—

allow, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services to retain, generally and indiscriminately, traffic and location data in situations where the Member State concerned is confronted with a serious threat to national security that is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, where the decision imposing such an instruction is subject to effective review, either by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision is binding, the aim of that review being to verify that one of those situations exists and that the conditions and safeguards which must be laid down are observed, and where that instruction may be given only for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended if that threat persists;

—

provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;

—

provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;

—

provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating crime and safeguarding public security, for the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems;

—

allow, for the purposes of combating serious crime and, a fortiori, safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers,

provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse.

1.

Article 12(2)(a) and (d) of Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) and Article 23(2)(g) and (h) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6 and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, read in conjunction with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, and read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and of Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

must be interpreted as:

precluding legislative measures which, as a preventive measure, in order to combat market abuse offences including insider dealing, provide for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic data for a year from the date on which they were recorded.

2.

European Union law must be interpreted as precluding a national court from restricting the temporal effects of a declaration of invalidity which it is required to make, under national law, with respect to provisions of national law which, first, require operators providing electronic communications services to retain generally and indiscriminately traffic data and, second, allow such data to be submitted to the competent financial authority, without prior authorisation from a court or independent administrative authority, owing to the incompatibility of those provisions with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to provisions of national law that are incompatible with EU law is, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, a matter for national law, subject to compliance, inter alia, with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

1.

Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that, in so far as it is established that a piece of national legislation imposing a levy the effect of which is to reduce the commissions of licence holders responsible for the management of games played on gaming machines entails a restriction on the freedom guaranteed by that provision of the FEU Treaty, such a restriction cannot be justified by objectives exclusively based on considerations relating to the improvement of public finances.

2.

In so far as Article 49 TFEU is applicable, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations must be interpreted as not precluding, in principle, a piece of national legislation which temporarily reduces, during the term of licensing agreements concluded between companies and the administration of the Member State concerned, the license holders’ commissions agreed to in those agreements, unless it appears, in view of the extent of the impact of that reduction on the profitability of the investments made by licence holders and in view of the possible suddenness and unforeseeable nature of that measure, that those licence holders were not given the time necessary to adapt to that new situation.

1.

Joins Cases C-619/20 P and C-620/20 P for the purposes of the judgment;

2.

Dismisses the appeal in Case C-377/20 P;

3.

Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 9 September 2020, IMG v Commission (T-381/15 RENV, EU:T:2020:406), in so far as it dismissed as unfounded the claim for damages brought by International Management Group (IMG) relating to the harm that was caused to it by the decision of the European Commission to no longer enter into new delegation agreements for indirect management with it, contained in the letter from that institution of 8 May 2015;

4.

Dismisses the appeal in Case C-620/20 P as to the remainder;

5.

Dismisses the action in Case T-381/15 RENV in so far as it relates to the claim for damages for the non-material harm that the decision referred to in point 3 of this operative part has caused to International Management Group (IMG);

6.

Refers Case T-381/15 RENV back to the General Court of the European Union for a ruling on the claim referred to in point 3 of this operative part, in so far as it relates to the material harm relied on by International Management Group (IMG);

7.

Orders International Management Group (IMG) to pay the costs in Case C-619/20 P;

8.

Reserves the costs in Cases C-620/20 P and T-381/15 RENV.

1.

Directive 2009/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on port State control, as amended by Directive (EU) 2017/2110 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017,

must be interpreted as:

2.

Article 11(b) of Directive 2009/16, as amended by Directive 2017/2110, read in conjunction with Part II of Annex I to that directive, as amended, must be interpreted as meaning that the port State may subject ships which systematically carry out search and rescue activities and which are located in one of its ports or in waters falling within its jurisdiction, having entered those waters and after all the operations relating to the transhipment or disembarking of persons to whom their respective masters have decided to render assistance have been completed, to an additional inspection if that State has established, on the basis of detailed legal and factual evidence, that there are serious indications capable of proving that there is a danger to health, safety, on-board working conditions or the environment, having regard to the conditions under which those ships operate.

3.

Article 13 of Directive 2009/16, as amended by Directive 2017/2110, must be interpreted as meaning that, during more detailed inspections organised pursuant to that article, the port State has the power to take account of the fact that ships which have been classified and certified as cargo ships by the flag State are, in practice, being systematically used for activities relating to the search for and rescue of persons in danger or distress at sea in the context of a control intended to assess, on the basis of detailed legal and factual evidence, whether there is a danger to persons, property or the environment, having regard to the conditions under which those ships operate. By contrast, the port State does not have the power to demand proof that those ships hold certificates other than those issued by the flag State or that they comply with all the requirements applicable to another classification.

4.

Article 19 of Directive 2009/16, as amended by Directive 2017/2110, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that it is established that ships which are, in practice, being systematically used for activities relating to the search for and rescue of persons in danger or distress at sea, despite having been classified and certified as cargo ships by a Member State which is the flag State, have been operated in a manner posing a danger to persons, property or the environment, the Member State which is the port State may not make the non-detention of those ships or the lifting of such a detention subject to the condition that those ships hold certificates appropriate to those activities and comply with all the corresponding requirements. By contrast, that State may impose predetermined corrective measures relating to safety, pollution prevention and on-board living and working conditions, provided that those corrective measures are justified by the presence of deficiencies which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or the environment and which make it impossible for a ship to sail under conditions capable of ensuring safety at sea. Such corrective measures must, in addition, be suitable, necessary, and proportionate to that end. Furthermore, the adoption and implementation of those measures by the port State must be the result of sincere cooperation between that State and the flag State, having due regard to the respective powers of those two States.

1.

Article 23(1) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, read in conjunction with Article 45(4) of that directive and in the light of the general principle of EU law relating to the right to sound administration and of Article 47 of the Charter,

must be interpreted as:

precluding national legislation which provides that, where a decision rejecting an application for international protection or withdrawing such protection is based on information the disclosure of which would jeopardise the national security of the Member State in question, the person concerned or his or her legal adviser can access that information only after obtaining authorisation to that end, are not provided even with the substance of the grounds on which such decisions are based and cannot, in any event, use, for the purposes of administrative procedures or judicial proceedings, the information to which they may have had access.

2.

Article 4(1) and (2), Article 10(2) and (3), Article 11(2) and Article 45(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 14(4)(a) and Article 17(1)(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted,

must be interpreted as:

precluding national legislation under which the determining authority is systematically required, where bodies entrusted with specialist functions linked to national security have found, by way of a non-reasoned opinion, that a person constituted a danger to that security, to refuse to grant that person subsidiary protection, or to withdraw international protection previously granted to that person, on the basis of that opinion.

3.

Article 17(1)(b) of Directive 2011/95

must be interpreted as:

not precluding an applicant from being excluded from being eligible for subsidiary protection, pursuant to that provision, on the basis of a criminal conviction of which the competent authorities were already aware when they granted to that applicant, at the end of a previous procedure, refugee status which was subsequently withdrawn.

1.

Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as amended by Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness and Article 47 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as:

precluding a national law relating to a summary procedure for the recovery of lawyers’ fees pursuant to which the claim brought against the consumer client is the object of a decision delivered by a non-judicial authority, the intervention of a court being provided for only at the stage of a possible objection being raised against that decision, without the court seised on that occasion being able to ascertain, if necessary of its own motion, whether the terms contained in the contract giving rise to the fees claimed are unfair or to allow the production, by the parties, of evidence other than the documentary evidence already produced before the non-judicial authority.

2.

Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13, as amended by Directive 2011/83,

must be interpreted as meaning that:

the exception provided for in that provision does not cover a term of a contract concluded between a lawyer and his or her client pursuant to which the client undertakes to follow the instructions of that lawyer, not to act without the knowledge or against the advice of that lawyer and not to withdraw himself or herself from the legal proceedings the conduct of which he or she has entrusted to that lawyer, on pain of a financial penalty.

3.

Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council,

must be interpreted as meaning that:

the insertion, into the contract concluded between a lawyer and his or her client, of a term which provides for a financial penalty to be borne by the latter if he or she withdraws himself or herself from the legal proceedings the conduct of which he or she has entrusted to that lawyer, that term referring to the fee-scale of a professional association and not having been referred to in the advertisement or in the information given prior to the conclusion of the contract, must be regarded as being a ‘misleading’ commercial practice, within the meaning of Article 7 of that directive, provided that it causes the consumer, or is likely to cause the consumer, to take a transactional decision that he or she would not otherwise have taken, which it is for the national court to ascertain.

1.

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (1) be interpreted as being directly applicable in relations between a private transport operator, with a single public service delegation, and its employees, in the light, in particular, of the liberalisation of the rail passenger transport sector?

2.

What is a reasonable carry-over period in respect of the acquired entitlement to four weeks’ paid annual leave within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88, in so far as the time during which annual leave may be accrued is one year?

3.

Is the application of an unlimited carry-over period in the absence of a provision of national law, a regulation or convention governing that period contrary to Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC?

1.

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (1) be interpreted as being directly applicable in relations between a private transport operator, with a single public service delegation, and its employees, in the light, in particular, of the liberalisation of the rail passenger transport sector?

2.

What is a reasonable carry-over period in respect of the acquired entitlement to four weeks’ paid annual leave within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88, in so far as the time during which annual leave may be accrued is one year?

3.

Is the application of an unlimited carry-over period in the absence of a provision of national law, a regulation or convention governing that period contrary to Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88?

1.

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (1) be interpreted as being directly applicable in relations between a private transport operator, with a single public service delegation, and its employees, in the light, in particular, of the liberalisation of the rail passenger transport sector?

2.

What is a reasonable carry-over period in respect of the acquired entitlement to four weeks’ paid annual leave within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88, in so far as the time during which annual leave may be accrued is one year?

3.

Is the application of an unlimited carry-over period in the absence of a provision of national law, a regulation or convention governing that period contrary to Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88?

1.

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (1) be interpreted as being directly applicable in relations between a private transport operator, with a single public service delegation, and its employees, in the light, in particular, of the liberalisation of the rail passenger transport sector?

2.

What is a reasonable carry-over period in respect of the acquired entitlement to four weeks’ paid annual leave within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88, in so far as the time during which annual leave may be accrued is one year?

3.

Is the application of an unlimited carry-over period in the absence of a provision of national law, a regulation or convention governing that period contrary to Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88?

1.

Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (1) be interpreted as being directly applicable in relations between a private transport operator, with a single public service delegation, and its employees, in the light, in particular, of the liberalisation of the rail passenger transport sector?

2.

What is a reasonable carry-over period in respect of the acquired entitlement to four weeks’ paid annual leave within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88, in so far as the time during which annual leave may be accrued is one year?

3.

Is the application of an unlimited carry-over period in the absence of a provision of national law, a regulation or convention governing that period contrary to Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88?

1.

Can European Commission Decision С(2021) [5739] of 27 July 2021 cancelling part of the Cohesion Fund contribution to the operational programme ‘Transport 2007-2013’ under the ‘Convergence’ objective in Bulgaria, CCI2007BG161PO004, be regarded as valid in the light of the requirements concerning the legal basis, the statement of reasons, the completeness and the objectivity of the examination carried out, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and the principle of good administration under Article 41 of the Charter?

2.

Must Article 100 of Council Regulation No 1083/2006 (1) be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of the legality of its decisions, the European Commission is not required to establish, examine and qualify all the legally relevant facts in the proceedings, but is required to limit its conclusions to and base them solely on the communication with the Member State and the exchange of observations or notifications with that Member State?

3.

In a situation such as the present one, in which there is a final act of the European Commission imposing a financial correction on a Member State for an irregularity in the expenditure of European Union funds in three separate procurement procedures, are the competent national authorities under an obligation to conduct their own procedure for establishing irregularities in order lawfully to make a financial correction under Article 98 of Regulation No 1083/2006?

4.

If the previous question is answered in the negative, is it to be assumed that the right of persons to participate in the procedure in which Member States make financial corrections is guaranteed, in accordance with the right to good administration under Article 41 of the Charter?

5.

Must Article 47 of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as the present one, in which there is a final act of the European Commission imposing a financial correction on a Member State for an irregularity in the expenditure of European Union funds in three separate procurement procedures, a national court is bound by the findings and conclusions of the European Commission where it is called upon to rule on an action against the imposition of a financial correction by the competent national authority in connection with one of those procurement procedures, or does it follow from that legal provision that the court must, in the context of a full judicial procedure and using all the means provided for by law, establish and examine the legally relevant facts and circumstances of the dispute, thereby providing the appropriate legal solution?

6.

If the previous question is answered to the effect that the national court is bound by the European Commission Decision, including its findings of fact, can it be assumed that persons on whom a financial correction has been imposed are guaranteed the rights to an effective remedy and to a fair hearing under Article 47 of the Charter?

1.

Are Article 49 TFEU (right of establishment) and/or Article 63 TFEU (free movement of capital) to be interpreted as precluding a legal provision or a fiscal practice of a Member State whereby, for the purposes of personal income tax in that Member State, a tax advantage, consisting in taxation of 50 % of the gain resulting from the transfer of company shares, is applied to transfers of shares in companies incorporated under national law, but not to transfers of shares in companies incorporated in another Member State?

2.

Are Article 49 TFEU (right of establishment) and/or Article 63 TFEU (free movement of capital) to be interpreted as precluding a legal provision or a fiscal practice of a Member State whereby, for the purposes of personal income tax in that Member State, a tax advantage, consisting in taxation of 50 % of the gain resulting from the transfer of company shares, is applied to transfers of shares in companies which have their actual domicile in the national territory, but not to transfers of shares in companies which have their actual domicile in the territory of another Member State?

3.

Are Article 49 TFEU (right of establishment) and/or Article 63 TFEU (free movement of capital) to be interpreted as precluding a legal provision or a fiscal practice of a Member State whereby, for the purposes of personal income tax in that Member State, a tax advantage, consisting in taxation of 50 % of the gain resulting from the transfer of company shares, is applied to transfers of shares in companies with tax residence in the national territory, but not to transfers of shares in companies with tax residence in the territory of another Member State?

4.

Are Article 49 TFEU (right of establishment) and/or Article 63 TFEU (free movement of capital) to be interpreted as precluding a legal provision or a fiscal practice of a Member State whereby, for the purposes of personal income tax in that Member State, a tax advantage, consisting in taxation of 50 % of the gain resulting from the transfer of company shares, is applied to transfers of shares in companies which conduct their business in the national territory, but not to transfers of shares in companies which conduct their business in the territory of another Member State?

5.

Is the principle of prohibition of abusive practices to be interpreted as applying to a transfer of company shares such as that in the present case, which, in essence, has a result equivalent to a dividend payment, and the legal form of which was chosen by the taxpayer with the fundamental aim of obtaining a tax advantage deriving from national law and strictly applicable to capital gains on securities, in circumstances such as those of the present case, in which the grant to the taxpayer of the tax advantage concerned depends on whether that taxpayer is able to rely on and exercise the right of establishment under Article 49 TFEU and/or free movement of capital under Article 63 TFEU?

6.

Is the principle of prohibition of abusive practices to be interpreted as precluding a taxpayer from relying on and exercising the right of establishment (under Article 49 TFEU) or the free movement of capital (under Article 63 TFEU) in order to benefit from the tax advantage provided for in national law for capital gains arising from the transfer of company shares, when, with the main objective of benefiting from that tax advantage, that taxpayer has carried out a transaction, which, in essence, has a result equivalent to a dividend payment, such as a transfer of shares?

7.

If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, can a taxpayer invoke legal certainty or legitimate expectations in order to challenge a refusal to recognise the right of establishment and/or free movement of capital in line with the principle of prohibition of abusive practices and, thus, legitimise that abusive practice?

8.

Is the principle of prohibition of abusive practices to be interpreted as meaning that its application depends on verification of the conditions for the application of the general anti-abuse regulations under national law?

9.

Is the principle of prohibition of abusive practices to be interpreted as meaning that its application depends on it being invoked by the national authorities?

10.

Is the principle of prohibition of abusive practices to be interpreted as meaning that its application depends on compliance by the national tax authorities with the procedure laid down for the application of the general anti-abuse regulations under national law?

11.

Given that the jurisdiction of the national court is limited to assessing the legality of tax measures and deciding whether to annul or to uphold them in the legal order, without replacing the Tax Authority, is the principle of prohibition of abusive practices to be interpreted as meaning that the Arbitration Tribunal has jurisdiction to reclassify/redefine/requalify the abusive transaction and apply the relevant national legislation to the transaction which would exist in its place?

1.

Is Article 164 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (1) to be interpreted as authorising the extension of inter-trade agreements which establish more stringent standards than those laid down in Union rules not only in the case of ‘production rules’, mentioned in point (b) of Article 164(4), but also in all of the other cases, mentioned in points (a) and (c) to (n) thereof, in relation to which Article 164 provides that the extension of an inter-trade agreement may be requested?

2.

Where there are no specific Union rules relating to a given class of fruit or vegetables, is Article 164 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 to be interpreted as authorising the extension of inter-trade agreements which establish more stringent standards than the applicable standards adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe to which EU law refers?

1.

Is Article 164 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (1) to be interpreted as authorising the extension of inter-trade agreements which establish more stringent standards than those laid down in Union rules not only in the case of ‘production rules’, mentioned in point (b) of Article 164(4), but also in all of the cases mentioned in points (a) and (c) to (n) thereof, in relation to which Article 164 provides that the extension of an inter-trade agreement may be requested and, in particular, as authorising, where EU rules lay down marketing and packaging rules for a given class of fruit or vegetables, the adoption of more stringent rules in an inter-trade agreement and their extension to all operators?

2.

If the answer to question 1 depends on whether it is ‘marketing rules’, mentioned in point (d) of Article 164(4), or ‘minimum standards of packing and presentation’, referred to in point (k) thereof, that are at issue, does the definition of size ranges intended to ensure the uniformity of products in the same package fall under marketing rules or under standards of packing and presentation?

1.

Is Article 164 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of 17 December 2013 (1) to be interpreted as authorising the extension of inter-trade agreements which establish more stringent standards than those laid down in Union rules not only in the case of ‘production rules’, mentioned in point (b) of Article 164(4), but also in all of the cases mentioned in points (a) and (c) to (n) thereof, in relation to which Article 164 provides that the extension of an inter-trade agreement may be requested?

2.

Are rules fixing harvesting dates and marketing dates rules that can be laid down by inter-trade agreement and extended on the basis of Article 164 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of 17 December 2013 and, if so, are rules fixing harvesting dates and marketing dates ‘production rules’, as referred to in point (b) of Article 164(4) or, as Annex XVIa to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 (2) establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products[, as amended,] previously stipulated, ‘marketing rules’, as now referred to in point (d) of Article 164(4)?

1.

Where new subscribers are given a gift (a ‘gadget’) when they subscribe to periodicals, must the making of that gift be considered, for the purposes of Article 16 of the VAT Directive, (1) to be:

2.

If the answer to the first question is that the making of the gift is a supply of goods made free of charge, is the setting of an annual ceiling on the overall value of gifts of 0.5 % of the turnover of the taxable person in the preceding year (in addition to the limit on the unitary value) compatible with the concept of ‘the application of goods … as gifts of small value’ referred to in the second paragraph of Article 16 of the VAT Directive?

3.

If the preceding question is answered in the affirmative, must that proportion of 0.5 % of the turnover of the taxable person in the preceding year be considered to be so low that it renders the second paragraph of Article 16 of the VAT Directive ineffective?

4.

Having regard also to the purposes for which it was established, does that ceiling of 0.5 % of the turnover of the taxable person in the preceding year infringe the principles of neutrality, of equal treatment or non-discrimination and of proportionality?

1.

Can EU law (Article 110 TFEU) be interpreted as meaning that the amount of a tax prohibited under EU law is incorporated in the value of a vehicle and may be transferred to third-party purchasers along with the right of ownership over the vehicle?

2.

Does the interpretation of [Article] 110 TFEU preclude national rules, such as those laid down by Article 1 of OUG No 52/2017, under which a refund of a tax prohibited by EU law may be made only to the taxpayer who paid the tax and not — where the tax has not been refunded to the person who paid it — to subsequent purchasers of the vehicle in respect of which the tax was paid?

1.

Is Article 106(1) TFEU to be interpreted as precluding provisions of national legislation, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which maintain the direct, original and non-competitive award, to a company whose capital is wholly owned by the State, of licences for the exploitation of mineral water springs by means of successive and unlimited extensions of exclusive licences (available to the state-owned company)?

2.

Are Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 49 and 119 TFEU, and Article 3 of Directive 2009/54/EC on the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters (1) to be interpreted as precluding provisions of national legislation, such as those at issue in the main proceedings and mentioned above, which introduce an unjustified restriction on the freedom to conduct a business, including the freedom of establishment?

1.

Is the definition of a credit institution in Article 4(1)(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that credit is to be granted exclusively from funds received from the public as deposits or other repayable funds, or may a credit institution also grant credit from funds from other sources?

2.

How is the content of the ‘instrument … in any form … by which the right to carry out the business is granted’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(42) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to be interpreted, and does it include both the authorisation scheme and the registration scheme which grant approval for credit operations?

1.

Are Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) and the principles of legal certainty, inviolability of final court judgments, effectiveness, and proportionality to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that a national court may not carry out, of its own motion, a review of unfair contractual terms and attach consequences thereto where it is supervising enforcement proceedings conducted by a court enforcement officer pursuant to a final and enforceable order for payment issued in proceedings in which no evidence is taken?

2.

Are Articles 3(1), 6(1) and 7(1) and (2), and 8 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the principles of legal certainty, effectiveness and proportionality, and the right to be heard by a court, to be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national legislation under which the entry of an unfair term in the register of unlawful terms renders that term unfair in any proceedings involving a consumer, including:

—

in the case where an honorary judge, as a fixed-term, part-time European worker comparable to a professional judge classified as a permanent, full-time European worker, merely submits an application to participate in stabilisation procedures that only formally implement Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Directive 1999/70,

—

or, if these procedures are not successfully concluded or no application is submitted, with the receipt of a payment in an amount that is manifestly inadequate and disproportionate in relation to the damage suffered as a result of the failure to transpose those directives?

1.

Is Article 370, read in conjunction with point 2 of Annex X, Part A, of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, to be interpreted as permitting the Member States concerned to impose VAT on a statutory media licence fee to finance the non-commercial activities of public radio and television bodies, notwithstanding the absence of a ‘supply of services for consideration’ within the meaning of Article 2(1) of that Directive?

If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, the Court of Justice is asked to answer the following questions referred for a preliminary ruling:

2.

Is Article 370, read in conjunction with point 2 of Annex X, Part A, of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State’s option to impose VAT on a statutory media licence fee as specified in question 1 may be maintained if, after the entry into force, on 1 January 1978, of Directive 77/388/EEC (2) of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes (Sixth Directive), the Member State has altered the licensing system from charging a licence fee for possessing radio and television equipment to charging a licence fee for possessing any device which can receive audiovisual programmes and services directly, including smartphones, computers, etc.?

3.

Is Article 370, read in conjunction with point 2 of Annex X, Part A, of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State’s option to impose VAT on a statutory media licence fee as specified in question 1 may be maintained if, after the entry into force, on 1 January 1978, of Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes (Sixth Directive), the Member State has altered the licensing system so that a smaller proportion of the licence fee resources will, at the discretion of the Minister for Culture, be used to finance (i) radio and television bodies which receive public subsidies but are not themselves public, and (ii) media and film organisations which contribute to but do not themselves carry out radio and television activities?

1.

In view of the principle of equal treatment under Article 3(1) of Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA, (1) and against the background of Article 3(5) of that decision, in the case of an actually existing situation of a cumulative sentence involving convictions handed down in Germany and in another EU Member State, can a sentence be imposed for the offence committed in Germany even where a notional inclusion of the sentence imposed in the other EU Member State would mean that the maximum permissible level under German law for a cumulative sentence for non-life custodial sentences is exceeded?

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative:

Must the taking into account of the sentence imposed in the other EU Member State, as provided for under the second sentence of Article 3(5) of Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA, take place in such a way that the disadvantage resulting from the impossibility to form a subsequent cumulative sentence is to be specifically documented and justified in the sentencing for the offence committed in Germany, in accordance with the principles governing the formation of cumulative sentences under German law?

—

set aside the judgment under appeal;

—

declare in accordance with Articles 263 and 264 TFEU that European Commission Decision C(2020) 3970 final of 9 June 2020 on State aid SA.57410 (2020/N) — Finland COVID-19: Recapitalisation of Finnair is void; and

—

order the Commission to bear its own costs and pay those incurrent by the appellant, and order the interveners at first instance and in this appeal (if any) to bear their own costs.

—

declare that, by failing to take the measures necessary to ensure that its designated air traffic service (ATS) provider complies with Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2009, (1) the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(3) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2009;

—

order the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.

—

set aside the judgment under appeal;

—

declare void the decisions of the SRB dated 23 February 2018 with respect to the appellant and its Luxembourg subsidiary;

—

order the SRB to pay the appellant's costs and the costs of this appeal, and

—

to the extent that the Court of Justice is not in a position to rule on the substance, refer the case back to the General Court.

—

that the General Court failed to respect the clear description of the limits of the SRB’s powers which is set out in Article 18 SRMR and which provides that the SRB may only act with external legal effect if all three conditions under Article 18 SRMR are met and if the European Commission and the Council of the European Union do not object;

—

that there is no basis in the text of Article 18 SRMR for the assumption that the SRB may adopt a measure with external legal effect if only the first two conditions are met;

—

that the SRB effectively conceded its mistake by taking a different approach in the most recent analogous cases;

—

that the General Court failed to examine fully the legality of the contested decisions (SRB/EES/2018/09 and SRB/EES/2018/10 of 23 February 2018) by failing to determine how precisely, according to the General Court’s interpretation of the contested decisions, the legal position of the appellant and its subsidiary was changed;

—

that the General Court distorted the clear content of the contested decisions by failing to admit that they contain decisions that the appellant and its subsidiary be liquidated, and

—

that the General Court committed a number of related mistakes by, inter alia, confusing the contested decisions with the measures which the SRB addressed to the National Resolution Authorities for purposes of the implementation of the contested decisions.

—

that the General Court distorted the content of the file by claiming an implicit FOLTF (failing or likely to fail) assessment and failed to mention that the SRB expressly stated in its defense that it did not make a FOLTF assessment; and

—

that in the same context the General Court committed further related errors and distortions as well as failures to address the appellant’s arguments by, inter alia, failing to address the effect of the moratorium of suspending the payment obligations and by misinterpreting the concept of liquidity within the meaning of Article 18 SRMR.

—

declare that by not taking the measures necessary to ensure that the ATS provider designated by it complies with Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2009 (1), Republic of Malta has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(3) TEU in conjunction with Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2009; and

—

order the Republic of Malta to pay the costs.

—

annul the Commission Implementing Decision of 2 June 2022 terminating the procedure for authorising the placing on the market of Alphitobius diaperinus larva as a novel food without updating the Union list of novel foods; (1)

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging a breach of Article 6(3) of Commission Implementing Regulation 2017/2469, (2) insofar the decision was adopted without the procedural requirements and guarantees set out under that provision having been complied with, making the decision illegal.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of good administration and of Article 41 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and more particularly:

3.

Third plea in law, a subsidiary plea to the effect that, if neither the first plea nor the second plea is upheld, the applicants submit a plea of illegality based on Article 277 TFEU against Article 10(6) of Regulation 2015/2283 (3) and Article 6 of Commission Implementing Regulation 2017/2469, alleging that those provisions are void because they are in breach of the principle of legal certainty and of the principle of equal treatment.

—

annul Commission Decision C(2020) 8550 final, of 4 December 2020, on aid scheme SA.21259 (2018/C) (ex 2018/NN) implemented by Portugal in favour of the Zona Franca da Madeira (ZFM) — Regime III (Madeira Free Zone — Scheme III);

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

The first plea in law relates to the fulfilment of the requirements for the compatibility of the Zona Franca da Madeira — Regime III, namely the source of the earnings and the creation and maintenance of jobs in the region.

2.

The second plea in law relates to the allegedly unjustified delay in the Commission’s response.

3.

The third plea in law relates to the alleged failure to comply with the obligation to state reasons.

4.

The fourth plea in law relates to the right to a fair hearing.

5.

The fifth plea in law relates to the protection of legitimate expectations.

6.

The sixth plea in law relates to the principle of legal certainty.

—

annul Commission Decision C(2020) 8550 final, of 4 December 2020, on aid scheme SA.21259 (2018/C) (ex 2018/NN) implemented by Portugal in favour of the Zona Franca da Madeira (ZFM) — Regime III (Madeira Free Zone — Scheme III);

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

The first plea in law relates to the fulfilment of the requirements for the compatibility of the Zona Franca da Madeira — Regime III, namely the source of the earnings and the creation and maintenance of jobs in the region.

2.

The second plea in law relates to the allegedly unjustified delay in the Commission’s response.

3.

The third plea in law relates to the alleged failure to comply with the obligation to state reasons.

4.

The fourth plea in law relates to the right to a fair hearing.

5.

The fifth plea in law relates to the protection of legitimate expectations.

6.

The sixth plea in law relates to the principle of legal certainty.

—

annul Commission Decision C(2020) 8550 final, of 4 December 2020, on aid scheme SA.21259 (2018/C) (ex 2018/NN) implemented by Portugal in favour of the Zona Franca da Madeira (ZFM) — Regime III (Madeira Free Zone — Scheme III);

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

1.

The first plea in law relates to the fulfilment of the requirements for the compatibility of the Zona Franca da Madeira — Regime III, namely the source of the earnings and the creation and maintenance of jobs in the region.

2.

The second plea in law relates to the allegedly unjustified delay in the Commission’s response.

3.

The third plea in law relates to the alleged failure to comply with the obligation to state reasons.

4.

The fourth plea in law relates to the right to a fair hearing.

5.

The fifth plea in law relates to the protection of legitimate expectations.

6.

The sixth plea in law relates to the principle of legal certainty.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order CPVO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

—

Infringement of Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2100/94 of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2100/94 of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 76 of Regulation (EU) 2100/94 of the Council;

—

Infringement of Article 81 of Regulation (EU) 2100/94 of the Council.

—

annul Article 2(3) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973 of 14 March 2022 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 of the European Parliament and of the Council by laying down criteria on agronomic efficiency and safety for the use of by-products in EU fertilising products, and

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the defendant exceeded its powers or misused its powers, in breach of EU law, by adopting Article 2(3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973 (1) on the basis of the power conferred under the first sentence of Article 42(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1009. (2)

According to the applicant, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 42(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1009, the defendant may adopt delegated acts only for the purposes of agronomic efficiency and safety. Instead, the defendant laid down the limit values for the parameters ‘total chromium’ and ‘vanadium’ in Article 2(3)(a) and (c) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973 for the purposes of health and environmental protection. The laying down of the limit values for total chromium and vanadium is not covered by the legal basis in the first sentence of Article 42(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1009.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging breach of the precautionary principle pursuant to the second sentence of Article 42(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 on account of a misinterpretation of the present scientific evidence.

According to the applicant, the defendant, in adopting Article 2(3)(a) and (c) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973, failed to determine, analyse and evaluate the latest scientific evidence as well as base its decision to adopt Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973 on that evidence.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of inquisitorial procedure, in particular the defendant’s official duty to determine and take account of the latest scientific evidence.

According to the applicant, the defendant failed sufficiently to determine the latest scientific evidence and to take account of that evidence in the adoption of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty on account of a failure to take account of the latest scientific evidence.

According to the applicant, the undertakings concerned by Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973 relied on the defendant laying down only those criteria that can be technically derived from the latest scientific evidence. In addition, those undertakings relied on the defendant laying down only criteria of agronomic efficiency and safety. The limit values for total chromium and vanadium do not constitute criteria of agronomic efficiency and safety. The addressees of Article 2(3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973 were not able to predict the laying down of the limit values for total chromium and vanadium.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality on account of the prohibition of lime-containing fertilising products from the steel industry by the adoption of Article 2(3)(a) and (c) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973.

According to the applicant, the limit values for total chromium and vanadium laid down by the defendant fail to take account of the principle of proportionality pursuant to the second sentence of Article 5(1) [and] Article 5(4) TEU, since the limit values exclude lime-containing fertilising products from the steel industry from the EU law on fertilising products, and, in the applicant’s submission, this will have, in many respects, negative effects on the environment, human, animal and plant health, the public interest in a safe and affordable supply of fertilising materials and food, and the interests of manufacturers and distributors.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the defendant’s formal obligation to state reasons.

According to the applicant, the laying down of limit values for total chromium and vanadium is not sufficiently taken into consideration in the recitals of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/973. The defendant did not disclose the decisive (relevant) facts on the basis of which it laid down the limit values. It justified the laying down of the limit values with aspects of health and environmental protection. On the other hand, the criteria of agronomic efficiency and safety required under the legal basis in the first sentence of Article 42(7) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 were not addressed. Therefore, the reasoning that can be inferred from the recitals is, from a formal point of view alone, insufficient and incomplete. The considerations do not comply with the obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296.

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging material inaccuracy and incompleteness of the reasoning, resulting from the material inaccuracy and incompleteness of the technical derivation of the limit values for total chromium and vanadium.

—

annul the defendant’s decision of 17 December 2021 not to implement sections (1) and (2) of the operational part of the judgment of the GCEU, of 16 December 2020, in case T-187/18, VP v Cedefop;

—

annul the connected decision not to renew the applicant’s employment contract for an indefinite period with effect from 16 November 2017;

—

annul the decision of 17 June 2022 of the defendant rejecting the complaint of the applicant of 3 March 2022 against the decision of 17 December 2021;

—

order the compensation of the moral prejudice suffered by the applicant evaluated ex aequo et bono to one hundred thousand Euros;

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the defendant’s decision not to implement the core sections (1) and (2) of the judgment of 16 December 2020 in case T-187/18, VP v Cedefop and, consequently, not to renew the employment contract of the applicant is vitiated by a breach of the obligation pursuant to Article 266 TFEU to comply with the Judgment in Case T-187/18 of 16 December 2020 and a manifest error of assessment.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the defendant failed its obligation to duty of care.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the defendant infringed the principles of equal treatment and protection of legitimate expectations.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the defendant misused its power.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order anyone opposing the action to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision in so far as it refused registration as an European Union trade mark of the figurative sign ENDURANCE in respect of the goods and services in Classes 9, 25, 28 and 35;

—

order EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the applicant, including the expenses necessarily incurred for the purpose of the appeal proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul the contested decision;

—

order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs.

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

—

annul Article 74a and Article 74b of Regulation 2016/794 (1) as amended by Regulation 2022/991 (2);

—

condemn the defendants to pay the costs of the proceedings.

—

order the Commission to pay forthwith the default interest amount, corresponding to default interest in the amount of EUR 3 382 129,97 at the ECB refinancing rate plus 3,5 % for the period from 19 June 2017 to 25 May 2022 or, alternatively, at such a rate and over such a period the Court sees fit (under the applicant’s first and/or second pleas in law);

—

order the Commission to pay forthwith compound interest on the default interest amount of EUR 3 382 129,97 (or such other amount as the Court determines is owing to the applicant), corresponding to the ECB refinancing rate plus 3,5 % for the period from 25 May 2022 to the date of payment of such a default interest amount or, alternatively, at such a rate and over such a period the Court sees fit;

—

further or in the alternative, annul the Commission’s refusal decision dated 7 July 2022, in consequence of which the Commission must pay to the applicant default interest and compound interest thereon with immediate effect; or in the further alternative, declare that the Commission’s failure to act by not paying default interest and compound interest thereon (or any interest) is unlawful; and

—

order the Commission to pay the applicant’s legal and other expenses in respect of these proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the applicant is entitled to recover the default interest amount of EUR 3 382 129,97, or alternatively interest calculated for such period and at such rate as the Court shall think fit, by an action under the first paragraph of Article 266 TFEU, on the basis that the Commission was obliged to pay such interest in order to comply with the judgment of the General Court in Case T-341/17. In this regard, the applicant relies in the alternative on Article 277 TFEU, in the event that the Commission seeks to rely on secondary legislation and such legislation is interpreted in a manner that is inconsistent with the applicant’s Treaty rights.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the applicant is entitled, further and/or in the alternative, to recover such default interest by an action under the second paragraph of Article 266, Article 268 and Article 340 TFEU and under Article 41(3) of the Charter, on the basis of the non-contractual liability of the European Union owing to the Commission’s failure to pay such interest in compliance with the judgment of the General Court in Case T-341/17. In this regard, the applicant again relies in the alternative on Article 277 TFEU, in the event that the Commission seeks to rely on secondary legislation and such legislation is interpreted in a manner that is inconsistent with the applicant’s Treaty rights.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the applicant is entitled to the payment of compound interest in respect of the Commission’s failure to pay such default interest, by actions brought pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 266 or, alternatively, the second paragraph thereof, Article 268 and Article 340 TFEU and under Article 41(3) of the Charter. In this regard, the applicant again relies in the alternative on Article 277 TFEU, in the event that the Commission seeks to rely on secondary legislation and such legislation is interpreted in a manner that is inconsistent with BA’s Treaty rights.

4.

Further, and to the extent necessary, by relying on the forth plea in law the applicant seeks — pursuant to Article 263(4) TFEU — an annulment of the Commission’s decision of 7 July 2022 to refuse to pay default interest and compound interest thereon, based on an infringement of Article 266 TFEU and/or the general principle of EU law that EU institutions must give restitution following a judgment annulling a measure.

5.

In the alternative to the fourth plea in law, by relying on the fifth plea in law the applicant seeks a declaration under Article 265 TFEU that the Commission has acted unlawfully by failing to pay to the applicant default interest and compound interest thereon after the applicant’s request for this of 8 June 2022, contrary to Article 266 TFEU and/or the general principle of EU law that EU institutions must give restitution following a judgment annulling a measure.

—

annul European Commission Decision C(2022) 4761 final of 12 July 2022 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU (Case AT.40.522 — Metal Packaging) insofar as it applies to the applicants; and

—

order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed the principle of patere legem quam ipse fecisti, a general principle of EU law, by accepting the re-allocation of the case from the German Federal Cartel Office (‘FCO’) thereby departing from established rules of practice as set out in the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission, by accepting the re-allocation of the case from the FCO, violated the applicants’ legitimate expectations that it would comply with established rules of practice.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission, by accepting the re-allocation of the case at such a late stage of the FCO’s proceedings, violated the principle of subsidiarity.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed the applicants’ rights of defence by accepting the re-allocation of the case from the FCO several years after the expiry of the two-month initial allocation period.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission, by accepting the re-allocation of the case after the expiry of the two-month initial allocation period, failed to appropriately balance the objectives of competition law enforcement and those of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, and the applicants’ rights of defence, thus breaching the principle of proportionality.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission, by accepting the re-allocation of the case from the FCO after the expiry of the two-month initial allocation period, infringed the principle of good administration.

—

annul Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the European Commission’s Decision of 4 December 2020 on aid scheme SA.21259 (2018/C) (ex 2018/NN) implemented by Portugal in favour of the Madeira Free Zone (MFZ) — Regime III;

—

order the European Commission to bear all the costs of the proceedings.

1.

First plea in law, alleging an error of law, in so far as the criterion relating to ‘activities effectively and materially performed in Madeira’ has been interpreted and applied correctly in the implementation of MFZ Regime III. The applicant claims that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the criterion ‘profits resulting from activities effectively and materially performed in Madeira’. The profits of companies registered in the MFZ which may be eligible for a tax benefit are not limited to those resulting from activities that are subject to additional costs associated with remoteness, that is to say activities performed solely in the geographic territory of the Autonomous Region of Madeira. In view of the aims and context of MFZ Regime III, the correct interpretation of that criterion allows those activities associated with ZFM licensed companies, which had their decision-making centre there, to be regarded as activities effectively and materially performed in Madeira, irrespective of whether they are engaged in international activities.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging an error of law, in so far as the criterion relating to ‘job … maintenance’ has been interpreted and applied correctly in the implementation of MFZ Regime III. The applicant claims that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the criterion ‘job … maintenance’. Given that there is no concept of ‘job’ in the European Union and that such a concept has not been clarified for the purposes of the application of Regime III, or in the 2007 and 2013 Decisions, or in the 2007 Guidelines, the concept of a job under national employment legislation should be accepted. The methodology for defining jobs as ‘FTE’ (full-time equivalent) or ‘ALU’ (annual labour unit) does not apply to MFZ Regime III.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the general principles of European Union law of legal certainty and legitimate expectations. The applicant claims that the European Commission’s Decision of 4 December 2020 on aid scheme SA.21259 (2018/C) (ex 2018/NN) implemented by Portugal in favour of the Madeira Free Zone (MFZ) — Regime III infringes the general principles of European Union law of legal certainty and legitimate expectations, so that the Commission cannot require the Portuguese national authorities to recover the aid at issue from the beneficiaries, and specifically from the applicant.

—

annul the contested decision pursuant to Article 264 TFEU, in so far as it concerns the applicants; and

—

order the Commission to pay the costs incurred by the applicants, pursuant to Article 134 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

1.

First plea in law, alleging lack of competence of the defendant due to an infringement of the principle of subsidiarity

The defendant was not competent to conduct the proceeding against Silgan or to adopt the contested decision. In view of the in-depth investigations and the fact that the national proceedings permitted a final decision, the Bundeskartellamt (German competition authority) was in a position to bring an end to the investigation procedure in the present case. The defendant was not in a better position to conduct the proceeding.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging misuse of powers

The opening of the proceeding and the adoption of the decision by the defendant were guided by irrelevant considerations. They were carried out in order to circumvent the provisions provided for under German law on penalties imposed for infringements of Article 101 TFEU and to close a supposed loophole in German law on penalties.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to sound administration under Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

The defendant infringed the principle of sound administration and thus infringed the applicants’ fundamental right under Article 41 of the Charter, since the contested decision is disproportionate, is contrary to the applicants’ legitimate expectations and runs counter to the principle that the administration is bound by its own acts.

—

annul the decision of 17 November 2021 which imposed on the applicant the penalty of deferment of advancement to a higher step for a period of six months;

—

order the European Commission to pay the costs and to pay one euro to the applicant.

1.

First plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment which render the contested decision unlawful. He relies, in that regard, on the fact that the alleged misconduct on which the contested decision is based has not been established and that that is apparent, inter alia, from the unanimous opinion given by the Disciplinary Board.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence. The applicant relies, in particular, on the right to be heard, in so far as the members of the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC), to whom the powers of the appointing authority (‘the Appointing Authority’) were delegated during the procedure and who drafted the inquiry report, the conclusions of which were questioned by the Disciplinary Board, then played a decisive role in the adoption of the decision taken, in a non-transparent way, by the Appointing Authority.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality.

—

annul, in their entirety, the contested decision and the decision of EUIPO’s Opposition Division of 12 November 2021 or, in the alternative, amend the contested decision by upholding the appeal lodged by the applicant;

—

make an appropriate order as to costs in the applicant’s favour.

—

Annul the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 25 July 2022 on the calculation of the 2017 ex-ante contributions of Hypo Vorarlberg Bank AG and Portigon AG to the Single Resolution Fund (SRB/ES/2022/41) together with annexes, at least in so far as it concerns the applicant, and

—

Order the Single Resolution Board to pay the costs.

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements due to a lack of full disclosure of the contested decision.

The contested decision was not fully disclosed to the applicant contrary to Article 1(2) TEU, Articles 15, 296 and 298 TFEU, and Articles 42 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). Knowledge of the data which were not shared was required, as a central component of the decision, in order to understand how the individual situation of the applicant was taken into account relative to the situation of all the other institutions concerned in the calculation of the contributions.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of legal certainty due to the retrospective adoption of the contested decision.

The retrospective adoption of the contested decision is contrary to the principle of legal certainty as it was not necessary to achieve the objective.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 102 of Directive 2014/59/EU, (1) Article 69(1) and (2) and Article 70(2) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, (2) Articles 3 and 4(2) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 (3) and the principle of proportionality due to the incorrect determination of the target level, as the defendant set an excessive target level contrary to the EU legal framework.

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements due to an inadequate statement of reasons for the decision.

The contested decision infringes the obligation to state reasons provided for in Article 296, second paragraph, TFEU and Article 41(1) and (2)(c) of the Charter, as only a few selected conclusions were disclosed. The requirements as to the scope of the obligation to state reasons as specified in Case C-584/20 P (4) were not complied with.

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements due to an inadequate statement of reasons with respect to the exercise of significant discretionary powers.

The contested decision infringes the obligation to state reasons because, as regards the defendant’s margin of discretion, it was not explained which assessments had been made by the defendant and for what reasons. Accordingly an arbitrary exercise of discretion by the defendant could therefore not be ruled out.

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 102 of Directive 2014/59/EU; Article 69(1) and (2), and Article 70(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014; Article 4(2), Article 6(2)(a), Article 7(2)(a), and Article 17(3) and (4) as well as Annex 1 to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 and the principles of effective judicial protection and of proportionality on account of non-compliance with the factual circumstances.

The contested decision is contrary to the EU legal framework and the principles of effective judicial protection and of proportionality as the defendant did not consider current factual circumstances when adopting the contested decision and based it on inaccurate forecasts (in particular the target level).

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements due to the absence of a hearing and the failure to observe the right to a fair hearing.

Contrary to Article 41(1) and 2(a) of the Charter, the applicant was not given the right to be heard either before the adoption of the contested decision or before that of the contribution decision on which it was based. The consultation carried out did not offer the possibility for it to submit effective and comprehensive observations.

8.

Eighth plea in law alleging the unlawfulness of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 as the legal basis for the contested decision, the unlawfulness of the risk adjustment method provided for in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 and the margin of discretion granted to the SRB.

Articles 4 to 7 and 9 as well as Annex 1 to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63, on which the contested decision is based, create an opaque system for setting contributions, that is contrary to Articles 16, 17, 41 and 47 of the Charter and does not ensure compliance with Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter or with the principles of proportionality and of legal certainty. The defendant enjoys a large margin of discretion the exercise of which is not possible to review.

9.

Ninth plea in law claiming the unlawfulness of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 (5) as the basis for the contested decision.

The contested decision infringes the Treaties as Article 8 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 goes beyond the limits provided for in Article 70(7) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 read in conjunction with Article 291 TFEU and neither the implementing regulation nor the legal basis are accompanied by a statement of reasons as required under Article 296, second paragraph, TFEU. That unlawfulness is reflected in the contested decision.

10.

Tenth plea in law, alleging the unlawfulness of Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as the legal basis for Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 as well as for the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 and therefore the contested decision.

In the alternative, the applicant alleges the unlawfulness of the provisions of Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 that render the contribution system binding and grant the defendant a broad margin of discretion. In so far as those provisions are not amenable to an interpretation consistent with primary law, they are contrary to the obligation to state reasons, the principle of legal certainty as well as the Treaties (in particular Article 1(2) TEU; Articles 15, 296 and 298 TFEU) and the Charter (in particular Articles 16, 17, 41, 42 and 47 of the Charter).

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declare that, after Frontex was called upon to act in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 265 TFEU, Frontex unlawfully failed to act, by refraining from taking the decision to withdraw the financing of all or part of its activities in the Aegean Sea region, to suspend those activities or to terminate them in whole or in part, in accordance with Article 46(4) of Regulation 2019/1896 (1), or by not providing duly justified grounds for failing to implement the relevant measure within the meaning of Article 46(6) of that regulation, and, further, that it did not define its position in response to the applicant’s preliminary request.

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in the alternative, annul the decision of 27 July 2022 of Frontex, refusing to act upon the invitation to act in accordance with Article 46(4).

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order the defendant to pay all the costs, in accordance with Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

1.

First plea in law, alleging that, after Frontex was called upon to act in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 265 TFEU, it has unlawfully failed to act, by refraining from taking the decision to withdraw the financing of all or part of its activities in the Aegean Sea Region, to suspend those activities or to terminate them in whole or in part, in accordance with Article 46(4) of Regulation 2019/1896, or by not providing duly justified grounds for failing to implement the relevant measure within the meaning of Article 46(6) of that regulation.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that, in the alternative, should the Court consider that Frontex’s reply on the preliminary request pursuant to Article 265 TFEU constitutes a definition of position bringing the failure to act to an end, then its refusal to act in accordance with the applicant’s invitation to act forms the basis of an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

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annul the decision of the Council of the European Union of 27 July 2022;

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order the Council of the European Union to pay the entirety of the costs;

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with all the legal consequences which that entails.

1.

First plea in law, alleging an infringement of the freedom of expression and information.

2.

Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of the freedom to conduct a business.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination.