reporting and evaluation of all interventions funded under IPA III is provided in IPA III Regulation. It calls for a reinforced monitoring and reporting with a focus on results, covering outputs, outcomes and impacts, with the aim of both providing effective accountability

and transparency in implementing the Union budget and ensuring effective assessment of progress towards the achievement of the objectives of the Instrument.

The IPA III Results Framework is used as one of the sources of evidence that will benefit the evaluation work and contribute to the quality of the evaluations. The framework has been built around the IPA III instrument and by design it is meant to be measuring its performance anchoring on the overall intervention logic. Evaluation work can benefit from IPA III Results Framework data as a valid source of secondary evidence. Furthermore, other sources of evidence (studies, surveys, interviews, statistics, etc) are also deployed for ensuring a robust and triangulated evidence base. This combined source of evidence is serving for boosting accountability and at the same time play a significant role in responding to corporate needs for communication and learning.

The IPA III Results Framework also feeds three annual reporting obligations: the Programme Performance Statements (PPS); the Report stemming from the article 16 of the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) accompanying the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF); Annual report on the implementation of the European Union's External Action instruments; IPA III Programming Framework Annual Assessment

- **DOAG**

The design of actions under the DOAG follows the same process as for NDICI-Global Europe and uses the same templates, identifying an intervention logic and defining indicators in a logistical framework to measure progress. Monitoring during implementation is done at an operational level and like for NDICI-Global Europe actions the reporting on DOAG programmes contributes to reports such as the AMPR through the Annual Results Reporting Exercise, linking indicators to the Global Europe Results Framework.

- **INSC**

As the GERF does not contain indicators related to nuclear safety, the INSC MIP 2021-2027 contains an annex with performance indicators at three levels: programme impact indicators, programme implementation indicators and project-specific indicators. For the latter, each contract includes a dedicated indicative logical framework matrix with key performance indicators, which is reviewed and reported on at a regular interval by the INSC implementing partners.

### **3. Annual Reports**

Annual Reports outline on annual basis key aspects of the EU's financial support for international cooperation and development, European neighbourhood policy, humanitarian aid and civil protection, EU enlargement policy, peace, security and defence, crisis response and preparedness, human rights and democracy, gender equality and support to EU foreign policy objectives. Annual Reports provide many positive examples of EU-funded interventions in Europe and across the globe that illustrate our continuing efforts to deliver results.

Annual Reports can be found here: [Annual reports \(europa.eu\)](https://annual-reports.europa.eu/)

## ANNEX VII FINANCIAL OVERVIEW

Table 1 Externally assigned revenues for 2021-2022 in million EUR

<i>Instrument</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
NDICI-Global Europe	2,316	15,613
IPA III	5,659	7,778

Table 2 Distribution of Commitments by instrument for 2021-2022

<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Commitments (in EUR million)</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
NDICI-Global Europe Pillar 1: Geographic programmes	13,312	48.6 %
NDICI-Global Europe Pillar 2: Thematic programmes	3,889	14.2 %
NDICI-Global Europe Pillar 3: Rapid response actions	1,755	6.4 %
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)	3,891	14.2 %
Decision on the Overseas Association including Greenland (DOAG)	135	0.5 %
European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)	74	0.3 %
European Fund for Sustainable Development + (EFSD+)*	3,393	12.4 %
Other	920	3.4 %
<b>Total</b>	<b>27,369</b>	<b>100 %</b>

Table 3 Overview of Commitments and Payments per instrument (2017-2020)

	2017		2018		2019		2020	
<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>
11 <sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF), incl. 'envelope B'	5,137	3,412	4,602	3,585	2,856	3,471	3,432	4,249
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)	2,428	1,946	2,451	2,062	2,697	1,997	2,816	2,486
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – geographic programmes	1,713	1,442	1,752	1,481	1,865	1,450	1,936	1,623
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II)	2,031	1,517	2,015	1,345	2,912	1,496	1,727	1,853
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – thematic programmes	1,373	996	1,166	1,109	1,307	1,072	1,258	1,198
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)	259	247	333	321	364	308	400	367
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	176	145	172	173	164	141	164	138
Partnership Instrument (PI)	134	77	143	114	149	128	161	125
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)	53	71	32	38	32	34	31	13
Instrument for Greenland (GD)	32	30	32	30	33	29	33	33
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – other	-3	109	0	0	0	0	0	10

Table 4 Overview of Commitments and Payments per instrument (2021-2022)

<i>Budget position</i>	<i>2021</i>		<i>2022</i>	
	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>
14.010101 – Support expenditure for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument	301	244	300	261
14.010165 – European Education and Culture Executive Agency – Contribution from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for the completion of previous programmes	4	4	0	0
14.010175 – European Education and Culture Executive Agency – Contribution from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe	0	0	6	6
14.020110 – Neighbourhood South region	1,052	90	1,694	542
14.020111 – Neighbourhood East region	296	101	1,121	910
14.020112 – Neighbourhood – Territorial and cross-border cooperation and supporting measures	4	0	56	0
14.020120 – West Africa	1,689	10	951	280
14.020121 – East and Central Africa	1,313	5	1,271	348
14.020122 – Southern Africa and Indian Ocean	193	0	1,063	44
14.020130 – Middle East and Central Asia	376	0	366	79
14.020131 – South and East Asia	388	0	551	37
14.020132 – The Pacific	61	0	120	4
14.020140 – The Americas	258	0	272	30
14.020141 – The Caribbean	112	0	106	8
14.020150 – Erasmus+ – NDICI – Global Europe contribution	20	0	289	154
14.020160 – European Development Fund – ACP Investment Facility reflows	0	0	0	0
14.020170 – NDICI Global Europe – Provisioning of the common provisioning fund	1,595	6	1,950	1,391
14.020210 – Election observation missions – Human Rights and Democracy	50	9	27	16
14.020211 – Fundamental rights and freedoms – Human Rights and Democracy	150	13	266	69
14.020220 – Civil Society Organisations	200	0	358	40
14.020230 – Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention	134	8	138	33

<i>Budget position</i>	<i>2021</i>		<i>2022</i>	
	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>
14.020240 – People – Global Challenges	1,612	697	410	0
14.020241 – Planet – Global Challenges	76	0	134	28
14.020242 – Prosperity – Global Challenges	130	0	132	16
14.020243 – Partnerships – Global Challenges	15	0	58	10
14.020310 – Crisis response	261	88	268	257
14.020320 – Resilience	530	0	634	192
14.020330 – Foreign policy needs	13	0	49	18
14.05 Decision on the Overseas Association including Greenland (DOAG)	63	1	72	30
14.06 European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)	38	1	36	4
15.02 Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)	1,494	7	2,397	435

Table 5 Breakdown by recipient countries / region of Commitments by the European Commission from 2017 to 2022

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
<b>Part I: Developing Countries and Territories (Official Development Assistance)</b>	<b>16,445</b>	<b>15,151</b>	<b>15,432</b>	<b>15,053</b>	<b>14,617</b>	<b>19,149</b>
<b>Bilateral</b>	<b>15,996</b>	<b>14,946</b>	<b>15,166</b>	<b>14,815</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>19,146</b>
<b>Europe</b>	<b>6,887</b>	<b>2,680</b>	<b>4,606</b>	<b>3,071</b>	<b>2,923</b>	<b>4,989</b>
Albania	80	110	93	258	68	107
Belarus	30	30	31	32	16	28
Bosnia-Herzegovina	77	91	127	136	84	58
Europe, regional	509	688	897	963	1,084	1,719
Kosovo	171	176	153	175	119	126
Moldova	74	51	25	59	75	235

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
Montenegro	41	46	44	31	35	50
North Macedonia	82	102	114	133	93	95
Serbia	177	224	223	237	126	232
States Ex-Yugoslavia	23	0	0	15	2	2
Türkiye	1,918	947	2,656	775	1,027	1,312
Ukraine	263	215	243	257	194	1,025
<b>Africa</b>	<b>6,213</b>	<b>5,470</b>	<b>4,126</b>	<b>4,753</b>	<b>6,324</b>	<b>6,970</b>
Africa, regional	411	852	369	559	1,743	2,222
<b>Africa (North of Sahara)</b>	<b>752</b>	<b>655</b>	<b>719</b>	<b>810</b>	<b>745</b>	<b>800</b>
Algeria	30	46	35	40	25	45
Egypt	45	56	55	110	7	183
Libya	72	78	40	44	114	49
Morocco	116	202	225	223	240	354
North of Sahara, regional	189	56	84	27	206	63
Tunisia	300	217	280	366	153	106
<b>Africa (South of Sahara)</b>	<b>5,050</b>	<b>3,962</b>	<b>3,038</b>	<b>3,384</b>	<b>3,836</b>	<b>3,948</b>
Angola	65	22	23	25	0	83
Benin	100	47	0	7	25	35
Botswana	0	3	7	0	0	13
Burkina Faso	63	44	37	103	200	0
Burundi	104	15	74	20	90	12
Cabo Verde	12	10	17	0	21	0
Cameroon	130	45	79	15	44	48
Central African Republic	79	214	28	118	38	66
Chad	22	31	105	12	103	50
Comoros	1	0	12	7	0	31

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
Congo	0	39	33	2	40	5
Democratic Republic of the Congo	107	145	73	91	227	141
Djibouti	60	30	8	37	32	5
Eastern Africa, regional	0	0	0	355	344	440
Eritrea	84	0	181	0	0	0
Eswatini	0	3	22	9	0	0
Ethiopia	67	300	125	181	21	173
Gabon	1	0	5	1	0	7
Gambia	113	96	50	15	0	18
Ghana	189	13	40	95	0	80
Guinea	145	45	9	37	0	39
Guinea-Bissau	0	58	8	2	13	38
Ivory Coast	11	39	31	18	62	34
Kenya	62	45	139	110	87	121
Lesotho	6	42	42	20	0	29
Liberia	52	15	58	3	0	0
Madagascar	168	85	60	29	0	161
Malawi	165	22	55	102	0	125
Mali	91	262	79	101	224	26
Mauritania	59	33	24	16	48	40
Mauritius	3	8	0	12	0	2
Middle Africa, regional	0	0	0	0	0	28
Mozambique	48	211	160	338	3	214
Namibia	0	0	4	0	0	24
Niger	83	134	66	139	331	72
Nigeria	286	58	20	17	120	63



<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
Rwanda	4	5	15	42	88	94
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	7	7	0	8
Senegal	53	143	28	121	107	72
Sierra Leone	105	35	62	18	0	56
Somalia	323	126	81	79	63	161
South Africa	60	20	27	19	12	30
South of Sahara, regional	1,716	1,093	804	528	1,163	630
South Sudan	26	5	2	21	57	22
Southern Africa, regional	0	0	0	18	0	88
St. Helena	0	22	0	1	0	0
Sudan	73	105	13	172	12	53
Tanzania	55	100	3	135	180	166
Togo	12	20	37	17	50	50
Uganda	143	65	154	5	27	19
Western Africa, regional	0	0	0	106	4	78
Zambia	82	99	65	25	0	151
Zimbabwe	24	13	66	33	0	47
<b>America</b>	<b>684</b>	<b>791</b>	<b>659</b>	<b>749</b>	<b>539</b>	<b>519</b>
America, regional	94	109	216	230	259	235
<b>America (North &amp; Central America)</b>	<b>451</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>210</b>
Antigua And Barbuda	3	5	0	0	0	0
Belize	12	14	0	0	1	0
Caribbean, regional	0	0	0	20	120	47
Central America, regional	0	0	0	11	28	27
Costa Rica	2	0	1	0	0	0
Cuba	24	10	43	2	0	9

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
Dominica	1	14	9	0	0	0
Dominican Republic	10	34	8	0	0	13
El Salvador	20	35	1	33	0	9
Grenada	0	0	0	1	0	0
Guatemala	16	17	66	15	20	49
Haiti	224	9	30	163	10	30
Honduras	16	68	37	23	18	0
Jamaica	20	0	20	5	2	10
Mexico	1	0	0	4	0	0
Montserrat	0	19	0	0	0	0
Nicaragua	20	71	0	17	13	16
North & Central America, regional	44	30	5	4	0	0
Panama	0	0	0	0	0	0
St. Lucia	2	0	0	6	0	0
St. Vincent & Grenadines	7	0	0	0	0	0
West Indies, regional	29	196	60	0	0	0
<b>America (South America)</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>74</b>
Argentina	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	51	3	36	56	0	14
Brazil	0	5	0	0	0	0
Colombia	48	5	52	24	2	11
Ecuador	6	48	0	3	0	5
Guyana	0	0	0	3	0	5
Paraguay	2	12	53	42	0	12
Peru	23	0	4	25	0	18
South America, regional	9	18	13	61	65	0

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
Suriname	0	2	5	0	0	1
Venezuela	0	69	0	1	1	8
<b>Asia</b>	<b>2,697</b>	<b>2,826</b>	<b>3,058</b>	<b>3,167</b>	<b>2,032</b>	<b>2,944</b>
Asia, regional	139	21	177	422	514	414
<b>Asia (Far East Asia)</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>183</b>
Cambodia	158	114	3	10	0	31
China	0	1	0	0	0	22
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0
Far East Asia, regional	15	3	10	33	30	0
Indonesia	10	3	0	3	12	0
Laos	4	73	50	5	0	44
Malaysia	0	0	3	0	6	4
Mongolia	5	0	51	0	0	4
Philippines	4	29	98	49	0	62
Thailand	1	6	4	14	18	4
Timor-Leste	0	18	20	2	0	12
Viet Nam	26	13	1	160	0	0
<b>Asia (Middle East Asia)</b>	<b>1,175</b>	<b>1,313</b>	<b>1,431</b>	<b>1,579</b>	<b>945</b>	<b>1,532</b>
Iran	10	24	21	5	26	0
Iraq	191	163	219	253	129	78
Jordan	95	78	105	84	99	195
Lebanon	49	86	40	106	138	229
Middle East, regional	20	6	62	25	230	249
Syria	481	496	515	655	67	67
West Bank and Gaza Strip	241	314	252	263	43	522
Yemen	89	146	217	188	213	192

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
<b>Asia (South &amp; Central Asia)</b>	<b>1,160</b>	<b>1,233</b>	<b>1,210</b>	<b>890</b>	<b>507</b>	<b>815</b>
Afghanistan	371	240	248	227	76	162
Armenia	41	36	53	69	0	77
Azerbaijan	14	14	13	14	14	20
Bangladesh	183	267	21	48	140	28
Bhutan	4	0	7	2	15	9
Central Asia, regional	85	104	166	51	21	10
Georgia	120	112	152	110	16	145
India	0	2	0	0	1	5
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0	1
Kyrgyz Republic	8	12	31	34	33	3
Maldives	0	5	2	0	0	5
Myanmar	40	288	144	25	72	60
Nepal	43	9	56	20	31	74
Pakistan	185	68	93	60	0	99
South Asia, regional	3	0	75	55	0	0
South & Central Asia, regional	0	11	2	4	52	3
Sri Lanka	40	41	41	17	13	17
Tajikistan	0	0	84	112	23	44
Turkmenistan	6	0	0	0	0	6
Uzbekistan	16	25	22	42	0	47
<b>Oceania</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>85</b>
Fiji	2	3	0	20	0	0
Kiribati	2	0	21	0	3	5
Marshall Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0
Micronesia, Fed. States	0	0	14	4	0	0

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
Nauru	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oceania, regional	90	66	104	26	19	13
Palau	0	2	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea	0	85	0	38	0	67
Samoa	1	0	0	0	14	0
Solomon Islands	0	0	0	8	8	0
Tonga	1	2	0	0	10	0
Tuvalu	7	0	0	0	0	0
Vanuatu	0	25	0	11	0	0
Wallis & Futuna	0	20	0	1	0	0
<b>Developing countries, unspecified</b>	<b>2,854</b>	<b>2,977</b>	<b>2,566</b>	<b>2,975</b>	<b>2,743</b>	<b>3,643</b>
<b>Bilateral, core contributions to NGOs and other private bodies / PPPs</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Multilateral (inflows)</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>United Nations agency, fund or commission (UN)</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>
FAO	0	0	0	0	2	2
OHCHR	0	4	0	0	0	0
UNEP	1	0	0	1	1	0
UNFCCC	0	0	0	3	2	0
UNRWA	102	102	103	87	0	0
<b>Other multilateral institution</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation	50	0	90	130	0	0
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	285	90	68	13	0	0
Other multilateral institutions	1	4	0	0	0	0
<b>Triangular co-operation</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
<b>Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (NON-ODA eligible countries)</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>265</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>126</b>
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	35	34	35	37	0	0
Greenland	32	32	33	33	60	0
Russia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Seychelles	0	10	0	0	0	2
Anguilla	14	3	0	0	0	0
Aruba	0	0	13	0	0	0
Bahamas	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barbados	0	0	0	4	0	0
British Virgin Islands	0	0	2	0	0	0
Curaçao	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands Antilles	6	0	4	17	0	0
Saint Pierre And Miquelon	0	0	0	1	0	28
Sint Maarten	0	0	7	7	0	0
St. Kitts-Nevis	0	5	0	0	0	0
Trinidad And Tobago	0	4	8	0	0	0
Turks & Caicos Islands	0	3	0	0	0	0
Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0
Falkland Islands	6	0	0	0	0	0
Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong, China	0	0	0	0	1	0
Korea	0	0	0	0	0	4
Taiwan	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	2	2	2	2	2	2

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	0	0
United Arab Emirates	0	0	0	0	0	3
Cook Islands	1	0	0	0	0	0
French Polynesia	0	30	0	1	0	2
New Caledonia	30	0	0	1	0	31
Pitcairn Islands	0	2	0	0	0	0
MADCT Unallocated	126	134	171	174	28	54
<b>Part II: Other Unallocated</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>182</b>
<b>ODA Countries Other Flows</b>	<b>524</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>905</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>153</b>
<b>NON-ODA Countries Other Flows</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Administrative Costs Ex-BA lines – Heading 4</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Administrative Costs – Heading 5</b>	<b>311</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Administrative Costs Ex-BA lines Heading 6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>397</b>
<b>Administrative Costs Heading 7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>507</b>	<b>544</b>

Table 6 Breakdown by aid mechanism of Commitments by the European Commission from 2017 to 2022

<i>Aid Mechanisms</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
Project-type interventions (grants incl. blending)	12,391	11,680	12,192	11,146	12,515	15,303
Sector budget support	1,321	917	1,164	988	575	945
General budget support	517	677	418	883	591	1,032
Other mechanisms	2,743	2,408	2,203	2,595	1,810	2,816
<b>Total</b>	<b>16,972</b>	<b>15,682</b>	<b>15,977</b>	<b>15,612</b>	<b>15,491</b>	<b>20,096</b>

Table 7      *Overview of Commitments and Payments through Trust Funds (2014-2020)*

<i>Trust Funds</i>	<i>Commitments</i>	<i>Payments</i>
Trust Fund Africa	5,186	3,091
Trust Fund Bêkou	314	197
Trust Fund Colombia	123	66
Trust Fund Madad	2,282	1,515
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,905</b>	<b>4,869</b>



Table 8 Overview of emerging challenges and priorities cushion mobilisations as of January 2024


NDICI-Global Europe's cushion - multiannual planning (EUR million)									
	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Year tbd	Total
Amounts available	1.408	1.538	1.395	1.324	1.249	1.170	1.226		<b>9.310</b>
Top-up Global challenges thematic programme	168	163	269						<b>600</b>
Top-up Human Rights and Democracy thematic programme		100	100						<b>200</b>
Top-up Civil Society Organisations thematic programme		150	50						<b>200</b>
COVAX	400								<b>400</b>
Support to vaccination and global health (SOTEU announcement)	450								<b>450</b>
Support roll-out of vaccines (from budget 2022 conciliation)		75							<b>75</b>
Initiative on vaccines production in Africa (SOTEU announcement)			134	266					<b>400</b>
GFATM seventh replenishment								65	<b>65</b>
Global Partnership for Education			225						<b>225</b>
Syrian refugees package - Türkiye	370	469	82						<b>921</b>
Syrian refugees package - Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq		50	130	130					<b>310</b>
Migration - North Africa	20	30							<b>50</b>
Ukraine pledge 5/5/22		200							<b>200</b>
Ukraine pledge 8/4/22		301							<b>301</b>
Ukraine pledge - Fast recovery - 2/3/23			305						<b>305</b>
Ukraine - Interest rate subsidy MFA1+MFA2 6 billion MFA loan			100	195	174	174	174		<b>819</b>
Ukraine - Provisioning EIB repurposed loans 1,59 billion					322	322	322		<b>967</b>
Global Gateway - EIB provisioning					250	250	250		<b>750</b>
Union secure connectivity programme					50	50	50		<b>150</b>
Total amount	1.408	1.538	1.395	591	797	797	797	65	<b>7.388</b>
	100%	100%	100%	45%	64%	68%	65%		<b>79%</b>
Remaining amount	0	0	0	732	452	373	430	-65	<b>1.922</b>

## ANNEX VIII INTERVENTION LOGICS


MFF 2021 – 2027

### 1. NDICI-GE


#### NDICI Intervention Logic\*



2. IPA III




## 3. DCI



\*IPA countries are only eligible for CSO-LA Priority 3 Development Education and Awareness Raising initiatives fostering citizens' awareness of and mobilization for development issues.


\*\* Lays down rules and conditions for the provision of financial assistance to actions for DCI, EIDHR, ENI, IcSP, IPAII, and PI. INSC and GD contain references to CIR. EDF contains implementing rules analogous to CIR.

## 4. EDF







## 5. ENI



## 6. IPA II




## 7. IcSP





## 8. PI

FIGURE 1: OVERALL INTERVENTION LOGIC OF THE PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT FOR COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES




\* The term 'outcome' equals the term 'result' as in the new instructions from the Secretary General linked to the Better Regulation Guidelines and the development of Strategic Plans of DGs. Due to the fact that the PI is an external action instrument with a strong influence of OECD/DAC terminology, the term outcome will be used.


\*\* PI funds for the implementation of the Erasmus+ Programme are transferred to DG EAC. The implementation, monitoring and evaluation of these funds is subject to the provisions of the Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing 'Erasmus+' and is beyond the scope of the management of the PI.

\*\*\* PI actions are either standalone or PSF/TAIEX. Standalone actions are of a longer-term and structural nature. PSF and TAIEX actions are more ad-hoc, reacting to short-term needs or building ground for future standalone actions, in support of the PI strategy.

## 9. EIDHR



## 10. INSC



## 11. CIR

CONTEXT	2012 Financial Regulation		EXPECTED OUTCOMES	EXPECTED IMPACT
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* EU external action is supported by 8 distinct EU Budget EFIs (+ EDF outside EU budget) governed by separate Regulations;</li> <li>* Financial Regulation and Comitology Regulation followed by all EFIs;</li> <li>* Implementing rules under the 2007-2013 Regulations diverse with inconsistency-risks;</li> <li>* Increasing emphasis on partner Country ownership and results oriented management;</li> <li>* Strengthened emphasis on EU policy priorities and principles;</li> </ul>	2011 Comitology Regulation		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Unified adoption of action programmes and measures (Comitology);</li> <li>* Common financing provisions;</li> <li>* Specific financing provisions for DCI, ENI, IPA II, INSC and EIDHR;</li> <li>* Common rules for monitoring and evaluation;</li> <li>* Enhanced EU visibility;</li> <li>* Tracking of expenditure on climate action and biodiversity;</li> <li>* Linking budget support to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Efficient use of resources for optimal impact of EU external action;</li> <li>* Improved delivery of the objectives of the EFIs (effectiveness);</li> <li>* Enhanced coherence, complementarity, synergies and added value between and across EFIs;</li> <li>* Efficiency gains: more timely, cost efficient and coordinated forms of working;</li> <li>* Increased leverage of EFIs to raise financial, political or policy engagement;</li> </ul>
	2007-2013 Regulations Diverse implementing rules:	2014-2020 Common Implementing Rules (CIR)		
	DCI	DCI		
	EIDHR	EIDHR		
	ENI	ENI		
	IPA	IPA II		
	IFS	IcSP		
		PI		
	INSC	2014-2020 INSC, art. 8 with ref. to CIR		
	GD	2014-2020 GD, art. 5&6 with ref. to CIR		
	EDF Outside EU budget	2014-2020 EDF, outside EU budget, with own Implementing rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* A common transversal Regulation has the ability (fitness for purpose) to harmonise and simplify implementing rules for optimal impact, while allowing for a sufficient degree of flexibility, despite continued compartmentalisation of EFIs;</li> <li>* Common implementing rules have the ability to contribute to enhanced coherence, complementarity and synergies between EFIs;</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* For historical and political reasons EU external action has been organised through distinct EFIs;</li> <li>* EFI Regulations are conceptualised and negotiated through separate processes (compartmentalisation);</li> <li>* Risk of diversity and lack of consistency in implementing rules;</li> </ul>		Creating CIR to achieve harmonisation and simplification of implementing rules for 8 EFIs which continue to be distinct;		

## **ANNEX IX EXTERNAL STUDY**

[https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/publications/evaluation-european-unions-external-financing-instruments-2014-2020-and-2021-2027\\_en](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/publications/evaluation-european-unions-external-financing-instruments-2014-2020-and-2021-2027_en)