Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2022/C 359/01)

Last publication

OJ C 340, 5.9.2022

Past publications

OJ C 326, 29.8.2022

OJ C 318, 22.8.2022

OJ C 311, 16.8.2022

OJ C 303, 8.8.2022

OJ C 294, 1.8.2022

OJ C 284, 25.7.2022

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

Taking of the oath by new Members of the General Court

(2022/C 359/02)

Following their appointment as Judges at the General Court of the European Union for the period from 30 June 2022 to 31 August 2022 by decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union of 29 June 2022, (1) Ms Beatrix Ricziová and Mr Tihamér Tóth took the oath before the Court of Justice on 6 July 2022.

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(1)  OJ L 173, 30.6.2022, p. 77.

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 5 May 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu — Croatia) — A.H. v Zagrebačka banka d.d

(Case C-567/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Consumer protection - Unfair terms - Directive 93/13/EEC - Applicability of ratione temporis - Article 10(1) - Loan agreement concluded prior to Member State’s accession to the EU but amended after that date - Article 6 - Reimbursement of benefits improperly obtained by the seller or supplier - National legislation providing for the replacement of unfair terms and reimbursement of the overpayment - Applicability of ratione materiae - Article 1(2) - Exclusion of contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions)

(2022/C 359/03)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A.H.

Defendant: Zagrebačka banka d.d

Operative part of the judgment

Article 1(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that contract terms reflecting provisions of national law, under which the seller or supplier was obliged to propose to the consumer an amendment to his or her original contract by means of an agreement, the content of which is determined by those provisions, and the consumer was able to consent to such an amendment do not fall within the material scope of that directive.

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(1)  OJ C 19, 18.1.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 July 2022 — European Commission v VW, European Parliament, Council of the European Union

(Joined Cases C-116/21 P to C-118/21 P, C-138/21 P and C-139/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Civil service - Pension - Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union - Article 20 of Annex VIII - Grant of a survivor’s pension - Surviving spouse of a former official in receipt of a retirement pension - Marriage entered into after termination of the official’s service - Condition that the marriage must have lasted for at least five years at the date of the official’s death - Article 18 of Annex VIII - Marriage entered into before termination of the official’s service - Condition that the marriage must have lasted for at least one year only - Plea of illegality in respect of Article 20 of Annex VIII - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Article 20 - Principle of equal treatment - Article 21(1) - Principle of non-discrimination on the ground of age - Article 52(1) - No arbitrary or manifestly inappropriate differentiation in the light of the objective pursued by the EU legislature)

(2022/C 359/04)

Language of the case: French

Parties

(Case C-116/21 P)

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: G. Gattinara, B. Mongin and B. Schima, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: VW (represented by: N. de Montigny, avocate), European Parliament (represented by: D. Boytha, J. Steele and J. Van Pottelberge, Agents), Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Alver, M. Bauer and R. Meyer, acting as Agents)

(Case C-117/21 P)

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: G. Gattinara, B. Mongin and B. Schima, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: BT (represented by: J.-N. Louis, avocat), European Parliament (represented by: D. Boytha, J. Steele and J. Van Pottelberge, acting as Agents), Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Alver and M. Bauer, acting as Agents), International Association of Former Officials of the European Union (AIACE International) (represented by: N. Maes, advocaat, and J. Van Rossum, avocat)

(Case C-118/21 P)

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: G. Gattinara, B. Mongin and B. Schima, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: RN (represented by: F. Moyse, avocat), European Parliament (represented by: D. Boytha, J. Steele and J. Van Pottelberge, acting as Agents)

(Case C-138/21 P)

Appellant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Alver and M. Bauer, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: BT (represented by: J.-N. Louis, avocat), European Commission (represented by: G. Gattinara, B. Mongin and B. Schima, acting as Agents), European Parliament (represented by: D. Boytha, J. Steele and J. Van Pottelberge, acting as Agents), International Association of Former Officials of the European Union (AIACE International), (represented by: N. Maes, advocaat, and J. Van Rossum, avocat)

(Case C-139/21 P)

Appellant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Alver and M. Bauer, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: VW (represented by: N. de Montigny, avocate), European Commission (represented by: G. Gattinara, B. Mongin and B. Schima, acting as Agents), European Parliament (represented by: D. Boytha, J. Steele and J. Van Pottelberge, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Sets aside the judgments of the General Court of the European Union of 16 December 2020, VW v Commission (T-243/18, not published, EU:T:2020:619), of 16 December 2020, BT v Commission (T-315/19, not published, EU:T:2020:622), and of 16 December 2020, RN v Commission (T-442/17 RENV, EU:T:2020:618);

2.	Dismisses VW’s action in Case T-243/18, BT’s action in Case T-315/19 and RN’s action in Case T-442/17 RENV;

3.	Orders VW to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission and the Council of the European Union in Case T-243/18 as well as in Cases C-116/21 P and C-139/21 P;

4.	Orders BT to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission and the Council of the European Union in Case T-315/19 as well as in Cases C-117/21 P and C-138/21 P;

5.	Orders RN to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission in Cases F-104/15 and T-442/17 RENV as well as in Case C-118/21 P;

6.	Orders the European Commission and RN to bear their own costs in Case T-695/16 P;

7.

Orders the European Parliament and the International Association of Former Officials of the European Union (AIACE International) to bear their own costs in all of the cases in which they respectively intervened at first instance and in the appeals, including, as regards the European Parliament, in Cases F-104/15 and T-695/16 P.

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(1)  OJ C 182, 10.5.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 July 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation — France) — Execution of a European arrest warrant against KL

(Case C-168/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA - Article 2(4) - Condition of double criminality of the act - Article 4.1 - Ground for optional non-execution of a European arrest warrant - Review by the executing judicial authority - Acts some of which constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State - Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Principle of proportionality of criminal offences and penalties)

(2022/C 359/05)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

KL

Intervening party: Procureur général près la cour d’appel d’Angers

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 2(4) and Article 4.1 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that the condition of double criminality of the act, provided for in those provisions, is met in the situation in which a European arrest warrant has been issued for the enforcement of a custodial sentence handed down for acts which are covered, in the issuing Member State, by an offence which requires that those acts impair a legal interest protected in that Member State, where such acts are also covered by a criminal offence under the law of the executing Member State and the impairment of that legal interest is not an element constituting that criminal offence.

2.

Article 2(4) and Article 4.1 of Framework Decision 2002/584, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299, read in the light of Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that the executing judicial authority may not refuse to execute a European arrest warrant issued for the enforcement of a custodial sentence where that sentence was imposed in the issuing Member State for the commission by the requested person of a single offence consisting of several acts and only some of those acts constitute a criminal offence in the executing Member State.

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(1)  OJ C 228, 14.6.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 14 July 2022 — European Commission v Republic of Poland and Others

(Case C-207/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Annulment of Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1442 - Article 16(4) and (5) TEU - Article 3(2) and (3) of Protocol (No 36) on transitional provisions - Application ratione temporis - Council’s voting rules - Qualified majority)

(2022/C 359/06)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: Ł. Habiak, K. Herrmann, R. Tricot and C. Valero, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, acting as Agent), Kingdom of Belgium, Republic of Bulgaria, French Republic, Hungary, Kingdom of Sweden (represented initially by H. Eklinder, J. Lundberg, C. Meyer-Seitz, A. Runeskjöld, M. Salborn Hodgson, R. Shahsavan Eriksson, H. Shev and O. Simonsson, and subsequently by H. Eklinder, C. Meyer-Seitz, A. Runeskjöld, M. Salborn Hodgson, R. Shahsavan Eriksson, H. Shev and O. Simonsson, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Republic of Poland.

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(1)  OJ C 206, 31.5.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 14 July 2022 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht — Austria) — EPIC Financial Consulting Ges.m.b.H. v Republic of Austria, Bundesbeschaffung GmbH

(Joined Cases C-274/21 and C-275/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Public procurement - Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 - Not applicable to procedures for granting an interlocutory injunction and review procedures as referred to in Article 2 of Directive 89/665/EEC in the absence of an international element - Directive 2014/24/EU - Article 33 - Treatment of a framework agreement as a contract, for the purposes of Article 2a(2) of Directive 89/665 - Not possible to award a new public contract where the quantity and/or maximum value of the works, supplies or services concerned laid down by the framework agreement has or have already been reached - National legislation providing for the payment of fees for access to administrative proceedings in the field of public procurement - Obligations to determine and pay the fees for access to proceedings before the court rules on an application for an interlocutory injunction or an action for review - Non-transparent procedure for the award of a public contract - Principles of effectiveness and equivalence - Effectiveness - Right to an effective remedy - Directive 89/665 - Articles 1, 2 and 2a - Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - National legislation providing for the dismissal of an action for review where the fees for access to proceedings have not been paid - Determination of the estimated value of a public contract)

(2022/C 359/07)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesverwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: EPIC Financial Consulting Ges.m.b.H.

Defendants: Republic of Austria, Bundesbeschaffung GmbH

Operative part of the judgment

1.

Article 1(1) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, as amended by Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, must be interpreted as meaning that the conclusion of a framework agreement with a single economic operator, in accordance with Article 33(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, corresponds to the conclusion of a contract as referred to in Article 2a(2) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23.

2.

Article 33(3) of Directive 2014/24 must be interpreted as meaning that a contracting authority may no longer rely, for the purpose of awarding a new contract, on a framework agreement in respect of which the quantity and/or maximum value of the works, supplies or services concerned laid down therein has or have already been reached, unless the award of that contract does not entail a substantial modification of that framework agreement, as provided for in Article 72(1)(e) of that directive.

3.

The principle of equivalence must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which lays down, in respect of applications for an interlocutory injunction and actions for review relating to a procedure for the award of a public contract, procedural rules that are different from those which apply, inter alia, to civil proceedings.

4.

Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation requiring a litigant to identify, in his or her application for an interlocutory injunction or action for review, the procedure for the award of a public contract concerned and the separately contestable decision that he or she is challenging, where the contracting authority has opted for a procedure for the award of a public contract without prior publication of a contract notice and the contract award notice has not been published yet.

5.

Article 2(1) of Directive 89/665, as amended by Directive 2014/23, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as: — precluding national legislation which requires a court with which an application for an interlocutory injunction is lodged seeking to prevent purchases on the part of the contracting authority, to determine, before ruling on that application, the type of contract award procedure concerned, the (estimated) value of the contract at issue and the total number of separately contestable decisions and, where appropriate, the lots from the contract award procedure concerned, for the sole purpose of calculating the amount of the flat-rate court fees which the person making that application must pay, failing which that application would be dismissed on that ground alone, where the contracting authority has opted for a procedure for the award of a public contract without prior publication of a contract notice and, at the time the action for annulment against a decision linked to that procedure is brought, the contract award notice has not been published yet; — not precluding national legislation which requires a court before which an action for the annulment of a separately contestable decision taken by the contracting authority is brought to determine, before ruling on that action, the type of contract award procedure concerned, the (estimated) value of the contract at issue and the total number of separately contestable decisions and, where appropriate, the lots from the contract award procedure concerned, for the sole purpose of calculating the amount of the flat-rate court fees which the applicant must pay, failing which his or her action would be dismissed on that ground alone.

6.

Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which requires a litigant lodging an application for an interlocutory injunction or an action for review to pay flat-rate court fees of an amount impossible to foresee, where the contracting authority has opted for a procedure for the award of a public contract without prior publication of a contract notice or, as the case may be, without subsequent publication of a contract award notice, with the result that it can be impossible for the litigant to ascertain the estimated value of the contract and the number of separately contestable decisions adopted by the contracting authority on the basis of which those fees were calculated.

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(1)  OJ C 320, 9.8.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 1 August 2022 — Aquind Ltd, Aquind Energy Sàrl, Aquind SAS v European Commission, Kingdom of Spain, Federal Republic of Germany, French Republic

(Case C-310/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Energy - Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 - Trans-European energy infrastructure - Projects of common interest of the European Union - Article 3(4) and Article 16 - Delegation of power to the European Commission - Article 290 TFEU - Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/389 - Amendment of the list of projects of common interest of the Union - Act adopted by the Commission - Right of objection of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union - Time limit - Nature of the act before the expiry of that period)

(2022/C 359/08)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Aquind Ltd, Aquind Energy Sàrl, Aquind SAS (represented by: C. Davis and S. Goldberg, Solicitors, and by E. White, avocat)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: O. Beynet and B. De-Meester, acting as Agents), Kingdom of Spain (represented by: M.J. Ruiz Sánchez, acting as Agent), Federal Republic of Germany, French Republic

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders Aquind Ltd, Aquind Energy Sàrl and Aquind SAS to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

3.	Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 320, 9.8.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 14 July 2022 — SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria Srl v European Commission

(Case C-371/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Arbitration clause - Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013) - Grant agreement - The MARSOL Project - Eligible costs - European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigation report finding certain expenses incurred to be ineligible - Repayment of sums paid - Right to access OLAF’s file - Right to be heard - Burden of proof - Distortion of the facts - Probative value - Principle of proportionality - Unjust enrichment)

(2022/C 359/09)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria Srl (represented by: V. Catenacci, F.S. Marini and R. Viglietta, avvocati)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: J. Estrada de Solà and S. Romoli, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria Srl to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 310, 2.8.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 14 July 2022 — Romania v European Commission

(Case C-401/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Cohesion Fund and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) - Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 - Co-financing rate applicable - Amendment of the rate between the submission of the final application for an interim payment and the acceptance of the accounts - Principle that accounts relate to a specific year and principle of non-retroactivity)

(2022/C 359/10)

Language of the case: Romanian

Parties

Appellant: Romania (represented by: L.-E. Baţagoi and E. Gane, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: A. Armenia and S. Pardo Quintillán, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders Romania to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission.

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(1)  OJ C 329, 16.8.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 1 August 2022 — Petrus Kerstens v European Commission

(Case C-447/21 P) (1)

(Appeal - Civil Service - Disciplinary proceedings - Requests for assistance - Rejection - Notification of decisions by electronic means - Action for annulment - Period allowed for commencing proceedings - Point from which time starts to run - Action brought out of time)

(2022/C 359/11)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Petrus Kerstens (represented by: C. Mourato, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: T. S. Bohr, acting as Agent)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders Mr Petrus Kerstens to bear his own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission.

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(1)  OJ C 431, 25.10.2021.

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 14 July 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta domstolen — Sweden) — CC v VO

(Case C-572/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility - Parental responsibility - Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 - Article 8(1) and Article 61(a) - General jurisdiction - Perpetuatio fori principle - Transfer, during the proceedings, of the habitual residence of a child from a Member State of the European Union to a third State that is party to the 1996 Hague Convention)

(2022/C 359/12)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Högsta domstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CC

Defendant: VO

Operative part of the judgment

Article 8(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, read in conjunction with Article 61(a) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that a court of a Member State that is hearing a dispute relating to parental responsibility does not retain jurisdiction to rule on that dispute under Article 8(1) of that regulation where the habitual residence of the child in question has been lawfully transferred, during the proceedings, to the territory of a third State that is a party to the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, signed at The Hague on 19 October 1996.

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(1)  OJ C 481, 29.11.2021.

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 1 August 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal da Relação de Évora — Portugal) — Criminal proceedings against TL

(Case C-242/22 PPU) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Urgent preliminary ruling procedure - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - Directive 2010/64/EU - Right to interpretation and translation - Article 2(1) and Article 3(1) - Concept of an ‘essential document’ - Directive 2012/13/EU - Right to information in criminal proceedings - Article 3(1)(d) - Scope - Not implemented in domestic law - Direct effect - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Article 47 and Article 48(2) - European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Article 6 - Suspended prison sentence with probation - Breach of the probation conditions - Failure to translate an essential document and absence of an interpreter when that document was being drawn up - Revocation of the suspension of the prison sentence - Failure to translate the procedural acts relating to that revocation - Consequences for the validity of that revocation - Procedural defect resulting in relative nullity)

(2022/C 359/13)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal da Relação de Évora

Party in the main proceedings

TL

Intervening parties: Ministério Público

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(1) and Article 3(1) of Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings and Article 3(1)(d) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, read in the light of Article 47 and Article 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the infringement of the rights provided for by those provisions of those directives must be invoked by the beneficiary of those rights within a prescribed period, failing which that challenge will be time-barred, where that period begins to run before the person concerned has been informed, in a language which he or she speaks or understands, first, of the existence and scope of his or her right to interpretation and translation and, secondly, of the existence and content of the essential document in question and the effects thereof.

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(1)  OJ C 257, 4.7.2022.

Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 24 March 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Judiciaire — Bobigny — France) — BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA v ZD

(Case C-288/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Consumer protection - Directive 93/13/EEC - Unfair terms in consumer contracts - Loan agreement denominated in a foreign currency (Swiss francs) - Terms exposing the borrower to a foreign exchange risk - Article 4(2) - Requirements of intelligibility and transparency - Burden of proof - Article 3(1) - Significant imbalance - Article 5 - Contractual term that is in plain, intelligible language)

(2022/C 359/14)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal Judiciaire — Bobigny

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA

Defendant: ZD

Operative part of the order

1.

Article 4(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of the ‘main subject matter of the contract’, within the meaning of that provision, covers terms of the loan agreement which provide that the foreign currency is the account currency and the euro the settlement currency and which have the effect that the foreign exchange risk is borne by the borrower, where those terms lay down an essential element characterising the agreement.

2.

Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the context of a loan agreement denominated in a foreign currency, the requirement of transparency of the terms of that agreement, which provide that the foreign currency is the account currency and the euro the settlement currency and which have the effect that the foreign exchange risk is borne by the borrower, is satisfied where the seller or supplier has provided the consumer with sufficient and accurate information to enable the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, to understand the specific functioning of the financial mechanism in question and thus to evaluate the risk of potentially significant adverse economic consequences of such terms on his or her financial obligations throughout the term of the agreement.

3.	Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding the burden of proving that a contractual term is plain and intelligible, for the purposes of Article 4(2) of that directive, from being borne by the consumer.

4.

Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that terms of a loan agreement which provide that the foreign currency is the account currency and the euro the settlement currency and which have the effect of placing the foreign exchange risk on the borrower, without providing for an upper limit to that risk, are liable to cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under that agreement, to the detriment of the consumer, where the seller or supplier could not reasonably expect, in compliance with the requirement of transparency in relation to the consumer, that the consumer would have agreed to a disproportionate foreign exchange risk resulting from those terms.

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(1)  OJ C 297, 7.9.2020.

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 23 March 2022 — (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rayonen sad Lukovit — Bulgaria) — Criminal proceedings against AZ

(Case C-454/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Transport - Directive 1999/37/EC - Registration documents for vehicles - Directive 2014/45/EU - Periodic roadworthiness tests for motor vehicles - Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties - Driving a motor vehicle which is not duly registered - Penalties - No implementation of EU law - Clear lack of jurisdiction of the Court)

(2022/C 359/15)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Rayonen sad Lukovit

Criminal proceedings against

AZ

Operative part of the order

The Court of Justice of the European Union clearly has no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred by the Rayonen sad Lukovit (District Court, Lukovit, Bulgaria) by decision of 23 September 2020.

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(1)  OJ C 433, 14.12.2020.

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Oberösterreich — Austria) — J.P. v B.d.S.L.

(Case C-521/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 53(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - Directive 1999/62/EC - Charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures - Tolls - Non-payment - Penalties - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Article 50 - Ne bis in idem principle - Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure - Lack of sufficient information - No link between the interpretation of EU law sought and the actual facts of the main action or its purpose - Manifest inadmissibility)

(2022/C 359/16)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesverwaltungsgericht Oberösterreich

Parties to the main proceedings

Complainant: J.P.

Defendant authority: B.d.S.L.

Operative part of the order

The request for a preliminary ruling made by the Landesverwaltungsgericht Oberösterreich (Regional Administrative Court, Upper Austria, Austria), by decision of 15 October 2020, is manifestly inadmissible.

---

(1)  OJ C 35, 1.2.2021.

Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Efeteio Athinon — Greece) — VP, CX, RG, TR and Others v Elliniko Dimosio

(Case C-133/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social Policy - Directive 1999/70/EC - Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP - Clause 4 - Principle of non-discrimination - Successive fixed-term contracts in the public sector - National legislation establishing a difference in treatment as regards remuneration between workers employed under fixed-term contracts for the supply of services and those employed under contracts of indefinite duration - No justification - Concept of ‘objective reasons’)

(2022/C 359/17)

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Efeteio Athinon

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: VP, CX, RG, TR and Others

Respondent: Elliniko Dimosio

Operative part of the order

Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a fixed-term worker, whose contracts is classified as a contract for the supply of services, is not entitled to receive remuneration equivalent to that paid to a permanent worker on the ground that that worker carried out his or her work under a fixed-term contract in the knowledge that that contract sought to meet permanent and long-lasting needs of his or her employer.

---

(1)  OJ C 206, 31.5.2021.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 27 January 2022 — MP v Consejería de Presidencia

(Case C-59/22)

(2022/C 359/18)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: MP

Defendant: Consejería de Presidencia

Questions referred

A)

For the purposes of clause 2 of the agreement annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC (1) of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must a worker with a ‘non-permanent contract of indefinite duration’, as described in this order, be regarded as a ‘worker with a fixed-term contract’ and is such a worker included in the scope of the framework agreement and, in particular, clause 5 thereof?

B)

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, for the purposes of the application of clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC, must it be considered that there has been ‘successive use’ of temporary contracts or successive renewals in the case of a worker having a non-permanent contract of indefinite duration with an administrative authority, where that contract does not set a term and the duration of the contract is instead subject to the publication of a vacancy notice and the filling of the post, which would lead to termination of the contract, where that vacancy notice was not published between the start date of the employment relationship and the first half of 2021?

C)

Is clause 5 of [the agreement annexed to] Council Directive 1999/70/EC … to be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of Article 15(5) of the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers Statute) (the aim of which is to comply with the directive and which therefore provides for a maximum duration of 24 months for all of a worker’s successive temporary contracts combined during a reference period of 30 months) in accordance with which periods worked as a non-permanent worker with a contract of indefinite duration are not counted, in view of the fact that, in that case, for the purposes of such a contract, there is no limitation applicable to its duration, number, reasons for renewal or the use of further, successive contracts?

D)

Does clause 5 of the agreement annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC … preclude national legislation which does not establish any limitation (in terms of either number, duration or reasons) on express or tacit renewals of a particular temporary contract, like the non-permanent contract of indefinite duration in the public sector, and merely sets a limit for successive terms of that contract through the use of further temporary contracts?

E)

Since no provision limiting express or tacit renewals of the contracts of non-permanent workers engaged on an indefinite basis has been enacted by the Spanish legislature, is the situation of a public sector worker, like the worker in these proceedings, who has a non-permanent contract of indefinite duration the envisaged duration of which has never been expressed or specified and which has been extended until 2021 without any selection process having been launched to fill her post and bring the situation of temporary employment to an end, to be regarded as an infringement of clause 5 of the agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC?

F)

Can the national legislation be considered to include measures that are a sufficient deterrent in respect of the use of successive contracts or renewals of temporary contracts contrary to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, which fulfil the conditions established by the case-law of the CJEU in its judgments of 7 March 2018 in Case C-494/16, (2) Santoro, and of 8 May 2019 in Case C-494/17, (3) Rossato, in relation to compensation for the harm suffered by a worker by means of restitutio in integrum, when it provides solely for limited and objective compensation (20 days’ salary for each year worked, up to a limit of one year’s pay) but no provision exists for additional compensation to compensate in full for the harm caused if it exceeds that amount?

G)

Can the national legislation be considered to include measures that are a sufficient deterrent in respect of the use of successive contracts or renewals of temporary contracts contrary to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, which fulfil the conditions established by the case-law of the CJEU in its judgments of 7 March 2018 in Case C-494/16, Santoro, and of 8 May 2019 in Case C-494/17, Rossato, in relation to compensation for the harm suffered by a worker, when it provides only for compensation that becomes due at the time when the contract is terminated because the post has been filled but which does not provide for any compensation while the contract is in force as an alternative to a declaration that the contract is of indefinite duration? In a dispute in which the only issue is whether the worker has permanent status, but the contract has not been terminated, is it necessary to award compensation for harm suffered as a result of the temporary nature of the contract as an alternative to a declaration of permanent status?

H)

Can the national legislation be considered to include measures that are a sufficient deterrent against public administrative authorities and public sector bodies in respect of the use of successive contracts or renewals of temporary contracts contrary to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, which are aimed at ‘preventing and penalising the misuse of contracts of indefinite duration’ by an employer in relation to other and future workers, which fulfil the conditions established by the case-law of the CJEU in its judgments of 7 March 2018 in Case C-494/16, Santoro, and of 8 May 2019 in Case C-494/17, Rossato, where those measures consist of legal provisions introduced with effect from 2017 (34th additional provision of Law 3/2017 on General State Budgets for 2017 (Ley 3/2017 de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para el año 2017) of 27 June 2017; 43rd additional provision of Law 6/2018 on General State Budgets for 2018 (Ley 6/2018 de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para el año 2018) of 3 July 2018; and Royal Decree-Law 14/2021 (Real Decreto-ley 14/2021) of 6 July 2021) which state that liability will be established for ‘unlawful actions’ without specifying that liability other than by a general reference to legislation which does not specify [it] and without any specific instance of the establishment of liability existing in the context of thousands of judgments which have ruled that workers have non-permanent contracts of indefinite duration on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions on temporary contracts?

I)

If those measures are considered to be a sufficient deterrent, given that they were introduced for the first time in 2017, can those measures be applied to prevent the conversion of contracts into contracts of indefinite duration where the conditions for such a conversion on the grounds of infringement of clause 5 of the Framework Agreement occurred at an earlier point in time or, on the other hand, would that constitute a retroactive and expropriatory application of those measures?

J)

If the view is taken that no measures exist that are a sufficient deterrent in Spanish law, must the consequence of the infringement of clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC by a public employer be that the contract is treated as a non-permanent contract of indefinite duration or must the worker be recognised as having fully permanent status?

K)

Is the conversion of the contract into a permanent contract under the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC and the case-law of the CJEU interpreting that directive required even if it is considered to be contrary to Articles 23(2) and 103(3) of the Spanish Constitution, where those constitutional provisions are interpreted as meaning that access to all public sector employment, including where engagement is under an employment contract, may occur only after a candidate has passed a competitive selection procedure in which the principles of equality, merit, ability and publicity are applied?

L)

Must the conversion of the specific worker’s contract into a permanent contract be set aside where, by means of a Law, notice is published of a procedure for the consolidation of temporary employment, with the publication of a vacancy notice for the post occupied by the worker, bearing in mind that that procedure must guarantee ‘compliance with the principles of free competition, equality, merit, ability and publicity’ and that therefore the worker in respect of whom successive contracts or temporary renewals have been used may not consolidate his or her post because it is awarded to another person, in which case that worker’s contract will be terminated with compensation calculated at the rate of 20 days’ salary for each year worked, up to a limit of one year’s pay?

M)	Even if he or she is not dismissed, is the worker entitled to compensation equal to or greater than that amount, to be determined by the courts if it is not quantified in law, for the use of successive contracts or the renewal of his or her contract contrary to clause 5?

N)	Is all of the foregoing affected in any way, and if so how, by the fact that the employment relationship at issue is a seasonal relationship of indefinite duration, where that relationship has been reflected in cascading temporary contracts, season after season, as stated in the worker’s appeal?’

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(1)  OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43.

(2)  EU:C:2018:166.

(3)  EU:C:2019:387.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 17 February 2022 — IP v Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED)

(Case C-110/22)

(2022/C 359/19)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: IP

Defendant: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED)

Questions referred

1.

For the purposes of clause 2 of the agreement annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC (1) of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must a worker employed under a ‘non-permanent contract of indefinite duration’, as described in this order, be regarded as a ‘worker with a fixed-term contract’ and is such a worker included in the scope of the framework agreement and, in particular, clause 5 thereof?

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, for the purposes of the application of clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC, must it be considered that there has been ‘successive use’ of temporary contracts or successive renewals in the case of a worker employed by an administrative authority under a non-permanent contract of indefinite duration, where that contract does not provide for a specific term and the duration of the contract is instead subject to the future publication of a vacancy notice and the filling of the post, where that vacancy notice was not published between 2002 and the first half of 2021?

3.

Is clause 5 of [the agreement annexed to] Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP to be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of Article 15(5) of the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers Statute) (the aim of which is to comply with the directive and which therefore provides for a maximum duration of 24 months for all of a worker’s successive temporary contracts combined during a reference period of 30 months) pursuant to which periods worked as a non-permanent worker with a contract of indefinite duration are not counted, in view of the fact that, in that case, for the purposes of such a contract, there is no limitation applicable to its duration, number, reasons for renewal or the use of further, successive contracts?

4.

Does clause 5 of the agreement annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP preclude national legislation which does not establish any limitation (in terms of either number, duration or reasons) on express or tacit renewals of specific types of temporary contract, such as non-permanent contracts of indefinite duration in the public sector, and merely sets a limit for successive terms of that contract through the use of further temporary contracts?

5.

Since no provision limiting express or tacit renewals of the contracts of non-permanent workers engaged on an indefinite basis has been enacted by the Spanish legislature, is the situation of a public sector worker, like the worker in these proceedings, who is employed under a non-permanent contract of indefinite duration the envisaged duration of which has never been expressed or specified and which has lasted from at least 2002 (reinstatement following dismissal) until 2021 without any selection process having been launched to fill his post and bring the situation of temporary employment to an end, to be regarded as an infringement of clause 5 of the agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC?

6.

Can the national legislation be considered to include measures that are a sufficient deterrent in respect of the use of successive contracts or renewals of temporary contracts contrary to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, which fulfil the conditions established by the case-law of the CJEU in its judgments of 7 March 2018 in Case C-494/16, (2) Santoro, and of 8 May 2019 in Case C-494/17, (3) Rossato, in relation to compensation for the harm suffered by a worker by means of restitutio in integrum, when it provides solely for limited and objective compensation (20 days’ salary for each year worked, up to a limit of one year’s pay) but no provision exists for additional damages to compensate in full for the harm caused if it exceeds that amount?

7.

Can the national legislation be considered to include measures that are a sufficient deterrent in respect of the use of successive contracts or renewals of temporary contracts contrary to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, which fulfil the conditions established by the case-law of the CJEU in its judgments of 7 March 2018 in Case C-494/16, Santoro, and of 8 May 2019 in Case C-494/17, Rossato, in relation to compensation for the harm suffered by a worker, when it provides only for compensation that becomes due at the time when the contract is terminated because the post has been filled but which does not provide for any compensation while the contract is in force as an alternative to a declaration that the contract is of indefinite duration? In a dispute in which the only issue is whether the worker has permanent status, but the contract has not been terminated, is it necessary to award compensation for harm suffered as a result of the temporary nature of the contract as an alternative to a declaration of permanent status?

8.

Can the national legislation be considered to include measures that are a sufficient deterrent against public administrative authorities and public sector bodies in respect of the use of successive contracts or renewals of temporary contracts contrary to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, which are aimed at ‘preventing and penalising the misuse of contracts of indefinite duration’ by an employer in relation to other and future workers, which fulfil the conditions established by the case-law of the CJEU in its judgments of 7 March 2018 in Case C-494/16, Santoro, and of 8 May 2019 in Case C-494/17, Rossato, where those measures consist of legal provisions introduced with effect from 2017 (34th additional provision of Law 3/2017 on General State Budgets for 2017 (Ley 3/2017 de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para el año 2017) of 27 June 2017; 43rd additional provision of Law 6/2018 on General State Budgets for 2018 (Ley 6/2018 de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para el año 2018) of 3 July 2018; and Royal Decree-Law 14/2021 (Real Decreto-ley 14/2021) of 6 July 2021) which state that liability will be established for ‘unlawful actions’ without specifying that liability other than by a general reference to legislation which does not specify [it] and without any specific instance of the establishment of liability existing in the context of thousands of judgments which have ruled that, in the event of non-compliance with the provisions on temporary contracts, workers are deemed to be employed under non-permanent contracts of indefinite duration?

9.

If those measures are considered to be a sufficient deterrent, given that they were introduced for the first time in 2017, can those measures be applied to prevent the conversion of contracts into contracts of indefinite duration where the conditions for such a conversion on the grounds of infringement of clause 5 of the Framework Agreement occurred at an earlier point in time or, on the other hand, would that constitute a retroactive and expropriatory application of those measures?

10.

If the view is taken that no measures exist that are a sufficient deterrent in Spanish law, must the consequence of the infringement of clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC by a public employer be that the contract is treated as a non-permanent contract of indefinite duration or must the worker be recognised as having fully permanent status, without making any distinction?

11.

Is the conversion of the contract into a permanent contract under the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC and the case-law of the CJEU interpreting that directive required, in accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law, even if it is considered to be contrary to Articles 23(2) and 103(3) of the Spanish Constitution, where those constitutional provisions are interpreted as meaning that access to all public sector employment, including where engagement is under an employment contract, may occur only after a candidate has passed a competitive selection procedure in which the principles of equality, merit, ability and publicity are applied? Given that another interpretation — that used by the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court, Spain) — is possible, is it necessary to apply the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law to the constitutional provisions of the Member State, so that it is obligatory to choose the interpretation which renders those provisions compatible with EU law, in this case by construing Articles 23(2) and 103(3) of the Constitution as not requiring the application of the principles of equality, merit and ability to procedures for the recruitment of contractual staff?

12.

Is it possible that conversion of the contract into a permanent contract under the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC and the case-law of the CJEU interpreting that directive may not apply if, before that conversion is ordered by a court, provision is made for a statutory procedure for the consolidation of temporary employment, which is required to be conducted in the near future and which involves the publication of vacancy notices to fill the post occupied by the worker, bearing in mind that that procedure must guarantee ‘compliance with the principles of free competition, equality, merit, ability and publicity’ and that therefore the worker in respect of whom a succession of temporary contracts or renewals has been used may be able to consolidate his post, but may also not be able to do so because that post is awarded to another person, in which case that worker’s contract will be terminated with compensation calculated at the rate of 20 days’ salary for each year worked, up to a limit of one year’s pay?’

---

(1)  OJ 1999 L 175, p. 45.

(2)  EU:C:2018:166.

(3)  EU:C:2019:387.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 3 March 2022 — IK v Agencia Madrileña de Atención Social de la Comunidad de Madrid

(Case C-159/22)

(2022/C 359/20)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: IK

Respondent: Agencia Madrileña de Atención Social de la Comunidad de Madrid

Questions referred

A)

Can the national legislation be considered to include measures that are a sufficient deterrent in respect of the use of successive contracts or renewals of temporary contracts contrary to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, which fulfil the conditions established by the case-law of the CJEU in its judgments of 7 March 2018 in Case C-494/16, Santoro, (1) and of 8 May 2019 in Case C-494/17, Rossato, (2) in relation to compensation for the harm suffered by a worker by means of restitutio in integrum, when it provides solely for limited and objective compensation (20 days’ salary for each year worked, up to a limit of one year’s pay) but no provision exists for additional compensation to make full reparation for the harm caused if it exceeds that amount?

B)

Can the national legislation be considered to include measures that are a sufficient deterrent in respect of the use of successive contracts or renewals of temporary contracts contrary to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, which fulfil the conditions established by the case-law of the CJEU in its judgments of 7 March 2018 in Case C-494/16, Santoro, and of 8 May 2019 in Case C-494/17, Rossato, in relation to compensation for the harm suffered by a worker, when it provides only for compensation that becomes due at the time when the contract is terminated because the post has been filled, but which does not provide for any compensation while the contract is in force as an alternative to a declaration that the contract is of indefinite duration? In a dispute in which the only issue is whether the worker has permanent status, but the contract has not been terminated, is it necessary to award compensation for harm suffered as a result of the temporary nature of the contract as an alternative to a declaration of permanent status?

C)

Can the national legislation be considered to include measures that are a sufficient deterrent against public administrative authorities and public sector bodies in respect of the use of successive contracts or renewals of temporary contracts contrary to clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, which are aimed at ‘preventing and penalising the misuse of contracts of indefinite duration’ by an employer in relation to other and future workers, which fulfil the conditions established by the case-law of the CJEU in its judgments of 7 March 2018 in Case C-494/16, Santoro, and of 8 May 2019 in Case C-494/17, Rossato, where those measures consist of legal provisions introduced with effect from 2017 (34th additional provision of Ley 3/2017 de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para el año 2017 (Law 3/2017 on General State Budgets for 2017) () of 27 June 2017; 43rd additional provision of Ley 6/2018 de Presupuestos Generales del Estado para el año 2018 (Law 6/2018 on General State Budgets for 2018) of 3 July 2018; and Real Decreto-ley 14/2021 (Royal Decree-Law 14/2021) of 6 July 2021) which state that liability will be established for ‘unlawful actions’ without specifying that liability other than by a general reference to legislation which does not specify [it] and without any specific instance of the establishment of liability existing in the context of thousands of judgments which have ruled that workers have non-permanent contracts of indefinite duration on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions on temporary contracts?

D)

If the view is taken that no measures exist that are a sufficient deterrent in Spanish law, must the consequence of the infringement of clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC (3) by a public employer be that the contract is treated as a non-permanent contract of indefinite duration or must the worker be recognised as having fully permanent status, without making any distinction?

E)

Is the conversion of the contract into a permanent contract under the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC and the case-law of the CJEU interpreting that directive required, pursuant to the principle of the primacy of EU law, even if it is considered to be contrary to Articles 23(2) and 103(3) of the Spanish Constitution, where those constitutional provisions are interpreted as meaning that access to all public sector employment, including where engagement is under an employment contract, may occur only after a candidate has passed a competitive selection procedure in which the principles of equality, merit, ability and publicity are applied? Given that another interpretation — that used by the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court, Spain) — is possible, must the principle of conforming interpretation be applied to the constitutional provisions of the Member State, so that it is obligatory to choose the interpretation which renders those provisions compatible with EU law, in this case by construing Articles 23(2) and 103(3) of the Constitution as not requiring the application of the principles of equality, merit and ability to procedures for the recruitment of contractual staff?

F)

Is it possible that conversion of the contract into a permanent contract under the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC and the case-law of the CJEU interpreting that directive may not apply if, before that conversion is ordered by a court, provision is made for a statutory procedure for the consolidation or stabilisation of temporary employment, which is required to be conducted in the near future and which involves the publication of vacancy notices to fill the post occupied by the worker, bearing in mind that that procedure must guarantee ‘compliance with the principles of free competition, equality, merit, ability and publicity’ and that therefore the worker in respect of whom a succession of temporary contracts or renewals has been used may be able to consolidate his post, but may also not be able to do so because that post is awarded to another person, in which case that worker’s contract will be terminated with compensation calculated at the rate of 20 days’ salary for each year worked, up to a limit of one year’s pay?

---

(1)  EU:C:2018:166.

(2)  EU:C:2019:387.

(3)  OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 11 May 2022 — Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe) v College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden, in the presence of: Dow AgroScience BV (Dow)

(Case C-308/22)

(2022/C 359/21)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe)

Defendant: College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden

In the presence of: Dow AgroScience BV (Dow)

Questions referred

1.

Does the Member State concerned, which decides on the authorisation of a plant protection product under Article 36(2) of Regulation 1107/2009, (1) have any discretion to depart from the assessment of the zonal rapporteur Member State that examined the application under Article 36(1) of Regulation 1107/2009 and, if so, what is the margin of that discretion?

2.

If the answer to the first question is that the Member State concerned has no or limited discretion, how is the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter given effect? Is it then possible for the correctness of the zonal rapporteur Member State’s assessment to be fully challenged before the national court of the Member State concerned?

3.

If the Member State concerned, or the court of that Member State, concludes that the zonal rapporteur Member State’s assessment is based on insufficient grounds, to what extent is the Member State concerned required to involve the zonal rapporteur Member State in preparing an adequately reasoned assessment?

4.	Can the zonal rapporteur Member State confine itself to an assessment based exclusively on adopted guidance documents, even if the scientific and technical knowledge contained therein is no longer fully up to date?

5.

If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, can the Member State carrying out the zonal assessment additionally rely on scientific and technical knowledge contained in guidance documents which have already been drawn up but not yet adopted, or must the Member State carrying out the zonal assessment take account of all scientific and technical knowledge available even outside of the guidance documents?

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(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 11 May 2022 — Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe) v College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden, in the presence of: Adama Registrations B.V. (Adama)

(Case C-309/22)

(2022/C 359/22)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe)

Defendant: College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden

In the presence of: Adama Registrations B.V. (Adama)

Questions referred

1.

Does Article 2 of Regulation 2018/605 (1) imply that the competent authority must also apply the new criteria for the determination of endocrine disrupting properties in the assessment and decision-making process relating to applications for authorisation which were still pending on 10 November 2018, also in view of Article 29(1)(e) in conjunction with Article 4(3) of Regulation 1107/2009? (2)

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the negative, is it incumbent on the competent authority to stay the assessment and decision-making process relating to applications for authorisation pending the findings of the European Commission on the effects of Regulation 2018/605 on any proceedings pending under Regulation 1107/2009, having regard to recital 8 of the preamble to Regulation 2018/605?

3.

If the answer to that second question is in the negative, is it sufficient for the competent authority to make an assessment solely on the basis of data known at the time of the application, even if the scientific and technical knowledge reflected therein is no longer current at the time when the contested decision is taken?

---

(1)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/605 of 19 April 2018 amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 by setting out scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine disrupting properties (OJ 2018 L 101, p. 33).

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 11 May 2022 — Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe) v College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden in the presence of: BASF Nederland BV (BASF)

(Case C-310/22)

(2022/C 359/23)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe)

Defendant: College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden

In the presence of: BASF Nederland BV (BASF)

Questions referred

1.

Does it follow from the second paragraph of Article 4(1) of Regulation 1107/2009, (1) in conjunction with paragraph 3.6.5 of Annex II thereto, that the potential endocrine disrupting properties of an active substance need no longer be assessed during the assessment at national level of an application for authorisation of a plant protection product?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does it mean that the scientific insights and technical knowledge relating to endocrine disrupting properties, which, for example, underpin Regulations 283/2013 (2) and 2018/605, (3) need not be taken into account when assessing the authorisation of a plant protection product? How does that relate to the requirement of Article 29(1)(e) of Regulation 1107/2009 that such an assessment must be conducted on the basis of current scientific and technical knowledge?

3.	If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, how can a non-governmental organisation such as the appellant be said to have an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter to refer the approval of an active substance to a court of law?

4.	If the answer to the first question is in the negative, does it mean that, when assessing an application for authorisation, the state of scientific and technical knowledge about that endocrine disrupting property at that time is decisive?

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1).

(2)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 283/2013 of 1 March 2013 setting out the data requirements for active substances, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ 2013 L 93, p. 1).

(3)  Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/605 of 19 April 2018 amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 by setting out scientific criteria for the determination of endocrine disrupting properties (OJ 2018 L 101, p. 33).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 12 May 2022 — E. v Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej we Wrocławiu

(Case C-322/22)

(2022/C 359/24)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: E.

Respondent: Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej we Wrocławiu

Question referred

Do the principles of effectiveness, sincere cooperation and equivalence expressed in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union …, or any other relevant principle laid down in EU law, preclude a provision of national law such as Article 78 § 5(1) and (2) of the ustawa z 29 sierpnia 1997 r. Ordynacja podatkowa (Law of 29 August 1997 establishing the Tax Code) (consolidated text: Dz. U. of 2012, item 749, as amended), which provides that interest on overpaid tax which is collected by a paying agent in a manner not consistent with EU law is not due to the taxable person for the period after the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication in the Official Journal of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union declaring that the collection of the tax is incompatible with EU law, where the request for a declaration of that overpayment was submitted by the taxable person after that time limit and the provisions of national law relating to the collection of the tax continue to be incompatible with EU law despite the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 10 April 2014, [E. … (C-190/12, EU:C:2014:249)]?

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo No 17 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 17 May 2022 — KT v Departamento de Justicia de la Generalitat de Catalunya

(Case C-331/22)

(2022/C 359/25)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo No 17 de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: KT

Defendant: Departamento de Justicia de la Generalitat de Catalunya

Questions referred

1.

Law 20/2021 lays down as the sole punitive measure the holding of selection procedures and the payment of compensation only to victims of abuse who are not successful in those selection procedures. Does that Law infringe clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC (1) by failing to penalise abuse occurring in relation to temporary public employees who have been successful in such selection procedures, when a penalty is always essential and success in such a selection procedure is not a punitive measure which satisfies the requirements laid down in the Directive, as the CJEU held in its order of 2 June 2021 in Case C-103/19? (2)

2.

If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, and Law 20/2021 does not lay down other effective measures penalising the misuse of a succession of fixed-term contracts or the improper extension of a temporary contract, does the legislative omission consisting of the failure to provide for the conversion of a succession of fixed-term employment contracts or the improper extension of a temporary contract into a contract of indefinite duration infringe clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC, as the CJEU ruled in its order of 30 September 2020 in Case C-153/20? (3)

3.

The Tribunal Supremo [Supreme Court, Spain] laid down in its judgments Nos 1425/2018 and 1426/2018 of 26 September 2018 the case-law, confirmed by its judgment No 1534/2021 of 20 December 2021, according to which the measure to be adopted in the event of misuse of temporary appointments may simply consist of keeping a public employee who is the victim of such misuse in a situation of job insecurity until such time as the employer administrative authority determines whether a structural need exists and holds the appropriate selection procedures — in which candidates who have not suffered such misuse of temporary appointments may also participate — to fill the posts concerned with permanent or career public employees. Does that case-law infringe clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC when the holding of an open selection procedure and successful participation in that selection procedure is not a punitive measure which satisfies the requirements laid down in the Directive, as the CJEU held in its order of 2 June 2021 in Case C-103/19?

4.

If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative and the case-law of the Tribunal Supremo [Supreme Court] does not lay down other effective measures for penalising the misuse of successive fixed-term contracts or the improper extension of a temporary contract, does the judicial omission consisting of the failure to provide for the conversion of a succession of fixed-term employment contracts or the improper extension of a temporary contract into a contract of indefinite duration infringe clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC, as the CJEU ruled in its order of 3 September 2020 in Case C-153/20?

5.

If the legislation adopted to transpose clause 5 of the Framework Agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC infringes Community law by failing to lay down any specific punitive measure which would ensure compliance with the objectives of that Community provision and bring to an end the job insecurity of public employees In the light of that situation, must the national judicial authorities proceed to order the conversion of an abusive temporary relationship into a permanent relationship which differs from that of a career civil servant but which gives the victim of the abuse job security to prevent that abuse from going unpunished and the undermining of the objectives of clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, even though such a conversion is not provided for in the domestic legislation, provided that the temporary relationship concerned was preceded by a selection process that was open to the public and complied with the principles of equality, merit and ability?

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(1)  Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43).

(2)  EU:C:2021:460.

(3)  EU:C:2020:760.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) (Portugal) lodged on 24 May 2022 — Cofidis v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-340/22)

(2022/C 359/26)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Cofidis

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Questions referred

1

Does Directive 2014/59/EU (1) of 15 May 2014 preclude the taxation in a Member State of branches of financial institutions resident in another Member State of the European Union, pursuant to legislation such as the Portuguese national rules governing the additional solidarity tax on the banking sector, which is levied on the adjusted liabilities and notional value of off-balance sheet derivative financial instruments and from which the revenue collected is not allocated to national financing arrangements for resolution measures or to the financing of the Single Resolution Fund?

2

Does the freedom of establishment enshrined in Article 49 TFEU preclude national legislation such as that laid down in the Portuguese national rules governing the additional solidarity tax on the banking sector, which permits the deduction from the liabilities, as determined and approved, certain liability items which are taken into account for the purposes of the calculation of tier 1 and tier 2 own funds, in accordance with the provisions of Part II of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, taking into account the transitional provisions laid down in Part IX of that Regulation, which may be issued only by entities with legal personality, in other words, which may not be issued by branches of non-resident credit institutions?

---

(1)  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190).

(2)  OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) (Portugal) lodged on 31 May 2022 — NM v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-349/22)

(2022/C 359/27)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: NM

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Question referred

Does Article 110 TFEU preclude a situation in which a rule of national law, such as Article 8(1)(d) of the CISV [(Código do Imposto Sobre Veículos; Code on Vehicle Tax)], which provides that private vehicles that satisfy certain environmental criteria are to be subject to tax on the release for consumption of motor vehicles ([imposto sobre veículos;] ISV) at a reduced rate of 25 %, remains in force and, under the version of the legislation in force from 1 January 2021 — which is more restrictive than the version previously in force — applies both to new Portuguese vehicles and to second-hand vehicles from other Member States of the European Union which are registered for the first time in Portugal from that date onwards, thereby providing the same tax treatment for those vehicles but giving rise to what could be considered unequal treatment between second-hand vehicles which have been in use for the same length of time and which satisfy the less demanding environmental criteria that previously applied but which do not satisfy the requirements in the new law, under which treatment is dependent on whether (a) they were originally sold and registered in Portugal before the date on which the new version of the law came into force, in which case they will have benefited from the reduced tax rate of 25 %, which is likely to be reflected in the purchase price of second-hand vehicles; or (b) they were registered in another Member State while the previous version of the law was in force and were released for consumption in Portugal after that date, in which case they are subject to tax at the rate of 100 %?

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Hamm (Germany) lodged on 1 June 2022 — Criminal proceedings against A.

(Case C-352/22)

(2022/C 359/28)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Hamm

Parties to the main proceedings:

Requested person: A.

Applicant: Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamm

Questions referred

Must Article 9(2) and (3) of Directive 2013/32/EU, (1) in conjunction with Article 21(1) of Directive 2011/95/EU, (2) be interpreted as meaning that the final recognition of a person as a refugee within the meaning of the Geneva Convention on Refugees in another Member State of the European Union is binding for the purposes of the extradition procedure in the Member State requested to extradite such a person on account of the obligation under EU law to interpret national law in conformity with the directives (third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU and Article 4(3) TEU), that is to say, is binding in such a way that extradition of the person to the third country or country of origin is thereby necessarily precluded until his or her recognition as a refugee has been revoked or has expired?

---

(1)  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).

(2)  Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 2 June 2022 — Pro Rauchfrei e.V. v JS e.K.

(Case C-356/22)

(2022/C 359/29)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Pro Rauchfrei e.V.

Defendant: JS e.K.

Questions referred

1.

Does the concept of ‘placing on the market’ within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 8(3) of Directive 2014/40/EU (1) cover the offering of tobacco products via vending machines in such a way that, although the cigarette packets contained in them display the warnings prescribed by law, the cigarette packets are initially stocked in the machine in such a way that they are not visible to the consumer, and the warnings on them become visible only when the customer operates the machine, which has previously been enabled by the cashier, and the cigarette packet is thus dispensed onto the checkout belt prior to the payment process?

2.	Does the prohibition in the first sentence of Article 8(3) of Directive 2014/40/EU on warnings being ‘hidden by other items’ cover the case in which the entire tobacco packaging is hidden when the goods are presented by an automatic vending machine?

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(1)  Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC (OJ 2014 L 127, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 8 June 2022 — G sp. z o.o. v W S.A.

(Case C-371/22)

(2022/C 359/30)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: G sp. z o.o.

Defendant: W S.A.

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 3(5) and (7) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, (1) which requires that the rights of an energy customer (small undertaking), in the event of a change of energy supplier, be exercised in accordance with the rule ensuring that the eligible customer is in fact able easily to switch to a new supplier, and that that change be made in a non-discriminatory manner as regards cost, effort or time, be interpreted as precluding the possibility of imposing a contractual penalty on an energy customer for terminating a fixed-term energy supply contract where the energy customer wishes to change energy supplier, irrespective of the amount of loss suffered (Articles 483(1) and 484(1) and (2) of the Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. kodeks cywilny (Law of 23 April 1964 establishing the Civil Code)) and without any criteria being laid down in the Law on Energy (Article 4j(3a) of the Ustawa z dnia 10 kwietnia 1997 r. prawo energetyczne (Law on Energy of 10 April 1997)) for the charging of such fees or the establishment thereof?

2.

Must Article 3(5) and (7) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, which requires that the rights of an energy customer (small undertaking), in the event of a change of energy supplier, be exercised in a non-discriminatory manner as regards cost, effort or time and in accordance with the rule ensuring that the eligible customer is in fact able easily to switch to a new supplier, be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of contractual clauses which, in the event of early termination of an energy supply contract concluded with a supplier for a fixed term, makes it possible to charge consumers (small undertakings) fees corresponding de facto to the cost of the energy not consumed before the end of the contract in accordance with the take-or-pay rule?

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(1)  OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg (Luxembourg) lodged on 9 June 2022 — CM v DN

(Case C-372/22)

(2022/C 359/31)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CM

Defendant: DN

Questions referred

1.

Does Article 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (1) apply: (a) to an application to modify rights of access as defined by Article 2(10) of that regulation, made by a person granted such rights by a judicial decision which, in the interests of the children, was not to take effect until a future time, but which became final and has the status of res judicata, delivered in the State in which the children were formerly habitually resident more than four months before the application is brought before the court on the basis of Article 9(1); (b) so as to exclude, if it does so apply, the general rule of jurisdiction contained in Article 8 of that regulation, notwithstanding that recital 12 of that regulation states that ‘the grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility established in the present Regulation are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity[; t]his means that jurisdiction should lie in the first place with the Member State of the child’s habitual residence, except for certain cases of a change in the child’s residence …’?

2.

If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, does the jurisdiction which thus exists under Article 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, which is expressed to be ‘by way of exception to Article 8’ of that regulation, preclude the application of Article 15 of the same regulation, which is expressed to apply ‘by way of exception’ and where it ‘is in the best interests of the child’?

---

(1)  OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 9 June 2022 — Criminal proceedings against NE

(Case C-373/22)

(2022/C 359/32)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

Party to the main proceedings

NE

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 2, Article 6(1) and (3) and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that a court before which a criminal case has been brought and which is at the same time a defendant in proceedings concerning an action for compensation brought by a defendant in that criminal case and based on an alleged infringement in the activity of that court or of a court whose successor in law it is, in the same or a different criminal case, or which would be liable to pay compensation if the action were upheld, is not an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of EU law?

2.

If so, must the abovementioned provisions of EU law be interpreted as meaning that such a court may not continue the criminal proceedings, including ruling on the merits of the case, and what would be the consequences for the procedural and substantive acts of that court were it not to disqualify itself?

3.

Must Article 2, Article 6(1) and (3) and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that, in the case where a court has been abolished by the adopted amendment to the Zakon za sadebnata vlast (Law on the Judiciary) (DV No 32/26 April 2022, the implementation of which has been postponed until 27 July 2022) but the judges must continue to hear the cases assigned to them up to that date and must also continue, after that date, to hear cases of that institution in which they have held preliminary hearings, the independence of that court is impaired, given that the abolition of the court is justified on the ground that the constitutional principle of the independence of the judiciary and the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens is thereby safeguarded and the facts leading to the conclusion that those principles have been infringed are not duly set out?

4.

Must the abovementioned provisions of EU law be interpreted as precluding national provisions such as those of the Law on the Judiciary (DV No 32/26 April 2022, the implementation of which has been postponed until [27] July 2022), which lead to the complete abolition of (the Specialised Criminal Court as) an autonomous body of the judiciary in Bulgaria on the ground referred to above and to the transfer of judges (including the judge of the panel who is hearing the criminal case at hand) from that court to various courts throughout the country, including courts situated far from the place where they currently perform their duties, without the place in question having been specified in advance, without the consent of the judges, and in the presence of restrictions which are laid down by law in respect of those members of the national legal service alone as to the maximum number which can be reappointed to a judicial body?

5.

If so, and in the light of the primacy of EU law, what procedural acts should be undertaken by the members of the national legal service attached to the courts to be abolished? What consequences would that have for the procedural decisions of the court to be abolished in the cases which must be taken to their conclusion and for the decisions terminating the proceedings in those cases?

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 10 June 2022 — Google Ireland Limited, Tik Tok Technology Limited and Meta Platforms Ireland Limited v Kommunikationsbehörde Austria (Komm Austria)

(Case C-376/22)

(2022/C 359/33)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants on a point of law: Google Ireland Limited, Tik Tok Technology Limited and Meta Platforms Ireland Limited

Defendant: Kommunikationsbehörde Austria (Komm Austria)

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 3(4)(a)(ii) of Directive 2000/31/EC, (1) be interpreted as meaning that a measure taken against a ‘given information society service’ can also be understood as a legislative measure relating to a general category of certain information society services (such as communications platforms), or does the existence of a measure within the meaning of that provision require that a decision be taken in relation to a specific individual case (for example, concerning a communications platform identified by name)?

2.

Must Article 3(5) of Directive 2000/31 be interpreted as meaning that failure to notify the measure taken to the Commission and the Member State in which the platform is established, which, under that provision, must be notified ‘in the shortest possible time’ (ex post facto) in the case of urgency, means that — following the expiry of a sufficient period for the (ex post facto) notification — that measure must not be applied to a given service?

3.	Does Article 28a(1) of Directive 2010/13/EU, (2) as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/1808, (3) preclude the application of a measure as provided for in Article 3(4) of Directive 2000/31 where it does not relate to broadcasts and user-generated videos made available on a video-sharing platform?

---

(1)  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1).

(2)  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ 2010 L 95, p. 1).

(3)  Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in view of changing market realities (OJ 2018 L 303, p. 69).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 10 June 2022 — LR v Ministero dell’Istruzione, Ufficio scolastico regionale Lombardia, Ufficio scolastico regionale Friuli Venezia Giulia

(Case C-377/22)

(2022/C 359/34)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: LR

Defendants: Ministero dell’Istruzione, Ufficio scolastico regionale Lombardia, Ufficio scolastico regionale Friuli Venezia Giulia

Question referred

Without prejudice to the possibility of considering the years of service completed by the applicant in the United Kingdom under EU law, notwithstanding the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, must Article 45(1) and (2) TFEU and Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 (1) be interpreted as precluding a rule such as that laid down in Article 1(6) of decreto legge n. 126/2019 (Decree-Law No 126/2019), converted, with amendments, by legge n. 159/2019 (Law No 159/2019), according to which, in order to take part in the extraordinary competition for the recruitment of permanent teaching staff at Italian secondary schools, only the years of service completed by candidates on fixed-term contracts at Italian State secondary schools are considered valid, and not the years of service at peer institutions in other European countries, given that the procedure in question is specifically intended to counter the phenomenon of precarious employment in Italy? If the Court of Justice does not hold the Italian legislation to be contrary, in abstract terms, to the European regulatory framework, can the measures envisaged by that legislation be regarded as proportionate, in concrete terms, in view of the abovementioned public-interest objective?

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(1)  Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (OJ 2011 L 141, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands) lodged on 15 June 2022 — X v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

(Case C-392/22)

(2022/C 359/35)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: X

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Questions referred

1.

Should the Dublin Regulation, (1) in view of recitals 3, 32 and 39 thereof, and read in conjunction with Articles 1, 4, 18, 19 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted and applied in such a way that the principle of inter-State trust is not divisible, so that serious and systematic infringements of EU law committed by the potentially responsible Member State, before transfer, with respect to third-country nationals who are not (yet) Dublin returnees absolutely preclude transfer to that Member State?

2.

If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, should Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, read in conjunction with Articles 1, 4, 18, 19 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that, if the Member State potentially responsible infringes EU law in a serious and systematic way, the transferring Member State cannot, within the framework of the Dublin Regulation, rely blindly on the principle of inter-State trust but must eliminate all doubts or must demonstrate that, after the transfer, the applicant will not be placed in a situation which is contrary to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

3.

What evidence can the applicant use in support of his arguments that Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation precludes his transfer, and what standard of proof should be applied? In the light of the references to the Union acquis in the recitals of the Dublin Regulation, does the transferring Member State have a duty of cooperation or verification, or, in the event of serious and systematic infringements of fundamental rights with respect to third-country nationals, is it necessary to obtain individual guarantees from the Member State responsible that the applicant’s fundamental rights will (indeed) be respected after the transfer? Is the answer to this question different if the applicant lacks evidence in so far as he is unable to support his consistent and detailed statements with documents, when he cannot be expected to do so, given the nature of the statements?

4.	Is the answer to the foregoing questions under III different if the applicant demonstrates that complaining to the authorities and/or recourse to legal remedies in the responsible Member State will not be possible and/or effective?

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(1)  Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31.).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší soud České republiky (Czech Republic) lodged on 15 June 2022 — EXTÉRIA, s. r. o. v Spravíme, s. r. o.

(Case C-393/22)

(2022/C 359/36)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Nejvyšší soud České republiky

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: EXTÉRIA, s. r. o.

Defendant: Spravíme, s. r. o.

Question referred

Must Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters be interpreted as meaning that the concept ‘contract for the provision of services’ also includes a contract to enter into a future contract (pactum de contrahendo), in which the parties undertook to enter into a future contract that would be a contract for the provision of services, within the meaning of that provision?

---

(1)  OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van beroep te Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 15 June 2022 — Oilchart International NV v O.W. Bunker (Netherlands) BV, ING Bank NV

(Case C-394/22)

(2022/C 359/37)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hof van beroep te Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Oilchart International NV

Defendants: O.W. Bunker (Netherlands) BV, ING Bank NV

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 1(2)(b) of the Brussels Ia Regulation (Regulation No 1215/2012 (1)) in conjunction with Article 3(1) of the Insolvency Regulation (Regulation No 1346/2000 (2)) be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings’ in Article 1(2)(b) of the Brussels Ia Regulation includes also proceedings in which the claim is described in the summons as a pure trade receivable, without any mention of the respondent’s previously declared bankruptcy, whereas the actual legal basis of that claim is the specific derogating provisions of Netherlands bankruptcy law (Article 25(2) of the Wet van 30 september 1893, op het faillissement en de surséance van betaling (Law of 30 September 1893 on bankruptcy and suspension of payment; ‘NFW’)) and whereby: — it must be determined whether such a claim must be considered a verifiable claim (Article 26 NFW in conjunction with Article 110 thereof) or an unverifiable claim (Article 25(2) NFW), — it appears that the question whether both claims can be brought simultaneously and whether one claim does not appear to exclude the other, taking into account the specific legal consequences of each of those claims (inter alia, in terms of the possibilities of calling for a bank guarantee deferred after the bankruptcy), may be determined in accordance with the rules specific to Netherlands bankruptcy law? And further

2.

Can the provisions of Article 25(2) [NFW] be regarded as compatible with Article 3(1) of the Insolvency Regulation, in so far as that legislative provision would allow such a claim (Article 25(2) NFW) to be brought before the court of another Member State instead of before the insolvency court of the Member State in which the bankruptcy was declared?

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 2000 L 160, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Varna (Bulgaria) lodged on 14 June 2022 — Trade Express-L OOD v Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia ‘Darzhaven rezerv i voennovremenni zapasi’

(Case C-395/22)

(2022/C 359/38)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Administrativen sad Varna

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Trade Express-L OOD

Defendant: Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia ‘Darzhaven rezerv i voennovremenni zapasi’

Questions referred

1.

Having regard to the objective of Council Directive 2009/119/EC (1) of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, and to Article 2(d) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on energy statistics, and in the light of the principle of proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 17 thereof, must recital 33 and Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of that directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which persons who have made intra-Community receipts of lubricating oils as defined in point 3.4.20 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 (or importers of such lubricating oils) can be obliged to establish emergency stocks?

2.

Having regard to the objective of Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, and in the light of the principle of proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 17 thereof, must recital 33 and Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of that directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the types of products in respect of which emergency stocks must be established and maintained are limited to some of the types of products in Article 2(i) of that directive, in conjunction with Chapter 3.4 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008?

3.

Having regard to the objective of Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, and in the light of the principle of proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 17 thereof, must recital 33 and Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of that directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the making by a person of intra-Community receipts or imports of one of the types of products referred to in Article 2(i) of that directive, in conjunction with Chapter 3.4 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008, entails an obligation on the part of that person to establish and maintain emergency stocks of another, different type of product?

4.

Having regard to the objective of Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, and in the light of the principle of proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 17 thereof, must recital 33 and Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of that directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which a person is obliged to establish and maintain stocks of a product which he or she does not use in the course of his or her economic activity and which is not connected with that activity, whereby that obligation also entails a significant financial burden (leading, in practice, to the impossibility of compliance), since the person neither possesses the product nor imports it and/or holds stocks of it?

5.

If any of those questions is answered in the negative: Having regard to the objective of Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, and in the light of the principle of proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 17 thereof, must recital 33 and Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of that directive be interpreted as meaning that a person who has made intra-Community receipts or imports of a particular type of product can only be obliged to establish and maintain emergency stocks of the same type of product which was the subject of the intra-Community receipts/imports?

---

(1)  OJ 2009 L 265, p. 9.

(2)  OJ 2008 L 304, p. 1.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kammergericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 15 June 2022 — Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin

(Case C-396/22)

(2022/C 359/39)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Kammergericht Berlin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin

Questions referred

1.

Must proceedings for the subsequent determination of a cumulative sentence still also be considered to fall within the scope of Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, (2) where the decision is taken by way of a judgment following a hearing, but, in that judgment, the finding of guilt cannot be reviewed and the sentence imposed in respect of the individual offence cannot be amended?

2.

Is it compatible with the primacy of EU law for the German legislature to have configured the case of conviction in absentia as an absolute impediment to surrender in Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the Gesetz über die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Law on international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters), even though Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, provides only for an optional ground for refusal in that regard?

---

(1)  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).

(2)  Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kammergericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 15 June 2022 — Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin

(Case C-397/22)

(2022/C 359/40)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Kammergericht Berlin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin

Other party: LM

Questions referred

1.

In the case where a summons is served on an adult member of the addressee’s household, is Article 4a(1)(a)(i) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, (2) still to be interpreted as meaning that the issuing judicial authority must prove that the person concerned actually received the summons, or is that provision to be interpreted as meaning that service on the adult member of the addressee’s household proves actual knowledge where the person concerned does not plausibly demonstrate that (and explain why) he or she did not obtain knowledge of the summons?

2.

Where appeal proceedings have been conducted, is the concept of ‘trial’ in Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, to be interpreted as relating to the trial which preceded the decision at first instance if only the requested person lodged an appeal and it was dismissed without examination of the merits?

3.

Is it compatible with the primacy of EU law for the German legislature to have configured the case of conviction in absentia as an absolute impediment to surrender in Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the Gesetz über die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Law on international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters), even though Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, provides only for an optional ground for refusal in that regard?

---

(1)  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).

(2)  Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kammergericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 15 June 2022 — Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin

(Case C-398/22)

(2022/C 359/41)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Kammergericht Berlin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin

Other party: RQ

Questions referred

1.

Where appeal proceedings have been conducted, is the concept of ‘trial’ in Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (1) as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, (2) to be interpreted as relating to the trial which preceded the decision at first instance if only the requested person lodged an appeal and either it was dismissed without examination of the merits or the judgment at first instance was varied in his or her favour?

2.

Is it compatible with the primacy of EU law for the German legislature to have configured the case of conviction in absentia as an absolute impediment to surrender in Paragraph 83(1)(3) of the Gesetz über die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Law on international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters), even though Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, provides only for an optional ground for refusal in that regard?

---

(1)  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).

(2)  Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 15 June 2022 — Confédération paysanne v Ministère de l’agriculture et de la souveraineté alimentaire, Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique

(Case C-399/22)

(2022/C 359/42)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Confédération paysanne

Defendants: Ministère de l’agriculture et de la souveraineté alimentaire, Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique

Questions referred

1.

Must the provisions of Regulation No 1169/2011, (1) Regulation No 1308/2013, (2) Regulation No 543/2011 (3) and Regulation No 952/2013 (4) be interpreted as authorising a Member State to adopt a national measure prohibiting the importation, from a specific country, of fruit and vegetables that infringe Article 26 of Regulation No 1169/2011 and Article 76 of Regulation No 1308/2013 for failing to indicate the country or territory from which they actually originate, in particular where that failure is significant and it is difficult to verify the origin once the produce enters the EU?

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, must the agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters, approved by the Council Decision of 28 January 2019, amending Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement of 26 February 1996 establishing an association between the European Union and its Member States, and Morocco, be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of applying Articles 9 and 26 of Regulation (EU) No 1669/2011 and Article 76 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, on the one hand, fruit and vegetables harvested in Western Sahara have Morocco as the country of origin and, on the other, the Moroccan authorities have the power to issue the certificates of conformity provided for by Regulation No 543/2011 to fruit and vegetables harvested in Western Sahara?

3.

If the second question is answered in the affirmative, does the Council Decision of 28 January 2019 approving the agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters comply with Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU and the customary international law principle of self-determination set out, in particular, in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter?

4.

Must Articles 9 and 26 of Regulation (EU) No 1669/2011 and Article 76 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 be interpreted as meaning that, at the stages of importation and sale to the consumer, the packaging of fruit and vegetables harvested in Western Sahara cannot indicate Morocco as the country of origin but must indicate the territory of Western Sahara?

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004 (OJ 2011 L 304, p. 18 and corrigendum OJ 2013 L 163, p. 32).

(2)  Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 671).

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors (OJ 2011 L 157, p. 1).

(4)  Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ 2013 L 269, p. 1 and corrigendum OJ 2013, L 287, p. 90).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Dioikitiko Protodikeio Athinon (Greece) lodged on 16 June 2022 — Ethnikos Organismos Pistopoiisis Prosonton & Epaggelmatikou Prosanatolismou (ΕΟPPΕP) v Elliniko Dimosio

(Case C-404/22)

(2022/C 359/43)

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Dioikitiko Protodikeio Athinon

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ethnikos Organismos Pistopoiisis Prosonton & Epaggelmatikou Prosanatolismou (ΕΟPPΕP)

Defendant: Elliniko Dimosio

Questions referred

1)

(a) What does the term ‘undertaking carrying out an “economic activity”’ mean for the purposes of Article 2(a) of Directive 2002/14/EC? (1) (b) Does it include private-law legal entities such as the EOPPEP which, in the exercise of its powers of certification of vocational training bodies, acts as a public-law legal entity and exercises public powers, inasmuch as (i) for certain of its activities, such as the provision of all manner and form of vocational guidance services to the competent ministerial bodies, centres and vocational education and training bodies, undertakings, and employers’ and workers’ associations (Article 14(2)(ib) of Law 4115/2013, Government Gazette I/24), it follows from Article 14(2)(ie) of that law laying down the requirements for the provision of advisory and vocational guidance services by private individuals and legal entities in Greece that there may be a market in which commercial undertakings are carrying out an activity in competition with the applicant, and (ii) according to Article 23(1)(d) of that law, the applicant’s resources include revenue from the performance of work and the provision of services either allocated to it by the Minister or performed on behalf of third parties, including government departments, national and international organisations, public- or private-law legal entities and private individuals, whereas (iii) for its other activities, Article 20 of Law 4115/2013 provides for the payment of fees? (c) Does the answer to the above question depend on whether, in relation to most of the activities (Article 14(2) of Law 4115/2013) of the private-law legal entity, a few appear to be carried out only in a market environment and, if the answer to that is in the negative, whether it suffices that the legislature provided (Article 14(2)(ib) and Article 23(1)(d) of Law 4115/2013) for that legal entity to act, in part at least, as a market operator or whether it is necessary to prove that it does indeed carry out a particular activity in a market environment?

2)

(a) What do the terms ‘situation’, ‘structure’ and ‘probable development of employment’ in the undertaking, on which workers must be informed and consulted, mean for the purposes of Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 2002/14/EC? (b) Do the above terms include the removal of employees from positions of responsibility in which they were placed temporarily after the private-law legal entities EKEPIS and EKEP had merged with the EOPPEP and operating regulations had been adopted for that legal entity which did not abolish those positions, and must the workers therefore be informed and consulted prior to their removal? (c) Does the answer to the above question depend on (i) whether the smooth functioning of the legal entity and its operational needs were cited as the reason for the removal of a worker from a position of responsibility, so that it can achieve the objectives which it was established to pursue, or whether poor performance of the worker’s duties as acting head was the reason for the worker’s removal; (ii) the fact that the employees removed from positions of responsibility were retained as members of the legal entity’s staff; or (iii) the fact that other persons were temporarily placed in positions of responsibility by the decision of the competent body removing employees from positions of responsibility?

---

(1)  Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community — Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on employee representation (OJ 2002 L 80, p. 29).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Brně (Czech Republic) lodged on 20 June 2022 — CV v Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky

(Case C-406/22)

(2022/C 359/44)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Krajský soud v Brně

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: CV

Defendant: Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky

Questions referred

1.

Should the criterion for the designation of safe countries of origin for the purposes of Article 37(1) of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection in Annex I(b) to [that directive] — i.e., that the country concerned provides protection against persecution and ill treatment through observance of the rights and freedoms laid down in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of that convention — be interpreted as meaning that, if the country withdraws from its commitments under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in time of emergency under Article 15 of the Convention, it no longer meets the criterion for being designated as a safe country of origin?

2.

Should Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council be interpreted as meaning that they prevent a Member State from designating a country as a safe country of origin only in part, with certain territorial exceptions, to which the assumption that that part of the country is safe for the applicant will not apply, and if the Member State does designate a country with such territorial exceptions as safe, then the country concerned as a whole cannot be deemed a safe country of origin for the purposes of [that directive]?

3.

If the reply to either of these two questions referred is affirmative, should Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that a court deciding about an appeal challenging the decision on the manifestly unfounded nature of the application, pursuant to Article 32(2) of [that directive], issued in proceedings conducted pursuant to Article 31(8)(b) of [that directive], must take into account ex officio that the designation of the country as safe is contrary to EU law, due to the reasons stated above, without requiring an objection on the part of the applicant?

---

(1)  OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Apelativen sad Sofia (Bulgaria) lodged on 21 June 2022 — UA v EUROBANK BULGARIA AD

(Case C-409/22)

(2022/C 359/45)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Apelativen sad Sofia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: UA

Defendant: EUROBANK BULGARIA AD

Questions referred

1.

Does a power of attorney by which the agent makes a disposal of assets on behalf of the payer by means of a payment order constitute a payment instrument within the meaning of Article 4(23) of [Directive 2007/64/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC]?

2.

Does the ‘apostille’ certificate placed on a document by the competent foreign authority in accordance with the 1961 Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents form part of the authentication procedure for both the payment instrument and the payment transaction within the meaning of Article 4(19) of that directive, in conjunction with Article 59(1) thereof?

3.	If the payment instrument (including one authorising a third person to make disposals on behalf of the payer) is formally (prima facie) regular, can the national court assume that the payment transaction is authorised, that is to say, that the payer has consented to its execution?

---

(1)  Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (OJ 2007 L 319, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 21 June 2022 — Thermalhotel Fontana Hotelbetriebsgesellschaft m.b.H.

(Case C-411/22)

(2022/C 359/46)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: Thermalhotel Fontana Hotelbetriebsgesellschaft m.b.H.

Respondent authority: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Südoststeiermark

Questions referred

1.

Does compensation which is due to workers during their isolation as persons infected with, suspected of being infected with, or suspected of being contagious with COVID-19 for the pecuniary disadvantages caused by the impediment to their employment, and which is initially payable to the workers by their employer, with the entitlement to compensation vis-à-vis the Austrian Federal Government then being transferred to the employer at the time of payment, constitute a sickness benefit within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004? (1) If Question 1 is answered in the negative:

2.

Must Article 45 TFEU and Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 (2) be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the granting of compensation for loss of earnings suffered by workers as a result of isolation ordered by the health authorities in the case of a positive COVID-19 test result (with the compensation being initially payable to the workers by their employer, and the entitlement to compensation vis-à-vis the Austrian Federal Government then being transferred to the employer to that extent) is subject to the condition that the isolation is ordered by an Austrian authority on the basis of provisions of national law relating to epidemics, with the result that such compensation is not paid to workers who, as frontier workers, are resident in another Member State and whose isolation (‘quarantine’) is ordered by the health authorities of their Member State of residence?

---

(1)  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ 2004 L 166, p. 1).

(2)  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (OJ 2011 L 141, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 21 June 2022 — Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira v NT

(Case C-412/22)

(2022/C 359/47)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Respondent: NT

Questions referred

1.

Can Article 2 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/278 (1) of 26 February 2016 be interpreted as meaning that the repeal of the anti-dumping duties, apart from taking effect for the future from 28 February 2016, also affects imports of fasteners subject to those duties which took place up to 27 February 2016, but were assessed (for anti-dumping duties and other duties) on a date after 28 February 2016 (post-clearance recovery)?

2.

Will the answer to the first question be different it is considered that the post-clearance recovery has its origin in a transcript made, pursuant to a decision of 21 April 2017, of a criminal investigation initiated on the basis of evidence provided by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), within the framework of OLAF investigation CASE OF/2010/0697, AAA 2010/016-(2012)S01, in which it was concluded that the goods exported to the European Community in containers (…) and (…) on 3 April 2010 and in containers (…) and (…) on 24 April 2010 were of Chinese non-preferential origin?

---

(1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/278 of 26 February 2016 repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China, as extended to imports of certain iron or steel fasteners consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not (OJ 2016 L 52, p. 24).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 21 June 2022 — DocLX Travel Events GmbH v Verein für Konsumenteninformation

(Case C-414/22)

(2022/C 359/48)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant on a point of law: DocLX Travel Events GmbH

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Verein für Konsumenteninformation

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 12(2) of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 (1) be interpreted as meaning that the traveller — irrespective of the time of his or her declaration of termination — is in any event entitled to terminate a package free of charge if the unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances significantly affecting the package did in fact occur at the time of the (scheduled) start of the package?

2.	Must Article 12(2) of Directive 2015/2302 be interpreted as meaning that the traveller is already entitled to terminate a package free of charge if the occurrence of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances was to be expected at the time of the declaration of termination?

---

(1)  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ 2015 L 326, p. 1).

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal du travail francophone de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 20 June 2022 — JD v Acerta — Caisse d’assurances sociales ASBL, Institut national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti), Belgian State

(Case C-415/22)

(2022/C 359/49)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal du travail francophone de Bruxelles

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: JD

Defendants: Acerta — Caisse d’assurances sociales ASBL, Institut national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti), Belgian State

Question referred

Does the principle of EU law based on a single social security scheme applicable to workers, whether employed or self-employed, active or retired, preclude a Member State of residence from requiring, as in the present case, a retired official of the European Commission, who pursues an activity as a self-employed person, to be subject to its social security scheme and the payment of purely ‘solidarity’ social security contributions, where the retired official is subject to the compulsory social security scheme of the European Union and does not derive any benefits, be they contributory or non-contributory, from the national scheme to which he or she is subject by force?

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance du Luxembourg (Belgium) lodged on 21 June 2022 — SA CEZAM v Belgian State

(Case C-418/22)

(2022/C 359/50)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Tribunal de première instance du Luxembourg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SA CEZAM

Defendant: Belgian State

Questions referred

1.

Do Articles 62[(2)], 63, 167, 206, 250 and 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) and the principle of proportionality, as interpreted, in particular, in the judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 May 2019, EN.SA (C-712/17), taken together with the principle of neutrality, preclude provisions of national legislation such as Article 70[(1)] of the VAT Code, Article 1 of and part V of Table G in the annex to Royal Decree No 41 setting the amounts of the proportionate tax penalties in relation to value added tax, pursuant to which: — in the event of errors as to content discovered on the inspection of accounts, — and in order to sanction the failure, in whole or in part, to enter taxable transactions in relation to which the amount of tax due is greater than EUR 1 250 euros, that infringement is penalised by a flat-rate fine at a reduced rate of 20 % of the tax due, without it being possible, for the purposes of calculating the fine, to deduct therefrom any input tax paid, on account of the fact that it has not been deducted because no return was submitted, where, pursuant to [Article 1(2) of] Royal Decree No 41, the scale of reductions set out in Tables A to J of the annex to that decree applies only where the infringements sanctioned have been committed without any intention to evade or to facilitate the evasion of the tax?

2.

Is the answer to that question different if the taxable person has, voluntarily or otherwise, paid the amount of tax that has become chargeable following the inspection, so as to make good the shortfall in payment of the tax and thereby to allow the attainment of the objective of ensuring the correct collection of the tax?

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(1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

Appeal brought on 27 June 2022 by the European Economic and Social Committee against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 27 April 2022 in Case T-750/20 Correia v EESC

(Case C-423/22 P)

(2022/C 359/51)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) (represented by: M. Pascua Mateo, A. Carvajal García-Valdecasas, L. Camarena Januzec, acting as Agents, and B. Wägenbaur, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: Paula Correia

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

1.	Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 27 April 2022 in so far as it declares admissible the request for career reconstitution, and reject the form of order sought by the applicant at first instance;

2.	Order the other party to the proceedings to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the costs before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In its appeal, the EESC argues that the concept of a reasonable period for submitting a request for career reconstitution, and the case-law on the factors to be taken into account in determining whether the period is reasonable, have been misinterpreted.

The first ground of appeal alleges an incorrect legal characterisation of the facts. It is argued that the General Court misrepresented part of the content of the defence and rejoinder and failed to undertake a complete characterisation of the points of fact and of law.

The second ground of appeal alleges infringement of the principle of legal certainty.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 28 June 2022 — Scuola europea di Varese v PD and LC, as persons exercising parental responsibility over the minor NG

(Case C-431/22)

(2022/C 359/52)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Scuola europea di Varese

Defendants: PD and LC, as persons exercising parental responsibility over the minor NG

Question referred

Is the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 27(2) of the Convention defining the Statute of the European Schools, done in Luxembourg on 21 June 1994, to be interpreted as meaning that the Complaints Board referred to therein is to have sole jurisdiction in the first and final instance, once all administrative channels provided for in the General Rules have been exhausted, in any dispute concerning a decision on repeating a year adopted in relation to a secondary-school pupil by the Class Council?

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administratīvā rajona tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 30 June 2022 — AS Latvijas valsts meži v Dabas aizsardzības pārvalde, Vides pārraudzības valsts birojs, intervening party: Valsts meža dienests

(Case C-434/22)

(2022/C 359/53)

Language of the case: Latvian

Referring court

Administratīvā rajona tiesa

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: AS Latvijas valsts meži

Defendants: Dabas aizsardzības pārvalde, Vides pārraudzības valsts birojs

Intervening party: Valsts meža dienests

Questions referred

1.

Does the concept of ‘project’ within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (1) also include activities undertaken in a forest area to ensure maintenance of the area’s forest fire protection infrastructure installations in accordance with the fire protection requirements established in the applicable legislation?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must the activities undertaken in a forest area to ensure maintenance of the area’s forest fire protection infrastructure installations in accordance with the fire protection requirements established in the applicable legislation be deemed, for the purposes of Article 6(3) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, (2) to constitute a project which is directly connected with or necessary to that management, meaning that an assessment procedure for special areas of conservation of European importance (Natura 2000) is not required for the activities in question?

3.

If the answer to the second question is in the negative, does Article 6(3) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora also require an assessment to be carried out for plans and projects (activities) which are not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the special area of conservation but which are likely to have a significant effect on conservation areas of European importance (Natura 2000), but which are nevertheless undertaken in accordance with national legislation in order to satisfy forest fire protection and firefighting requirements?

4.	If the answer to the third question is in the affirmative, is it possible to continue and complete the activity in question before carrying out an assessment procedure for special areas of conservation of European importance (Natural 2000) ex post facto?

5.

If the answer to the third question is in the affirmative, in order to avoid a possibly significant impact, are the competent authorities under a duty to require the damage to be made good and to adopt measures if the significance of the impact was not assessed during the assessment procedure for special areas of conservation of European importance (Natural 2000)?

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(1)  OJ 2012 L 26, p. 1.

(2)  OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7, Special edition in Latvian: Chapter 15 Volume 002 P. 102

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla y León (Spain) lodged on 1 July 2022 — Asociación para la Conservación y Estudio del Lobo Ibérico (ASCEL) v Administración de la Comunidad Autónoma de Castilla y León

(Case C-436/22)

(2022/C 359/54)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla y León

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Asociación para la Conservación y Estudio del Lobo Ibérico (ASCEL)

Defendant: Administración de la Comunidad Autónoma de Castilla y León

Questions referred

In view of the fact that any measure adopted by a Member State pursuant to the Directive must, in accordance with Article 2(2) thereof, pursue the aim of maintaining or restoring, at favourable conservation status, animal species of Community interest, such as the wolf (lupus canis)

1.

Do the provisions of Articles 2(2), 4, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 17 of Council Directive 92/43/EEC (1) of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora preclude a regional Law (Ley 4/1996 de Caza de Castilla y León (Law 4/1996 on Hunting in Castille and Leon) of 12 July 1996 and, subsequently, Ley 4/2021 de Caza y de Gestión Sostenible de los Recursos Cinegéticos de Castilla y León (Law 4/2021 on Hunting and the Sustainable Management of the Hunting Resources of Castille and Leon) of 1 July 2021), pursuant to which the wolf is declared to be a species of game which may be hunted, and the consequent authorisation of the local exploitation of wolves in hunting areas during the 2019/2020, 2020/2021 and 2021/2022 seasons, when the conservation status of the wolf is unfavourable-poor according to the report covering the six-year period 2013-2018 which Spain sent to the European Commission in 2019, as a result of which the State (the Member State, Article 4 HD) included all Spanish wolf populations in the List of Wild Species under Special Protection and the Spanish Inventory of Endangered Species, thereby also affording strict protection to populations situated north of the Douro?

2.

Is it compatible with that aim for different protection to be afforded to the wolf depending on whether it is found north or south of the Douro River, bearing in mind (i) that, scientifically, that distinction is currently considered to be inappropriate; (ii) that the assessment of the conservation status of the wolf in the three regions where it is found in Spain (Alpine, Atlantic and Mediterranean) in the period 2013-2018 was unfavourable; (iii) that the wolf is a strictly protected species in almost every Member State and, in particular, because of a shared region, in Portugal; and (iv) the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the natural range and the territorial scope to be taken into account in order to assess the wolf’s conservation status, it being more consistent with that directive, including with Article 2(3) thereof, that the wolf should be included, without differentiating between north and south of the Douro, in Annexes II and IV, such that the capture and killing of wolves would be possible only if there is no satisfactory alternative pursuant to and subject to the requirements laid down in Article 16? If that distinction is considered to be justified,

3.

Does the term ‘exploitation’ in Article 14 of the Directive include the cynegetic exploitation, that is the hunting, of wolves, in view of the special importance that this species has (it is a priority species in the other territorial areas), bearing in mind that, up to now, the hunting of wolves has been permitted and its status in the period 2013-2018 was determined to be unfavourable?

4.

Does Article 14 of the Directive preclude the declaration, by Law, that wolves north of the Douro are a species of game and may be hunted (Article 7 and Annex I of Law 4 of 12 July 1996 on Hunting in Castille and Leon and Article 6 and Annex I of Law 4 of 1 July 2001 on Hunting and the Sustainable Management of the Hunting Resources of Castille and Leon) and the approval of a plan for the local exploitation of wolves in hunting grounds situated north of the Douro River for the 2019/2020, 2020/2021 and 2021/2022 seasons, without any data being available on which to base an assessment of whether the surveillance provided for in Article 11 of the Directive was carried out, without any census since 2012-2013 and without sufficient, objective, scientific and up-to-date information on the status of the wolf being held in the file which was the basis for the local exploitation plan, when, during the period 2013-2018, in the three regions where wolves are found in Spain (Alpine, Atlantic and Mediterranean), the assessment of the wolf’s conservations status was unfavourable?

5.

Pursuant to Articles 4, 11 and 17 of the HD, are the reports which must be taken into consideration in order to determine the conservation status of the wolf (current real population levels, current geographical distribution, reproductive rate, and so on) those which are drawn up by the Member State every six years or, if necessary, within a shorter period, by means of a scientific committee like that created by Real Decreto (Royal Decree) 139/2011, taking account of the fact that wolf populations come within the remit of different Autonomous Communities and of the need to conduct an assessment of the measures concerning a local population ‘on a larger scale’, in accordance with the judgment of 10 October 2019, [Luonnonsuojeluyhdistys Tapiola,] C-674/17, [EU:C:2019:851]? (2)

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(1)  OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7.

(2)  EU:C:2019:851.

Appeal brought on 6 July 2022 by the Republic of Slovenia against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 27 April 2022 in Case T-392/20, Petra Flašker v European Commission

(Case C-447/22 P)

(2022/C 359/55)

Language of the case: Slovenian

Parties

Appellant: Republic of Slovenia (represented by: B. Jovin Hrastnik)

Other parties to the proceedings: Petra Flašker, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court;

—	dismiss the action brought at first instance; and

—	order the applicant at first instance to pay all the costs of the proceedings.

In the event that the Court should find that the state of proceedings does not permit final judgment to be given, the appellant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court; and

—	refer the case back to the General Court for judgment.

Pleas in law and main arguments

1.

The General Court misapplied the law, by misinterpreting Article 108(2) and (3) TFEU and Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation 2015/1589, (1) by misconstruing the scope of the obligations on the Commission at the stage of the preliminary examination of a notified measure, and ruling incorrectly as regards the existence of serious difficulties which the Commission faced in examining the measures in question, that is to say the assets under management received by the public pharmacies Lekarna Ljubljana p.o. and Lekarna Ljubljana after 1979

2.

The General Court misapplied the law, by making an incorrect legal classification of the facts and wrongly finding that the Commission, by reference to the assets granted under management to Lekarna Ljubljana p.o. in 1979 and transferred to Lekarna Ljubljana in 1997, had faced serious difficulties, as a result of which it had to begin in this case the investigation procedure provided for under Article 108(2) TFEU.

3.	The General Court misapplied the law in so far as its judgment is vitiated by failure to provide adequate reasons.

4.

The General Court infringed the procedural rules by, on the one hand, taking into consideration general assertions put forward in the application by the applicant and, on the other hand, failing to take into consideration certain allegations put forward by the Commission in its defence. As such, it infringed the Commission’s right to an effective remedy and a fair hearing, which also adversely affected the interests of the appellant in the current case.

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(1)  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9)

Appeal brought on 6 July 2022 by Stiftung für Forschung und Lehre (SFL) against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 1 June 2022 in Case T-481/17, Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL v SRB

(Case C-448/22 P)

(2022/C 359/56)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: Stiftung für Forschung und Lehre (SFL) (represented by: R. Pelayo Jiménez and A. Muñoz Aranguren, lawyers)

Other parties to the proceedings: Single Resolution Board (SRB), Kingdom of Spain, European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commission, Banco Santander, SA, Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

1.	set aside the judgment of the General Court, Third Chamber, Extended Composition of 1 June 2022 as well as the Decision of the Executive Session of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) SRB/EES/2017/08 of 7 June 2017 on the adoption of a resolution scheme in respect of Banco Popular Español, S.A.;

2.	in the alternative, in the event that the state of the procedure does not allow the Court to rule on the merits of the case, set aside the judgment under appeal and refer the case back to the General Court so that it may deliver a new judgment in accordance with the ruling of the Court;

3.	in any event, order the SRB to pay the costs of the present appeal and the costs of the action for annulment before the General Court, and order BANCO SANTANDER to bear its own costs at both instances.

Pleas in law and main arguments

First plea in law: alleging infringement by the judgment under appeal of the right to effective judicial protection (Article 47 of the Charter), as well as of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Articles 76(d) and 103(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, and the case-law of the ECtHR on the right to a fair trial (use of relevant evidence and access to justice).

Second plea in law: infringement by the judgment of the Court of the right to effective judicial protection (Article 47 of the Charter), Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 103(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, and infringement of the principle of prudence applied to the Single Resolution Mechanism.

Third plea in law: infringement of the duty to state reasons by the decision of the SRB, which is not remedied by the judgment under appeal, and breach of the principle of equality of arms (Article 47 of the Charter).

Fourth plea in law: infringement by the judgment under appeal of Articles 17 and 52 of the Charter and misinterpretation of Article 20(16) of Regulation No 806/2014. (1)

Fifth plea in law: infringement of Article 18(1)(b) of Regulation 806/2014, since the judgment under appeal denies that the existence of early intervention measures, which would have prevented the non-viability of Banco Popular, would render the resolution decision null and void.

Sixth plea in law: error of law in not finding that the existence of an emergency liquidity facility sufficient to deal with the liquidity crisis of Banco Popular, approved by the Bank of Spain and the ECB, was established. Infringement of Article 18(1) SRMR.

Seventh plea in law: infringement of Articles 20(1) and 20(5)(b) of Regulation No 806/2014, since the judgment of the General Court held that Deloitte had the status of ‘independent expert’.

Eighth plea in law: infringement of Article 24 of Regulation 806/2014 and Article 39(2)(b), (d) and (f) of Directive 2014/59 (2) by the judgment under appeal, since the obligation to maximise the sale price in the resolution process and to respect the principle of equality and transparency between the interested bidders was not complied with.

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(1)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 — OJ 2014 L 255, p. 1.

(2)  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council — OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Ravensburg (Germany) lodged on 8 July 2022 — VX and AT v Gemeinde Ummendorf

(Case C-456/22)

(2022/C 359/57)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Ravensburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: VX, AT

Defendant: Gemeinde Ummendorf

Question referred

Is the concept of non-material damage in Article 82(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the assumption of non-material damage requires a noticeable disadvantage and an objectively comprehensible impairment of personal interests, or is the mere short-term loss of the data subject’s unfettered control over his or her data due to the publication of personal data on the internet for a period of a few days, which did not have any noticeable or adverse consequences for the data subject, sufficient for that purpose?

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(1)  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1).

Action brought on 8 July 2022 — European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands

(Case C-459/22)

(2022/C 359/58)

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: W. Roels, acting as Agent)

Defendant: Kingdom of the Netherlands

Form of order sought

The Commission claims that the Court should:

—

declare that, by approving and maintaining in force the requirements for pension capital transfer as set out in Articles 19a(1)(d) and 19b(1) and (2) of the Wet op de Loonbelasting 1964 (Law on wages tax); Article 40c of the Uitvoeringsregeling Invorderingswet (Decree implementing the Law on the collection of taxes); Article 10d(3) of the Uitvoeringsbesluit Loonbelasting 1965 (Decision implementing the Law on wages tax), as well as Annex IV to Decision DGB2012/7010M on international aspect of pensions, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil the obligations incumbent on that Member State under Articles 45, 56 and 63 TFEU;

—	order the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Commission is of the view that the Netherlands legislation on the requirements for transfer of pension capital transfers accrued in the so-called ‘second pillar’, the supplementary pension accrual via the employer, is incompatible with the free movement of workers, services and capital. Although those requirements are applicable to domestic and foreign transfers, they are more easily fulfilled by domestic pension providers than for foreign pension providers that wish to provide in their own Member State of establishment pension services to employees working there who have previously accrued pension capital in the Netherlands. In the event of failure to comply with the requirements set by the legislation, the pension capitals accrued in the Netherlands are included in the levy.

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 11 July 2022 — BM v LO

(Case C-462/22)

(2022/C 359/59)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: BM

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: LO

Question referred

Does the waiting period of one year or six months under the fifth and sixth indents, respectively, of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (1) begin to run with respect to the applicant only upon establishment of his or her habitual residence in the Member State of the court seised, or is it sufficient if, at the beginning of the relevant waiting period, the applicant initially has mere de facto residence in the Member State of the court seised, and his or her residence becomes established as habitual residence only subsequently, in the period before the application was made?

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(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1).

Appeal brought on 26 July 2022 by Finanziaria d’investimento Fininvest SpA (Fininvest) against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 11 May 2022 in Case T-913/16 Finanziaria d’investimento Fininvest SpA (Fininvest), Silvio Berlusconi v European Central Bank (ECB)

(Case C-512/22 P)

(2022/C 359/60)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Finanziaria d’investimento Fininvest SpA (Fininvest) (represented by: M. Carpinelli, R. Vaccarella, A. Baldaccini and A. Saccucci, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Central Bank, European Commission, Silvio Berlusconi

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

—	set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 11 May 2022;

—	consequently, annul the ECB’s decision of 25 October 2016;

—	in the alternative, in the event that the Court of Justice finds that it cannot make a decision as matters stand, set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 11 May 2022 and refer the case back to a different chamber of the General Court;

—	order the ECB to pay the costs, including those incurred at first instance;

—	where necessary, take the appropriate measures of organisation and measures of inquiry in order to acquire the minutes of the hearing of 16 September 2021 and the sound recording of the hearing.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

First ground. Error in law in the assessment of the effects of the control exercised by the applicants at first instance over Banca Mediolanum — Manifest error of assessment and distortion of the facts concerning the acquisition of the qualifying holding — Unlawful substitution of the grounds of the decision at issue — Infringement of the audi alteram partem principle — Error in law in the legal classification of the type of ‘acquisition’ of a qualifying holding under EU law and national law — Failure to apply national law — Infringement of the principle of sincere cooperation — Contradictory nature of the statement of reasons — Misuse of powers

The ground is divided into six parts concerning the following matters:

(a)	the assessment of the joint control over Banca Mediolanum exercised, ‘before the merger in question’, by the applicants at first instance through a shareholders’ agreement entered into with Fin. Prog Italia: incorrect assessment of the consequences;

(b)

the status of Silvio Berlusconi as a qualifying shareholder of Banca Mediolanum was incorrectly reconstructed from the sequence ‘measure of Banca d’Italia of 7 October 2014’ — ‘merger’ — ‘judgment of the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy) of 3 March 2016’; misrepresentation of the facts and clear errors in law;

(c)	the substitution by the General Court of its own reasons for those of the author of the decision at issue; infringement of Articles 263 and 264 TFEU;

(d)	the new concept under EU law of acquisition of a qualifying holding: failure to apply national law;

(e)	the creation by the General Court of a category not provided for under the rules of EU law;

(f)	the distinction between indirect qualifying holdings and direct qualifying holdings: infringement of Article 22 CRD IV and of Article 22 of Legislative Decree No 385/1993 (‘TUB’).

Second ground. Errors in law concerning the finding that Directive No 2013/36/EU is lawful (1) — Infringement of the general principle of non-retroactivity of measures and of the general principle of legal certainty — Manifestly contradictory nature of the statement of reasons

Third ground. Errors in law — Infringement of the principle of res judicata and of the general principle of legal certainty — Infringement of the right to effective judicial protection (reference to the ninth ground) — Failure to state reasons

Fourth ground. Errors in law concerning the application of the national rules on the implementation of Directive No 2013/36/EU — Infringement of the principle of legal certainty — Failure to take into consideration a decisive event which occurred during proceedings (rehabilitation) which meant that the person concerned automatically reacquired his or her status as having a good reputation within the meaning of the national implementing rules.

The ground is divided into four parts concerning the following matters:

(a)	the incorrect implementation into national law of Article 23(1) of the CRD IV and, consequently, the unlawful nature of Ministerial Decree 144/1998;

(b)	the failure to publish the list (of documents to be submitted for the purposes of authorisation) provided for in Article 23(4) of the CRD IV;

(c)	the non-enforceable nature of the 2008 Guidelines;

(d)	the rehabilitation measure obtained by Silvio Berlusconi: failure to take into consideration a decisive event which occurred during proceedings which meant that he automatically reacquired his status as having a good reputation within the meaning of the national implementing rules.

Fifth ground. Error in law in the interpretation of Article 23 of Directive No 2013/36/EU in relation to the significance of the requirement to have regard to the possible influence of the proposed acquirer in the event of the loss of his or her status as having a good reputation under national law

Sixth ground. Errors in law as to the significance of the principle of proportionality in the application of Directive No 2013/36/EU in relation to the alleged automatic decision-making under a provision of national implementing law — Prohibition on automatic decision-making — Failure to state reasons or inadequate statement of reasons

Seventh ground. Errors in law in the interpretation and application of Article 22(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (2) and of Article 32(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (3) — Infringement of the relevant applicable provisions of national law — Infringement of Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter — Manifestly illogical and contradictory nature of the statement of reasons

Eighth ground. Unlawful nature of the brief period (three days) provided for in Article 31(3) of Regulation EU No 468/2014 for the submission of comments — Infringement of Article 41 of the Charter and of the corresponding general principles of law derived from the constitutional traditions shared by the Member States — Contradictory and illogical nature of the statement of reasons — Failure of the time period to observe the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality and failure to exercise jurisdiction by the General Court in that regard

Ninth ground. Errors in law in the application of Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court in relation to new pleas in law introduced after delivery of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 December 2018 — Manifest error of assessment concerning the existence of a ‘new matter of law’, failure to state reasons and manifestly illogical nature of the statement of reasons — Infringement of the principle of effective judicial protection and of Article 47 of the Charter — Failure to state reasons for its failure to examine new pleas in law of its own motion

Tenth ground. Manifest error of assessment as regards the admissibility of the plea in law concerning the document from social services confirming that probation had been concluded — Manifestly illogical nature of the statement of reasons — Infringement of national law — Infringement of Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court — Infringement of the principle of effective judicial protection and of Article 47 of the Charter — Failure to state reasons for its failure to examine the plea in law of its own motion

Eleventh ground. Infringement of Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court concerning the inadmissibility of new evidence — Manifest error of assessment concerning the significance, for the purposes of the decision, of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 December 2018 and of the judgment of the Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione (Combined Chamber of the Court of Cassation, Italy) No 10355/2021 — Failure to examine a document that is decisive for the purposes of the admissibility of new pleas in law — Infringement of the rights of the defence and of Article 47 of the Charter in particular

---

(1)  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338).

(2)  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63).

(3)  Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ 2014 L 141, p. 1).

Appeal brought on 27 July 2022 by Silvio Berlusconi against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 11 May 2022 in Case T-913/16 Finanziaria d’investimento Fininvest SpA (Fininvest), Silvio Berlusconi v European Central Bank (ECB)

(Case C-513/22 P)

(2022/C 359/61)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Silvio Berlusconi (represented by: A. Di Porto, N. Ghedini and B. Nascimbene, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Central Bank, European Commission, Finanziaria d’investimento Fininvest SpA (Fininvest)

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

—	set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 11 May 2022;

—	consequently, annul the European Central Bank’s decision of 25 October 2016;

—	in the alternative, in the event that the Court of Justice finds that it cannot make a decision as matters stand, set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 11 May 2022 and refer the case back to a different chamber of the General Court;

—	order the European Central Bank to pay the costs, including those incurred at first instance;

—

by way of measures of inquiry: — order the documents declared inadmissible by the General Court to be added to the file in the case; — where necessary, take the appropriate measures of organisation and measures of inquiry in order to acquire the minutes of the hearing of 16 September 2021 and the sound recording of the hearing.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

First ground. Error in law in the assessment of the effects of the control exercised by the applicants at first instance over Banca Mediolanum — Manifest error of assessment and distortion of the facts concerning the acquisition of the qualifying holding — Unlawful substitution of the grounds of the decision at issue — Infringement of the audi alteram partem principle — Error in law in the legal classification of the type of ‘acquisition’ of a qualifying holding under EU law and national law — Failure to apply national law — Infringement of the principle of sincere cooperation — Contradictory nature of the statement of reasons — Misuse of powers

The ground is divided into six parts concerning the following matters:

(a)	the assessment of the joint control over Banca Mediolanum exercised, ‘before the merger in question’, by Fininvest and Silvio Berlusconi through a shareholders’ agreement entered into with Fin. Prog Italia: incorrect assessment of the consequences;

(b)

the status of Silvio Berlusconi as a qualifying shareholder of Banca Mediolanum was incorrectly reconstructed from the sequence ‘measure of Banca d’Italia of 7 October 2014’ — ‘merger’ — ‘judgment of the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy) of 3 March 2016’; misrepresentation of the facts and clear errors in law;

(c)	the substitution by the General Court of its own reasons for those of the author of the decision at issue; infringement of Articles 263 and 264 TFEU;

(d)	the new concept under EU law of acquisition of a qualifying holding: failure to apply national law;

(e)	the creation by the General Court of a category not provided for under the rules of EU law;

(f)	the distinction between indirect qualifying holdings and direct qualifying holdings: infringement of Article 22 of Directive No 2013/36/EU and of Article 22 of Legislative Decree No 385/1993 (‘TUB’).

Second ground. Errors in law concerning the finding that Directive No 2013/36/EU is lawful (1) — Infringement of the general principle of non-retroactivity of measures and of the general principle of legal certainty — Manifestly contradictory nature of the statement of reasons

Third ground. Errors in law — Infringement of the principle of res judicata and of the general principle of legal certainty — Infringement of the right to effective judicial protection (reference to the ninth ground) — Failure to state reasons

Fourth ground. Errors in law concerning the application of the national rules on the implementation of Directive No 2013/36/EU — Infringement of the principle of legal certainty — Failure to take into consideration a decisive event which occurred during proceedings (rehabilitation) which meant that the person concerned automatically reacquired his or her status as having a good reputation within the meaning of the national implementing rules.

The ground is divided into four parts concerning the following matters:

(a)	the incorrect implementation into national law of Article 23(1) of Directive No 2013/36/EU and, consequently, the unlawful nature of Ministerial Decree 144/1998;

(b)	the failure to publish the list (of documents to be submitted for the purposes of authorisation) provided for in Article 23(4) of Directive No 2013/36/EU;

(c)	the non-enforceable nature of the 2008 Guidelines;

(d)	the rehabilitation measure obtained by Silvio Berlusconi: failure to take into consideration a decisive event which occurred during proceedings which meant that he automatically reacquired his status as having a good reputation within the meaning of the national implementing rules.

Fifth ground. Error in law in the interpretation of Article 23 of Directive No 2013/36/EU in relation to the significance of the requirement to have regard to the possible influence of the proposed acquirer in the event of the loss of his or her status as having a good reputation under national law

Sixth ground. Errors in law as to the significance of the principle of proportionality in the application of Directive No 2013/36/EU in relation to the alleged automatic decision-making under a provision of national implementing law — Prohibition on automatic decision-making — Failure to state reasons or inadequate statement of reasons

Seventh ground. Errors in law in the interpretation and application of Article 22(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (2) and of Article 32(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (3) — Infringement of the relevant applicable provisions of national law — Infringement of Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter — Manifestly illogical and contradictory nature of the statement of reasons

Eighth ground. Unlawful nature of the brief period (three days) provided for in Article 31(3) of Regulation EU No 468/2014 for the submission of comments — Infringement of Article 41 of the Charter and of the corresponding general principles of law derived from the constitutional traditions shared by the Member States — Contradictory and illogical nature of the statement of reasons — Failure of the time period to observe the criteria of reasonableness and proportionality and failure to exercise jurisdiction by the General Court in that regard

Ninth ground. Errors in law in the application of Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court in relation to new pleas in law introduced after delivery of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 December 2018 — Manifest error of assessment concerning the existence of a ‘new matter of law’, failure to state reasons and manifestly illogical nature of the statement of reasons — Infringement of the principle of effective judicial protection and of Article 47 of the Charter — Failure to state reasons for its failure to examine new pleas in law of its own motion

Tenth ground. Manifest error of assessment as regards the admissibility of the plea in law concerning the document from social services confirming that probation had been concluded — Manifestly illogical nature of the statement of reasons — Infringement of national law — Infringement of Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court — Infringement of the principle of effective judicial protection and of Article 47 of the Charter — Failure to state reasons for its failure to examine the plea in law of its own motion

Eleventh ground. Infringement of Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court concerning the inadmissibility of new evidence — Failure to state reasons justifying the delay or inadequate statement of those reasons — Manifest error of assessment concerning the significance, for the purposes of the decision of documents concerning applications brought before the ECtHR, of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 December 2018 and of the judgment of the Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione (Combined Chamber of the Court of Cassation, Italy) No 10355/2021 — Failure to examine a document that is decisive for the purposes of the admissibility of new pleas in law — Infringement of the rights of the defence and of Article 47 of the Charter in particular

---

(1)  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338).

(2)  Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63).

(3)  Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) (OJ 2014 L 141, p. 1).

Appeal brought on 29 July 2022 by Tirrenia di navigazione SpA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 18 May 2022 in Case T-593/20 Tirrenia di navigazione SpA v European Commission

(Case C-514/22 P)

(2022/C 359/62)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Tirrenia di navigazione SpA (represented by: B. Nascimbene, F. Rossi Dal Pozzo and A. Moriconi, avvocati)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside the judgment of the General Court of 18 May 2022 in Case T-593/20;

—	declare Articles 2, 3 and 4 and, in the alternative, Articles 6 and 7 of Commission Decision (EU) 2020/1412 of 2 March 2020, which order the immediate and effective recovery of the alleged aid, to be void;

—	in the alternative to the point above, refer the case back to another chamber of the General Court;

—	order the defendant at first instance to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant challenges the judgment of the General Court in Case T-593/20, Tirrenia di navigazione SpA v Commission, by which that court dismissed the action for annulment of Articles 2, 3 and 4 and, in the alternative, Articles 6 and 7 of Decision (EU) 2020/1412 of 2 March 2020, by which the Commission concluded that certain measures relating to the appellant were to be regarded as illegal and incompatible State aid.

By the first ground of appeal, the appellant alleges an infringement of Articles 107(1) and 108(2) TFEU and of the 2004 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.

The appellant submits that the General Court made an error in law and failed to state reasons in so far as it finds that the appellant had failed to ensure observance of the conditions in paragraph 25(c) of the 2004 Guidelines.

On the contrary, the appellant submits that the Italian Government had (a) duly informed the Commission of the plan to privatise the business branch; (b) confirmed the intention to repay the rescue aid before the expiry of the six-month time limit using the proceeds of privatisation; and (c) published the liquidation plan on its own website. Therefore, it had put the Commission in a position to be perfectly aware of its own plans for a privatisation procedure as part of its liquidation plan and for subsequent repayment of the rescue aid.

According to the appellant, the formalistic approach adopted by the Commission and shared by the General Court is contrary to the principle of good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as being contrary to the principle of effectiveness.

By the second ground of appeal, the appellant alleges an infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU and of Article 108(2) TFEU by making reference to exemptions from paying certain taxes.

The appellant submits that the General Court made an error in law and failed to state reasons in so far as, with regard to ‘indirect taxes’, it found the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission in its counterclaim to be well founded.

In addition, the General Court made an error in law in its assessment of the applicability of Article 107(1) TFEU to the contested measure relied on by the appellant concerning the exemption from certain taxes, and the assessments by the General Court in that respect contain an inadequate statement of reasons.

Such an exemption from corporate income tax is, however, entirely conditional on the realisation of future and uncertain events such as to prevent any advantage in the form of the exemption being used by the appellant hitherto and to make it entirely possible, as is acknowledged in the decision, that such an advantage may be available in the future.

Further, the appellant claims that, in addition to the absence of any advantage, other constituent elements of the concept of aid are similarly lacking: the impact of the measure on trade within the European Union and the undermining of competition.

Thus, this exemption falls outside the concept of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and does not, therefore, constitute State aid.

By the third ground of appeal, the appellant alleges infringement of the principle of legal certainty and good administration with regard to the duration of the procedure, as well as the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and infringement of the principle of proportionality.

The appellant submits that the General Court made an error in law and failed to state reasons in so far as it affirms that, as a whole, the procedure that led to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2020/1412 was not of an excessive length and that, therefore, the principles of legal certainty, good administration and proportionality had not been infringed.

With regard to infringement of the principle of proportionality, the General Court found the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission in its counterclaim to be well founded and, in doing so, made an error in law.

Further, the appellant claims that Decision (EU) 2020/1412, in accordance with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, could not have required the recovery of the disputed aid measures from Tirrenia in AS.

According to the appellant, the General Court, by failing to find that the Commission had infringed the general principles referred to above and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, made an error in law.

By the fourth ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court failed to place an item of evidence in the file in the case.

The appellant complains that it was unable to deposit in the file in the case, in accordance with to Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Commission Decision of 30 September 2021 on the measures SA.32014, SA.32015, SA.32016 (2011/C) (ex 2011/NN) implemented by Italy and the Region of Sardinia in favour of Saremar (notified under document C(2021) 6990), which the appellant acquired from the Commission following a request for access to the documents.

According to the appellant, in view of the relevance of the Saremar decision, the failure to place this additional evidence in the file in the case failed to give effect to the judgment of the General Court, both by reason of the fact that this infringed the General Court’s own Rules of Procedure and was contrary to the duty to state reasons imposed on any EU institution, and by reason of the fact that it constituted a manifest infringement of the appellant’s rights of defence.

Appeal brought on 29 July 2022 by Tirrenia di navigazione SpA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 18 May 2022 in Case T-601/20 Tirrenia di navigazione SpA v European Commission

(Case C-515/22 P)

(2022/C 359/63)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Appellant: Tirrenia di navigazione SpA (represented by: B. Nascimbene, F. Rossi Dal Pozzo and A. Moriconi, avvocati)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	set aside the judgment of the General Court of 18 May 2022 in Case T-601/20;

—	declare Articles 1(3) and 2 of Commission Decision (EU) 2020/1411 of 2 March 2020;

—	in the alternative to the point above, refer the case back to another chamber of the General Court;

—	order the defendant at first instance to pay the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant challenges the judgment of the General Court of 18 May 2022 in Case T-601/20, Tirrenia di navigazione SpA v Commission, by which that court dismissed the action for annulment of Articles 1(3) and 2 of Decision (EU) 2020/1411 of 2 March 2020, by which the Commission declared ‘aid granted to Adriatica for the period January 1992 to July 1994 in relation to the Brindisi/Corfu/Igoumenitsa/Patras connection is incompatible with the common market’, which was ‘unlawfully put into effect in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU’.

By the first ground of appeal, the appellant alleges an infringement of procedure concerning the limitation period for the recovery of interest on aid found to be illegal and incompatible.

According to the appellant, the General Court made a number of errors: (a) in holding, in respect of the specific finding that interest had not been recovered for the period between 1 January 2007 and 26 March 2007, that this was not outside of the ten-year limitation period; and (b) in holding that the appellant could not challenge the failure to establish such an infringement, which constitutes a manifest infringement of the audi alteram partem principle and, therefore, of the rights of the defence, as regards the Member State concerned.

By the second ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the aid was erroneously categorised as new, that the decision which declared the State aid to be new and incompatible is unlawful, and that the obligation to state reasons has not been met and that the proportionality principle has been infringed.

The General Court has not shown how the Commission, through Decision (EU) 2020/1411 of 2 March 2020, rectified the defect established in the judgment of the General Court of 4 March 2009 in Joined Cases T-265/04, T-292/04 and T-504/04 concerning a 2004 decision (2005/163/EC).

The General Court erred in finding that the Commission had corrected its failure to state reasons established in 2009 and had shown with Decision (EU) 2020/1411 that the subsidies for PSOs granted to Adriatica are new aid.

The appellant submits that the General Court made an error in law and failed to state reasons in so far as it finds that the Commission correctly categorised the subsidies for PSOs granted to Adriatica for the period from January 1992 to July 1994 in relation to the Brindisi/Corfu/Igoumenitsa/Patras connection as incompatible with the internal market.

The appellant claims that the General Court was necessarily obliged to verify whether the Commission, in Decision (EU) 2020/1411 (a) specifically defined the situation on the market; (b) correctly compared the purpose of the aid measure with the purpose of the agreement; (c) correctly explained how the distortion of competition caused by the aid measure had been worsened by the combination of that measure (otherwise found to be compatible) and participation in a cartel; and, therefore, (d) stated reasons for the cause and effect relationship as far as concerns the existence of consequent obstacles to intra-Community trade.

The appellant also claims that the conclusions reached by the Tribunal are contrary to the general principle of proportionality.

By the third ground of appeal, the appellant alleges infringement of the principle of legal certainty and good administration with regard to the duration of the procedure, as well as the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and infringement of the principle of proportionality.

The appellant submits that the General Court made an error in law and failed to state reasons in so far as it affirms that, as a whole, the procedure that led to the adoption of Decision (EU) 2020/1411 of 2 March 2020 was not of an excessive length and that, therefore, the principles of legal certainty, good administration and proportionality had not been infringed.

Further, the appellant claims that, in accordance with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Decision (EU) 2020/1411 of 2 March 2020 could not have required the recovery of the aid.

According to the appellant, the General Court, by failing to find that the Commission had infringed the general principles referred to above and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, made an error in law.

By the fourth ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court failed to place an item of evidence in the file in the case.

The appellant complains that it was unable to deposit in the file in the case, in accordance with to Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Commission Decision of 30 September 2021 on the measures SA.32014, SA.32015, SA.32016 (2011/C) (ex 2011/NN) implemented by Italy and the Region of Sardinia in favour of Saremar (notified under document C(2021) 6990), which the appellant acquired from the Commission following a request for access to the documents.

According to the appellant, in view of the relevance of the Saremar decision, the failure to place this additional evidence in the file in the case failed to give effect to the judgment of the General Court, both by reason of the fact that this infringed the General Court’s own Rules of Procedure and was contrary to the duty to state reasons imposed on any EU institution, and by reason of the fact that it constituted a manifest infringement of the appellant’s rights of defence.

Order of the President of the Court of 8 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña — Spain) — IP v Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional de Cataluña (TEAR de Cataluña)

(Case C-330/20) (1)

(2022/C 359/64)

Language of the case: Spanish

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 359, 26.10.2020.

Order of the President of the Court of 8 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña — Spain) — CZ v Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional de Cataluña (TEAR de Cataluña)

(Case C-366/20) (1)

(2022/C 359/65)

Language of the case: Spanish

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 359, 26.10.2020.

Order of the President of the Court of 24 March 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski gradski sad — Bulgaria) — EUROBANK BULGARIA v NI, RZ, DMD DEVELOPMENTS

(Case C-445/21) (1)

(2022/C 359/66)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 412, 11.10.2021.

Order of the President of the Court of 31 March 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Korneuburg — Austria) — Laudamotion GmbH v TG, QN, AirHelp Germany GmbH

(Case C-517/21) (1)

(2022/C 359/67)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 471, 22.11.2021.

Order of the President of the Court of 15 March 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats's-Hertogenbosch — Netherlands) — G v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

(Case C-614/21) (1)

(2022/C 359/68)

Language of the case: Dutch

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 2, 3.1.2022.

Order of the President of the Court of 30 March 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — YV v Stadtverkehr Lindau (B) GmbH

(Case C-685/21) (1)

(2022/C 359/69)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 84, 21.2.2022.

Order of the President of the Court of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Piteşti — Romania) — Proceedings brought by MK

(Case C-709/21) (1)

(2022/C 359/70)

Language of the case: Romanian

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 51, 31.1.2022.

Order of the President of the Court of 29 March 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich — Poland) — Provident Polska S.A. v VF

(Case C-717/21) (1)

(2022/C 359/71)

Language of the case: Polish

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 128, 21.3.2022.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — AI and Others v ECDC

(Case T-864/19) (1)

(Civil service - ECDC staff members - Psychological harassment - Request for assistance - Prior warnings - Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights - Article 24 of the Staff Regulations - Scope of the duty to provide assistance - Duty to have regard for the welfare of officials - Opening of an investigation - Reasonable time period - Liability - Unlawfulness)

(2022/C 359/72)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: AI, HV, HW, HY (represented by: L. Levi and A. Champetier, lawyers)

Defendant: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (represented by: J. Mannheim, acting as Agent, and by D. Waelbroeck and A. Duron, lawyers)

Re:

By their action brought under Article 270 TFEU, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 17 December 2019, the applicants, AI, HV, HW and HY, seek compensation for the harm which they claim to have suffered as a result, essentially, of the lack of an appropriate response from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) in relation to the conduct of A (Head of Unit) towards them between 2012 and 2018, constituting, in their view, psychological harassment.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders each party to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 61, 24.2.2020.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — JC v EUCAP Somalia

(Case T-165/20) (1)

(Arbitration clause - International contract staff of EUCAP Somalia - Common Foreign and Security Policy mission - Termination of a fixed-term contract during the trial period - Notification of termination of the contract by registered letter with a form for acknowledgment of receipt - Sent to an incomplete address - Starting point of the period for an internal appeal prior to court proceedings - Determination of the applicable law - Mandatory provisions of national employment law - Invalidity of the trial clause - Irregular notification of notice - Compensation in lieu of notice - Retroactive payment of remuneration - Counterclaim)

(2022/C 359/73)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: JC (represented by: A. Van Himst, lawyer)

Defendant: EUCAP Somalia (represented by: E. Raoult, lawyer)

Re:

By his action under Article 272 TFEU, the applicant seeks, first, a declaration that the letters of 4 November 2019 and of 3 December 2019 by which EUCAP Somalia notified him of its decision to terminate his employment contract are invalid and, in so far as necessary, a declaration that the decision of 24 January 2020 by which EUCAP Somalia rejected his non-disciplinary internal appeal against the decision to terminate his employment contract as notified by the letter of 3 December 2019 is invalid and, second, that EUCAP Somalia be ordered to pay him his salary retroactively until the definitive, proper and lawful end date of the contractual relationship.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Declares that the notice of termination contained in the letter of 4 November 2019 is invalid;

2.

Declares that the termination of the contract of 21 August 2019 concluded between EUCAP Somalia and JC is lawful, valid and enforceable against JC on the date of 5 December 2019 and takes definitive effect at the end of the one month notice period from 9 December 2019 in accordance with Article 18.1 of that contract;

3.

Orders EUCAP Somalia to pay JC, first, a sum corresponding to his remuneration, as set out in Article 12.2 of the employment contract, excluding the daily allowances provided for by Article 15 of that contract, for the period 26 November to 8 December 2019 inclusive and, second, a sum corresponding to compensation in lieu of notice equal to one month of that remuneration, for the period 9 December 2019 to 9 January 2020, plus interest at the statutory rate under Belgian law;

4.	Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

5.	Rejects EUCAP Somalia’s counterclaim;

6.	Orders EUCAP Somalia to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 9, 11.1.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — JF v EUCAP Somalia

(Case T-194/20) (1)

(Arbitration clause - International contract staff of EUCAP Somalia - Common Foreign and Security Policy mission - Non-renewal of employment contract following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union - Right to be heard - Equal treatment - Non-discrimination on grounds of nationality - Transition period provided for in the agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union - Action for annulment - Action for damages - Acts inseparable from the contract - Inadmissibility)

(2022/C 359/74)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: JF (represented by: A. Kunst, lawyer)

Defendant: EUCAP Somalia (represented by: E. Raoult, lawyer)

Re:

By his action, the applicant, seeks, first, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, annulment of EUCAP Somalia’s note of 18 January 2020 and the letter of 29 January 2020 by which it decided not to renew his contract of employment and, secondly, on the basis of Article 268 TFEU, compensation for the damage he suffered as a result of those acts, and, in the alternative, on the basis of Article 272 TFEU, that the contested acts be declared unlawful and compensation for the damage he suffered as a result of those acts.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders JF to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 201, 15.6.2020.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — VeriGraft v Eismea

(Case T-457/20) (1)

(Arbitration clause - ‘Horizon 2020 — Framework Programme for Research and Innovation’ (2014-2020) - Grant Agreement ‘Personalised Tissue-Engineered Veins as the first Cure for Patients with Chronic Venous Insufficiency — P TEV’ - Unforeseen subcontracting costs - Simplified approval procedure - Subcontracting mentioned in the periodic technical reports - Approved periodic technical reports - Eligible costs)

(2022/C 359/75)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: VeriGraft AB (Gothenburg, Sweden) (represented by: P. Hansson and M. Persson, lawyers)

Defendant: European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency (Eismea) (represented by: A. Galea, acting as Agent, and by D. Waelbroeck and A. Duron, lawyers)

Re:

By its action based on Article 272 TFEU, the applicant, VeriGraft AB, seeks a declaration: (i) that the subcontracting costs rejected by the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (EASME) constitute eligible costs under the Grant Agreement relating to the project ‘Personalised Tissue-Engineered Veins as the first Cure for Patients with Chronic Venous Insufficiency — P-TEV’, with reference 778620; (ii) that debit note No 3242004635 issued by EASME in the amount of EUR 106 928,74 is unfounded; and (iii) that the recovery of the sum of EUR 109 230,19 from the guarantee fund set up by the Grant Agreement is also unfounded.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.

Upholds VeriGraft AB’s request seeking a declaration that the subcontracting costs rejected by the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in the amount of EUR 258 588,80 constitute eligible costs under the Grant Agreement ‘Personalised Tissue-Engineered Veins as the first Cure for Patients with Chronic Venous Insufficiency — P-TEV’, with reference 778620;

2.	Upholds VeriGraft’s request seeking a declaration that debit note No 3242004635, issued by the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in the amount of EUR 106 928,74, is unfounded;

3.

Upholds VeriGraft’s request seeking a declaration that the recovery of the sum of EUR 109 230,19 from the guarantee fund set up by the Grant Agreement ‘Personalised Tissue-Engineered Veins as the first Cure for Patients with Chronic Venous Insufficiency — P-TEV’, with reference 778620, is unfounded;

4.	Orders the European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency (Eismea) to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 297, 7.9.2020.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — Delifruit v Commission

(Case T-629/20) (1)

(Plant protection products - Active substance chlorpyrifos - Determination of maximum residue levels for chlorpyrifos in or on bananas - Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 - Scientific and technical knowledge available - Other legitimate factors)

(2022/C 359/76)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Delifruit, SA (Guayaquil, Ecuador) (represented by: K. Van Maldegem, P. Sellar and S. Abdel-Qader, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: F. Castilla Contreras, A. Dawes and M. ter Haar, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Delifruit, SA, seeks the partial annulment of Commission Regulation (EU) 2020/1085 of 23 July 2020 amending Annexes II and V to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for chlorpyrifos and chlorpyrifos-methyl in or on certain products (OJ 2020 L 239, p. 7, corrigendum OJ 2020 L 245, p. 31) (‘the contested regulation’), in so far as it sets the maximum residue level (‘MRL’) for chlorpyrifos in or on bananas at 0.01 mg/kg.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Delifruit, SA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 433, 14.12.2020.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — Standard International Management v EUIPO — Asia Standard Management Services (The Standard)

(Case T-768/20) (1)

(EU trade mark - Revocation proceedings - EU figurative mark The Standard - Declaration of revocation - Place of the use of the mark - Advertisements and offers for sale to consumers in the EU - Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001keywords)

(2022/C 359/77)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Standard International Management LLC (New York, New York (United States) (represented by: M. Edenborough QC, S. Wickenden, Barrister, and M. Maier, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája, Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Asia Standard Management Services Ltd (Hong Kong, China)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 27 November 2020 (Case R 828/2020-5).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 27 November 2020 (Case R 828/2020-5) as regards the services in Classes 38, 39, 41, 43 and 44;

2.	Orders EUIPO to bear, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by Standard International Management LLC, including those incurred for the purposes of the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

---

(1)  OJ C 62, 22.2.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — Gugler France v EUIPO — Gugler (GUGLER)

(Case T-147/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark GUGLER - Absolute ground for invalidity - No bad faith - Article 51(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2022/C 359/78)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Gugler France (Les Auxons, France) (represented by: A. Grolée, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Alexander Gugler (Maxdorf, Germany) (represented by: M. -C. Simon, lawyer)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 9 December 2020 (Case R 893/2020-5).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Gugler France to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 163, 3.5.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — CCTY Bearing Company v EUIPO — CCVI International (CCTY)

(Case T-176/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU word mark CCTY - Earlier EU figurative mark CCVI - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Misuse of rights - Article 71 of Regulation 2017/1001)

(2022/C 359/79)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: CCTY Bearing Company (Zhenjiang, China) (represented by: L. Genz and C. Stadler, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Capostagno and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: CCVI International Srl (Vicenza, Italy) (represented by: D. Demarinis, R. Covelli and M. Theisen, lawyers)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 3 February 2021 (Case R 779/2020-4).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders CCTY Bearing Company to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 206, 31.5.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — Illumina v Commission

(Case T-227/21) (1)

(Competition - Concentrations - Pharmaceutical industry market - Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 - Referral request from a competition authority not having jurisdiction under national law to examine the concentration - Commission decision to examine the concentration - Commission decisions accepting requests from other national competition authorities to join the referral request - Competence of the Commission - Time limit for submitting the referral request - Concept of ‘made known’ - Reasonable time - Legitimate expectations - Public statements by the Vice-President of the Commission - Legal certainty)

(2022/C 359/80)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Illumina, Inc. (Wilmington, Delaware, United States) (represented by: D. Beard, Barrister, and P. Chappatte, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: N. Khan, G. Conte and C. Urraca Caviedes, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the applicant: Grail LLC, formerly Grail, Inc. (Menlo Park, California, United States) (represented by: D. Little, Solicitor, J. Ruiz Calzado, J.M. Jiménez-Laiglesia Oñate and A. Giraud, lawyers)

Interveners in support of the defendant: Hellenic Republic (represented by: K. Boskovits, acting as Agent), French Republic (represented by: T. Stéhelin, P. Dodeller, J.-L. Carré and E. Leclerc, acting as Agents), Kingdom of the Netherlands (represented by: M. Bulterman and P. Huurnink, acting as Agents), EFTA Surveillance Authority (represented by: C. Simpson, M. Sánchez Rydelski and M.-M. Joséphidès, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment, first, of Commission Decision C(2021) 2847 final of 19 April 2021, accepting the request of the Autorité de la concurrence française (French Competition Authority) to examine the concentration relating to the acquisition by Illumina, Inc. of sole control over Grail, Inc. (Case COMP/M.10188 — Illumina/Grail), second, of Commission Decisions C(2021) 2848 final, C(2021) 2849 final, C(2021) 2851 final, C(2021) 2854 final and C(2021) 2855 final of 19 April 2021, accepting the requests of the Greek, Belgian, Norwegian, Icelandic and Dutch competition authorities to join that referral request, and third, of the Commission's letter of 11 March 2021 informing Illumina and Grail of that referral request.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Illumina, Inc. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

3.	Orders the Hellenic Republic, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and Grail LLC to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 252, 28.6.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — Unimax Stationery v EUIPO — Mitsubishi Pencil (uni)

(Case T-369/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark uni - Absolute grounds for refusal - Distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Signs or indications which have become customary - Article 7(1)(d) of Regulation No 40/94 (now Article 7(1)(d) of Regulation 2017/1001))

(2022/C 359/81)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Unimax Stationery (Daman, India) (represented by: E Amoah, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Mitsubishi Pencil Co. Ltd (Tokyo, Japan) (represented by: A. Perani and G. Ghisletti, lawyers)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 April 2021 (Case R 1909/2020-5).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Unimax Stationery to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 338, 23.8.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — TL v Commission

(Case T-438/21) (1)

(Civil service - Members of the temporary staff - Fixed-term contract - Decision not to renew the contract - Vacancy notice - Manifest error of assessment - Duty of care - Psychological harassment - Liability)

(2022/C 359/82)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: TL (represented by: L. Levi and N. Flandin, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B. Mongin and M. Brauhoff, acting as Agents)

Re:

By her action based on Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, TL, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the European Commission’s authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment of 29 October 2020 not to renew her contract of employment and, so far as necessary, of the decision of 20 April 2021 rejecting her complaint brought under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union against that decision and, secondly, compensation in respect of the damage which she claims to have suffered as a result of those acts.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders TL to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 357, 6.9.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — Purasac v EUIPO — Prollenium Medical Technologies (Rejeunesse)

(Case T-543/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark Rejeunesse - Earlier EU word mark REVANESSE - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 359/83)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Purasac Co. Ltd (Anyang-si, South Korea) (represented by: P. Lee, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: E. Sliwinska and J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Prollenium Medical Technologies, Inc. (Aurora, Ontario, Canada) (represented by: R. Lyxell, lawyer)

Re:

By its action brought under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 2 July 2021 (Case R 146/2021-4).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Purasac Co. Ltd to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 422, 18.10.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — Brand Energy Holdings v EUIPO (RAPIDGUARD)

(Case T-573/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark RAPIDGUARD - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - No distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Right to be heard)

(2022/C 359/84)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Brand Energy Holdings BV (Vlaardingen, Netherlands) (represented by: A. Hönninger and F. Dechent, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 30 June 2021 (Case R 294/2021-5).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Brand Energy Holdings BV to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

---

(1)  OJ C 431, 25.10.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — Rimini Street v EUIPO (WE DO SUPPORT)

(Case T-634/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - International registration designating the European Union - Word mark WE DO SUPPORT - Absolute ground for refusal - No distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 359/85)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Rimini Street, Inc. (Las Vegas, Nevada, United States) (represented by: E. Ratjen, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: R. Raponi and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 3 August 2021 (Case R 710/2021-4).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Rimini Street, Inc., to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 502, 13.12.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — dennree v EUIPO (BioMarkt)

(Case T-641/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for registration of the EU figurative mark BioMarkt - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) du of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 359/86)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: dennree GmbH (Töpen, Germany) (represented by: K. Röttgen, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Eberl and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) du 9 August 2021 (Case R 783/2021-5).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders dennree GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 471, 22.11.2021.

Judgment of the General Court of 13 July 2022 — TL v Commission

(Case T-677/21) (1)

(Civil service - Members of the temporary staff - Appraisal report for 2019 - Obligation to state reasons - Manifest error of assessment - Setting of objectives - Misuse of powers - Liability)

(2022/C 359/87)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: TL (represented by: L. Levi and N. Flandin, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: M. Brauhoff and L. Hohenecker, acting as Agents)

Re:

By her action based on Article 270 TFEU, the applicant seeks, first, annulment of her appraisal report for 2019 or, in the alternative, its partial annulment and, so far as necessary, of the decision of the European Commission’s authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment of 8 July 2021 dismissing her complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union against that report, and, secondly, compensation for the non-material damage which she claims to have suffered due to the unlawfulness of that report.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders TL to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 502, 13.12.2021.

Order of the General Court of 21 July 2022 — Fersher Developments and Lisin v Commission and ECB

(Case T-200/18) (1)

(Action for damages - Economic and monetary policy - Stability support programme for Cyprus - Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality concluded between Cyprus and the European Stability Mechanism - Jurisdiction of the General Court - Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals - Equal treatment - Principle of proportionality - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

(2022/C 359/88)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Fersher Developments LTD (Nicosia, Cyprus), Vladimir Lisin (Lipetsk, Russia) (represented by: R. Nowinski, lawyer)

Defendants: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn, T. Materne and S. Delaude, acting as Agents), European Central Bank (represented by: O. Heinz, P. Papapaschalis, G. Várhelyi and M. Szablewska, acting as Agents, and by H.-G. Kamann, lawyer)

Re:

By their action under Article 268 TFEU, the applicants seek compensation for the damage they claim to have suffered as a result of the decision of the Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) to make the grant of a financial assistance facility to the Republic of Cyprus subject to certain conditions.

Operative part of the order

1.	The action is dismissed.

2.	Fersher Developments LTD and Mr Vladimir Lisin shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 211, 18.6.2018.

Order of the General Court of 25 July 2022 — Armadora Parleros v Commission

(Case T-254/21) (1)

(Non-contractual liability - Common fisheries policy - Failure by the Commission to exercise its powers of control covered by the applicable legislation - Engine power of boats - Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals - Damage - Causal link - Limitation period - Action manifestly inadmissible)

(2022/C 359/89)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Armadora Parleros, SL (Santa Eugenia de Ribeira, Spain) (represented by: J. Navas Marqués, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: M. Morales Puerta and K. Walkerová, acting as Agents)

Re:

By its action based on Article 268 TFEU, the applicant seeks compensation for damage caused to it by the loss of profit which it suffered as a result of an engine failure of its fishing vessel, the Vianto Tercero, in 2005. It attributes the origin of that engine failure to defective supervision by the Commission of the monitoring by the Kingdom of Spain of the rules of the common fisheries policy in the North-West Cantabrian sea fisheries zone. According to the applicant, the engine failure was caused by overuse of the engine due to the applicant’s exposure to unfair competition from fishing vessels with an engine power in excess of the permitted power.

Operative part of the order

1.	The action is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible and, in any event, manifestly lacking any foundation in law.

2.	Armadora Parleros SL shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 252, 28.6.2021.

Order of the General Court of 15 July 2022 — El Corte Inglés v EUIPO — Brito & Pereira (TINTAS BRICOR)

(Case T-317/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Revocation of the contested decision - Action which has become devoid of purpose - No need to adjudicate)

(2022/C 359/90)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: El Corte Inglés, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J. Rivas Zurdo, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carillo, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Brito & Pereira (Vizela, Portugal)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant seeks annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 26 March 2021 (Case R 882/2020-1).

Operative part of the order

1.	There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.	The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by El Corte Inglés, SA.

---

(1)  OJ C 289, 19.7.2021.

Order of the General Court of 19 July 2022 — Anglofranchise v EUIPO — Bugrey (BOY LONDON)

(Case T-439/21) (1)

(European Union trade mark - Cancellation proceedings - Withdrawal of the application for a declaration of invalidity - No need to adjudicate)

(2022/C 359/91)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Anglofranchise Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: P. Roncaglia, F. Rossi, N. Parrotta and R. Perotti, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: R. Raponi and J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Yuliya Bugrey (Milan, Italy) (represented by: D. Russo, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the EUIPO of 23 April 2021 (Case R 459/2020-5), relating to cancellation proceedings between Yuliya Bugrey and Anglofranchise.

Operative part of the order

1.	There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.	Anglofranchise Ltd and Yuliya Bugrey shall bear their own costs and each pay half of the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

---

(1)  OJ C 357, 6.9.2021.

Order of the General Court of 20 July 2022 — Sanoptis v EUIPO — Synoptis Pharma (SANOPTIS)

(Case T-30/22) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Withdrawal of the application for registration - No need to adjudicate)

(2022/C 359/92)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Sanoptis Sàrl (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: S. Rost, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Synoptis Pharma sp. z o.o. (Warsaw, Poland)

Re:

By its action based on Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Sanoptis Sàrl, seeks annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 18 November 2021 (Case R 850/2021-4).

Operative part of the order

1.	There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

2.	Sanoptis Sàrl shall pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 119, 14.3.2022.

Action brought on 7 May 2022 — Aziz v Commission

(Case T-266/22)

(2022/C 359/93)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Ahmad Aziz (Pieta, Malta) (represented by: L. Cuschieri, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the decision number Ares(2022)3227480 of 26 April 2021 of the European Commission, not to rectify personal data of the applicant pursuant to Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1);

—

declare that there is a breach of Article 50 of the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights when authorities started two parallel criminal and civil proceedings against the applicant, on submitting his own personal data, with same alleged facts, when the applicant is already acquitted from Pakistani trial court with same alleged facts;

—

declare that there is a breach of Article 17 for non-provision of data when the European Commission processed the applicant’s personal data. The applicant claims that the General Court should annul the European Commission’s decision number Ares(2022)2457760 dated 1 April 2022 for non-provision of data in term of Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging that the European Commission infringed Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 in failing to rectify the applicant’s personal data.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging that the European commission infringed Article 17(3) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 in not providing the applicant with his personal data.

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the European Commission infringed the principle of presumption of openness and disclosure in failing to give the applicant access to his personal data, when parallel criminal and civil proceedings are ongoing against him. The applicant had the right to be provided with his personal data in ongoing parallel criminal and civil proceedings.

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(1)  Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39).