Official Journal C 213/30 M

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Timişoara — Romania) — SC Avio Lucos SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură — Centrul judeţean Dolj, Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură (APIA) — Aparat Central

(Case C-116/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Agriculture - Common agricultural policy - Direct support schemes - Common rules - Single area payment scheme - Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 - Article 2(c) - Concept of ‘agricultural activity’ - Article 35 - Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 - National legislation requiring the production of a legal document establishing the right to use the agricultural parcel made available to the farmer under a concession contract and making the validity of such a contract conditional on the future concessionaire having the status of breeder or owner of animals - Concessionaire of an area of pastureland who has concluded a cooperation contract with animal breeders - Res judicata)

(2022/C 213/02)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Timişoara

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SC Avio Lucos SRL

Defendants: Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură — Centrul judeţean Dolj, Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură (APIA) — Aparat Central

Operative part of the judgment

Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1310/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013, and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 of 30 November 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation No 73/2009 as regards cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system, under the direct support schemes for farmers provided for [by] that Regulation, as well as for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards cross-compliance under the support scheme provided for the wine sector, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which makes the grant of support under the single area payment scheme subject to an obligation on the applicant to prove that he has a ‘right to use’ the agricultural area covered by that application, provided that it is consistent with the objectives pursued by the EU legislation concerned, as well as with the general principles of EU law, in particular the principle of proportionality.

Regulation No 73/2009, as amended by Regulation No 1310/2013, and Regulation No 1122/2009 must be interpreted as not precluding, in the specific case in which the right to use an agricultural area has been justified by the beneficiary of support under the single area payment scheme through the submission of a concession contract in respect of pastureland in the public domain of a regional administrative authority, national legislation which makes the validity of such a contract conditional on the future concessionaire having the status of breeder or owner of animals.

Article 2(c) of Regulation No 73/2009, as amended by Regulation No 1310/2013, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘agricultural activity’ covers an activity by which a person takes pastureland on concession and subsequently concludes a cooperation contract with animal breeders, under which those breeders graze their animals on the land granted on concession, and the concessionaire retains the right to use the land, but undertakes not to restrict the grazing activity and takes responsibility for the maintenance of the pastureland, provided that such maintenance meets the conditions laid down by the optional standard referred to in Annex III to that regulation.

EU law must be interpreted as precluding the application, in the legal order of a Member State, of the principle of res judicata which, in a dispute between the same parties concerning the lawfulness of a measure for recovery of the sums paid to an applicant for support under a single area payment scheme, prevents the court hearing the case from examining the conformity with EU law of national requirements relating to the lawfulness of the right to use the agricultural area covered by the aid application, on the ground that that recovery measure is based on the same facts between the same parties and on the same national legislation as those analysed in a previous judicial decision which has become final.

(1) OJ C 279, 24.8.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/3

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court — Ireland) — G.D. v The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, Attorney General

(Case C-140/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector - Confidentiality of the communications - Providers of electronic communications services - General and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data - Access to retained data - Subsequent court supervision - Directive 2002/58/EC - Article 15(1) - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) - Possibility for a national court to restrict the temporal effects of a declaration of the invalidity of national legislation that is incompatible with EU law - Excluded)

(2022/C 213/03)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Supreme Court

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: G.D.

Defendants: The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, Attorney General

Operative part of the judgment

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislative measures which, as a preventive measure for the purposes of combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, provide for the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data. However, that Article 15(1), read in the light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, does not preclude legislative measures that provide, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating serious crime and preventing serious threats to public security, for

the targeted retention of traffic and location data which is limited, on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory factors, according to the categories of persons concerned or using a geographical criterion, for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary, but which may be extended;

the general and indiscriminate retention of IP addresses assigned to the source of an internet connection for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary;

the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems; and

recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services, by means of a decision of the competent authority that is subject to effective judicial review, to undertake, for a specified period of time, the expedited retention of traffic and location data in the possession of those service providers;

provided that those measures ensure, by means of clear and precise rules, that the retention of data at issue is subject to compliance with the applicable substantive and procedural conditions and that the persons concerned have effective safeguards against the risks of abuse;

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which the centralised processing of requests for access to data, which have been retained by providers of electronic communications services, issued by the police in the context of the investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences, is the responsibility of a police officer, who is assisted by a unit established within the police service which has a degree of autonomy in the exercise of its duties, and whose decisions may subsequently be subject to judicial review;

EU law must be interpreted as precluding a national court from limiting the temporal effects of a declaration of invalidity which it is bound to make, under national law, with respect to national legislation imposing on providers of electronic communications services the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data, owing to the incompatibility of that legislation with Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The admissibility of evidence obtained by means of such retention is, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, a matter for national law, subject to compliance, inter alia, with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

(1) OJ C 247, 27.7.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/5

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 April 2022 — European Commission v Council of the European Union

(Case C-161/20) (1)

(Action for annulment - Council decision, contained in the act of the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) of 5 February 2020, endorsing the submission to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) concerning the introduction of life cycle guidelines to estimate well-to-tank greenhouse gas emissions of sustainable alternative fuels - Article 17(1) TEU - External representation of the European Union - Transmission of that submission to the IMO by the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council, on behalf of the Member States and the Commission)

(2022/C 213/04)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented: initially by J.-F. Brakeland, S.L. Kalėda, W. Mölls and E. Georgieva, and subsequently by J.-F. Brakeland, S.L. Kalėda and E. Georgieva, acting as Agents)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: N. Rouam, K. Michoel, T. Haas and A. Norberg, acting as Agents)

Interveners in support of the defendant: Kingdom of Belgium (represented by: S. Baeyens and P. Cottin, acting as Agents, and by V. Van Thuyne and W. Timmermans, advocaten), Czech Republic (represented by: M. Smolek, J. Vláčil, D. Czechová, K. Najmanová and L. Březinová, acting as Agents), Kingdom of Denmark (represented: initially by J. Nymann-Lindegren, M. Jespersen, V. Pasternak Jørgensen and M. Søndahl Wolff, and subsequently by V. Pasternak Jørgensen and M. Søndahl Wolff, acting as Agents), Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: D. Klebs and J. Möller, acting as Agents), Hellenic Republic (represented by: S. Chala, acting as Agent), French Republic (represented by: J.-L. Carré, T. Stéhelin and A.-L. Desjonquères, acting as Agents), Kingdom of the Netherlands (represented by: M.K. Bulterman, M.H.S. Gijzen and J.M. Hoogveld, acting as Agents), Republic of Finland (represented by: H. Leppo, acting as Agent), Kingdom of Sweden (represented by: O. Simonsson, J. Lundberg, C. Meyer-Seitz, A.M. Runeskjöld, M. Salborn Hodgson, H. Shev, H. Eklinder and R. Shahsavan Eriksson, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union;

3.	Orders the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to bear their own costs.

(1) OJ C 209, 22.6.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/5

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia — Romania) — SC Avio Lucos SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură — Centrul judeţean Dolj, Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură (APIA) — Aparat Central

(Case C-176/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Agriculture - Common agricultural policy - Direct support schemes - Common rules - Single area payment scheme - Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 - Article 4(1)(a) and (c) and Article 4(2)(b) - National legislation making direct support conditional on the farmer keeping his own animals - Article 9(1) - Concept of ‘active farmer’ - Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 - Article 60 - Circumvention clause - Concept of ‘artificially created conditions’)

(2022/C 213/05)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SC Avio Lucos SRL

Defendants: Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură — Centrul judeţean Dolj, Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură (APIA) — Aparat Central

Operative part of the judgment

Article 4(1)(c)(iii) and Article 4(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides that the minimum activity on agricultural areas naturally kept in a state suitable for grazing or cultivation, referred to in those provisions, must be carried out by the farmer with animals kept by the farmer himself.

Article 4(1)(a) and (c) and Article 9(1) of Regulation No 1307/2013 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘active farmer’, within the meaning of that second provision, covers a legal person who has concluded a concession contract relating to an area of pastureland belonging to a municipality and who grazes on that land animals which have been loaned to it, free of charge, by natural persons who own those animals, provided that that person carries out on that area of pastureland a ‘minimum activity’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(c)(iii) of that regulation.

Article 60 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that a situation in which an applicant for financial support under the single area payment scheme submits, in support of his application, a concession contract relating to areas of pastureland and loan-for-use contracts, concluded free of charge, in respect of animals intended for grazing on those areas, may fall within the concept of ‘artificially created conditions’ for the purposes of that provision, provided that, first, it is apparent from a combination of objective circumstances that, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the relevant rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved and, second, the intention to obtain an advantage from the EU rules by creating artificially the conditions laid down to obtain it is established.

(1) OJ C 297, 7.9.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/6

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Niedersächsisches Finanzgericht — Germany) — I GmbH v Finanzamt H

(Case C-228/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Common system of value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 132(1)(b) - Exemptions for certain activities in the public interest - Exemption for hospital and medical care - Private hospital - Duly recognised establishment - Comparable social conditions)

(2022/C 213/06)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Niedersächsisches Finanzgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: I GmbH

Defendant: Finanzamt H

Operative part of the judgment

Article 132(1)(b) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which — by stipulating that the provision of medical care by a private hospital is to be exempt from value added tax if that establishment is approved in accordance with the national provisions relating to the general health insurance regime, following its inclusion in a Land-level hospital plan or the conclusion of care supply contracts with statutory health insurance or substitute funds — results in comparable private hospitals which supply similar services under social conditions comparable with those applicable to bodies governed by public law being treated differently as regards the exemption laid down in that provision;

Article 132(1)(b) of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to determine whether medical care provided by a private hospital is supplied under social conditions comparable with those applicable to bodies governed by public law, the competent authorities of a Member State may take into consideration — where they are intended to attain the objective of reducing medical costs and making high-quality care more accessible to individuals — the regulatory conditions applicable to the services supplied by hospitals governed by public law and indicators of that private hospital’s performance in terms of staff, premises and equipment and the cost-efficiency of its management, in so far as those indicators are also applicable to establishments governed by public law. Account may also be taken of the method of calculating fixed-rate daily fees and the fact that the services supplied by that private hospital are borne by the social security regime or under contracts concluded with public authorities, so that the cost borne by patients is similar to that borne by patients for similar services supplied by hospitals governed by public law.

(1) OJ C 271, 17.8.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/7

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per l’Emilia Romagna — Italy) — PG v Ministero della Giustizia, CSM — Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri

(Case C-236/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP - Clauses 2 and 4 - Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC - Clause 4 - Principle of non-discrimination - Equal treatment in employment and occupation - Magistrates and ordinary judges - Clause 5 - Measures intended to penalise improper use of fixed-term contracts - Directive 2003/88/EC - Article 7 - Paid annual leave)

(2022/C 213/07)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale amministrativo regionale per l’Emilia Romagna

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: PG

Defendants: Ministero della Giustizia, CSM — Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri

Intervening parties: Unione Nazionale Giudici di Pace (Unagipa), TR, PV, Associazione Nazionale Giudici di Pace — ANGDP, RF, GA, GOT Non Possiamo Più Tacere, Unione Nazionale Italiana Magistrati Onorari — UNIMO

Operative part of the judgment

Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, Clause 4 of the framework agreement on part-time work, concluded on 6 June 1997 and which is annexed to Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, as amended by Council Directive 98/23/EC of 7 April 1998, and Clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work, concluded on 18 March 1999 and which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not provide for an entitlement for magistrates to 30 days’ paid annual leave or to a social security and pension scheme deriving from the employment relationship, such as that provided for ordinary judges, if that magistrate comes within the definition of ‘part-time worker’ within the meaning of the framework agreement on part-time work and/or ‘fixed-term worker’ within the meaning of the framework agreement on fixed-term work and is in a comparable situation to that of an ordinary judge;

Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Directive 1999/70, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which a fixed-term employment relationship can be renewed a maximum of three times successively, each renewal being for a duration of four years, for a total duration that does not exceed 16 years, and which does not provide for the possibility of penalising in an effective and dissuasive way the abusive continuance of the employment relationship.

(1) OJ C 271, 17.8.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/8

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Bucureşti — Romania) — Berlin Chemie A. Menarini SRL v Administraţia Fiscală pentru Contribuabili Mijlocii Bucureşti — Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti

(Case C-333/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 44 - Place of supply of services - Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 - Article 11(1) - Provision of services - Point of reference for tax purposes - Concept of a ‘fixed establishment’ - Company from one Member State affiliated to a company located in another Member State - Suitable structure in terms of human and technical resources - Ability to receive and use the services for the fixed establishment’s own needs - Marketing, regulatory, advertising and representation services provided by a related company to the recipient company)

(2022/C 213/08)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Bucureşti

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Berlin Chemie A. Menarini SRL

Defendant: Administraţia Fiscală pentru Contribuabili Mijlocii Bucureşti — Direcţia Generală Regională a Finanţelor Publice Bucureşti

Intervener: Berlin Chemie AG

Operative part of the judgment

Article 44 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008, and Article 11(1) of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that a company which has its registered office in one Member State does not have a fixed establishment in another Member State on the ground that that company owns a subsidiary there that makes available to it human and technical resources under contracts by means of which that subsidiary provides, exclusively to it, marketing, regulatory, advertising and representation services that are capable of having a direct influence on the volume of its sales.

(1) OJ C 339, 12.10.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/9

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Helsingin hallinto-oikeus — Finland) — A SCPI

(Case C-342/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Articles 63 and 65 TFEU - Free movement of capital - Restrictions - Tax on the income of legal persons - Exemption for investment funds - Conditions for exemption - Condition related to the fund being in contractual form)

(2022/C 213/09)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Helsingin hallinto-oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: A SCPI

Interested party: Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö

Operative part of the judgment

Articles 63 and 65 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, by limiting entitlement to the exemption of rental income and of profits from the disposal of immovable property or shares in companies owning immovable property solely to investment funds constituted in accordance with contract law, excludes from entitlement to that exemption a non-resident alternative investment fund constituted in accordance with statute, even though that fund, which benefits from a system of tax transparency in the Member State in which it is established, is not subject to income tax in that latter Member State.

(1) OJ C 339, 12.10.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/9

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia no 49 de Barcelona — Spain) — EL, TP v Caixabank SA

(Case C-385/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Unfair terms in consumer contracts - Directive 93/13/EEC - Principle of effectiveness - Principle of equivalence - Judicial proceedings seeking a declaration that a contractual term is unfair - National court's power of review of its own motion - National proceedings for taxation of costs - Costs recoverable in respect of lawyers’ fees)

(2022/C 213/10)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de Primera Instancia no 49 de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: EL, TP

Defendant: Caixabank SA

Operative part of the judgment

Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides, in the context of the taxation of the costs in connection with proceedings concerning the unfairness of a contractual term, for a limit applicable to the lawyers’ fees recoverable by the successful consumer from the seller or supplier ordered to pay the costs, provided that that limit allows the consumer to obtain, in that connection, the reimbursement of a reasonable and proportionate amount in relation to the costs that he or she was objectively required to incur in order to bring such an action;

Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which the value of the claim, which constitutes the basis for calculating the costs recoverable by the consumer who has been successful in an action relating to an unfair contractual term, must be determined in the application or, otherwise, is set by that legislation, without it being possible to alter that information subsequently, on condition that the court responsible ultimately for the taxation of costs remains free to determine the actual value of the claim for the consumer, ensuring that he or she is entitled to reimbursement of a reasonable amount that is proportionate to the costs that he or she objectively had to incur in order to bring such an action.

(1) OJ C 423, 7.12.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/10

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 7 April 2022 — Solar Ileias Bompaina AE v European Commission

(Case C-429/20 P) (1)

(Appeal - State aid - Market for electricity generated from renewable energy sources - National legislation which allegedly has the effect of conferring an unlawful advantage on electricity suppliers - Complaint to the European Commission - Rejection decision without initiating the formal investigation procedure - Action for annulment - Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 - Article 1(h) - Concept of ‘interested party’ - Inadmissibility)

(2022/C 213/11)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Solar Ileias Bompaina AE (represented by: A. Metaxas, dikigoros, and A. Bartosch, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: B. Stromsky and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the appeal;

2.	Orders Solar Ileias Bompaina AE to pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 359, 26.10.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/11

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo — Portugal) — Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas IP (IFAP) v LM (C-447/20), BD, Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira (C-448/20)

(Joined Cases C-447/20 and C-448/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 - Own resources of the European Union - Protection of the European Union’s financial interests - Proceedings relating to irregularities - Article 4 - Adoption of administrative measures - Article 3(1) - Limitation period for proceedings - Expiry - Whether it may be relied on in the context of the enforced recovery procedure - Article 3(2) - Period for implementation - Applicability - Starting point of the limitation period - Interruption and suspension - Discretion of the Member States)

(2022/C 213/12)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas IP (IFAP)

Defendants: LM (C-447/20), BD, Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira (C-448/20)

Operative part of the judgment

Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the financial interests [of the European Union] must be interpreted as not precluding, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, national legislation under which, for the purposes of challenging a decision to recover amounts wrongly paid, adopted after the expiry of the limitation period for proceedings referred to in that provision, the addressee thereof is required to plead the irregularity of that decision within a certain period before the administrative court having jurisdiction, failing which the challenge will be time-barred, and the addressee is no longer able to object to the enforcement of that decision by relying on that irregularity in the context of the judicial proceedings for enforced recovery brought against that addressee.

The first subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 2988/95 must be interpreted as having immediate effect in the national legal systems, without there being any need for the national authorities to adopt measures of application. It follows that the addressee of a decision to recover amounts wrongly received must, in any event, be able to rely on the expiry of the period for implementation laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 3(2) of that regulation or, as the case may be, of an extended period for implementation pursuant to Article 3(3) of that regulation, in order to oppose the enforced recovery of those amounts.

The first subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 2988/95 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that the period for implementation which it establishes starts to run from the adoption of a decision requiring repayment of amounts wrongly received, since that period must begin to run from the day on which that decision becomes final, that is to say, from the day on which the period for bringing an action has expired or all rights of appeal have been exhausted.

The second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of Regulation No 2988/95 must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which the period for implementation laid down in the first subparagraph thereof is interrupted by the summons for enforced recovery of the debt which is the subject of a recovery decision.

(1) OJ C 443, 21.12.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/12

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas — Lithuania) — UB v Kauno teritorinė muitinė

(Case C-489/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Union Customs Code - Extinguishment of the customs debt - Goods unlawfully introduced into the customs territory of the European Union - Seizure and confiscation - Directive 2008/118/EC - Excise duties - Directive 2006/112/EC - Value added tax - Chargeable event - Chargeability)

(2022/C 213/13)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: UB

Respondent: Kauno teritorinė muitinė

Interested party: Muitinės departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos Finansų ministerijos

Operative part of the judgment

Article 124(1)(e) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that a customs debt is extinguished where goods are seized and subsequently confiscated when they have already been unlawfully introduced into the customs territory of the European Union.

Article 2(b) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC, as well as Article 2(1)(d) and Article 70 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, must be interpreted as meaning that the extinguishment of the customs debt on the ground provided for in Article 124(1)(e) of the Union Customs Code does not lead to the extinguishment of the debt linked, respectively, to excise duty and to value added tax in respect of goods unlawfully introduced into the customs territory of the European Union.

(1) OJ C 433, 14.12.2020.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/12

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Nederlandstalige ondernemingsrechtbank Brussel — Belgium) — Q, R, S v United Airlines Inc.

(Case C-561/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Air transport - Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 - Common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights - Connecting flight consisting of two legs - Significant delay to final destination caused in the second leg of that flight linking two airports in a third country - Validity of that regulation under international law)

(2022/C 213/14)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Nederlandstalige ondernemingsrechtbank Brussel

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Q, R, S

Defendant: United Airlines Inc.

Operative part of the judgment

Article 3(1)(a), read in conjunction with Articles 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that a passenger on a connecting flight, comprising two legs and subject to a single booking with a Community carrier, departing from an airport located in the territory of a Member State and arriving at an airport located in a third country via another airport in that third country, is entitled to compensation from the third-country air carrier which operated the entirety of that flight acting on behalf of that Community carrier, where that passenger has reached his or her final destination with a delay of more than three hours caused in the second leg of the said flight;

The examination of the second question referred for a preliminary ruling has disclosed no factor such as to affect the validity of Regulation No 261/2004 in the light of the principle of customary international law according to which each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its airspace.

(1) OJ C 128, 12.4.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/13

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — J v H Limited

(Case C-568/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial cooperation in civil matters - Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters - Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 - Scope - Article 2(a) - Concept of ‘judgment’ - Order for payment made in another Member State after a summary contested examination of a judgment given in a third State - Article 39 - Enforceability in Member States)

(2022/C 213/15)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberster Gerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: J

Defendant: H Limited

Operative part of the judgment

Article 2(a) and Article 39 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an order for payment made by a court of a Member State on the basis of final judgments delivered in a third State constitutes a judgment and is enforceable in the other Member States if it was made at the end of adversarial proceedings in the Member State of origin and was declared to be enforceable in that Member State. The fact that it is recognised as a judgment does not, however, deprive the party against whom enforcement is sought of the right to apply, pursuant to Article 46 of that regulation, for a refusal of enforcement on one of the grounds referred to in Article 45.

(1) OJ C 28, 25.1.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/14

Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation — France) — V A, Z A v TP

(Case C-645/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial cooperation in civil matters - Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 - Article 10 - Subsidiary jurisdiction in matters of succession - Deceased person habitually resident at the time of his or her death in a State that is not bound by Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 - Deceased person who is a national of a Member State and has assets in that Member State - Obligation for the court of that Member State seised to examine of its own motion the criteria as regards its subsidiary jurisdiction - Appointment of an administrator of the estate)

(2022/C 213/16)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants in the appeal on a point of law: V A, Z A

Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: TP

Operative part of the judgment

Article 10(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as meaning that a court of a Member State must raise of its own motion its jurisdiction under the rule of subsidiary jurisdiction referred to in that provision where, having been seised on the basis of the rule of general jurisdiction established in Article 4 of that regulation, it finds that it has no jurisdiction under that latter provision.

(1) OJ C 53, 15.2.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/14

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof — Germany) — Y GmbH v Hauptzollamt

(Case C-668/20) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Common Customs Tariff - Combined Nomenclature - Classification of goods - Headings 1302, 3301 and 3302 - Extracted vanilla oleoresin - Excise duties - Directive 92/83/EEC - Exemptions - Article 27(1)(e) - Definition of ‘flavour’ - Directive 92/12/EEC - Excise Committee of the European Commission - Powers)

(2022/C 213/17)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Bundesfinanzhof

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Y GmbH

Defendant: Hauptzollamt

Operative part of the judgment

The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1754 of 6 October 2015, must be interpreted as meaning that a product consisting of approximately 85 % ethanol, 10 % water, 4,8 % dry residue and having an average vanilla content of 0,5 %, which is obtained by diluting, for the purposes of standardisation, in water and ethanol an intermediate product itself extracted from vanilla bean using ethanol, falls under subheading 1302 19 05 of that nomenclature;

Article 27(1)(e) of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages must be interpreted as meaning that a vanilla oleoresin falling under subheading 1302 19 05 of the Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Regulation No 2658/87, as amended by Implementing Regulation 2015/1754, must be regarded as a ‘flavour’ within the meaning of that provision, provided that it constitutes an ingredient which brings a specific taste or smell to a particular product.

(1) OJ C 72, 1.3.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/15

Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht, Autonome Sektion für die Provinz Bozen — Italy) — KW (C-102/21), SG (C-103/21) v Autonome Provinz Bozen

(Joined Cases C-102/21 and C-103/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Aid granted by Member States - Aid scheme for the construction of mini-hydroelectric power plants - Alpine and mountain huts without connection to an electricity grid - Authorisation by the European Commission - Expiry)

(2022/C 213/18)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht, Autonome Sektion für die Provinz Bozen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: KW (C-102/21), SG (C-103/21)

Defendant: Autonome Provinz Bozen

Operative part of the judgment

The authorisation for the aid scheme for the construction of mini-hydroelectric power plants resulting from Commission Decision C(2012) 5048 final of 25 July 2012 on State aid SA.32113 (2010/N) — Italy: Aid scheme for energy savings, district heating and electrification of remote areas in Alto Adige/South Tyrol was no longer in force when the Autonome Provinz Bozen (Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Italy) granted subsidies to KW and SG;

Article 108(3) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the European Commission is not required to request the Member State to recover unlawful aid within the meaning of Article 1(f) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

(1) OJ C 217, 7.6.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/16

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi — Poland) — Proceedings relating to the recognition and enforcement of a financial penalty imposed on D.B.

(Case C-150/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - Mutual recognition - Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA - Enforcement of financial penalties - Article 1(a)(ii) - Decision imposing a financial penalty issued by an administrative authority - Decision open to appeal to a public prosecutor, subject to instructions from the Minister for Justice - Subsequent appeal before a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters)

(2022/C 213/19)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi

Parties to the main proceedings

Defendant: D.B.

Intervening party: Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź-Bałuty

Operative part of the judgment

Article 1(a)(ii) of Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as meaning that a final decision requiring a financial penalty to be paid by a natural person, adopted by an authority of the issuing Member State other than a court in respect of a criminal offence under the law of the issuing Member State, constitutes a ‘decision’, within the meaning of that provision, where the legislation of that Member State provides that an appeal against that decision is to be examined first by a public prosecutor placed under the hierarchical authority of the Minister for Justice and subsequently, if that public prosecutor adopts a decision dismissing that appeal, a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters may be seised by the person concerned, provided that access to that court is not made subject to conditions which make it impossible or excessively difficult.

(1) OJ C 329, 16.8.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/16

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 7 April 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Bottrop — Germany) — Fuhrmann-2-GmbH v B.

(Case C-249/21) (1)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling - Consumer protection - Directive 2011/83/EU - Article 8(2) - Distance contracts concluded by electronic means - Information requirements for the trader - Activation of a button or a similar function in order to place the order with an obligation to pay - Unambiguous formulation corresponding to the words ‘order with obligation to pay’ - Taking account only of the words on the button or similar function for the purposes of assessing the ‘corresponding’ nature of such a formulation)

(2022/C 213/20)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Bottrop

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Fuhrmann-2-GmbH

Defendant: B.

Operative part of the judgment

The second subparagraph of Article 8(2) of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of determining — in the context of an ordering process relating to the conclusion of a distance contract by electronic means — whether a form of words displayed on the ordering button or on a similar function, such as the formulation ‘complete booking’, is a formulation ‘corresponding’ to the words ‘order with obligation to pay’, within the meaning of that provision, only the words that appear on that button or that similar function should be taken into account.

(1) OJ C 297, 26.7.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/17

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia n.o 20 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 6 August 2021 — F C and M A B v Caixabank S.A., formerly Bankia, S.A.

(Case C-484/21)

(2022/C 213/21)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de Primera Instancia n.o 20 de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: F C C and M A B

Defendant: Caixabank S.A., formerly Bankia, S. A.

Questions referred

Is it compatible with Article 38 [of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union], the principle of the effectiveness of EU law, and Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 13/93 (1) for the limitation period of an action for damages arising from an unfair term, such as a costs clause, to begin to run before the point when the term in question has been declared void for unfairness?

Is it compatible with Article 38 [of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union], the principle of the effectiveness of EU law, and Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 13/93 to fix the commencement of the limitation period for an unfair term as the date on which a court with authority to create case-law, such as the Supreme Court, states that a particular term is unfair, irrespective of whether or not the consumer in question is aware of the content of the judgment?

Is it compatible with Article 38 [of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union], the principle of the effectiveness of EU law, and Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 13/93 to establish that, in a long-term contract, the limitation period for claiming any mortgage creation costs paid begins to run at the point when payment is made, given that the unfair term has exhausted its effects at that point and there is no risk that it will be reapplied?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/18

Appeal brought on 15 December 2021 by Wolfgang Kappes against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 13 October 2021 in Case T-429/20, Sedus Stoll AG v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-784/21 P)

(2022/C 213/22)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Wolfgang Kappes (represented by: B. Schneiders, J. Schneiders, T. Pfeifer, N. Gottschalk, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Sedus Stoll AG, European Union Intellectual Property Office

By order of 5 April 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear his own costs.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/18

Appeal brought on 15 December 2021 by Wolfgang Kappes against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber) delivered on 13 October 2021 in Case T-436/20, Sedus Stoll AG v European Union Intellectual Property Office

(Case C-785/21 P)

(2022/C 213/23)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Wolfgang Kappes (represented by: B. Schneiders, J. Schneiders, T. Pfeifer, N. Gottschalk, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: Sedus Stoll AG, European Union Intellectual Property Office

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/18

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 20 December 2021 — Bankia, S.A. v WE and XA

(Case C-810/21)

(2022/C 213/24)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Bankia, S.A.

Respondents: WE and XA

Questions referred

In relation to the pursuit of an action to enforce the restitutory effects of a declaration of nullity of a term under which the borrower is required to pay the costs of formalising the contract, is it compatible with Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 (1) to make the bringing of the action subject to a 10-year limitation period which starts to run from when the term exhausts its effects upon settlement of the final payment, the point at which the consumer becomes aware of the facts which establish the unfairness, or is it necessary for the consumer to be in possession of additional information concerning the legal assessment of the facts?

Given that the action for restitution is subject to a long limitation period of 10 years, at what point must the consumer be in a position to be aware of the unfairness of the term and of the rights granted to him or her under Directive 93/13 — before the limitation period starts to run or before that period expires?

2.	If knowledge of the legal assessment of the facts is necessary, must the start of the limitation period be made subject to the existence of settled case-law concerning the nullity of the term or may the national court take other, different circumstances into consideration?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/19

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 20 December 2021 — Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. v TB and UK

(Case C-811/21)

(2022/C 213/25)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.

Respondents: TB and UK

Questions referred

2.	If knowledge of the legal assessment of the facts is necessary, must the start of the limitation period be made subject to the existence of settled case-law concerning the nullity of the term or may the national court take other, different circumstances into consideration?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/19

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 20 December 2021 — Banco Santander, S.A. v OG

(Case C-812/21)

(2022/C 213/26)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Banco Santander, S.A.

Respondent: OG

Questions referred

2.	If knowledge of the legal assessment of the facts is necessary, must the start of the limitation period be made subject to the existence of settled case-law concerning the nullity of the term or may the national court take other, different circumstances into consideration?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/20

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 20 December 2021 — OK and PI v Banco Sabadell

(Case C-813/21)

(2022/C 213/27)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: OK and PI

Respondent: Banco Sabadell

Questions referred

2.	If knowledge of the legal assessment of the facts is necessary, must the start of the limitation period be made subject to the existence of settled case-law concerning the nullity of the term or may the national court take other, different circumstances into consideration?

(1) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Oost-Vlaanderen, Afdeling Gent (Belgium) lodged on 17 January 2022 — VN v Belgische Staat

(Case C-34/22)

(2022/C 213/28)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Oost-Vlaanderen, Afdeling Gent

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: VN

Defendant: Belgische Staat

Question referred

Does Article 21(1)(5) of the ITC 1992, as amended by Article 170 of the Law of 25 April 2014 on various provisions, infringe the provisions of Articles 56 and 63 TFEU and Articles 36 and 40 of the EEA Agreement, in that the provision in question, although it applies without distinction to domestic and foreign service providers, not only requires compliance with conditions analogous to those set out in Article 2 RD/ITC 1992, which are de facto specific to the Belgian market, but also requires, first of all, that such analogous requirements be laid down by the public authorities in the EEA State concerned, thus going beyond local prudential supervision and falling instead within the scope of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Directive No 94/19/EC, [thereby] seriously imped[ing] foreign service providers from offering their services in Belgium? (1)

(1) Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes (OJ 1994 L 135, p. 5).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/21

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Craiova (Romania) lodged on 28 January 2022 — NR v Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel Craiova

(Case C-58/22)

(2022/C 213/29)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Curtea de Apel Craiova

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: NR

Other party: Parchetul de pe lângă Curtea de Apel Craiova

Question referred

Is the ne bis in idem principle, as guaranteed by Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Romania’s obligations to address the benchmarks set out in the CVM decision (Commission Decision 2006/928), to be interpreted as meaning that a decision to take no further action, issued by the public prosecutor after obtaining essential evidence in the case, precludes another public prosecution from being brought against the same person, for the same acts, albeit with a different legal classification, since that decision is final — unless it is established that the circumstance on which the discontinuance was based does not exist, or new facts or circumstances have emerged which show that the circumstance on which the discontinuance was based no longer exists?

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/22

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Germany) lodged on 1 February 2022 — RL v Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden

(Case C-61/22)

(2022/C 213/30)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: RL

Defendant: Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden

Questions referred

Does the obligation to take fingerprints and store them in identity cards in accordance with Article 3(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1157 (1) infringe higher-ranking EU law, in particular

(a)	Article 77(3) TFEU,

(b)	Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

(c)	Article 35(10) of the General Data Protection Regulation, (2)

and is it therefore invalid on one of those grounds?

(1) Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on strengthening the security of identity cards of Union citizens and of residence documents issued to Union citizens and their family members exercising their right of free movement (OJ 2019 L 188, p. 67).

(2) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/22

Appeal brought on 2 February 2022 by the European Investment Bank against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 24 November 2021 in Case T-370/20, KL v European Investment Bank

(Case C-68/22 P)

(2022/C 213/31)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Investment Bank (EIB) (represented by: G. Faedo and I. Zanin, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: KL

Form of order sought

By its appeal, the EIB claims that the Court should:

—	declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

—	set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-370/20;

—	if the Court considers that the state of the proceedings so permits, grant the EIB the form of order sought at first instance;

—	order KL to pay the entirety of the costs at both instances.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the EIB raises two grounds.

The first ground of appeal, divided into four sub-grounds, concerns the misinterpretation of the EIB’s internal rules on invalidity.

In the first place, the General Court erred in law as regards the concept of invalidity as provided for in Article 46-1 of the transitional pension scheme regulations applicable to EIB staff (TPSR) and Article 11.1 of the EIB’s administrative measures. By finding that the concept of invalidity within the meaning of those articles must be interpreted as referring to an EIB staff member who has been declared, by an invalidity committee established by the EIB, incapable of resuming his or her duties or equivalent duties within that body, the General Court distorted the letter and the content of the EIB’s internal rules and adopted an interpretation which contradicts the purpose of the invalidity pension as a social protection measure.

In the second place, the General Court erred in law in that it excluded the competence of the invalidity committees established by the EIB to rule on the capacity of a staff member of the EIB to carry out activities outside its premises, on the general labour market.

In the third place, the General Court erred in law by interpreting Articles 46-1 of the TPSR and 11.1 of the EIB’s administrative measures on the basis of reasoning by analogy with Article 78 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union.

In the fourth place, the General Court erred in law by rejecting the EIB’s interpretation of Article 51-1 of the TPSR and by failing to interpret that article in conjunction with Article 46-1 of the TPSR.

The second ground of appeal, divided into two sub-grounds, is based on a dual distortion of the facts.

In the first place, the General Court erred in law by treating as legally binding documents of the Invalidity Committee which were not undersigned by all the members of that committee.

In the second place, the General Court incorrectly assessed the content of the Invalidity Committee’s opinion in so far as it found that the Invalidity Committee had declared that the applicant was incapable of performing duties at the EIB when the forms signed by all the members of that committee declared that the applicant is not invalid.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/23

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vrchní soud v Praze (Czech Republic) lodged on 7 February 2022 — ALD Automotive s.r.o. v DY, insolvency administrator of the debtor GEDEM-STAV a.s.

(Case C-78/22)

(2022/C 213/32)

Language of the case: Czech

Referring court

Vrchní soud v Praze

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ALD Automotive s.r.o.

Defendant: DY, insolvency administrator of the debtor GEDEM-STAV a.s.

Questions referred

1.	On the basis of what criteria does the entitlement to obtain the fixed sum of at least EUR 40 arise pursuant to Article 6(1) of Directive 2011/7/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council in the case of agreements with recurring or ongoing performance?

2.	Can the claim pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Directive be refused by Member State courts on the grounds of the application of general private-law principles?

3.	If the response to the second question is in the affirmative, subject to what conditions can Member State courts refuse to award the amount of the claim under Article 6(1) of the Directive?

(1) Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (OJ 2011 L 48, p. 1).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/24

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Cartagena (Spain) lodged on 8 February 2022 — RTG v Tuk Travel, S.L.

(Case C-83/22)

(2022/C 213/33)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 5 de Cartagena

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: RTG

Defendant: Tuk Travel, S.L.

Questions referred

Must Articles 169(1) and (2)(a) TFEU and 114(3) TFEU be interpreted as precluding Article 5 of Directive 2015/2302 (1) on package travel and linked travel arrangements, since that article does not include, among the compulsory precontractual information to be provided to travellers, the right, conferred on travellers by Article 12 of the directive, to terminate the contract before the start of the package and obtain a full refund of payments made in the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances which significantly affect the performance of the package?

Do Articles 114 and 169 TFEU, and Article 15 of Directive 2015/2302, preclude the application of the principles of the delimitation of the subject matter of an action by the parties and of the correlation between the claims put forward in the action and the rulings contained in the operative part, which are laid down in Articles 216 and 218(1) LEC [Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Law on Civil Procedure)], where those procedural principles are liable to impede the full protection of the applicant consumer?

(1) Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ 2015 L 326, p. 1).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/25

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Korneuburg (Austria) lodged on 9 February 2022 — TT v AK

(Case C-87/22)

(2022/C 213/34)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht Korneuburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: TT

Respondent: AK

Questions referred

Must Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, (1) be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter, if they consider that a court of another Member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, may request such a court to assume jurisdiction even in the case where that other Member State has become the place of habitual residence of the child following wrongful removal?

If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

Must Article 15 of Regulation No 2201/2003 be interpreted as meaning that the criteria for the transfer of jurisdiction that are set out in that article are regulated exhaustively, without the need to consider further criteria in the light of proceedings initiated under Article 8(f) of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction?

(1) OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/25

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands) lodged on 22 February 2022 — X, Y, and their six minor children v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

(Case C-125/22)

(2022/C 213/35)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats’s-Hertogenbosch

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: X, Y, and their six minor children

Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid

Questions referred

Must Article 15 of the Qualification Directive, (1) read in conjunction with Article 2(g) of the Qualification Directive, Article 4 of the Qualification Directive, Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as meaning that, in considering whether an applicant is in need of subsidiary protection, all relevant factors relating both to the applicant’s individual situation and personal circumstances, and to the general situation in the country of origin, must always be examined and assessed as an integrated whole and having regard to their mutual interdependence before determining what feared manifestation of serious harm may be substantiated by those factors?

In the event that the Court of Justice answers the first question in the negative, is the evaluation of the applicant’s individual situation and personal circumstances in the context of the assessment of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, which the Court has already clarified must be taken into account, more comprehensive than the assessment of the individualisation requirement referred to in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in N.A. v. United Kingdom? (2) Can those factors, in the case of the same application for subsidiary protection, be taken into account when assessing both Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive and Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive?

Must Article 15 of the Qualification Directive be interpreted as meaning that, when assessing the need for subsidiary protection, the so-called sliding scale, which the Court of Justice has already clarified must be applied when assessing an alleged fear of serious harm as referred to in Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, must also be applied when assessing an alleged fear of serious harm as referred to in Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive?

Must Article 15 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, be interpreted as meaning that humanitarian circumstances, which are a direct or an indirect consequence of acts and/or omissions of an actor of serious harm, must be taken into account when assessing whether an applicant is in need of subsidiary protection?

(1) Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).

(2) ECHR 17 July 2008, No 25904/07, N.A. v United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0717JUD002590407.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/26

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nederlandstalige rechtbank van eerste aanleg Brussel (Belgium) lodged on 23 February 2022 — NORDIC INFO v Belgische Staat

(Case C-128/22)

(2022/C 213/36)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Nederlandstalige rechtbank van eerste aanleg Brussel

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: NORDIC INFO

Defendant: Belgische Staat

Questions referred

Must Articles 2, 4, 5, 27 and 29 of the Citizenship Directive 2004/38, (1) which implement Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, be interpreted as not precluding the regulations of a Member State (in the present case, deriving from Articles 18 and 22 of the Ministerieel Besluit van 30 juni 2020 houdende dringende maatregelen om de verspreiding van het coronavirus COVID-19 te beperken (Ministerial Decree of 30 June 2020 on urgent measures to limit the spread of the coronavirus COVID-19), as amended respectively by Articles 3 and 5 of the Ministerieel besluit van 10 juli 2020 (Ministerial Decree of 10 July 2020)) which by way of a general measure:

—

impose, in principle, on Belgian nationals and their family members as well as on Union citizens residing in Belgian territory and their family members an exit ban for non-essential travel from Belgium to countries within the EU and the Schengen Area that are coloured red in accordance with a colour code drawn up on the basis of epidemiological data;

—

impose on non-Belgian Union citizens and their family members (who may or may not have the right to reside in Belgian territory) entry restrictions (such as quarantines and tests) for non-essential travel from countries within the EU and the Schengen Area to Belgium which are coloured red in accordance with a colour code drawn up on the basis of epidemiological data?

Must Articles 1, 3 and 22 of the Schengen Borders Code (2) be interpreted as not precluding the regulations of a Member State (in the present case, Articles 18 and 22 of the Ministerial Decree of 30 June 2020 on urgent measures to limit the spread of the coronavirus COVID-19 (as amended by Articles 3 and 5 respectively of the Ministerial Decree of 10 July 2020)) which impose an exit ban on non-essential travel from Belgium to countries within the EU and the Schengen Area and an entry ban from those countries to Belgium which may not only be checked and sanctioned, but may also be enforced ex officio by the Minister, the mayor and the police commander?

(1) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77).

(2) Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 1).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/27

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 1 March 2022 — Criminal proceedings against Accused Person 5

(Case C-147/22)

(2022/C 213/37)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Accused Person 5

Questions referred

Does the ne bis in idem principle, laid down in Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [(‘the Charter’)] and in Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement [(‘CISA’)], preclude the pursuit of criminal proceedings instituted in one Member State against the same person and for the same acts as formed the subject of criminal proceedings instituted in another Member State which have already been finally terminated by a decision of the public prosecutor ordering the discontinuance of the pre-trial investigation?

Is the fact that, even though the decision of the public prosecutor ordering the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings (pre-trial investigation) in one Member State leaves open the possibility for the pre-trial investigation to be re-opened up until such time as prosecution of the criminal offence becomes time-barred, the public prosecutor’s office did not consider there to be grounds for reopening the aforementioned pre-trial investigation of its own motion, compatible with the ne bis in idem principle laid down in Article 50 of the [Charter] and in Article 54 of the [CISA], and does that fact permanently preclude the institution of new criminal proceedings in [another] Member State against the same person and for the same acts?

Is a pre-trial investigation discontinued in respect of an accused person who was not questioned in his capacity as a person under judicial investigation in connection with a criminal offence relating to the co-accused persons, but in respect of whom measures of investigation were carried out in his capacity as an accused person, and in relation to whom the discontinuance of the pre-trial investigation was based on investigative information provided following a request for legal cooperation, as well as on the provision of bank account information and on the questioning of the co-accused persons in their capacity as persons under judicial investigation, compatible with the ne bis in idem principle laid down in Article 50 of the [Charter] and in Article 54 of the [CISA], and can such a pre-trial investigation be regarded as being sufficiently thorough and exhaustive?

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/28

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 2 March 2022 — S, A, Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie; Other party: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(Case C-151/22)

(2022/C 213/38)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: S, A, Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

Other party: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Questions referred

Must Article 10(1)(e) of the Qualification Directive (1) be interpreted as meaning that political opinion as a reason for persecution may also be invoked by applicants who merely claim to hold a political view, and/or to express such a view, without having attracted the negative interest of an actor of persecution during their residence in their country of origin and since their residence in the host country?

If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, and a political view is thus sufficient to qualify as a political opinion, what weight must be given to the strength of that political view, thought or belief and to the importance to the foreign national of the activities stemming from it in the examination and assessment of an asylum application, that is to say, the examination of the reality of that applicant’s alleged fear of persecution?

3.	If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, is the criterion then that such a political opinion must be deeply rooted, and if not, what is the relevant criterion and how is it to be applied?

If the criterion is that the political opinion must be deeply rooted, can an applicant who fails to demonstrate that he or she holds a deeply rooted political opinion be expected to refrain from expressing that political opinion upon return to the country of origin, so as not to arouse the negative interest of an actor of persecution?

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/28

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Nacional (Spain) lodged on 4 March 2022 — Criminal proceedings against Juan

(Case C-164/22)

(2022/C 213/39)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Audiencia Nacional

Party to the main proceedings

Juan

Other party: Ministerio Fiscal

Questions referred

Whether, in the present case, a situation of ‘bis in idem’ for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement arises, on the grounds that, according to the scope ascribed to that concept by European case-law, the same acts are involved; or whether it is instead for this court to make the assessment, based on the principles set out in this decision, including the requirement to apply the totality principle and for the sentence to be capped in accordance with proportionality criteria, on the grounds that the case involves a single continuing offence.

If it is concluded that a situation of ‘bis in idem’ does not arise, on the grounds that, in accordance with the criteria put forward in this decision, the facts are not completely identical:

(A)

Whether, in the light of the circumstances of the present case, the restrictions on the effects of judgments delivered in other EU Member States expressly established in Article 14(2) of the Ley Orgánica 7/2014 de 12 de noviembre, sobre intercambio de información de antecedentes penales y consideración de resoluciones judiciales penales en la Unión Europea (Organic Law 7/2014 of 12 November 2014 on exchanging information on criminal records and taking account of judicial decisions in criminal matters), which transposes European legislation, are compatible with Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA (1) of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings, and with Article 45 and Article 49(3) of the Charter and the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions within the European Union.

(B)

Whether the absence of a procedure or mechanism in Spanish law which provides for the recognition of judgments delivered in other European countries, for the application of the totality principle and for the adjustment or capping of sentences to ensure they are proportional, in situations where a sentence imposed by a foreign court is to be served in Spain and the sentence concerns acts which form a continuing offence or linked offences when taken in conjunction with other acts that have been tried and been the subject of a conviction in Spain, is contrary to Article 45 and Article 49(3) of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (2) of 13 June 2002 and Article 8(1) and (2) of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA (3) of 27. November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union and, in general, with the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions within the European Union.

(1) Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings (OJ 2008 L 220, p. 32).

(2) 2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States — Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).

(3) Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (OJ 2008 L 327, p. 27).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/29

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) lodged on 8 March 2022 — JA v Wurth Automotive GmbH

(Case C-177/22)

(2022/C 213/40)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht Salzburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: JA

Defendant: Wurth Automotive GmbH

Questions referred

Does the assessment of whether the applicant is a consumer within the meaning of Articles 17 and 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) depend on

(a)	whether the applicant pursued the activity of a graphic and web designer declared by her in the proceedings only as an employed person or, at least in part, also in the context of a freelance activity at the time of concluding the contract of sale and immediately thereafter and

(b)	the purpose for which the applicant acquired the vehicle, that is to say solely for the purpose of satisfying her own needs in terms of private consumption or also in connection with a current or future trade or professional activity or purpose?

2.	Would the applicant no longer be able to rely on her status as a consumer if she had resold the passenger car in August 2019, and would any profit made in the process be relevant?

Must the applicant be considered not to be a consumer merely because she signed a standard contract of sale prepared by the defendant, the printed form of which designated the buyer as a ‘company’ and contained the text ‘business-to-business/no return, no warranty/delivery only after receipt of money’ under the heading ‘special agreements’ in a smaller font, without objecting to this and referring to the fact that she was a consumer?

4.	Must the applicant accept responsibility for the conduct of her partner, who acted as a car dealer in arranging the purchase, from which the defendant could have concluded that the applicant was a trader?

Is it to the detriment of the applicant in the assessment of whether she is a consumer if the court of first instance was unable to determine why the written contract of sale differed from the preceding offer by the applicant’s partner in terms of the designation of the buyer or what was discussed in that regard during the telephone calls between the applicant’s partner and one of the defendant’s salespeople?

6.	Is it relevant to the applicant’s status as a consumer if the applicant’s partner telephoned the defendant several weeks after taking delivery of the vehicle to enquire whether it was possible to state the VAT on the invoice?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/30

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 10 March 2022 –Saint-Louis Sucre v Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation, SICA des betteraviers d’Étrépagny

(Case C-183/22)

(2022/C 213/41)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Saint-Louis Sucre

Defendants: Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation, SICA des betteraviers d’Étrépagny

Questions referred

Must the rule set out in [the French version of] Article 153(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of 17 December 2013, (1) according to which the statutes of a producer organisation require its members to ‘be members of only one producer organisation for any given product of the holding’, be interpreted as applying only to producer members?

In order to ensure compliance with the principle set out in Article 153(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, according to which the producer members of a producer organisation must scrutinise democratically their organisation and its decisions:

—

is it necessary, in order to assess the independence of the members of the organisation, to take account exclusively of the holding of their capital by the same natural or legal person, or also of other links such as, for non-producer members, affiliation to the same union confederation, or, for producer members, the exercise of management responsibilities within such a confederation?

—

is it sufficient, in order to conclude that producer members do have control over the organisation, for those members to have a majority of the votes, or is it necessary to examine whether, in view of the distribution of votes among members who are genuinely independent, the voting share of one or more non-producer members enables them, even without a majority, to control the decisions taken by the organisation?

(1) Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 671).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/31

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 9 March 2022 — Sad Trasporto Locale SpA v Provincia autonoma di Bolzano

(Case C-186/22)

(2022/C 213/42)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant: Sad Trasporto Locale SpA

Defendant and respondent: Provincia autonoma di Bolzano

Questions referred

Must Article 1(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 (1) be interpreted as precluding the application of that regulation to the operation of national and international multimodal public passenger transport services, where, first, the public transport service is of a uniform nature for the purposes of the award and is performed by tramway, funicular railway and cableway, and second, track-based modes of transport account for more than 50 % of the service awarded in its entirety to the operator?

If the first question is answered in the negative, where Regulation No 1370/2007 also applies to the operation of national and international multimodal public passenger transport services, in which, first, the public transport service is of a uniform nature for the purposes of the award and is provided by tramway, funicular railway and cableway, second, track-based modes of transport account for more than 50 % of the service awarded in its entirety to the operator, must Article 5(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1370/2007 be interpreted as requiring, particularly in relation to the direct award to an internal operator of a public service contract that includes the transport of passengers by tramway, verification of the legal form of the measure awarding the service, with the effect of excluding from the scope of Article 5(2) of that regulation measures that do not take the form of services concession contracts?

If the second question is answered in the affirmative, must Article 5(1)(b) and the second subparagraph of Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/23/EU (2) be interpreted as meaning that the operating risk in exploiting those services must not be transferred to the contractor if the contract awarded: (a) is based on gross cost, with the contracting entity receiving the revenue; (b) only envisages as operating revenue for the operator a fee paid by the [contracting] entity, commensurate with the volume of services provided (and therefore excluding demand risk); (c) leaves the contracting entity with demand-side operating risk (reduction in fees due to a decline in service volumes below a predefined threshold), regulatory risk (resulting from legislative or regulatory changes and delay in the granting of authorisation and/or certification by the competent bodies), financial risk (non-payment or late payment of fees and failure to adjust fees), and risk of force majeure (resulting from an unforeseeable change in the service performance conditions); (d) transfers to the contractor supply side operating risk (changes in the costs of factors such as energy, raw materials and supplies that are beyond the operator’s control), industrial relations risk (resulting from changes in staff costs under a collective agreement), management risk (resulting from an increase in operating costs due to incorrect estimates), and socio-environmental risk (resulting from operating incidents involving assets needed to provide the service)?

Must Articles 107(1) TFEU and 108(3) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a direct award of a public service contract for the transport of passengers by a competent local authority to an internal operator, public service compensation calculated on the basis of management costs that, although related to the anticipated service requirements, are, on the one hand, estimated taking into account the historical costs of the service provided by the incumbent operator, awarded a services concession which was extended for more than 10 years, and on the other hand, are based on costs or fees that relate to the previous award or at least involve standard market parameters applicable to all operators in the sector, constitutes State aid subject to prior control under Article 108(3) TFEU?

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ 2007 L 315, p. 1).

(2) Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 1).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/32

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 11 March 2022 — ME v État belge

(Case C-191/22)

(2022/C 213/43)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: ME

Defendant: État belge

Question referred

Must Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and [Article 4(1)(c)] of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (1) and the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty be interpreted as requiring Member States to take into account the age of a child for whom family reunification is sought not at the date of the application for family reunification but at the date when the sponsor, who has been recognised as a refugee, submitted his or her application for international protection and to regard that child as a minor within the meaning of Article 4[(1)(c)] of Directive 2003/86/EC where that child was a minor at the time that the sponsor submitted his or her application for asylum but attained majority before the sponsor obtained refugee status and before the application for family reunification was lodged?

(1) OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/33

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 11 March 2022 — IB v Regione Lombardia, Provincia di Pavia

(Case C-196/22)

(2022/C 213/44)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: IB

Respondents: Regione Lombardia, Provincia di Pavia

Questions referred

Do the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/92 of 30 June 1992 (1) instituting a Community aid scheme for forestry measures in agriculture, without however providing for a system of disqualification and penalties, preclude, taking into account the provisions of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 (2) on the protection of the European Communities financial interests, the application of a provision of national law that, in implementing the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No 2080/92, provides, in the event of irregularities found in the granting of aid, for the disqualification from receiving that aid and the repayment of amounts received on that basis?

If the answer to the first question is in the negative, do the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/92 of 30 June 1992 instituting a Community aid scheme for forestry measures in agriculture preclude, taking into account the provisions of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 and the principles of equity and proportionality referred to in the eighth recital thereof, the application of a provision of national law that, in implementing the provisions of Regulation No 2080/92, provides, in the event of an irregularity found in the granting of the aid, for the disqualification from receiving that aid and the repayment of amounts received on that basis when the area reforested or improved is 20 % less than the area that qualified for the aid and for which the premium was received?

If the answer to the first question is in the negative, do the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/92 of 30 June 1992 instituting a Community aid scheme for forestry measures in agriculture preclude, taking into account the provisions of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995, the retroactive application of a provision of national law that, in implementing the provisions of Regulation No 2080/92, provides, in the event of an irregularity found in the granting of the aid, for the disqualification from receiving that aid and the repayment of amounts received on that basis?

If the answer to the first question is in the negative, do the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/92 of 30 June 1992 instituting a Community aid scheme for forestry measures in agriculture preclude, taking into account the provisions of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995, an interpretation of a provision of national law that, in implementing the provisions of Regulation No 2080/92, provides, in the event of an irregularity found in the granting of the aid, for the disqualification from receiving that aid and the repayment of amounts received on that basis, in the sense that the beneficiary is required to repay the entire amount received on that basis and not merely to repay the amounts for the year in respect of which the irregularity in the granting of the aid was found?

(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/92 of 30 June 1992 instituting a Community aid scheme for forestry measures in agriculture (OJ 1992 L 215, p. 96).

(2) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities financial interests (OJ 1995 L 312, p. 1).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/34

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rayonen sad Lukovit (Bulgaria) lodged on 18 March 2022 — Criminal proceedings

(Case C-209/22)

(2022/C 213/45)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Rayonen sad Lukovit

Party to the main proceedings

Rayonna prokuratura Lovech, teritorialno otdelenie Lukovit

Questions referred

Do factual situations in which coercive measures in the form of personal search and seizure were carried out against a natural person believed by the police to be in possession of narcotics during the investigation of an offence relating to the possession of narcotics come within the scope of Directive 2013/48/EU (1) on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty and of Directive 2012/13/EU (2) on the right to information in criminal proceedings?

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, what is the status of such a person within the meaning of the Directives if national law does not recognise the legal concept of ‘suspect’ and the person has not been formally ‘accused’ by official notification, and must such a person be granted the right to information and access to legal counsel?

Do the principle of legality and the prohibition of arbitrary actions allow a national provision such as Article 219(2) of the Nakazatelno-protsesualen kodeks (Code of Criminal Procedure, Bulgaria; ‘the NPK’), which provides that the investigating authority may formally accuse a person in the record of the first investigative act against him or her, if national law does not recognise the legal concept of ‘suspect’ and the rights of defence under national law arise only from the time at which the person is formally ‘accused’, which in turn is at the discretion of the investigating authority, and does such a national procedure impair the effective exercise and the essence of the right of access to a lawyer under Article 3(3)(b) of Directive 2013/48/EU?

Does the principle of practical effectiveness of EU law permit a national practice under which the judicial review of coercive measures to obtain evidence, including personal search and seizure during criminal investigation proceedings, does not allow for a review of whether a sufficiently serious breach has been committed of the fundamental rights of suspects and accused persons guaranteed by Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Directive 2013/48/EU and Directive 2012/13/EU?

Does the principle of the rule of law permit national legislation and case-law according to which the court is not authorised to review the act of formally accusing a person, when it is precisely and exclusively this formal act that determines whether a natural person is granted the rights of defence when coercive measures are taken against that person for purposes of investigation?

(1) OJ 2013 L 294, p. 1.

(2) OJ 2012 L 142, p. 1.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/35

Appeal brought on 4 April 2022 by Mylan IRE Healthcare Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 26 January 2022 in Case T-303/16, Mylan IRE Healthcare v Commission

(Case C-237/22 P)

(2022/C 213/46)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Mylan IRE Healthcare Ltd (represented by: I. Vernimme and L. Bidaine, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, UAB VVB

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

—	declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

—	set aside in its entirety the judgment under appeal;

—

if the Court considers that the state of the proceedings so permits, annul Commission Implementing Decision C(2016) 2083 final of 4 April 2016 concerning, in the framework of Article 29 of Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, the marketing authorisations for ‘Tobramycin VVB and associated names’, medicinal products for human use which contain the active substance ‘tobramycin’ (the contested decision); otherwise, refer the case back to the General Court;

—	order the Commission to pay the costs of the appellant incurred as a result of both the present proceedings and those of the proceedings at first instance;

—	order UAB VVB to support its own costs incurred as a result of both the present proceedings and those of the proceedings at first instance.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of its action, the appellant relies on two pleas in law.

First plea in law alleging an error in law in the interpretation of the concept of ‘clinical superiority’ in the sense of Article 8(3)(c) of the Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products (1) (the Orphan Regulation), especially in the light of the interpretation given by the General Court to the concept of ‘significant benefit’ within the meaning of Article 3 of the Orphan Regulation.

Second plea in law alleging an insufficient reasoning of the General Court to base its conclusion that TOBI / Tobramycin VVB was safer than Tobi Podhaler in a substantial portion of the target population especially in the light of the content of contested decision.

(1) OJ 2000 L 18, p. 1.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/35

Appeal brought on 8 April 2022 by Scania AB, Scania CV AB, Scania Deutschland GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Tenth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 2 February 2022 in Case T-799/17, Scania and Others v Commission

(Case C-251/22 P)

(2022/C 213/47)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Scania AB, Scania CV AB, Scania Deutschland GmbH (represented by: D. Arts, advocaat, F. Miotto, avocate, N. De Backer, advocate, C.E. Schillemans, advocaat, C. Langenius, S. Falkner, L. Ulrichs, P. Hammarskiöld, advokater)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The Appellants claim that the Court should:

—	set aside, in whole or in part, the judgment under the appeal;

—	annul, in whole or in part, Decision C(2017) 6467 final of 27 September 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 EEA Agreement (Case AT.39824 — Trucks) and / or cancel or reduce the relevant fines;

—	or, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment, and

—	order the European Commission to pay the costs at first instance and for the present appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the Appellants rely on the following four grounds of appeal:

In their first ground of appeal, the Appellants submit that the General Court erred in law, by failing to acknowledge that the Commission, by adopting the Settlement Decision (1) and thereafter continuing its investigation against Scania by relying on the same case team, infringed Article (41)1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as interpreted in the case-law of the Court of Justice.

2.	In their second ground of appeal, the Appellants submit that the General Court erred in law, by characterising the geographic scope of the German level conduct as extending to the whole of the EEA, whereas it was limited to Germany.

3.	In their third ground of appeal, the Appellants submit that the General Court erred in law, by characterising the series of acts at the three different levels as a single infringement.

4.	In subsidiary order, in their fourth ground of appeal, the Appellants submit that the General Court erred in law, by upholding a fine in relation to conduct that is time-barred.

(1) Commission Decision C(2016) 4673 final of 19.07.2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39824 — Trucks).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/37

Judgment of the General Court of 30 March 2022 — Daimler v EUIPO (Representation of three-pointed stars on a black background I)

(Case T-277/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU pattern mark - Representation of three-pointed stars on a black background I - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 213/49)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Daimler AG (Stuttgart, Germany) (represented by: N. Siebertz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Schäfer and E. Markakis, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 March 2021 (Case R 1895/2020-5), concerning an application for registration of a pattern sign representing three-pointed stars on a black background I as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Daimler AG to pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 278, 12.7.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/37

Judgment of the General Court of 30 March 2022 — Daimler v EUIPO (Representation of three-pointed stars on a black background II)

(Case T-278/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU pattern mark - Representation of three-pointed stars on a black background II - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 213/50)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Daimler AG (Stuttgart, Germany) (represented by: N. Siebertz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Schäfer and E. Markakis, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 March 2021 (Case R 1896/2020-5), concerning an application for registration of a pattern sign representing three-pointed stars on a black background II as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Daimler AG to pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 278, 12.7.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/38

Judgment of the General Court of 30 March 2022 — Daimler v EUIPO (Representation of three-pointed stars on a black background IV)

(Case T-279/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark - Representation of three-pointed stars on a black background IV - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 213/51)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Daimler AG (Stuttgart, Germany) (represented by: N. Siebertz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Schäfer and E. Markakis, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 March 2021 (Case R 1898/2020-5) concerning an application for registration of a figurative sign representing three-pointed stars on a black background IV as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Daimler AG to pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 278, 12.7.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/38

Judgment of the General Court of 30 March 2022 — Daimler v EUIPO (Representation of three-pointed stars on a black background III)

(Case T-280/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark - Representation of three-pointed stars on a black background III - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2022/C 213/52)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Daimler AG (Stuttgart, Germany) (represented by: N. Siebertz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Schäfer and E. Markakis, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 March 2021 (Case R 1897/2020-5), concerning an application for registration of a figurative sign representing three-pointed stars on a black background III as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action;

2.	Orders Daimler AG to pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 278, 12.7.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/39

Judgment of the General Court of 30 March 2022 — Copal Tree Brands v EUIPO — Sumol + Compal Marcas (COPALLI)

(Case T-445/21) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark COPALLI - Earlier national word mark COMPAL - Relative ground for refusal - Damage to reputation - Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Unfair advantage taken of the distinctive character or repute of the earlier mark)

(2022/C 213/53)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Copal Tree Brands, Inc. (Oakland, California, United States) (represented by: B. Niemann Fadani, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: T. Frydendahl and D. Gája, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Sumol + Compal Marcas SA (Carnaxide, Portugal) (represented by: A. de Sampaio, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 May 2021 (Case R 1581/2020-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Sumol + Compal Marcas and Copal Tree Brands.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

1.	Dismisses the action

2.	Orders Copal Tree Brands, Inc. to pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 368, 13.9.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/39

Order of the General Court of 24 March 2022 — Di Taranto v EPPO

(Case T-368/21) (1)

(Action for annulment - Law governing the institutions - Enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office - Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 - Appointment of the European Delegated Prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office - Derived unlawfulness - Candidates nominated by the Italian Republic - Nomination disputed before the national court - Inadmissability)

(2022/C 213/54)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Alessandro Di Taranto (Rome, Italy) (represented by: G. Pellegrino, lawyer)

Defendant: European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) (represented by: L. De Matteis and T. Gut, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Decision No 34/2021 of the College of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office of 3 May 2021 on the appointment of fifteen European Delegated Prosecutors of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in the Italian Republic.

Operative part of the order

1.	The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

2.	Mr Alessandro Di Taranto shall pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 368, 13.9.2021.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/40

Order of the President of the General Court of 23 February 2022 — Atesos medical and Others v Commission

(Case T-764/21 R)

(Interim relief - Medical devices - Directive 93/42/EEC - Regulation (EU) 2017/745 - Application for suspension of operation of a measure - No urgency)

(2022/C 213/55)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Atesos medical AG (Aarau, Switzerland) and the seven other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to the order (represented by: M. Meulenbelt, B. Natens and I. Willemyns, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: E. Sanfrutos Cano, C. Hödlmayr and C. Vollrath, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU for suspension of operation of the unpublished Commission decision, the date of which is unknown, which provides for the expiry of the designation of Schweizerische Vereinigung für Qualitäts- und Management Systeme as a conformity assessment body for medical devices under Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices (OJ 1993 L 169, p. 1), and its removal from the database of notified and designated bodies with effect from 28 September 2021.

Operative part of the order

1.	The application for interim measures is dismissed.

2.	The costs are reserved.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/40

Order of the President of the General Court of 31 March 2022 — AL v Council

(Case T-22/22 R)

(Interim relief - Civil service - Officials - Disciplinary proceedings - Removal from post - Application for interim measures - Urgency - Prima facie case - Weighing of interests)

(2022/C 213/56)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: AL (represented by: R. Rata, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bauer and M. Alver, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU for, first, suspension of operation of the decision of the Council of 27 September 2021 imposing on the applicant the disciplinary penalty of removal from post with effect from 1 October 2021 and, second, reinstatement of the applicant as an official in his previous post and position.

Operative part of the order

1.	The operation of the decision of the Council of the European Union of 27 September 2021 imposing on the applicant the disciplinary penalty of removal from post is suspended with effect from 1 October 2021.

2.	The costs are reserved.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/41

Order of the President of the General Court of 30 March 2022 — RT France v Council

(Case T-125/22 R)

(Interim relief - Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine - Suspension of the broadcasting activities of certain media - Application for suspension of operation of a measure - No urgency - Weighing of competing interests)

(2022/C 213/57)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: RT France (Boulogne-Billancourt, France) (represented by: E. Piwnica, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: S. Lejeune, R. Meyer and S. Emmerechts, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application pursuant to Articles 278 and 279 TFEU for suspension of the operation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/351 of 1 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 65, p. 5) and of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 65, p. 1), in so far as those acts concern the applicant.

Operative part of the order

1.	The application for interim relief is dismissed.

2.	There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the applications for leave to intervene submitted by the European Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic and the Republic of Poland.

3.	The costs are reserved save for those incurred by the European Commission, the Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic and the Republic of Poland. Those parties shall bear the costs in the context of their application for leave to intervene.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/42

Action brought on 25 March 2022 — Ryanair v Commission

(Case T-164/22)

(2022/C 213/58)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Ryanair DAC (Swords, Ireland) (represented by: E. Vahida, F.-C. Laprévote, V. Blanc, D. Pérez de Lamo and S. Rating, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the European Commission’s decision (EU) of 21 December 2021 on State aid SA.63402 (2021/N) — Portugal — COVID-19: Damage compensation to TAP II; and

—	order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging that the Commission misapplied Article 107(2)(b) TFEU and committed a manifest error of assessment in its review of the proportionality of the aid to the damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging that the decision violates specific provisions of the TFEU and the general principles of EU Law that have underpinned the liberalisation of EU air transport since the late 1980s (i.e., non-discrimination, free provision of services and freedom of establishment).

3.	Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to initiate a formal investigation despite the existence of ‘serious difficulties’ and violated the applicant’s procedural rights.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed its duty to state reasons pursuant to Article 296(2) TFEU.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/42

Action brought on 6 April 2022 — Pharol v Commission

(Case T-181/22)

(2022/C 213/59)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Applicant: Pharol, SGPS, SA (Lisbon, Portugal) (represented by: N. Mimosa Ruiz and L. Bettencourt Nunes, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	recognise the applicant’s legitimate interest in bringing the present action for annulment;

—	declare that the present action for annulment has been brought in due form and is admissible;

—	annul Decision C(2022) 324 final of 25 January 2022, amending Decision C(2013) 306 final of 23 January 2013, relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (AT.39839 — Telefónica and Portugal Telecom) pursuant to Article 264 TFEU;

—	in the alternative, and also pursuant to Article 264 TFEU, for the reasons given, reduce the fine imposed on the applicant under Article 1 of the contested decision;

—	order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings and the expenses incurred by the applicant.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging a failure to have regard to the findings of the judgment of the General Court. The applicant submits that Decision C(2022) 324 final of 25 January 2022, amending Decision C(2013) 306 final of 23 January 2013, relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (AT.39839 — Telefónica and Portugal Telecom) represents a new interpretation of the non-competition clause, which disregards the findings and the force of res judicata of the judgment of the General Court, for which reason the contested decisions should be annulled.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements and of the rights of defence of Pharol due to a failure to adopt a statement of objections. The applicant submits that, since it has adopted a new interpretation of the non-competition clause, which affects the findings relating to the scale of the infringement, the Commission should have adopted a new statement of objections, and this amounts to an infringement of essential procedural requirements and of the rights of defence of the applicant, thereby justifying the annulment of the contested decision.

Third plea in law, alleging an error in determining the sales values connected with the infringement. The applicant submits, inter alia, that the essential element for analysing the existence of potential competition, for the purposes of identifying precisely the sales connected, directly or indirectly, with the infringement, must be the actual possibility of entering each market at issue, that is to say the absence of insurmountable barriers to entry and, where there are such barriers, the existence of real and concrete possibilities for the undertaking to enter each of the markets; it is not sufficient for the Commission to make a finding — which is moreover erroneous — in the contested decision that there are no insurmountable barriers.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/43

Action brought on 8 April 2022 — Ryanair v Commission

(Case T-185/22)

(2022/C 213/60)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Ryanair DAC (Swords, Ireland) (represented by: E. Vahida, F.-C. Laprévote, V. Blanc, D. Pérez de Lamo and S. Rating, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul the European Commission’s decision (EU) of 22 December 2021 on State aid SA.100121 (2021/N) — Portugal — COVID-19: Damage compensation to TAP III; and

—	order the European Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

1.	First plea in law, alleging that the Commission misapplied Article 107(2)(b) TFEU and committed a manifest error of assessment in its review of the proportionality of the aid to the damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.	Second plea in law, alleging that the decision violates specific provisions of the TFEU and the general principles of EU Law that have underpinned the liberalisation of EU air transport since the late 1980s (i.e., non-discrimination, free provision of services and freedom of establishment).

3.	Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to initiate a formal investigation despite the existence of ‘serious difficulties’ and violated the applicant’s procedural rights.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed its duty to state reasons pursuant to Article 296(2) TFEU.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/44

Action brought on 12 April 2022 — BNP Paribas v ECB

(Case T-186/22)

(2022/C 213/61)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: BNP Paribas (Paris, France) (represented by: A. Gossett-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul section 1.10 and sections 3.10.1 to 3.10.8 of ECB decision No ECB-SSM-2022-FRBNP-7 of 2 February 2022 (together with its annexes), in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken regarding irrevocable payment commitments in respect of the deposit guarantee schemes or the resolution funds;

—	order the defendant to pay all the costs

—

adopt, under Articles 88 and 89 of the Rules of Procedure, a measure of organisation of procedure requesting that the ECB communicate the decisions in respect of irrevocable payment commitments taken for other banking institutions for 2021, particularly those in respect of the other French banking institutions.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging an error of law and infringement of Article 266 TFEU. The applicant argues in that respect that by imposing, in the contested decision, a measure of general principle and based on a reasoning disregarding its individual prudential situation, the ECB exceeded the powers granted to it through Regulation No 1024/2013, (1) as made clear by the case-law of the General Court of the European Union.

Second plea in law, alleging a manifest error of appreciation and a breach of the principle of good administration. The applicant considers that the ECB, by failing to take into account all the relevant factors characterising its specific situation, drew incorrect conclusions regarding the prudential risks that would be induced by the action of the irrevocable payment commitments (IPC) on its individual situation.

Third plea in law, alleging an error of law by reason of a deprivation of effectiveness of the provisions of EU law governing the use of IPC. According to the applicant, since the ECB based its analysis on the points of principle may only lead to a requirement of full deduction of the IPC from the Common Equity Tier 1, that would lead to EU legislation authorising the credit institutions to use IPC in order to fulfil part of their obligations vis-à-vis the resolution funds and deposit guarantee schemes being deprived of their effectiveness.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging a breach of the principle of proportionality, on the ground that the ECB imposed on the applicant an unjustified and disproportionate measure in the light of its prudential situation.

(1) Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013, conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63).

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/45

Action brought on 12 April 2022 — BPCE and Others v ECB

(Case T-187/22)

(2022/C 213/62)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: BPCE (Paris, France) and the 51 other applicants (represented by: A. Gossett-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

—	annul section 1.3 and sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.8 of ECB decision No ECB-SSM-2022-FRBPC-10 of 2 February 2022 (together with its annexes), in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken in relation to irrevocable payment commitments concerning deposit guarantee schemes or resolution funds;

—	order the defendant to pay all the costs

—

adopt, under Articles 88 and 89 of the Rules of Procedure, a measure of organisation of procedure seeking to have the ECB communicate the decisions concerning irrevocable payment commitments taken in respect of other banking institutions for 2021, particularly those relating to the other French banking institutions.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law which are identical or similar to those relied upon in Case T-186/22, BNP Paribas v European Central Bank.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/46

Action brought on 12 April 2022 — Crédit agricole and Others v ECB

(Case T-188/22)

(2022/C 213/63)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Crédit agricole SA (Montrouge, France) and the 63 other applicants (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

—	annul section 1.5 and sections 3.5.1 to 3.5.8 of ECB decision No ECB-SSM-2022-FRCAG-5 of 2 February 2022 (together with its annexes), in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken in relation to irrevocable payment commitments concerning the deposit guarantee schemes or resolution funds;

—	order the defendant to pay all the costs

—

adopt, under Articles 88 and 89 of the Rules of Procedure, a measure of organisation of procedure seeking to have the ECB disclose the decisions concerning irrevocable payment commitments taken in respect of other banking institutions for 2021, particularly those relating to the other French banking institutions.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law which are identical or similar to those relied upon in Case T-186/22, BNP Paribas v European Central Bank.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/46

Action brought on 12 April 2022 — Conféderation nationale du Crédit Mutuel and Others v ECB

(Case T-189/22)

(2022/C 213/64)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Conféderation nationale du Crédit Mutuel (Paris, France) and the 37 other applicants (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul section 1.4 and sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.8 of ECB decision No ECB-SSM-2022-FRCMU-6 of 2 February 2022 (together with its annexes), in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken in relation to irrevocable payment commitments concerning the deposit guarantee schemes or resolution funds;

—	order the defendant to pay all the costs

—

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law which are identical or similar to those relied upon in Case T-186/22, BNP Paribas v European Central Bank.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/47

Action brought on 12 April 2022 — Banque Postale v ECB

(Case T-190/22)

(2022/C 213/65)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: La Banque Postale (Paris, France) (represented by: A. Gossett-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul section 1.2 and sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.8 of ECB decision No ECB-SSM-2022-FRBPL-1 of 2 February 2022 (together with its annexes), in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken in relation to irrevocable payment commitments concerning the deposit guarantee schemes or resolution funds;

—	order the defendant to pay all the costs

—

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law which are identical or similar to those relied upon in Case T-186/22, BNP Paribas v European Central Bank.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/47

Action brought on 12 April 2022 — Société générale v ECB

(Case T-191/22)

(2022/C 213/66)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Société générale (Paris, France) (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—	annul section 1.6 and sections 3.6.1 to 3.6.8 of ECB decision No ECB-SSM-2022-FRSOG-7 of 2 February 2022 (together with its annexes), in so far as it prescribes measures to be taken in relation to irrevocable payment commitments concerning the deposit guarantee schemes or resolution funds;

—	order the defendant to pay all the costs

—

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law which are identical or similar to those relied upon in Case T-186/22, BNP Paribas v European Central Bank.

30.5.2022

Official Journal of the European Union

C 213/48

Action brought on 15 April 2022 — OT v Council

(Case T-193/22)

(2022/C 213/67)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: OT (represented by: J.-P. Hordies and C. Sand, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/427 of 15 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 87, p. 1.), in so far as it concerns the applicant;

—	annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/429 of 15 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 87, p. 1.) in so far as it concerns the applicant;

—	order the Council to bear the full costs and expenses of the proceedings, including those incurred by the applicant.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging that Article 1(d) and (g) of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/330 of 25 February 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1) are unlawful, and infringement of the principles of equal treatment, legal certainty and sound administration.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, infringement of Articles 2 and 3 of the New York Convention on the Rights of the Child and infringement of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

3.	Third plea in law, alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons.

4.	Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence.

5.	Fifth plea in law, alleging manifest error in the assessment of the facts.

6.	Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the general principle of proportionality.

7.	Seventh plea in law, alleging a disproportionate infringement of the right to property, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to pursue a profession.

		ISSN 1977-091X
Official Journal of the European Union		C 213

English edition	Information and Notices	Volume 65 30 May 2022

Contents		page
	IV Notices
	NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES
	Court of Justice of the European Union
2022/C 213/01	Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union	1