(1)

The Schengen area without border control at internal borders relies on the effective and efficient application by the Member States of the Schengen acquis. That acquis comprises measures in the area of external borders, compensatory measures for the absence of controls at internal borders and a strong monitoring framework, which together facilitate free movement and ensures a high level of security, justice and protection of fundamental rights, including the protection of personal data.

(1)

The Schengen area without border control at internal borders relies on the effective and efficient application by the Member States of the Schengen acquis. That acquis comprises measures in the area of external borders, compensatory measures for the absence of controls at internal borders and a strong monitoring framework, which together ensures free movement as well as a high level of security, justice and protection of fundamental rights, including the protection of personal data.

(4)

In order to increase its effectiveness and efficiency, the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism should be enhanced. The revised evaluation and monitoring mechanism should aim at maintaining a high level of mutual trust among Member States by guaranteeing that Member States apply the Schengen acquis effectively following the agreed common standards, fundamental principles and norms, thereby contributing to a well-functioning Schengen area.

(4)

In order to increase its effectiveness and efficiency, the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism should be enhanced. The revised evaluation and monitoring mechanism should aim at maintaining a high level of mutual trust among Member States by guaranteeing that Member States apply the Schengen acquis effectively following the agreed common standards, fundamental principles and norms, in order to ensure a well-functioning Schengen area , in full respect for fundamental rights and without internal border controls .

(5)

The evaluation and monitoring mechanism should achieve these goals through objective and impartial evaluations that are able to quickly identify deficiencies in the application of the Schengen acquis that could disrupt the correct functioning of the Schengen area, ensure that these deficiencies are swiftly addressed, and provide the basis for a dialogue on the functioning of the Schengen area as a whole. This requires close cooperation between the Member States and the Commission, a balanced distribution of shared responsibilities and maintaining the peer review nature of the system. It also requires a closer involvement of the European Parliament. Given the extent of the changes, Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 should be repealed and replaced by a new Regulation.

(5)

The evaluation and monitoring mechanism should achieve these goals through objective and impartial evaluations that are able to quickly identify deficiencies in the application of the Schengen acquis that could disrupt the correct functioning of the Schengen area, ensure that these deficiencies are swiftly addressed, and provide the basis for a  genuine political dialogue among Member States on the functioning of the Schengen area as a whole. This requires close cooperation between the Member States and the Commission, a balanced distribution of shared responsibilities and maintaining the peer review nature of the system. It also requires a closer involvement of the European Parliament. Given the extent of the changes, Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 should be repealed and replaced by a new Regulation.

(6)

The evaluation and monitoring mechanism may cover all areas of the Schengen acquis — present and future — except those where a specific evaluation mechanism already exists under Union law. The evaluation and monitoring mechanism should encompass all relevant legislation and operational activities contributing to the functioning of Schengen area .

(6)

The evaluation and monitoring mechanism should cover all areas of the Schengen acquis — present and future — except those where a specific evaluation mechanism already exists under Union law. The evaluation and monitoring mechanism should cover both the efficiency of border controls at external borders and the absence of border controls at internal borders. The evaluation and monitoring mechanism should encompass all relevant legislation and operational activities contributing to the functioning of an area without border control at internal borders .

(7)

The correct functioning of the authorities that apply the Schengen acquis should be taken into account in all the evaluations in line with the European Council conclusions of 1 and 2 March 2012. The evaluation should also cover the practices of private entities, such as airlines or external service providers, as far as they are involved in or affected by the implementation of the Schengen acquis while cooperating with the Member States. Equally, given the increasing role of Union bodies, offices and agencies in the implementation of the Schengen acquis, the evaluation and monitoring mechanism should support the verification of the activities of these Union bodies, offices and agencies in so far as they perform functions on behalf of the Member States to assist in the operational application of provisions of the Schengen acquis. Verification of these activities in this regard should be embedded into the evaluation of the Member States and carried out without prejudice to and in full respect of the responsibilities attributed to the Commission and to the relevant governing bodies of the agencies, offices and bodies concerned by their establishing regulations and their own evaluation and monitoring procedures therein. Should evaluations identify deficiencies in relation to functions fulfilled or supported by Union bodies, offices and agencies, the Commission should inform their relevant governing bodies.

(7)

The correct functioning of the authorities that apply the Schengen acquis and their compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) should be taken into account in all the evaluations in line with the European Council conclusions of 1 and 2 March 2012. The evaluation should also cover the practices of private entities, such as airlines or external service providers, as far as they are involved in or affected by the implementation of the Schengen acquis while cooperating with the Member States. Equally, given the increasing role of Union bodies, offices and agencies in the implementation of the Schengen acquis, the evaluation and monitoring mechanism should support the verification of the activities of these Union bodies, offices and agencies in so far as they perform functions on behalf of the Member States to assist in the operational application of provisions of the Schengen acquis. Verification of these activities in this regard should be embedded into the evaluation of the Member States and carried out without prejudice to and in full respect of the responsibilities attributed to the Commission and to the relevant governing bodies of the agencies, offices and bodies concerned by their establishing regulations and their own evaluation and monitoring procedures therein. Should evaluations identify deficiencies in relation to functions fulfilled or supported by Union bodies, offices and agencies, the Commission should include that in the evaluation report and involve their relevant governing bodies.

(9)

The vulnerability assessment carried out by Frontex is a complementary mechanism to the evaluation and monitoring mechanism established by this Regulation for guaranteeing quality control at Union level and ensuring constant preparedness at both Union and national levels to respond to any challenges at the external border. Both mechanisms constitute a component of the European Integrated Border Management. Synergies between the vulnerability assessment and the evaluation and monitoring mechanism should be maximised with a view to establishing an improved situational picture of the functioning of the Schengen area, avoiding, to the extent possible, duplication of efforts and conflicting recommendations. For that purpose, regular exchange of information between Frontex and the Commission on the results of both mechanisms should take place. Increasing the strategic focus and more targeted evaluation design also requires increasing synergies further with the relevant mechanisms and platforms operated by Union agencies and national administrations, such as the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (‘EMPACT’) or the oversight conducted by the Commission with the support of eu-LISA as regards the preparation of the Member States for the implementation of relevant IT systems as well as the findings of the national quality control mechanisms.

(9)

The vulnerability assessment carried out by Frontex is a complementary mechanism to the evaluation and monitoring mechanism established by this Regulation for guaranteeing quality control at Union level and ensuring constant preparedness at both Union and national levels to respond to any challenges at the external border . That vulnerability assessment should feed into the annual evaluation programme, thus ensuring an up-to-date situational awareness . Both mechanisms constitute a component of the European Integrated Border Management. Synergies between the vulnerability assessment and the evaluation and monitoring mechanism should be maximised with a view to establishing an improved situational picture of the functioning of the Schengen area, avoiding, to the extent possible, duplication of efforts and conflicting recommendations. For that purpose, regular exchange of information between Frontex and the Commission on the results of both mechanisms should take place. Increasing the strategic focus and more targeted evaluation design also requires increasing synergies further with the relevant mechanisms and platforms operated by Union agencies and national administrations, such as the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (‘EMPACT’) or the oversight conducted by the Commission with the support of eu-LISA as regards the preparation of the Member States for the implementation of relevant IT systems as well as the findings of the national quality control mechanisms.

(10)

During the evaluation, particular attention should be paid to verifying respect for fundamental rights in the application of the Schengen acquis in addition to the evaluation of the correct implementation and application of the data protection requirements of the Schengen acquis carried out by separate evaluations. To increase the capacity of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism to identify violations of fundamental rights in relevant policy areas, additional measures should be implemented. Schengen evaluators should be properly trained in this regard, relevant information from the European Agency for Fundamental Rights should be better utilised and its experts better involved in the design and implementation of evaluations. Furthermore, evidence which is made public or provided through independent monitoring mechanisms or by relevant third parties at their own initiative such as ombudspersons, authorities monitoring the respect of fundamental rights, non-governmental and international organisations, should be taken into account in the programming, design and implementation of evaluations.

(10)

During the evaluation, particular attention should be paid to verifying respect for fundamental rights in the application of the Schengen acquis in addition to the evaluation of the correct implementation and application of the data protection requirements of the Schengen acquis carried out by separate evaluations. To increase the capacity of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism to identify violations of fundamental rights in relevant policy areas, additional measures should be implemented. Schengen evaluators should be properly trained in this regard, relevant information from the European Agency for Fundamental Rights should be better utilised and its experts better involved in the design and implementation of evaluations. In particular, the Commission, in cooperation with the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, should develop specific benchmarks, to be included in the standard questionnaire, against which compliance with fundamental rights can be assessed. Furthermore, evidence which is made public or provided through independent monitoring mechanisms or by relevant third parties at their own initiative such as ombudspersons, authorities monitoring the respect of fundamental rights, non-governmental and international organisations, should be taken into account in the programming, design and implementation of evaluations.

(12)

The forms of evaluations and methods should be made more flexible to increase the efficiency of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism and its capacity to adapt to new circumstances and legislative developments and to streamline the use of the resources of the Member States, Commission and the Union bodies, offices and agencies. Periodic evaluations through visits should be the primary means of evaluation. The proportion of unannounced visits and thematic evaluations should be gradually increased to ensure a more balanced use of available tools. The forms of evaluation should be clearly defined. Depending on the policy area and the nature of the evaluation and monitoring activity, the evaluation and monitoring mechanism should allow the evaluation of several Member States at the same time and conduct entirely or partly remote evaluations as well as to combine the evaluation of policy fields. The evaluation and monitoring mechanism should strive towards drawing comprehensive Member State evaluation reports assessing the Member State’s overall performance in the application of the Schengen acquis.

(12)

The forms of evaluations and methods should be made more flexible to increase the efficiency of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism and its capacity to adapt to new circumstances and legislative developments and to streamline the use of the resources of the Member States, Commission and the Union bodies, offices and agencies. Periodic evaluations through visits should be the primary means of evaluation. The proportion of unannounced visits and thematic evaluations should be gradually increased to ensure a more balanced use of available tools. The forms of evaluation should be clearly defined. Depending on the policy area and the nature of the evaluation and monitoring activity, the evaluation and monitoring mechanism should allow the evaluation of several Member States at the same time and conduct entirely or partly remote evaluations as complementary evaluation methods to physical visits, as well as to combine the evaluation of policy fields. The evaluation and monitoring mechanism should strive towards drawing comprehensive Member State evaluation reports assessing the Member State’s overall performance in the application of the Schengen acquis.

(13)

Thematic evaluations should be used more frequently to provide a comparative analysis of Member State practices. They should take place to assess the implementation of major legislative changes as they start to apply and of new initiatives, as well as to assess issues across policy areas or practices of Member States facing similar challenges .

(13)

Thematic evaluations should be used more frequently to provide a comparative analysis of Member State practices. They should take place to assess the implementation of major legislative changes as they start to apply and of new initiatives, as well as to assess issues across policy areas or similar policies and practices across the Member States.

(14)

Unannounced visits, being one of the most effective tools to verify Member States practices should , depending on their purpose, take place without prior notification to the Member State concerned or with only short prior notification. Unannounced visits without prior notification should take place for ‘investigative’ purposes in order to verify compliance with obligations under the Schengen acquis, including, in response to indications as regards the emergence of systemic problems that could potentially have a significant impact on the functioning of the Schengen area or to fundamental rights violations, in particular allegations of serious violations of fundamental rights at the external borders. In such cases, the provision of advance notice would defeat the objective of the visit. Unannounced visits with a 24-hour advance notice should take place if the main purpose of the visit is to carry out a random check of the Member State’s implementation of the Schengen acquis.

(14)

Unannounced visits, being one of the most effective tools to verify Member States practices, should take place without prior notification to the Member State concerned. Unannounced visits should take place for ‘investigative’ purposes in order to verify compliance with obligations under the Schengen acquis, including, in response to indications as regards the emergence of systemic problems that could potentially negatively impact the functioning of the Schengen area or lead to fundamental rights violations, in particular allegations of serious violations of fundamental rights at the external borders.

(14a)

A maximum of 24 hours’ notice should be given to a Member State prior to a short notice visit, which is a complementary tool. A short-notice visit should take place only where the main purpose of the visit is to carry out a random check of the implementation of the Schengen acquis by a Member State.

(15)

Programming the activities carried out under this Regulation via multiannual and annual evaluation programmes has already proven its added value to ensure predictability and certainty. Therefore, the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States should adopt multiannual and annual evaluation programmes. These programmes should also provide the necessary flexibility to be able to adapt to the dynamic nature of the Schengen acquis over time. In the event of force majeure adjustments to the programmes should be made in agreement with the Member States concerned without the need for a formal amendment of the programmes. The multiannual evaluation programme, adopted for seven years, should identify the specific priority areas to be covered by the periodic evaluations. This approach should allow for more flexibility, better prioritisation and a more balanced and strategic use of all tools available. The extension of the multiannual evaluation programme from five to seven years should also lead to an increased, closer and more targeted monitoring of the Member States without reducing the level of scrutiny.

(15)

Programming the activities carried out under this Regulation via multiannual and annual evaluation programmes has already proven its added value to ensure predictability and certainty. Therefore, the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States should adopt multiannual and annual evaluation programmes. These programmes should also provide the necessary flexibility to be able to adapt to the dynamic nature of the Schengen acquis over time. In the event of force majeure adjustments to the programmes should be made in agreement with the Member States concerned without the need for a formal amendment of the programmes. The multiannual evaluation programme, adopted for seven years, should identify the specific priority areas to be covered by the periodic evaluations. This approach should allow for more flexibility, adaptability based on the up-to-date information collected by the various analyses with a view to establishing an improved situational picture of the functioning of the Schengen area, better prioritisation as well as a more balanced and strategic use of all tools available. The extension of the multiannual evaluation programme from five to seven years should also lead to an increased, closer and more targeted monitoring of the Member States without reducing the level of scrutiny.

(16)

Evaluation and monitoring activities should be carried out by teams consisting of Commission representatives and experts designated by Member States. These representatives and experts should have appropriate qualifications, including a solid theoretical knowledge and practical experience. In order to ensure the participation of sufficient number of experienced experts in a faster and less burdensome way, a pool of experts should be established and maintained by the Commission in close cooperation with the Member States. The pool should be the primary source of experts for evaluation and monitoring activities.

(16)

Evaluation and monitoring activities should be carried out by teams consisting of Commission representatives and experts designated by Member States and Union observers . These representatives and experts should have appropriate qualifications, including a solid theoretical knowledge and practical experience , and have undertaken the appropriate training . In order to ensure the integrity of evaluation reports drawn up by teams following an evaluation, where the activities of a Union body, office or agency involved in the implementation of the Schengen acquis are evaluated together with the authorities of a Member State, Union observers should not have any conflict of interest. In order to ensure the participation of sufficient number of experienced experts in a faster and less burdensome way, a pool of experts should be established and maintained by the Commission in close cooperation with the Member States. The pool should be the primary source of experts for evaluation and monitoring activities.

(19)

Evaluation reports should be concise and succinct. They should focus on deficiencies with significant impact and highlight areas where important improvements could be made . Minor findings should not form part of the reports . The team should nevertheless communicate these findings to the evaluated Member State at the end of the evaluation activity, including to the authorities responsible for the relevant national quality control mechanism. The team should actively seek to identify best practices which should be added to the reports. In particular, new and innovative measures that significantly improve the implementation of the common rules and that could be put in practice by other Member States should be highlighted as a best practice for the purposes of the report.

(19)

Evaluation reports should be concise and give an account of deficiencies identified and highlight areas where improvements should be made. The team should communicate the findings to the evaluated Member State at the end of the evaluation activity, including to the authorities responsible for the relevant national quality control mechanism. The team should actively seek to identify best practices which should be added to the reports. In particular, new and innovative measures that significantly improve the implementation of the common rules and that could be put in practice by other Member States should be highlighted as a best practice for the purposes of the report.

(20)

Evaluation reports should, as a rule, contain recommendations on how to remedy deficiencies identified (including fundamental rights violations) and be adopted in a single act by the Commission by means of implementing acts through the examination procedure in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (36) . The consolidation of the report and recommendations within a single document and subject to a single adoption procedure reinforces the intrinsic connection between the evaluation findings and recommendations. In addition, the accelerated publication of the recommendations should enable Member States to address the deficiencies faster and more efficiently. At the same time, the use of the examination procedure should ensure Member State’s engagement in the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the recommendations.

(20)

Evaluation reports should, as a rule, contain recommendations on how to remedy deficiencies identified (including fundamental rights violations) and be adopted in a single act by the Commission by means of implementing acts through the examination procedure in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (36) and without unnecessary delay. Attention should, in particular, be paid to identifying and remedying fundamental rights violations . The consolidation of the report and recommendations within a single document and subject to a single adoption procedure reinforces the intrinsic connection between the evaluation findings and recommendations. In addition, the accelerated publication of the recommendations should enable Member States to address the deficiencies faster and more efficiently. At the same time, the use of the examination procedure should ensure Member State’s engagement in the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the recommendations.

(22)

In addition, where evaluations identify a serious deficiency, specific provisions should apply to ensure the prompt adoption of remedial measures. Given the risk posed by such deficiency, as soon as the evaluated Member State is informed about a serious deficiency, the evaluated Member State should start immediately implementing actions to remedy the deficiency including, where necessary, mobilising all available operational and financial means. Remedial action should be subject to tighter deadlines and closer political scrutiny and monitoring throughout the process. In this regard, the Commission should immediately inform the Council and the European Parliament when an evaluation establishes the existence of a serious deficiency and organise a ‘serious deficiency’ revisit no later than one year from the date of the evaluation to verify whether the Member State has remedied the shortcomings concerned. The Commission should present a revisit report to the Council following the revisit.

(22)

In addition, where evaluations identify a serious deficiency, specific provisions should apply to ensure the prompt adoption of remedial measures. Given the risk posed by such deficiency, as soon as the evaluated Member State is informed about a serious deficiency, the evaluated Member State should start immediately implementing actions to remedy the deficiency including, where necessary, mobilising all available operational and financial means. Remedial action should be subject to tighter deadlines and closer political scrutiny and monitoring throughout the process. In this regard, the Commission should immediately inform the Council and the European Parliament when an evaluation establishes the existence of a serious deficiency and report on any infringement proceedings that are ongoing or to be brought against the evaluated Member State. The Commission should also organise a ‘serious deficiency’ revisit no later than 180 days from the date of the evaluation to verify whether the Member State has remedied the shortcomings concerned. The Commission should present a revisit report to the Council and to the European Parliament following the revisit. Considering the severe impact that a serious deficiency might have on the Schengen area, the Commission should launch without delay an infringement procedure in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in order to address the identified shortcomings.

(23)

The identification of a serious deficiency requires a thorough case-by-case assessment on the basis of clear criteria regarding the nature, scale and potential impact of the problems, which may be different for each policy area. Different key elements for the effective implementation of the Schengen acquis and different combination of factors could lead to the classification of a finding as a serious deficiency. However, if it is considered that a shortcoming identified is or in a short-term has the potential of putting the overall functioning of the area without internal border control at risk, or have a significant negative impact on the rights of individuals, such shortcoming is to be regarded as a serious deficiency. Where a serious deficiency in the carrying out of external border control is identified in an evaluation report, Articles 21 and 29 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council (37) may apply.

(23)

The identification of a serious deficiency requires a thorough case-by-case assessment on the basis of clear criteria regarding the nature, scale and potential impact of the problems, which may be different for each policy area. Different key elements for the effective implementation of the Schengen acquis and different combination of factors could lead to the classification of a finding as a serious deficiency. However, if it is considered that a shortcoming identified is or in a short-term has the potential of putting the overall functioning of the area without internal border control at risk, or of negatively impacting fundamental rights or have a significant negative impact on the rights of individuals, such shortcoming is to be regarded as a serious deficiency. Where a serious deficiency in the carrying out of external border control is identified in an evaluation report, Articles 21 and 29 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council (37) may apply.

(26)

It is essential and desirable that the European Parliament and the Council regularly hold discussions at political level in order to raise awareness of the importance of the implementation of the Schengen acquis, hold Member States who persistently breach the common rules accountable, and increase pressure on them to remedy the deficiencies identified. The Commission should provide adequate input to facilitate these discussions including through the adoption of a comprehensive annual report covering the evaluations carried out during the previous year and state of implementation of recommendations, which would be part of the ‘State of Schengen’ report. The European Parliament is encouraged to adopt resolutions and the Council should adopt conclusions to increase pressure on Member States making insufficient progress. The ‘Schengen Forum’, as a unique stage to discuss Schengen at high level with representatives of the European Parliament, Member States and the Commission should provide a platform for informal discussions aiming at better implementation of the Schengen acquis.

(26)

It is essential and desirable that the European Parliament and the Council regularly hold discussions at political level in order to raise awareness of the importance of the implementation of the Schengen acquis, hold Member States who persistently breach the common rules accountable, and increase pressure on them to remedy the deficiencies identified. Both institutions should be fully and equally informed of all developments in the implementation of the Schengen acquis in the Member States. The Commission should provide adequate input to facilitate these discussions including through the adoption of a comprehensive annual report covering the evaluations carried out during the previous year and state of implementation of recommendations, which would be part of the ‘State of Schengen’ report. The European Parliament is encouraged to adopt resolutions and the Council should adopt conclusions to increase pressure on Member States making insufficient progress. The ‘Schengen Forum’, as a unique stage to discuss Schengen at high level with representatives of the European Parliament, Member States and the Commission should provide a platform for informal discussions aiming at better implementation of the Schengen acquis.

(28)

The classification status of the evaluation and revisit reports should be determined in accordance with the applicable security rules set out in Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 (38) . The evaluated Member State should nevertheless retain the possibility to request the classification of all or parts of the report in accordance with the applicable security rules.

(28)

The classification status of the evaluation and revisit reports should be determined in accordance with the applicable security rules set out in Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 (38). The evaluated Member State should , in exceptional cases, nevertheless retain the possibility to request the classification of all or parts of the report in accordance with the applicable security rules.

(29)

In view of the particular role entrusted to the European Parliament and to the national parliaments under the last sentence of Article 70 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as underlined in Article 12, point (c), of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as regards the national parliaments, the Council and the Commission should fully inform the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the content and results of the evaluations. In addition, should the Commission submit a proposal to amend this Regulation, the Council would, in accordance with Article 19(7), point (h), of its Rules of Procedure (39) , consult the European Parliament in order to take into consideration its opinion, to the fullest extent possible, before adopting a final text.

(29)

In view of the particular role entrusted to the European Parliament and to the national parliaments under the last sentence of Article 70 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as underlined in Article 12, point (c), of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as regards the national parliaments, the Council and the Commission should fully inform the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the content and results of the evaluations no later than 14 days after the evaluation procedure has been concluded . In addition, should the Commission submit a proposal to amend this Regulation, the Council would, in accordance with Article 19(7), point (h), of its Rules of Procedure (39) , consult the European Parliament in order to take into consideration its opinion, to the fullest extent possible, before adopting a final text.

(d)

‘unannounced evaluation’ means an evaluation, which is not included in the multiannual and annual evaluation programmes, to verify the application of the Schengen acquis by one or more Member States in one or more policy fields;

(d)

‘unannounced evaluation’ means an evaluation, which is conducted without any prior notice and which is not included in the multiannual and annual evaluation programmes, to verify the application of the Schengen acquis by one or more Member States in one or more policy fields;

(fa)

‘short-notice visit’ means a visit, which is conducted with a maximum 24-hour advance notice and with the purpose of carrying out a random check of the implementation of the Schengen acquis by a Member State;

(i)

‘serious deficiency’ means one or more deficiencies which concern the effective application of key elements of the Schengen acquis and which individually or in combination , have, or risk to have over time, a significant negative impact on the rights of individuals or on the functioning of the Schengen area;

(i)

‘serious deficiency’ means one or more deficiencies which concern the effective application of the Schengen acquis , or part of it, including upholding the Charter, and which individually or in combination negatively impact or risk negatively impacting freedom of movement, the rights of individuals or the functioning of the Schengen area;

(k)

‘team’ means a group comprising experts designated by Member States and Commission representatives who carry out evaluations and monitoring activities.

(k)

‘team’ means a group comprising experts designated by Member States and Commission representatives and observers designated by relevant Union institutions, bodies or agencies, who carry out evaluations and monitoring activities.

(ka)

‘Union observer’ means an individual designated by a Union institution, body, office or agency as referred to in Article 7(1) participating in an evaluation or monitoring activity.

(c a)

evaluations conducted with short-notice;

(a)

to evaluate practices at internal borders;

(a)

to evaluate practices at internal borders , in particular where internal border controls have been in place for longer than 180 days and locations were there are evidence of fundamental rights violations.

(b)

when it becomes aware of emerging or systemic problems that could potentially have a significant negative impact on the functioning of the Schengen area;

(b)

when it becomes aware of emerging or existing problems that could potentially have a significant negative impact on the functioning of the Schengen area , including circumstances that could give rise to internal security threats.

(c)

when it has grounds to consider that a Member State is seriously neglecting its obligations under the Schengen acquis including allegations of serious fundamental rights violations at the external borders.

(c)

when it has grounds to consider that a Member State is neglecting its obligations under the Schengen acquis , in particular allegations of serious fundamental rights violations at the external borders.